University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
5-1982

The Rules Enabling Act of 1934
Stephen B. Burbank
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Common Law Commons, Courts Commons, Judges Commons,
Legal Commons, and the Legal History Commons

Repository Citation
Burbank, Stephen B., "The Rules Enabling Act of 1934" (1982). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1396.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1396

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

University of Pennsylvania
Law Review
FOUNDED 1852

Formerly
American Law Register
VOLUME

130

MAY,

No. 5

1982

THE RULES ENABLING ACT OF 1934
STEPHEN

B.

BURBANK t

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.

II.

1018

INTRODUCTION .....................................
THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS .......................

A. Sibbach ...................................
B. Two Lines of Authority Following Sibbach ........
C. Hanna .....................................
III.

1027
1028
1032
1033

THE ANTECEDENT PERIOD OF TRAVAIL.................1035

A. The Process Acts and the Conformity Act of 1872 ...

1036

1036
1. The Process Acts ............................
a. The Process Acts and Static Conformity ...... 1037
b. Failure to Adopt Code Procedure in Court
1038
R ules ....................................
2. The Conformity Act of 1872 and Dynamic Con1039
form ity .....................................
3. The Conformity Act: Early Agitation for Reform 1040
a. Problems Arising from the Persistence of Fed1040
eral Procedure ............................
b. Lack of Uniformity: The Predicament of Multi1042
State Federal Practitioners ..................
B. The ABA and the Quest for Uniform Federal Pro1043
cedure in the Nineteenth Century ................
1045
C. The Reform Movement Matures .................
1. Roscoe Pound and the ABA Committee of Fifteen 1045
0 Copyright 1982 by Stephen B. Burbank.
f Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.

A.B. 1968, J.D. 1973,

Harvard University.
Frederick Stein, class of 1981, and Frank Perch, class of 1983, provided excellent research assistance.
I thank my colleagues in the University of Pennsylvania Legal Studies Seminar

for their comments on an early draft of this article. I am also indebted to Frank
Goodman, George Haskins, Virginia Kerr, Leo Levin, Louis Pollak, Louis Schwartz,
and Alan Watson for reading and discussing with me subsequent drafts.

Geoffrey

Hazard was unfailingly generous with his time and tried to preserve me from errors.
I am sure that he was not wholly successful.
This article is for my father.
(1015)

1016

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 130:1015

2. The Origins of the ABA Committee on Uniform
1048
Judicial Procedure ...........................
D. The ABA Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure
and the Uniform Federal Procedure Bill: 1912-1921 1050
1050
1. The Clayton Bill ............................
2. Borrowings from the New York Reform Movement 1055
1056
a. The 1912 New York Report ................
1059
b. The 1915 New York Report ................
1061
c. The 1915 Senate Hearings ..................
3. Senator Walsh Opposes the Uniform Federal Procedure Bill .................................. 1063
4. Clarification and Change in the ABA Plan and the
Uniform Federal Procedure Bill: The Sutherland
1065
Bill ........................................
1069
E. The Critical Years: 1922-1930 ....................
1. The 1922 House and Senate Hearings on the
1069
Sutherland Bill ............................
2. Chief Justice Taft Proposes Merged Law and
Equity Procedure ............................

3. Senator Cummins and Chief Justice Taft Rewrite
the Uniform Federal Procedure Bill ............
4. The Cummins Bill, 1924-1926 .................
5. The 1926 Senate Report: The Cummins Bill's
Limitations on Rulemaking Are Defined ........
6. The Cummins Bill, 1926-1930: Changes in the
Character of the Debate ......................
a. Questioning the Proper Allocation Between
Court Rules and Legislation ................
b. Questioning the Interchangeability of State and
Federal M odels ...........................
7. The 1928 Senate Report: From Dissent to Majority
R eport .....................................
F. Defeat and Victory: 1931-1934 ....................
1. The Lean Years: 1931-1933 ...................
2. Homer Cummings and Passage of the Act .......
IV.

THE RULES ENABLING ACT REINTERPRETED IN LIGHT OF
THE PRE-1934 HISTORY ..............................

1069

1071
1077
1083
1089
1090
1091
1092
1094
1094
1095
1098

A. The Interpretive Value of the Act's Antecedent
1098
Period of Travail ...............................
1. Relevance ....................................

a. The Pre-1934 Materials ....................
b. The Post-1934 Developments ...............
2. Weight .....................................
B. The Purpose of the Procedure/SubstanceDichotomy
1. Allocation of Lawmaking Power Between the
Supreme Court as Rulemaker and Congress ......
2. The Act's Second Sentence is Surplusage ........
3. Federalism ..................................
C. Standards of Allocation .........................

1098

1098
1101
1104
1106
1106
1107
1108
1113

THE RULES ENABLING ACT

1. The Relationship Between the Act and Constitutional Limitations on Court Rulemaking ........
a. The Constitutional Context .................
b. Constitutional Doctrine and the Campaign for
the Uniform Federal Procedure Bill .........
c. The Cummins Bill ........................
2. Procedure or Substantive Rights ...............
a. General Guidance .........................
b. The Substantive Rights that are Relevant Under
the A ct ..................................
c. Problems Arising from Use of the State Models:
The Protection of State Law ................
d. Refining the Standards of Allocation .........
V.

EXPERIENCE UNDER THE ACT ........................

1017

1114
1115
1117
1118
1121
1121
1122
1125
1127

1131

A. The OriginalAdvisory Committee's Approach to the
Procedure/SubstanceDichotomy: In General ....... 1132
B. Specific Problems of Power Noted by the Original
Advisory Committee or Resulting from its Approach 1137
1137
1. Evidence ....................................
2. Registration of Judgments ....................
1144
1145
3. Provisional and Final Remedies ...............
1147
4. The Incorporation Principle ..................
a. The Incorporation Principle and Derivative
1149
Suits: Cohen ..............................
b. The Incorporation Principle in Federal Ques1153
tion Cases ................................
c. The IncorporationPrinciple in Diversity Cases:
1154
Cohen Revisited ...........................
d. The Incorporation Principle and Federal
1155
Statutes ..................................
5. Tolling Statutes of Limitations and the Problem
1158
of Reverse Incorporation .....................
C. Specific Problems of Power That Were Not Noted by
the Original Advisory Committee: Hanna and Sib1164
bach Revisited .................................
1164
1. Service of Process: Hanna .....................
a. A Special Problem of Incorporation: The
1165
Supreme Court's Equity Rules ..............
b. Rule 4(dXl) and the Substantive Rights That
1168
Are Relevant Under the Act ................
c. The Pre-1934 History Provides Specific Guidance ..................................... 1171
d. The Real Problem in Hanna ............... 1173
2. Physical and Mental Examinations: Sibbach ..... 1176
1178
a. The Legislative History of the Rules .........
1179
b. Sibbach's Arguments .......................
1181
c. Rule 37: A Two-Edged Sword ...............
d. Rules 35 and 37 Analyzed in Light of the Pre1183
1934 H istory ..............................
VI. CONCLUSION ....................................... 1185

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

1018

[Vol. 130:1015

"It defies death." 1
"Once legislation is eventually enacted, the antecedent period of travail is usually relegated to
oblivion."

2

I.

INTRODUCTION

This is a difficult time for those involved in making rules of
procedure for the federal courts.3 The long-enduring pattern of
congressional acquiescence in Federal Rules was broken in response
to the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence in 1973 and has not
been reestablished.4 Although proposed amendments to the Fed1 S. REP. No. 1174, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1926) (minority views of Senator
Walsh); S. REP. No. 440, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1928).
2
Jaffin, Federal Procedural Revision, 21 VA. L. Rv. 504, 504 (1935).
"But
oblivion overtakes the past." Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation
of Powers, 37 HARv. L. REv. 1010, 1029 (1924).

3There are numerous terminological traps in the use of the words "rule" and
See, e.g., J. WEmnsT'rn, REFort OF CoURT RuLE-MA=tNG PRo-

"rulemaking."

155 n.2 (1977); Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HAnv. L. REv.
693, 697 n.31 (1974). This article will follow Professor Ely in using the unmodified
words "Federal Rule" to mean "a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or other Rule
promulgated pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act for use in all federal district courts
....Id.
The current version of the Enabling Act is contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1976), which provides:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules,
the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and
procedure of the district courts and courts of appeals of the United States
in civil actions, including admiralty and maritime cases, and appeals therein,
and the practice and procedure in proceedings for the review by the courts
of appeals of decisions of the Tax Court of the United States and for the
judicial review or enforcement of orders of administrative agencies, boards,
commissions, and officers.
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right
and shall preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as
declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution.
Such rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress by the Chief Justice at or after the beginning of a regular session
thereof but not later than the first day of May, and until the expiration
of ninety days after they have been thus reported.
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or
effect after such rules have taken effect. Nothing in this title, anything
therein to the contrary notwithstanding, shall in any way limit, supersede,
or repeal any such rules heretofore prescribed by the Supreme Court.
CEDURES

4 E.g., Martin, Inherent Judicial Power: Flexibility Congress Did Not Write into
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 TEx. L. REv. 167, 167-68 n.2 (1979); Wright,
Book Review, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 652, 652-53 (1978). Within six years, postponing
the effective date of proposed amendments to Federal Rules had become "not a
novel procedure." 125 CONG. REc. H6376 (daily ed. July 23, 1979) (statement of

Rep. Drinan).
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eral Rules of Civil Procedure have become effective without congressional interference since two of our most distinguished proceduralists opined that federal rulemaking was "in serious
trouble" r and "in very deep trouble," 1 the event gives the rulemakers little cause for celebration. Some of the proposed amendments were the subject of a dissent by three members of the
Supreme Court, not protesting, as often in the past, against overreaching7 but against under-reaching.8 Withal, the heads of a
key congressional committee and sub-committee were moved to
send letters, subsequently distributed to the entire federal judiciary,
recording various understandings of, and continuing interest in,
one of the amendments. 9 Moreover, the Civil Rules amendments
5 Wright, supra note 4, at 652.
1 Proceedings of a Session of the Conference of Metropolitan District Chief
Judges on Rules and Rule Making, 79 F.R.D. 471, 491-92 (1978) (remarks of
Professor Miller).
7
See, e.g., 368 U.S. 1012 (1961) (statements of Black and Douglas, J.J.); 374
U.S. 865 (1963) (statement of Black and Douglas, J.J.); 383 U.S. 1032 (1966)
(Black, J., dissenting); 383 U.S. 1089 (1966) (Douglas, J.,dissenting in part); 409
U.S. 1132 (1972) (Douglas, J.,dissenting).
8 "1 reiterate that I do not dissent because the modest amendments recommended by the Judicial Conference are undesirable. I simply believe that Congress'
acceptance of these tinkering changes will delay for years the adoption of genuinely
effective reforms." 446 U.S. 997, 1000 (1980) (dissenting statement of Powell, J.,
joined by Stewart and Rehnquist, J.J.). Justice PowelRs dissent is criticized in
Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CAL. L. REv. 806 (1981). Professor Rosenberg
has a different view. See Rosenberg, Foreword, 69 CAL. L. REv. 647, 648 (1981).
The "complacency" and "inertia" feared .by the Justice as a consequence of congressional inaction on the 1980 discovery amendments, 446 U.S. at 1000, have not
hindered the work of the Advisory Committee. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 90 F.R.D. 451 (1981) (proposed amendments to Rules 6, 7, 11, 16, 26, 52, 53, and 67 and proposed Rules 7276). For commentary, see Schroeder & Frank, Discovery Reform: Long Road to
Nowheresville, 68 A.B.A. J.572 (1982).
Even more recently, Congress has delayed the effective date of proposed amendments to Rule 4. See Act of Aug. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-227, 96 Stat. 246.
9 See letter from Representative Robert F. Drinan to Joseph F. Spaniol, Deputy
Director of the Administrative Offlce of the United States Courts (June 24, 1980)
(copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review); letter from Senator
Edward M. Kennedy to William E. Foley, Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts (July 29, 1980) (copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). Both letters concerned amended Rule 5(d) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and were evidently intended to encourage care by federal
district judges in waiving the filing requirement for discovery materials. See also
letter from William E. Foley to Senator Edward M. Kennedy (August 26, 1980)
(copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (responding to
Kennedy's letter of July 29, 1980). In response to Senator Kennedy's request on
behalf of the Senate Judiciary Committee, these letters were forwarded to all federal
judges and magistrates, as well as to circuit executives and clerks of courts and
divisional offices. Memorandum from Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr. (August 26, 1980)
(copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
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were not the only proposed rules of court before Congress during
this time. Others had not fared as well,'0 prompting Senator Kennedy to call for a reexamination of "the whole issue of Federal
judicial rulemaking."11
The imbroglio over the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence
gave birth to a small body of literature, 2 since nourished by the3
continuing difficulties of federal court rulemaking and by itself,'
analyzing systemic sources of those difficulties and prescribing or
denigrating reforms. -In addition, legislators have already put
their visions of reform in proposed legislation.' 4 The rulemakers
have not been idle in the face of this criticism from the Congress
and the profession. Even before Senator Kennedy suggested reexamination of federal court rulemaking, Chief Justice Burger
acknowledged that "the subject is important enough to merit a
fresh look." 15 In response to his request, the Federal Judicial
Center undertook a study, focusing "on those aspects of the process
-1 On April 30, 1979, the Court submitted to Congress amendments to the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
Rules Governing Proceedings in the United States District Courts under sections
2254 and 2255 of title 28, United States Code (the habeas rules), and an amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendments to the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure and to the habeas rules went into effect, as scheduled, on
August 1, 1979. Some of the amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were also permitted to take effect after ninety days. However, Congress deferred the effectiveness, until December 1, 1980, of proposed amendments to a
number of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and of the proposed amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 410. Act of July 31, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-42,
93 Stat. 326. The latter Rules went into effect on December 1, 1980, not, however,
without a fight. See 126 CoNre. REc. H8544-45 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1980); id.
H8425-29 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1980).

"3-125 CONG. REc. S10,460 (daily ed. July 24, 1979). In 1975, Congressman
Hungate observed: "Perhaps the time is ripe for Congress to re-examine the process
to determine whether or not the Rules Enabling Acts ought to be amended." Hungate, Changes in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 61 A.B.A. J. 1203, 1207
(1975); see also S. REP. No. 1406, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1966).
'2See, e.g., J. WEINsTEIN, supra note 3; Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power
of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 673 (1975);
Lesnick, The Federal Rule Making Process: A Time for Re-examination, 61 A.B.A.
J. 579 (1975).
13 See, e.g., Clinton, Rule 9 of the Federal Habeas Corpus Rules: A Case Study
on the Need for Reform of the Rules Enabling Acts, 63 IowA L. REv. 15 (1977);
Hazard, Book Review, 87 YALE L.J. 1284 (1978); Oakes, Book Review, 78 CoLumv.
L. Ruv. 205 (1978); Wright, Book Review, supra note 4.
14 See, e.g., H.R. 481, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (introduced by Rep. Holtzman); H.R. 480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (same); see also W. BRowN, FEDERAL RuIEMrA.N-c: PoBLEN.s Arm Possmnrr.s 49-50 (1981).

:1 Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, American Bar Association Midyear Meeting 6 (Feb. 11, 1979).
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that had been singled out for criticism and that might benefit from
change." 10 Completed in June 1981, the study reveals that steps
have already been taken to respond to problems previously identified and that other changes are under consideration. 17
As the Federal Judicial Center study observes, "[m]ost recent
analyses are less concerned with the source, or even the location,
of the [rulemaking] power than with the nature of the process
itself." 18 The observed inattention to questions of power extends
to the statutory limitations imposed by Congress on federal court
rulemaking,19 even though logic would suggest an analysis of those
limitations as the starting point for one interested in reform. The
16 Levin, Foreword to W. Bnow', supra note 14, at vii; see id. vi. Chief
Justice Burger has since described the study as follows: "That study, though not
intended to be a complete examination of the process, provides policy makers with,
among other things, a cogent analysis of the salient arguments for and against reducing the level of Supreme Court involvement in the rulemaking process. The
study takes a fresh look at many of the past problems encountered in this area and
deals mainly with various objections to the procedures." Burger, Year-End Report
on the Judiciary 23 (December 28, 1980).
17W. BRowN, 'upra note 14, at 36; see, e.g., id. 19-21, 125-26 (hearings held
by Civil Rules Committee); id. 27-30, 126-28 ("gap" reports explaining changes in
drafts); id. 27, 128-29 (availability of documents submitted by advisory committees
to the Judicial Conference); id. 28 (preparation of statement of procedures followed
for 1980 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). In his 1981 YearEnd Report on the Judiciary, the Chief Justice announced that a "formal statement
describing rulemaking procedures" was being prepared by the Standing Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference and would be considered at the March 1982 meeting of the Judicial Conference. Burger, supra note
16, at 22.
18 W. BRoWN, supra note 14, at 39; see also Schwartz, The Other Things That
Courts Do, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 438, 460 (1981).
19 For many years most commentators have regarded as "purely academic"
whether the Supreme Court has inherent power to promulgate rules of procedure
for the lower federal courts in contravention of statutes. Degnan, The Feasibility
of Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts, 24 F.R.D. 341, 342 (1959); see also
J. WFANsIn~, supra note 3, at 5, 48, 90; Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rule-Making: An Appraisal of Winberry -0. Salisbury, 65 Hav. L.
RBv. 234, 241 n.32, 251 (1951); Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control over
Judicial Rulemaking: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
3-4 (1958); Williams, The Source of Authority for Rules of Court Affecting Procedure, 22 WAsH. U. L.Q. 459, 486-94, 500-06 (1937). As summarized in the
Federal Judicial Center study: "It is now generally agreed that the power to make
rules for lower federal courts has been delegated to the Supreme Court by Congress,
and that Congress may withdraw or modify that power." W. BnowN, supra note
14, at 39.
The confrontation over the Federal Rules of Evidence rekindled interest in the
question of rulemaking power. Unfortunately, some commentators have ignored the
earlier literature and hence have neglected arguments and distinctions that made
their tasks considerably more difficult. See, e.g., Note, The Proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence: Of Privileges and the Division of Rule-Making Power, 76 MicH. L.
REv. 1177 (1978).
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matter has been discussed. 20 Too often, however, the question of
statutory authority has been rendered moot. Even in the literature
specific to the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, the arguments
at times anticipated Congress's action by obscuring the distinction
between power and prudence in court rulemaking. 21 Alternatively,
they proceeded from a view of the question of statutory authority
as settled 22 or in any event as subsidiary in interest to "the Erie
problem." 23 Commentators who have ventured to take questions
of statutory authority and precedent head-on have an air, occa2
sionally self-conscious, of crying in the wilderness.
There are obvious reasons for this reluctance to clutter process
with doctrine. The state of doctrine concerning the legality of
Federal Rules, for many years hopelessly confused, 25 has appeared
26
at least to those who
simply hopeless since Hanna v. Plumer,
27
have sought major reforms.
For one more sanguine about the
20

See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 13, at 56-77; Wright, supra note 4, at 653-54;
GA. L. REV. 563,
568-74 (1967) (limitations on procedural reform).
21
See, e.g., Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen
of Federal Rules of Evidence, 69 CoLum. L. REv. 353 (1969). The Act of March
30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9, providing that the proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence "shall have no force or effect except to the extent, and with such
amendments, as they may be expressly approved by Act of Congress," rendered
moot any question about the Court's power to prescribe rules of evidence under the
Rules Enabling Act.
22
This phenomenon received encouragement from the Supreme Court's decision in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). Compare Degnan, The Law of
Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HAnv. L. REv. 275, 283-87 (1962) with Green, Drafting Uniform Federal Rules of Evidence, 52 CoRNrr. L. REv. 177, 204 (1967).
But see, e.g., Goldberg, The Supreme Court, Congress, and the Rules of Evidence,
5 SETON HAmL L. REv. 667, 677-79 (1974); Note, Separation of Powers and the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 26 1-AsTmIs L.J. 1059, 1069-73 (1975).
23 This was true both before and after Hanna. See, e.g., Degnan, supra note
22, at 287-301; Kor, Continuing Effect of State Rules of Evidence in the Federal
Courts, 48 F.R.D. 65 (1969); Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the "Fact" Approach
to Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 MicH. L.
REv. 613, 702-48 (1967); see also Landers, The New Bankruptcy Rules: Relies of
the Past as Fixtures of the Future, 57 MnaN. L. REv. 827, 831-32 & n.14 (1973).
2
4 See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 13, at 55-76. Others have not been selfconscious. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
2z See, e.g., Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U. L. Rzv.
427, 428-37 (1958); Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play on the Federal
Rules, 3 VAND. L. REv. 711 (1950); Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: "Substance" and "Procedure" after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 34 ILL. L. REv. 271
(1939).
26380 U.S. 460 (1965) (holding that FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1) is valid and
governs service of process on an individual in a diversity action).
27
For the most common attitude about the effects of that decision, see Cleary,
The Plan for the Adoption of Rules of Evidence for United States District Courts,
25 RF-c. A.B. Crry N.Y. 142, 145-46 (1970); Green, supra note 22; Landers, supra
note 23, at 831-33; Miller, supra note 23, at 738-48.

cf. Wright, Procedural Reform: Its Limitations and Its Future, 1
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allocation of lawmaking power under the existing system, there
have been other reasons to consider changes "within the framework of the existing enabling act." 28
Nonetheless, since the Supreme Court first adjudicated a challenge to the validity of a Federal Rule in Sibbach v. Wilson &
Co., 20 a number of commentators have suggested that the Court's

interpretation of its rulemaking authority in that case, unrepudiated to date, 30 was broader than Congress intended. 31 In an important article published in 1974,32 Professor (now Dean) Ely asserted that the Court has fundamentally misapprehended the
limitations imposed by its basic rulemaking charter, the Rules
Enabling Act of 1934.33 If that proposition were to be demonstrated, 34 rather than merely asserted or assumed, it might suggest
changes in the character of the reform debate.
It is common knowledge that the 1934 legislative record of
the Rules Enabling Act is so abbreviated as to yield little of use
in the search for statutory meaning.3 5 It was common knowledge
28

Proceedings of a Session of the Conference of Metropolitan District Chief
judges on Rules and Rulemaking, supra note 6, at 483 (remarks of Judge Charles
Joiner).
29 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (upholding FED. R. Civ. P. 35, which authorizes physical
and mental examinations of parties).
3
oWhatever one thinks of Professor Ely's interpretation of the Rules Enabling
Act, see Ely, supra note 3, at 718-40, the notion that it "appears to reflect the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Hanna v. Plumer," Westen & Lehman, Is There Life
for Erie after the Death of Diversity?, 78 MiCH. L. REv. 311, 362 (1980) (footnote
omitted), will come as a surprise to many, including Professor Ely. See Ely, supra
note 3, at 720. However, the authors of that suggestion deprive it of any operational significance, and part company with Professor Ely, by embracing a "statutory
presumption of validity" and hence the status quo. Westen & Lehman, supra, at 364.
31 See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 13, at 56-64; Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail
and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure
Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. BEv. 842, 849-61 (1974); see also Lesnick, supra note 12,
at 583.
3
2 Ely, supra note 3, at 718-40.
33 Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064. The text of the
1934 Act is set forth infra text accompanying note 375. For the present version,
see supra note 3. For the history of amendments, see infra text accompanying
notes 399-404.
34 This is something Professor Ely does not do. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 3, at
719, 721 n.152, 724 n.170. For a similar technique at the constitutional level, see
Landers, supra note 31, at 855-57.
W

35 See, e.g., P. BATOR, P. M&smxN, D. SirApmo & H. WECHSLER, HART AND
'cHsrEn's
TnE FEDERAL CouaRTs AND TH FE:DERAL SYsTEm 674 (2d ed. 1973)

[hereinafter cited as HAnT & WEcurran]; Clinton, supra note 13, at 54 n.243, 55,
64; Ely, supra note 3, at 721 n.152; Note, Congressional Discretion in Dealing with
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 798, 800 (1973). The record
consists of very brief reports, see S. REP. No. 1049, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934);
H.R. REP. No. 1829, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), and floor remarks, see 78 CoNe.
REc. 9362-63 (1934) (Senate); id. 10,866 (House). See also infra text accompanying notes 366-73.
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at the time the Rules Enabling Act was passed that it represented
the conclusion of a campaign, conducted for more than twenty
years by the American Bar Association, for a uniform federal procedure bill authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
of procedure in civil actions at law.3 6 It was also well known
that during the campaign various incarnations of the bill that became the Act (including, as of 1924, bills essentially identical to
the Act) were given thorough consideration by committees of
Congress.37
Whether in 1934 or more recently, those seeking to interpret
the Rules Enabling Act have, with rare exception, wholly ignored
its long and once well-known history. In seeking explanations of
what appears to be a remarkable feat of abnegation, one is reminded that attitudes towards statutory interpretation, and in
particular towards the use of history in aid of interpretation, have
not always been as expansive as they are today. 38 Moreover, for
most law reformers and scholars in recent years, the failure to
examine the history of the Act can be explained. Scholars and
law reformers both need to set priorities on original investigation.
Over time, one person's neglect becomes another's ignorance. Still,
there remain some, working in early years and more recently,
whose failure to confront the history of the Act, or to do so fully
and fairly, is less easily explained.
This article is an attempt to rescue the antecedent period
of travail of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 from the oblivion
36

"To rehearse now the long struggle culminating in the passage of these recent

additions to the Judicial Code would seem unnecessary; especially so since the prenatal history of these statutes has been rather fully documented, and, moreover, is
conveniently preserved in Congressional hearings, reports and debates, in publications of the American Bar Association, and also in legal periodical literature." Jaffin,
supra note 2, at 504; see also, e.g., Clark, The Challenge of a New Federal Civil

Procedure, 20 CoRNELL L. REv. 443, 446-47 (1935); Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure: L The Background, 44 YALE L.J. 387, 388-89 (1935); Congress Strengthens the Machinery of Justice, 20 A.B.A. J. 422 (1934); Cummings,
The New Law Relating to Federal Procedure, 2 U.S.L.W. 2 (1934); Ohlinger,
Questions Raised by the Report of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Pro-

cedure for the District Courts of the United States, 11 U. CQN. L. Rev. 445, 478-80
(1937); Sunderland, The Grant of Rulemaking Power to the Supreme Court of the
United States, 32 Mrcu. L. REv. 1116, 1116-20 (1934); Wickes, The New RuleMaking Power of the United States Supreme Court, 13 Tvx. L. lRv. 1, 8-10 (1934).
3

7 See, e.g., Clark & Moore, supra note 36, at 394 & n.30, 411 n.114; Cummings, supra note 36; Ohlinger, supra note 36, at 468-80; Sunderland, supra note

36, at 1118 & n.10.
38
Compare Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HAnv. L. Rev. 863, 865 (1930)
with Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HAv.L.

tev. 886, 888

(1930). See also H. FannDLY, BENcmsfAnxs 212-19 (1967); Note, Intent, Clear
Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court,
95 HAnv. L. Rev. 892, 892-98 (1982).
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to which it has been consigned. As background for that endeavor,
I review briefly the Supreme Court decisions that have interpreted
the Act.39 I then consider the events and ideas that, and the
individuals who, in an informed account, must be considered links
in the causal chain that ends in passage of the Act.40 Since there
is no such account available, 41 since ignorance, misunderstanding
or distortion of the historical record has plagued the treatment of
the Act in the literature from the beginning, and since the research
for this article has unearthed material that may be of interest quite
apart from its bearing on the interpretation of the Act, the story
is rather fully told.
If one accepts the view of interpretive relevance posited
here, 42 the evidence of history is, in many respects, compelling,
illuminating issues that should be, those that have been, and those
that are, of interest in the reform debate.
The historical evidence compels the view that the limitations
imposed by the famous first two sentences of the Act[T]he Supreme Court of the United States shall have the
power to prescribe by general rules . . . the forms of
process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice
and procedure in civil actions at law. Said rules shall
neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive
rights of any litigant.were intended to allocate power between the Supreme Court as
rulemaker and Congress and thus to circumscribe the delegation
of legislative power, that they were thought to be equally relevant
in all actions brought in federal court, and that the protection of
state law was deemed a probable effect, rather than the primary
89 See infra text accompanying notes 54-82.
40 See infra text accompanying notes 83-375.
41
The Act has fared somewhat, but not much, better when the purpose of the
writer has been general historical background rather than interpretation. See sources
cited supra note 36. See also C. CLArK, HAmBooK OF T
LAw OF CoDE PLEADnGc § 9 (2d ed. 1947); P. Fis, THE Ponmcs OF FEDERAL JuicLAL ADmqINSTnAToN
17-24 (1973); 1B J. MooRE & T. CuRmR=, Moonxs FnmuxL PRAcnTcE ff0.501 (2d
ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as MOoRE]; 4 C. Wrinxr & A. MIL.E, FEananAL
PRACnCE AND PROCEDURE § 1003 (1969) [hereinafter cited as WRiGr & MrER];
Chandler, Some Major Advances in the Federal Judicial System, 31 F.R.D. 307,
479-85 (1963); Clark, Power of the Supreme Court to Make Rules of Appellate
Procedure, 49 -Anv. L. BRE. 1303, 1303-05 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Clark,
Supreme Court Power]; Clark, The Influence of Federal Procedural Reform, 13
Lw & CONTFNMP. PROBS. 144, 146-48 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Clark, Procedural
Reform]; Supreme Court Adopts Rules for Civil Procedurein Federal District Courts,
24 A.B.A. J. 97 (1938).
42 See infra text accompanying notes 376-408.
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purpose, of the allocation scheme established by the Act. 43 In this

aspect the history starkly contradicts the notion, shared by the
Supreme Court and many commentators, that the basic purpose
of the Act's procedure/substance dichotomy is to allocate lawmaking power between the federal government and the states. 44
In addition, the history reveals that, knowingly or unknowingly, Congress was faithful to the original understanding in its
1973 decision to take responsibility for the Federal Rules of Evidence. The same materials, however, also provide support for
Congress's decision to permit court rulemaking with respect to
45
much of the field of evidence in the future.
Finally, the history reveals that the decision to make court
rules supersede inconsistent statutes was made in 1914, not 1934,
and why, 46 and that in 1923 Chief Justice Taft wrote the second
section of the bill that became the Act, inserting the provision
requiring submission of proposed court rules to Congress for political reasons. 47 These are two among many matters of current
interest in the reform debate about which original investigation
permits us to substitute facts for speculation.
Of course, the history is not a Baedeker.48 It cannot guide
one with confidence through the maze of problems of validity
that has vexed the Advisory Committee, practicing lawyers, and
the courts since the Act was passed. Nonetheless, I attempt to
identify standards that those who shaped the legislation suggested
for allocating matters between the Court as rulemaker and Congress. The standards I derive from the pre-1934 history are significantly different from both those announced by the Supreme
Court and those suggested by Professor Ely and his followers.
They are standards that are consistent with the basic purpose of
the procedure/substance dichotomy to allocate lawmaking power
between federal institutions. Because of their origins in state law
models, however, they pose substantial theoretical and practical
problems in a federal system. Moreover, without refinement, they
threaten the usefulness of the entire court-rulemaking enterprise.
There is evidence of such refinement in the pre-1934 history of the
bill that became the Act, although, as might be expected, many of
43

See
See
45 See
46 See
44

infra text accompanying notes 415-47.
infra text accompanying notes 55-82.
infra notes 516-18 and accompanying text; 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976).
infra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.

47 See infra text accompanying note 265 and infra note 268.
4 But see T. ELIoT, "Burbank with a Baedeker: Bleistein with a Cigar," in
SELcTED PoEms oF

T.S. ELIOT 34 (1964).
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the difficulties apparent in the effort to allocate power were not
49
resolved.
Having offered a general reinterpretation of the Act in light
of the pre-1934 history, I turn to the implications of the new interpretation.5 0 For this purpose, I take as my text the work of
the original Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the decisions
of the Court. As useful as this enterprise may be for an assessment of the fidelity of the rulemakers to the statute's meaning,
it is revealing even if one does not accept the interpretive relevance
of the pre-1934 history or the standards derived here from that
history. For review of the work of the original Advisory Committee establishes that it proceeded without a coherent or consistent view of the limitations imposed by the Act's procedure/
substance dichotomy and that the Committee therefore resolved
perceived problems of power on an ad hoc basis. 51 Moreover, it
demonstrates that the Committee espoused at least one principle
of rulemaking that calls specifically into question-as the Committee's approach in general calls into question-the presumption
of validity of Federal Rules that has been central to the Court's
52
interpretation of the Act.
An effort of this sort is, at best, a source of new approaches
in the reform debate. In the concluding section, I offer some
tentative views on the adequacy of the Rules Enabling Act of
1934, reinterpreted in the light of its history, for the needs of the
nation today. I also make a proposal that, in combination with
procedural reforms that are underway, may help to achieve, without congressional intervention, a rational allocation of lawmaking
power between the Supreme Court and Congress. 53
II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The current debate about federal court rulemaking is in part
a result of the perceived inadequacy of the limitations in the Rules
Enabling Act as they have been interpreted by the Supreme Court.
That debate might have commenced earlier had the Court not,
from the beginning and for many years, conflated analysis under
the Act and analysis under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 54 and
49 See infra text accompanying notes 483-524.
50

See
See
52
See
53
See
51

infra text
infra text
infra text
infra text

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

54304 U.S. 64 (1938).

notes
notes
notes
notes

525-731.
528-43.
577-610.
732-83.
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its progeny and limited the reach of certain Federal Rules on an
ad hoc basis. Debate became inevitable when the Court finally
parsed those problems, effectively insulating Federal Rules from
Erie jurisprudence, but failed to reconsider its interpretation of
the Act. Those seeking solutions to the rulemaking crisis in doctrine rather than process have, by and large, accepted the Court's
original and enduring view that the Act's procedure/substance
dichotomy was intended to allocate lawmaking power between the
federal government and the states.
Since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective
in 1938, the Supreme Court has considered the limits on its rulemaking authority under the Rules Enabling Act in a number of
cases.55 In none of them has it made reference to the Act's 1934
legislative history,5 6 and in none has it suggested the relevance
of the pre-1934 legislative history, let alone of the Act's antecedent
period of travail more generally.
A. Sibbach
In Sibbach v. Wilson 6 Co.,57 the Court rejected a challenge
to the validity of Rule 35 by the plaintiff in a personal injury case
who had been ordered to submit to a physical examination. Sibbach is a marvelous vehicle for developing skepticism in law students. Viewed as an exercise in statutory interpretation, the
decision is even more remarkable.
According to the Court in Sibbach, the first sentence of the
Act delegates to the Court Congress's "undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts," drawing the
line at substantive law because Congress
has never essayed to declare the substantive state law, or
to abolish or nullify a right recognized by the substantive
law of the state where the cause of action arose, save
55 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (Rule 35 as applied to a plain-

tiff); Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946) (Rule 4(f));
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956) and Cold Metal Process Co.
v. United Eng'g & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445 (1956) (Rule 54(b)); Schlagenhauf

v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964) (Rule 35 as applied to a defendant); Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (Rule 4(d)(1)); cf. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S.
109 (1943) (Rule 8(c)); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S.
530 (1949) (Rule 3); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)
(Rule 23(b)); Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102
(1968) (Rule 19(b)); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (Rule 23); Walker

v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980) (Rule 3).
56 But af. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 162 (1973) (local Rule).
57312 U.S. 1 (1941). This case is discussed further infra text accompanying
notes 689-731.
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where a right or duty is imposed in a field committed
to Congress by the Constitution. On the contrary it has
enacted that the state law shall be the rule of decision in
the federal courts.58
The second sentence emphasizes the limits of the delegation. A
Federal Rule regulating matters properly characterized as procedural is valid. A Federal Rule regulating matters properly
characterized as substantive law is invalid, 9 and the Rules of Decision Act, directing the application of state law, applies. 60
58312 U.S. at 9-10 (footnote omitted). See also id. 11, where, in discussing
Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891), the Court observed: "Thus
the matter is treated as one of procedure, for Congress has not, if it could, declared
by statute the substantive law of a state." For the possible origins of these formulations, see A. MAsoN, HALAN FisKE SToNE: Pr.LAR OF TnE L.w 480-81 n.f

(1956).

59Note that the Court's opinion left open the possibility that a Federal Rule
might be declared invalid because of its effect or impact on rights claimed under
the substantive law, at least if the Rule were found effectively "to abolish or nulli"
such a right. 312 U.S. at 10. The focus of the Court's concern, however, was solely
on state substantive law. And, in suggesting that a question of validity be resolved
by a choice in favor of a procedural characterization whenever that is supported by
reference to one dimension of a Rule's effects, see id. 10 (the second sentence
directs "that the court shall not 'abridge, enlarge, nor modify substantive rights,' in
the guise of regulating procedure"); id. 14 (does the "rule really regulate procedure?"), the Court provided ample means to evade any such limitation. See also
infra note 71.
60 See 312 U.S. at 10-11. The Rules of Decision Act is codified at 28 U.S.C.

§1652 (1976).
The link between the constitutional and statutory allocation of federal and state
power and the scope of the delegation in the Rules Enabling Act is made clear in
the paragraph immediately following that suggesting limits on congressional power,
which is quoted supra text accompanying note 58. That paragraph begins: "Hence
we conclude that the Act of June 19, 1934, was purposely restricted in its operation
to matters of pleading and court practice and procedure. Its two provisos or caveats
emphasize this restriction." Id. 10 (emphasis added). The structure of the Court's
argument here seems to have been borrowed from the Brief for the Respondent in
Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6-7. Justice Frankfurter did
not share the Court's misapprehension. See 312 U.S. at 19 ("But Rule 35 applies
to all civil litigation in the federal courts, and thus concerns the enforcement of
federal rights and not merely of state law in the federal courts.").
The Court's mention of § 2's enjoinder to preserve the constitutional right to
jury trial as a "proviso" or "caveat" emphasizing "this restriction" suggests that the
Court interpreted the Act's first sentence as itself importing a limitation on rulemaking with respect to constitutional rights. In fact, such may have been Congress's
intent. See infra text accompanying notes 488, 497, 515 & 757-60. "ITlhis restriction," however, should perhaps be interpreted to include reference to the assertion,
in the preceding paragraph, of Congress's power to regulate federal practice and
procedure "by delegating to this or other federal courts authority to make rules not
inconsistent with the statutes or constitution of the United States." 312 U.S. at
9-10. The Court went on to note that there are "other limitations upon the authority to prescribe rules which might have been, but were not mentioned in the
Act; for instance, the inability of a court, by rule, to extend or restrict the jurisdiction conferred by a statute." Id. 10 (footnote omitted).
Professor Landers has argued that Sibbach's reference to "other limitations"
and Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), remove "any implication from Hanna
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Having stated that premise, although not any reasons for it,
the Court turned to Mrs. Sibbach's argument, which it had in
effect already rejected. She argued that Rule 35, authorizing
physical and mental examinations of parties, was invalid, not because it was a rule of substantive law, but because it abridged her
substantive rights and therefore ran afoul of the Act's second
sentence.6 ' The Court's response 62 was the suggestion that a third
category of rights of the sort Mrs. Sibbach advocated was impossible to formulate by reference to state law or other sources and
that the full extent of Congress' legislative power derived from article m and the
necessary and proper clause has been delegated for judicial rule-making." Landers,
supra note 31, at 854. It is not clear that this is a fair reading of Hanna. See
infra note 80 and accompanying text. But the pre-1934 history of the Act indicates
that the conclusion is correct. See infra text accompanying notes 415-47. It appears, however, that the limitation in connection with jurisdiction referred to in
Sibbach and Snyder was deemed by the sponsors of the bill that became the Act
to be covered by the bill's procedure/substance dichotomy. See infra note 673.
In any event, the existence of "other limitations" would not preclude the delegation
of Congress's full constitutional power, in particular its power to displace state law
in the twilight zone between procedure and substance, except to the extent such
limitations might be infringed thereby.
Professor Landers was again correct in arguing that the Act contains limitations
flowing from notions about the delegation of legislative power, although probably
not in tying those limitations strictly to constitutional requirements. Compare
Landers, supra note 31, at 854-57 with infra text accompanying notes 449-82.
61312 U.S. at 11. From the outset, the Court treated the case as involving-he
validity of both Rule 35 and Rule 37 (governing refusal to make discovery). See
infra62text accompanying note 715.
The Court also sought to demonstrate how two of its prior decisions on which
Mrs. Sibbach relied, Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891), and
Camden & Suburban Ry. Co. v. Stetson, 177 U.S. 172 (1900), in fact supported
the conclusion that Rule 35 was valid. The Court's analysis of both confirms that it
took a monolithic view of procedure and substance as marking the permissible areas
for federal and state law, respectively. Thus, in discussing Botsford, the Court
reasoned that the assumption made there, that a federal statute could authorize a
physical examination, mandated the characterization of the matter as procedural.
See supra note 58; see also Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 12. Stetson gave the Court more
trouble because in that case a New Jersey statute authorizing state courts to order
physical examinations had been held applicable under the Rules of Decision Act.
The Court dismissed the relevance of that fact with this observation: "[T]he entire
discussion goes upon the assumption that the matter is procedural. In any event,
the distinction between substantive law and procedural law was immaterial, for the
cause of action arose .. .in New Jersey." 312 U.S. at 12-13. As to both cases,
the Court essentially adopted the reasoning of the respondent. See Brief for the
Respondent in Reply to the Several Briefs Filed by Petitioner at 14-16. The Court
also distinguished Stack v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 177 Mass. 155, 58 N.E.
686 (1900), a third case relied on by Sibbach.
Mrs. Sibbach did not share the Court's monolithic view and had cited these
cases in support of her contention that Rule 35 was invalid under the Act's second
sentence, because it violated her substantive rights. See Brief in Support of Petition
for Writ of Certiorari at 30-39; see also id. 18-29. Although her briefs correctly
argued that the Act's procedure/substance dichotomy was intended to allocate lawmaking power between the Court as rulemaker and Congress and noted the relativity of the terms used to effect the allocation, see, e.g., id. 18-29, they also suggested the relevance of prior classification as between the Conformity Act and the
Rules of Decision Act and thus contributed to the Court's confusion. See, e.g., id.
38; see also id. 16.
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would, if accepted in the interpretation of the Act, "invite endless
litigation and confusion worse confounded." 63 "The test," the
Court said, "must be whether a rule really regulates procedure,the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress
for disregard or infraction of them. That the rules [Rules 35 and
37] in question are such is admitted." 64
Not until it had, in this passage, elaborated its major premise
did the Court return to the question of congressional intent. In
answering the contention by the four dissenting Justices that Rule
35 "work[ed] a major change of policy and that this was not intended by Congress," the Court asserted, among other things, that
the Rules as a whole represented such a departure and that "the
new policy envisaged in the enabling act of 1934 was that the
whole field of court procedure be regulated in the interest of
speedy, fair and exact determination of the truth." ,5 Finally,
63312 U.S. at 14.

64 Id. Petitioner's "admission" was as follows:
It may be that an order compelling the plaintiff to submit to a physical
examination does not determine the right which plaintiff seeks to have
adjudicated in the litigation. And not involving a right of this character,
the order may involve "procedure" and may not involve what is commonly
meant by the term "substantive law." Plaintiff contends that the order
nevertheless invades her "substantive rights." This contention requires a
consideration of the meaning of the limitation in the Rules Enabling Act
in the light of the limitations imposed on the rule-making power of courts
by the doctrine of separation of powers.
Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18.
65 312 U.S. at 14. Compare Justice Frankfurter in dissent:
So far as national law is concerned, a drastic change in public policy in a
matter deeply touching the sensibilities of people or even their prejudices
as to privacy, ought not to be inferred from a general authorization to formulate rules for the more uniform and effective dispatch of business on the
civil side of the federal courts.
Id. 18.
Mrs. Sibbach had also argued that Rule 35 involved questions of legislative
policy that were for Congress, not the Court. See Brief in Support of Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 39-44.
The breadth of rulemaking authority read into the Act in the majority opinion
in Sibbach was consistent with the personal views of its author, Justice Roberts,
prior to his appointment. Roberts had advocated "a very broad rulemaking power."
He explained:
And when I say the rulemaking power I mean, perhaps, very much more
than at first blush would appear. I mean this: That the question of forms
of action, the question of the initiation of an action, the question of pleadings, the question of proofs, the question of trial procedure, the question
of appellate procedure and the whole genus of procedural things, from the
start to the end of a litigation, ought to be in the hands of those who know
best about it and who, from time to time, can make rules to meet situations
as they arise in the actual practice of law.
Roberts, Trial Procedure-Past,Present and Future, 15 A.B.A. J. 667,-668 (1929).
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the Court relied on the legislative history of the Rules, and of
Rule 35 in particular, in support of its reasoning that, since "no
transgression of legislative policy was found," Rule 35 was valid. 66
B. Two Lines of Authority Following Sibbach
Following Sibbach, two lines of Supreme Court authority
developed for determining the reach and validity of Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. In a line of cases commencing with Palmer v.
Hoffman in 1943, the Court interpreted a number of Rules not
to cover the matters in question because of its conviction that
those matters were required by Erie and its progeny to be governed
by state law. 67 Another line of cases, commencing with Mississippi
Publishing Corp. v. Murphree in 1946, upheld the validity of
Federal Rules under the Act.68 The results in the first or Erie
line flowed naturally from Sibbach's unsupported premise that the
limits of the Court's delegated authority under the Act were
reached at the point that state law was found to be applicable
under the Rules of Decision Act.6 9 Just as naturally, they raised
fears for the integrity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
many of which appeared vulnerable to the developing Erie jurisprudence.7 0 The results in the second or Enabling Act line are
more difficult to characterize, although the absence of federalism
concerns in those cases, at least as presented by the parties, is sugU.S. at 16; see id. 14-16.
See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer
& Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541 (1949); see also Walker v. Arnco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980) (decided after Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965)).
68
See Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956); Cold Metal Process Co. v. United
Eng'g & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445 (1956); Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104
(1964); see also Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102
(1968) (decided after Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965)).
69
As noted above, the Court in Sibbach hedged its conclusions about Congress's
power with statements to the effect that, even if Congress could displace state substantive law, it had not done so but had, rather, directed in the Rules of Decision
Act that state law be applied. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60. Thus,
after Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), it was understandable that
the Court in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949),
and Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), sought to accommodate the allocation scheme that the Court in Sibbach had said the Rules Enabling
Act effected. See Note, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 62 HAv.
L. REv. 1030, 1032-33 (1949). Of course, it is quite another matter to regard
the results in those cases as constitutionally compelled. See Ely, supra note 3, at
698-99.
70
See, e.g., Gavit, States' Rights and Federal Procedure, 25 IND. L.J. 1 (1949);
Hill, supra note 25; Merrigan, supra note 25; Clark, Book Review, 36 CoRNELL L.
REv. 181, 184 (1950); see also Ely, supra note 3, at 721-22.
G6312
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gestive. 71 In light of Sibbach, it is not surprising that none of the
Court's decisions in either line thoroughly examined the question
of congressional intent. It is, however, grounds for regret and a
cause of the current controversy that, when the Court undertook to rationalize its previous decisions and to diminish the uncertainty they had wrought, it left Sibbach's major premise
unexamined.
C. Hanna
With Professor Ely's help, we know that in Hanna v. Plumer,72
the Supreme Court sought to do with Erie what the Court in
Erie had sought to do with federal common law-to reorient the
law by recalling attention to its sources. We learn from Hanna
that there is no one "Erie problem," but that there are rather a
number of problems of allocating lawmaking power between the
federal government and the states, in the solution of which the
source of the federal power asserted must be considered.7 3 We
are reminded that "[t]he line between 'substance' and 'procedure'
shifts as the legal context changes." 74 All of this is to the good
and has provided a fresh starting point for the discussion of some
7

1See cases cited supra note 68. Of the four cases decided before Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), only Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964),
involved a situation where state law might be in competition on the matter covered
by the Federal Rule challenged, and that was not the line of attack taken by the
challenger. See 379 U.S. at 112-14. Moreover, according to the Court, the petitioner did "not challenge the holding in Sibbach as applied to plaintiffs." Id. 113.
That made the Court's task an easy one. Cf. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust
Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 125 & n.22 (1968) (rejecting argument that "all
indispensable parties have a 'substantive right' to have suits dismissed in their
absence" and noting that "the question of joinder is one of federal law"). The two
decisions in 1956 involved the claim that amended Rule 54(b) was invalid as modifying an Act of Congress prescribing appellate jurisdiction. See Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956); Cold Metal Press Co. v. United Eng'g &
Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445 (1956). As noted supra note 60, the Court in Sibbach
had suggested that limitations on rulemaking relating to jurisdiction find their source
outside the Act. In Murphree, the Court defined away a potential problem as to
the effect of Rule 4(f) on jurisdiction. See infra note 673. Thereafter, Sibbach
provided ample support for the conclusion that the Rule was a rule of procedure.
See 326 U.S. at 445-46; supra note 59. At least the Court was forced to confront
the problem of the effect of Federal Rules on rights claimed under the substantive
law. The distinction it suggested, between Rules having "incidental effects," 326
U.S. at 445, and Rules operating "to abridge, enlarge or modify the rules of decision
by which [the] court will adjudicate... rights," id. 446, does not, however, provide
much guidance. See Landers, supra note 31, at 856.
72 380 U.S. 460 (1965). This case is discussed further infra text accompanying
notes 638-88.
73 See 380 U.S. at 469-74; Ely, supra note 3, passim.

74 380 U.S. at 471.
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very difficult problems of federalismY5 Hanna has not done much,
however, for our understanding of the Rules Enabling Act of
1934.Y
The opinion of the Court in Hanna treats the validity of
Rule 4(d)(1), regulating service of process on individuals, in two
places. Early in the opinion, quotations from Sibbach and from
Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree are deemed sufficient
to demonstrate the Rule's validity under the Enabling Act line
of cases. 77 Late in the opinion, invulnerability under Erie, if not
the Erie line of cases involving Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
is demonstrated by returning to Sibbach's major premise and
elaborating the requirements of federalism in light of the Court's
newly discovered positivism.7" The Court holds to the view that
"both the Enabling Act and the Erie rule say, roughly, that federal
courts are to apply state 'substantive' law and federal 'procedural'
law." 79 But the Court reminds us of Congress's power under the
Constitution to regulate federal practice and procedure, interprets
"procedure" broadly for that purpose, and fails to suggest any limitations on the Court under the Rules Enabling Act that are more
restrictive than the limitations on Congress under the Constitution. 0 This is Sibbach, dressed up a bit to be sure, but Sibbach
nonetheless.
In freeing Federal Rules from the constraints imposed on
federal common law by Erie and its progeny, Hanna established
75 See Ely, supra note 3; Note, The Law Applied in Diversity Cases: The Rules
of Decision Act and the Erie Doctrine, 85 YALE L.J. 678 (1976); Redish & Phillips,

Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91
HAzv. L. REv. 356 (1977); Westen & Lehman, supra note 30; Redish, Continuing
the Erie Debate: A Response to Westen and Lehman, 78 MiCH. L. REv. 959 (1980);
Westen, After "Life for Erie"-A Reply, 78 Micni. L. REv. 971 (1980).
76 Ely, supra note 3, at 720 acknowledges this.
77
See 380 U.S. at 464-65; see also id. 462-63 n.1; Ely, supra note 3, at 720.
78 See 380 U.S. at 469-74.
79 Id.471. See also id. 465: "The broad command of Erie was therefore identical to that of the Enabling Act: federal courts are to apply state substantive law
and federal procedural law:'
8
0 See id. 471-74. The Court did suggest that "a court, in measuring a Federal
Rule against the standards contained in the Enabling Act and the Constitution, need
not wholly blind itself to the degree to which the Rule makes the character and
result of the federal litigation stray from the course it would follow in state courts."

Id. 473. But this appears to be a matter of discretion. And it is true that "what
Justice Harlan termed the 'arguably procedural' test was set forth in the Court's
discussion of the Constitution and not in relation to the Enabling Act."

Ely, supra

note 3, at 720. But, for any limitations in addition to those on Congress, one is
remitted to the earlier quotations from Sibbach and Murphree, which are not inconsistent with the view that Congress delegated its full constitutional power to the
Court. Indeed, such may have been the view of the Court in Sibbach. See supra
text accompanying notes 60 & 69.
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that the problems were different and thus helped to put one myth
to rest.8 1 But the Court in Hanna adhered to the view that both
were problems of federalism, and in the hands of Professor Ely,
2
the case gave new life to another myth.
In sum, notwithstanding the accepted primacy of Congress in
the regulation of federal procedure, neither the Court nor commentators have moved beyond speculation or assertion in the interpretation of the Act. Although that posture can be justified
so long as the Act's history is confined to 1934, the relevant record
cannot fairly be so confined.
III. THE ANTECEDENT PERIOD OF TRAVAIL
The movement for a uniform federal procedure bill had its
origins in the nineteenth century. At important points, it derived
sustenance from, as well as sustained, procedural reform movements in the states, notably New York. The bill itself prompted
debate about matters as diverse as the convenience of lawyers, the
efficiency of judicial administration, and the constitutional power
of Congress to delegate rulemaking power to the Supreme Court.
The uniform federal procedure bill changed shape during the
long campaign for its passage. Developments in law and political
theory, perceptions of practical imperatives, and individual drafting styles all played a part in its transformation. What had been,
in 1912, a bill delegating court rulemaking power in categories of
seemingly ascertainable and limited content became in 1924, and
remained in 1934, a bill free in its first section of all but the
broadest categorical restrictions, the limitations imposed by which
were hardly apparent.
Yet throughout the period from 1912 to 1934, much of the
rhetoric describing, and argument concerning, the bill remained
the same. Moreover, in the Senate, where the debate about the
bill centered after 1923, assurances were provided that, changes in
language notwithstanding, its delegation was not as broad as asserted by its main critic. The draftsman of the 1924 version led
this effort to cabin the bill's abstractions. He relied heavily on
8

1 See Ely, supra note 3, at 693-718.
See Ely, supra note 3, at 718-40; see also Chayes, The Bead Game, 87 HAv.
L. REv. 741 (1974); Ely, The Necklace, 87 HAv. L. REv. 753 (1974); Harbrecht,
The Contemporaneous Ownership Rule in Shareholders' Derivative Suits, 25 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 1041, 1044-52 (1978); Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie-The
Thread, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1682 (1974); Westen & Lehman, supra note 30, at
359-64; cf. Wellborn, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Application of State
Law in the Federal Courts, 55 TEx. L. BEv. 371 (1977) (extending an analysis
adapted from Ely to the Federal Rules of Evidence).
82
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reports proposing the reform of procedure in New York, failing
to note the theoretical and practical difficulties posed by a borrowing for the federal system of an allocation scheme formulated for a
state, let alone a state like New York, with a history of procedural
regulation so different from the federal history.
In the end, as in the beginning, of the movement, the high
ground in the debate about the uniform federal procedure bill
involved the allocation of lawmaking power between the Supreme
Court as rulemaker and Congress. State interests as such were
acknowledged only late in the course of the bill's pre-1934 history.
Their protection was deemed a consequence, not the goal, of the
bill's procedure/substance dichotomy.
A. The Process Acts and the Conformity Act of 1872
Those of us who attended law school after 1938, when Erie
was decided and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became
effective, may not remember from our studies that both events
changed the source of the law applied in federal courts. We know
-too well-that Erie and its progeny led us from a regime of
bastard conformity to state "substantive" law to a regime of conformity to bastard state "substantive" law. Less clear in our minds
is how the Civil Rules affected the mix of federal and state "procedural" law in the federal courts. And what a mix it was. Successive attempts by Congress to minimize discontinuities between
the law applied in federal and state courts within a state culminated in an 1872 statute that many must have thought would
ensure continuing conformity to state law. It did not work out
that way.
1. The Process Acts
For most of the nineteenth century, a source of friction
created by federal courts, probably greater than the invocation
of "general common law" under Swift v. Tyson, s3 was the adherence to state laws governing process that had been superseded
locally as a result of changed attitudes and conditions. There were
at least two routes to that friction.84
8341 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).

"The point about Swift v. Tyson is that it was

immediately and enthusiastically accepted ....

[T]he doctrine of the general com-

mercial law was warmly welcomed and expansively construed, not only by the lower
federal courts but by the state courts as well." G. GmmorM, Tns AGEs OF AmmucAN LAw 33-34 (1977) (footnote omitted).
84 The discussion in this section is based in part on Warren, Federal Process
and State Legislation (pts. 1 & 2), 16 VA. L. REv. 421, 546 (1930).
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a. The Process Acts and Static Conformity
First, a decision that a matter was subject to the Process Act
of 1792,85 rather than to the Rules of Decision Act,86 meant that
the state law to be applied-both statutes required the application
of state law in actions at law-was state law of 1789 87 vintage and
not the most recent crop. In other words, as interpreted, the
Process Act required static, and the Rules of Decision Act dynamic,
conformity to state law. In Wayman v. Southard,S the Supreme
Court made such a decision with respect to the procedure to execute a judgment entered by a federal court. As a result, a post1789 Kentucky debtor relief statute requiring a judgment creditor
either to accept state banknotes in payment or to allow the defendant to give a replevin bond payable in two years was held
inapplicable.
The "politically unacceptable" result in Wayman 89 could
have been avoided if the trial court in that case had adopted the
Kentucky statute in rules of court as it was authorized to do under
the Process Act of 1792.90 In fact, the federal courts in Kentucky
8

a Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276.
8
6Act of Sept. 24, 1789, oh. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92.
87
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 32 (1825). The governing
year was 1789 rather than 1792 because the Process Act of 1792 incorporated state
procedure followed under the Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93 (the
Temporary Process Act), which mandated strict conformity. But see infra note 90.
8823 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
89 HAnTr & WECHSLE, supra note 35, at 670. See generally Warren, supra
note 84, at 435-50. Congress sought to resolve the problems caused by Wayrnan
and similar cases by requiring conformity to state law respecting "writs of execution
and other final process issued on judgments" as of 1828, with a proviso reserving to
the courts the power, by rules of court, to conform to changes made by later state
statutes. Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 68, § 3, 4 Stat. 278, 281. However, static conformity as of 1789 for the original states, and as of 1828 for states admitted between
1789 and 1828, was still required as to other matters covered by the Process Acts,
subject to the rulemaking provisions discussed in the text below. See Act of May
19, 1828, ch. 68, § 1, 4 Stat. 278. For states admitted after 1828, see Warren,
supra note 84, at 445.
9
0 Under the 1792 Act, the obligation to conform to state law in common law
actions and the obligation to apply "the principles, rules and usages which belong
to courts of equity and to courts of admiralty" were made "subject . . . to such
alterations and additions as the said courts ... deem expedient, or to such regulations as the supreme court of the United States shall think proper from time to time
by rule to prescribe to any circuit or district court concerning the same . .. " Act
of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276. For an argument that Congress's
intent may have been different with respect to common law, equity, and admiralty,
see Comment, Rules of Evidence and the Federal Practice: Limits on the Supreme
Court's Rulemaking Power, 1974 Anuz. ST. L.J. 77, 89 n.101. But see J. GoEBEI,
HISTORY OF THE SUPREmE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 542-47 (1971).
For other early nilemaking grants, see Act of

Sept. 24, 1789, oh. 20, § 17(b), 1 Stat. 73, 83; Act of March 2, 1793, oh. 22, § 7,
1 Stat. 333, 335; J. GOEBEL, supra, at 550-51.
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were apparently atypical in failing to keep current with state
legislation that responded to the economic miseries of the early
nineteenth century by regulating final process.9 1
b. Failureto Adopt Code Procedure in Court Rules
Federal court inertia in the face of changes in state procedure
was more common, however, with the advent of the code movement and was the second route to friction alluded to above. The
innovations in New York's procedure associated with the name
of David Dudley Field spread rapidly to the west,92 and they were

eligible for importation into the federal courts by court rule under
the Process Act of 1792. But the attitude of the Supreme Court
of the United States towards code procedure is perhaps best captured by the description of the reception of Field's 1848 Code at
home:
The cold, not to say inhuman, treatment which the
infant Code received from the New York judges is a matter of history. They had been bred under the commonlaw rules of pleading and taught to regard . . . with

suspicion a system which was heralded as so simple that
every man would be able to draw his own pleadings.93
In a series of opinions authored by Justice Grier, the Court heaped
scorn upon the new procedure of the codes and severely deprecated
its adoption by federal courts.94 Many lower federal courts took
the hint; some did not.95 As a result, in some states the emancipation from the technicalities of common law procedure wrought
by the code was complete, while in other states common law pro91 See Warren, supra note 84, at 549. There is irony in this refusal to use
local rulemaking power, since in Wayman, Chief justice Marshall suggested that that
power had been conferred so that federal courts could take advantage of state legislation which might rescind certain pre-1789 provisions enacted for the relief of
debtors. See 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 46-47.
92 On Field and the code movement, see DAvm DUDLEY FIELD: CENTENAuY
EssAYs (A. Reppy ed. 1949); see also C. CrAan, supra note 41; C. Coox, Tim
AMERICAN CODIFIcATION MOVEMENT ch. 8 (1981); L. FIEDmAN, A ISTORY OF
AMmucAN- LAw ch. 3 (1973); C. HEPBURN, TiE I-sToricAL DEVELOPMENT OF
CODE PLEADING

(1897).

McArthur v. Moffet, 143 Wis. 564, 567, 128 N.W. 445, 446 (1910), quoted
in C. CLANn, supra note 41, at 83.
94 See Randon v. Toby, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 518 (1850); McFaul v. Ramsey, 61
U.S. (20 How.) 523 (1858); Farni v. Tesson, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 309 (1862);
Warren, supra note 84, at 558-60.
95 Warren, supra note 84, at 560. For an interesting account of the efforts of
Judge Dillon to convert his colleagues on the federal bench, "old gentlemen . . .
[who] understood the common law method of practice and . . . were not in love
with the code," see 11 A.B.A. REP. 76 (1888).
93
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cedure ruled in federal court from the graveyard of static conformity.
In all states, it remained necessary for lawyers practicing in
federal court to master a discrete federal equity procedure. Equity
had remained free of any requirement of conformity since the
beginning of the Republic; 96 it had been governed by court rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court since 1822, 9 7 and it was pre-

served against the depredations of code merger (via court rule)
by Supreme Court interpretation. 9
2. The Conformity Act of 1872 and Dynamic Conformity
In 1872 Congress sought to relieve the inconvenience and inconsistency resulting from optional static conformity under the
Process Act of 1792. The Conformity Act of 1872 99 required,
in "like causes," dynamic conformity "as near as may be" with
respect to "the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in [civil causes] other than equity and admiralty causes."
Moreover, the Act required such conformity automatically, "any
rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding." 100
The "serious" "evil" 101 to which the Conformity Act of 1872
was addressed might have been avoided, and the Act itself never
passed, if the Supreme Court had exercised its supervisory rule06
The Temporary Process Act provided that "the forms and modes of proceedings in causes of equity ... shall be according to the course of the civil law... :'
Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93-94. Under the Process Act of 1792,
the forms of process in equity, except their style, and the forms and modes of proceedings were to be "according to the principles, rules and usages which belong to
courts of equity . . . as contra-distinguished from courts of common law." Act of
May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276. Even if desirable, conformity was impossible in many states because "in 1789 equity was either non-existent or undeveloped in the courts of many of the states." HART & WEcHsLEm, supra note 35,
at 664. Equity was also within the rulemaking grant of the Act. See supra note 90.
97See 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) xvii (1822).
18 See Bennett v. Butterworth, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 702 (1850).
09
Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5 & 6, 17 Stat. 196, 197. The Act was
passed after "singularly little debate" and with no printed report. Warren, supra
note 84, at 562.
10 0 Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197. This section contained
a proviso: "Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall alter the rules of
evidence under the laws of the United States, and as practiced in the Courts
thereof." Id. The proviso was stricken in the codification of 1878. Rev. Stat. ch.
18, § 914 (1878). See Miller, supra note 23, at 734-35. With respect to remedies
"by attachment or other process against the property of the defendant" and to
remedies "by execution or otherwise, to reach the property of the judgment debtor,"
the Act provided for "similar remedies" to those available in the states in 1872
(static conformity), with the federal courts empowered, in general rules, to adopt
subsequent state laws. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 6, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
101 Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426, 441 (1875).
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making power in law actions, which was first conferred by Congress in 1792,102 and which was reaffirmed and strengthened in

1842.103 Given the Court's solicitude for common law procedure
and its distaste for the reformed procedure of the codes, however,
it is not surprising that it did nothing by court rule in the law
field prior to 1872.104 The provision in the 1872 Act that insisted upon conformity "any rule of court to the contrary notwith10 5
standing" enjoined continued inactivity.

3. The Conformity Act: Early Agitation for Reform
a. Problems Arising from the Persistence of Federal Procedure
Dissatisfaction with the Conformity Act developed early and
increased over time, but it was never unanimous. In part, the unhappiness was a reaction to the Act's failure fully to achieve its
purpose of "bring[ing] about uniformity in the law of procedure
in the Federal and State courts of the same locality." 106 To the
0 2
1 See supra note 90. "Supervisory rulemaking" refers to the promulgation of
court rules for the conduct of proceedings in inferior courts and should be distinguished from local rulemaking, the promulgation of court rules for the conduct of
proceedings in the promulgating court.
103 And be it further enacted, That the Supreme Court shall have full
power and authority, from time to time, to prescribe, and regulate, and
alter, the forms of writs and other process to be used and issued in the
district and circuit courts of the United States, and the forms and modes
of framing and filing libels, bills, answers, and other proceedings and
pleadings, in suits at common law or in admiralty and in equity pending
in the said courts, and also the forms and modes of taking and obtaining
evidence, and of obtaining discovery, and generally the forms and modes
of proceeding to obtain relief, and the forms and modes of drawing up,
entering, and enrolling decrees, and the forms and modes of proceeding
before trustees appointed by the court, and generally to regulate the whole
practice of the said courts, so as to prevent delays, and to promote brevity
and succinctness in all pleadings and proceedings therein, and to abolish
all unnecessary costs and expenses in any suit therein.
Act of August 23, 1842, ch. 188, § 6, 5 Stat. 516, 518.
104 In Farni v. Tesson, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 309, 315 (1862), the Court declined
to adopt the example of state legislatures that had substituted "by codes, the whims
of sciolists and inventors for the experience and wisdom of ages." On the other
hand, in 1842, the Court brought out revised Equity Rules, see 42 U.S. (1 How.)
xli (1842), and thereafter, for the first time, promulgated Admiralty Rules, see 44
U.S. (3 How.) ix (1844). See also supra note 90. For a discussion of the reasons
for legislative rather than judicial leadership in the procedural reforms of the nineteenth century, see Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599,
599-601 (1926).
105 The Court's authority to promulgate court rules in equity and admiralty
was not affected by the Conformity Act of 1872 and was specifically continued by
section 917 of the Revised Statutes of 1878. It was exercised, albeit infrequently.
See, e.g., 226 U.S. 627 (1912) (Equity Rules); 254 U.S. 671 (1921) (Admiralty
Rules).
106 Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426, 441 (1875).
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extent that the Constitution of the United States and federal statutes regulated the procedure in federal courts, the problem was
unavoidable. In 1886, Justice Samuel F. Miller protested:
[T]he Federal judges and the practitioners in the Federal
courts are left to grope their way in this mingling of
Federal law with that of thirty-eight states of the Union.
,.

.

The condition of the Justices of the Supreme Court

of the United States, who are bound to take judicial notice of all these different laws, and are expected to ascertain what they are, can well be imagined. As one of them,
10 7

I favor codification.

By 1896, the ABA's Committee on Uniformity of Procedure and
Comparative Law complained that all but a few specialists in
federal practice felt the need to rely on the clerk of court for
guidance, and that a federal practitioner "even in his own state,
f[elt] no more certainty as to the proper procedure than if he were
before a tribunal of a foreign country." 1os
Quite apart from matters covered by the Constitution and
federal statutes, the Conformity Act itself, in the qualifier "as near
as may be," among other provisions, afforded numerous opportunities for federal courts to decline conformity to state law and thus
to perpetuate the inconvenience to the bar that it was the purpose of the Act to eliminate. 10 9 The ambiguity of the Act as in107Miller, Codification, 20 Am. L. REv. 315, 322 (1886); see also 11 A.B.A.
EMp. 68 (1888) (statement of Judge Dillon). An 1887 Report of the American
Bar Association's Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform agreed that the system created difficulties for lawyers practicing, and judges sitting, in federal courts
in different states; it also maintained, however, that a lawyer could approach a
common-law cause in federal court "with little more special preparation than if he
were acting in a similar action in the local tribunals with which he is most familiar."
10 A.B.A. REP. 317, 318 (1887). Yet another ABA Committee, in the same year,
sympathized with the particular burdens of those in Justice Miller's position, and
more generally concluded that the Conformity Act had "failed in the interest of
justice, since the Judges of the United States Courts cannot be expected to keep
pace with the minute local differences and changes constantly going on with the
growth of each of the State systems." Report of Committee on Judicial Administration and Remedial Procedure on Uniformity of Pleading and Practicein United
States Courts, 10 A.B.A. REP. 327, 327 (1887).
1o819 A.B.A. REP. 411, 420 (1896); see also Report of Committee on Uniformity of Procedure, 21 A.B.A. REP. 454, 462-63 (1898). Again, however, an
opponent of the Committee's resolution disputed the alleged complexity of federal
practice. See 19 A.B.A. REP. at 43-44 (statement of Everett P. Wheeler); see also
supra note 107.
10 9 See C. HEPBuRN, supra note 92, at 157-61; Warren, supra note 84, at 56467. The ABA's Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure compiled a list of "fiftyodd notable exceptions to conformity" that became standard fare in its reports.
See, e.g., Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 6 A.B.A. J. 509,
514, 525-27 (1920).
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terpreted, coupled with the potential complexity of an action drawing on so many sources of procedural law, made the practitioner's
job difficult. Hence, a common view of federal practice under the
Conformity Act was, "To the average lawyer it is Sanskrit; to the
experienced federal practitioner it is monopoly; to the author of
text books on federal practice it is a golden harvest." 110
b. Lack of Uniformity: The Predicament of Multi-State Federal
Practitioners
There was substantial agreement from the start regarding the
special plight of lawyers and judges who found themselves in
federal court in more than one state. The 1896 ABA report repeated the argument based on the difficulties faced by such lawyers
and judges that had previously been made in 1887; "1 it has since
become part of the litany of federal procedural reform." 2 At the
same time, the report documented the diversity of state procedural
systems and suggested another indictment of conformity: state systems that were inferior, notably New York's, were being inflicted
on the federal courts." 3
11o Report of
461, 466 (1921).
35 Hhnv. L. REv.
(1926) (Minority
is the same.").

the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 46 A.B.A. REP.
See, e.g., Note, Conformity by Federal Courts to State Procedure,
602 (1922). But see S. REP. No. 1174, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 23
Views) ("[O n the whole it is accurate to say that the practice

M'It will thus be observed that not only is the lawyer who goes outside
his own state in the Federal Courts met and hampered by new and unfamiliar rules of practice, but that the judges of the Circuit Courts sitting
in different states must follow the common law or the code practice with
their various modifications as he happens to sit in a state following one
or the other systems of procedure.
Report of the Committee on Uniformity of Procedure and Comparative Law, 19
A.B.A. REP. 411, 419 (1896) [hereinafter cited as Committee Report). For the
previous use of the argument, see supra note 107.
112 See, e.g., Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the judiciary,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 89-91 (1973) (statement of Albert Jenner). An amusing
variant of the argument appeared in The English Judicature Act and the American
Codes, 64 CENT. L.J. 105, 105 (1907):
How matters would be simplified and unified all over the country if the
English Act were adopted for the United States courts and by all the
states. An English lawyer could without embarrassment practice in the
United States, and an American lawyer could with equal facility practice
in the dominions of Great Britain, and as the English code is practically
drawn from the civil law he would not be disqualified because of a lack of
knowledge of procedure in any place where the civil code is in use.
113 See Committee Report, supra note 111, at 418-19.
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B. The ABA and the Quest for Uniform Federal Procedure
in the Nineteenth Century
The charge of the ABA Committee on Uniformity of Procedure and Comparative Law had been to "inquire into and collate the facts relative to the movement now in progress to further
a uniform system of legal procedure, and the study of comparative
legislation on that subject throughout the English-speaking
world." 114 This was a time of growing interest in uniform legislation generally. 1 5 Nevertheless, the Committee's report suggested as the main reason to strive for uniformity the possibility
of reform through comparative law. 116 The experience of the
chairman of the Committee, who was intimately involved in the
114Id. 411. The idea of uniformity was not a new one for the Association.
Speaking in support of an 1888 ABA resolution favoring a federal code of procedure,
David Dudley Field suggested that "if a Federal code of procedure is once made
the codes of procedure of the various states (for I believe there will be one in every
state eventually) will naturally assimilate themselves to the code of Federal procedure," which, he thought, was "what we all desire." 11 A.B.A. REP. 69-70
(1888). The resolution provided: "That in the opinion of this Association the
preparation of a code or codes of procedure for the United States courts, regulating
both civil and criminal proceedings, is both desirable and practicable." Id. 64.
Field had previously sought ABA support of a Senate bill providing for the appointment of a commission to prepare a federal code of procedure. See 9 A.B.A.
RE. 75 (1886). The 1888 resolution was a substitute.
Field did not need to explain why national uniformity resulting from state adoptions of a federal model was an argument in favor of a federal code of procedure,
because he had just noted the objection that uniform federal procedure would
create inconvenience:
I went before a committee of each House to urge [a bill for the appointment of a commission to prepare a federal code of procedure], and I
found there generally an assent to the principle, with only now and then
an objection, namely, that it would be very convenient for lawyers and for
judges to have the practice, conformable to the state practice always.
11 A.B.A. REP. 69 (1888).
115 The ABA's Committee on Uniform State Laws was appointed in 1889. See
12 A.B.A. REP. 50-51 (1889); Radin, The Achievemehts of the American Bar Association: A Sixty Year Record, 25 A.B.A. J. 903, 1007-09 (1939). C. C. Bonney,
who offered an alternative proposal to achieve uniform federal procedure in 1886,
see 9 A.B.A. REP. 78-79, 503-05 (1886), had previously promoted a model federal
law of negotiable paper. Radin, supra, at 1008. The resolution calling for the
appointment of the Committee on Uniformity of Procedure and Comparative Law
was thought to be "germane to the report of [the] Committee [on Uniform State
Laws]." 18 A.B.A. REP. 32 (1895) (statement of J. Newton Fiero). It was stimulated by a movement looking towards "Uniformity in Methods of Procedure in
Englishspeaking countries." Id. 33.
116 See Committee Report, supra note 111, at 417. The Committee's survey
had yielded responses from 43 states "almost unanimous in expressing a decided
opinion in favor of the desirability of [assimilating the practice of the state courts
and federal courts by rules regulating procedure], and a large majority believe in
its possibility, although as to its probability within a reasonable time, the views are
not so positive." Id. The Committee's Report was cited as evidence of a "general
tendency towards a uniform system of procedure in all the states." C. I-IPBURN,
supra note 92, at 136. It concluded that federal leadership was necessary because
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reform movement in New York, lurks not far below the surface
117
of the report.
The 1896 resolution of the ABA Committee on Uniformity
of Procedure and Comparative Law, calling for a congressional
study commission, was defeated,"" and it was laid on the table
when renewed in 1898.1 9 It may have been a mistake for the
ABA Committee to substitute for its original 1896 resolution,
which contemplated proposals (including court rules) formulated
by lawyers selected by the judiciary, the congressional study commission plan.120 The Committee's own report well made the
case against "placing full power and control in the legislatures" 121
and in favor of a system implemented by court rules. 122 Moreover,
from the earliest years of the movement to secure a uniform federal law of procedure, there was a difference of opinion as to
methods. Attempts by the ABA to secure a federal code of procedure, led by David Dudley Field, 123 were made at the end of
Field's career and of the codification movement. 124 Even at that
the divergence of views and lack of commitment to procedural reform among the
states made uniform legislation (as promoted by the Committee on Uniform State
Laws) unattainable. See Committee Report, supra note 111, at 422-23.
137 J. Newton Fiero was chairman of the New York State Bar Association from
1892 to 1894. In 1893 he vigorously attacked the state's Code of Civil Procedure
(the Throop Code), calling for its "revision, rearrangement and reconstruction." 16
N.Y. ST. B.A. REP. 51 (1893). Thereafter, he was active and prominent in the
Association's reform efforts. He was for many years chairman of the Committee on
Law Reform. See, e.g., 21 N.Y. ST. B.A. Rmr. 173, 331 (1898). In 1898 he was
appointed chairman of the Committee on Code Revision, the report of which established some of the basic principles of subsequent reform efforts in the state and had
effect at the national level as well. See 22 N.Y. ST. B.A. REP. 170 (1899); infra
note 134. His 1896 ABA Report made many references to the New York experience.
See, e.g., Committee Report, supra note 111, at 411, 414, 415, 418, 421-22, 422-23
(1896).
118 19 A.B.A. RnP. 47 (1896); see infra note 120.
13921 A.B.A. REP. 36 (1898).
120 See Committee Report, supra note 111, at 423-24 (1896). The Committee's
substitute resolution, as offered on the floor, would have led to the appointment "of
a commission to inquire into and report upon the practicability and expediency of
framing a system of procedure, civil and criminal, for use in the Federal jurisdiction
.
. Chairman Fiero noted that it was "not so broad as the suggestions which
were made by the Committee [in its report]" but had been drawn after consultation
with members of the Committees on Uniform State Laws and on Federal Code of
Criminal Procedure. Id. 43.
121 Id. 418.
122 Id. 420-21.
123 See supra note 114.
See Clark, Code Pleading and Practice Today, in DAviD DODiEY F"Em:

124

Cmq zNany EssAys, supra note 92, at 55, 60-61. Field's foremost opponent in the
last debate in New York over general codification had already acknowledged, with
reference to state law, that procedure "may not inappropriately be reduced to statutory form," but he had suggested rules of court as the preferred vehicle. J. C, aTER,
THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF Ouir CommoN LAw 84 (1884).

For a reassessment
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time, there were proposals before the Association, and bills before
Congress, for a system modeled on the Supreme Court's Equity
Rules. 125 Some of the opposition to the 1896 resolution reflected
this disagreement about methods.12
But disagreements about
methods were not the most serious obstacle. Among the arguments against the 1896 ABA resolution was the claim that the
Conformity Act system "seems to be perfectly satisfactory to the
American Bar." 127
C. The Reform Movement Matures
1. Roscoe Pound and the ABA Committee of Fifteen
The first decade of this century witnessed the birth of serious
and widespread interest in reform of judicial administration and
the renascence of interest in reform of judicial procedure. Roscoe
Pound's 1906 paper, "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With
the Administration of Justice," -12 precipitated a furor when it
was delivered at the ABA's annual meeting in St. Paul. 29 Within
a year, however, the Association's Committee on Judicial Administration and Remedial Procedure had issued a report concluding
that "many evils suggested in Mr. Pound's paper do exist" and
recommending the appointment of a special committee to address
them. 3 0 A Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and Formulate Proposed Laws to Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in Litigation, more commonly known as the Committee of Fifteen, was
of Field's role in the codification movement of the nineteenth century, see C. Coox,
supra note 92.
125 See, e.g., 9 A.B.A. REP. 78-79, 503-05 (1886) (bills introduced by C.C.
Bonney); Report of the Committee on Judicial Administration and Remedial Procedure on Uniformity of Pleading and Practice in United States Courts, 10 A.B.A.
REP. 327 (1887); 11 A.B.A. REp. 70-79 (1888); Note, A National Code of Procedure, 18 Am. L. REv. 464 (1884).
126 "Why should we want Congress-of all bodies the most incompetent-to
deal with this subject or to appoint a commission to deal with it and to tell lawyers
how to practice before the courts?" 19 A.B.A. REP. 44 (1896) (statement of
Everett P. Wheeler).
12719 A.B.A. REP. 47 (1896) (statement of Adolph Moses).
Congress had
failed to take action on the ABA's 1888 resolution, which was brought to its attention by a committee specially appointed for that purpose. See Report of the Committee on Judicial Administration and Remedial Procedure, 15 A.B.A. REP. 313
(1892). In 1892, the effort was renewed only as to criminal proceedings, because
there was "a division of opinion among the members of [the] Association and the
legal profession generally with respect to the resolution so far as it relates to the
preparation of a code of procedure regulating civil proceedings .... ." Id. 314.
12829 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906).
29
1 See id. 55-65.
13031 A.B.A. REP. 505, 511-12 (1907).
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appointed; Pound was made one of its members, and the Committee vigorously pursued its charge. Its 1909 report included a section on "General Principles of Reformed Procedure." 131 The
report contrasted the "legislative tinkering" in New York that had
turned the original Field Code of 1848 into an "overgrown mass
of detail" with the English Judicature Act of 1873 and suggested
the Supreme Court's rulemaking power in equity, admiralty and
bankruptcy as a "model that all our jurisdictions may well follow"
with respect to the "details of adjective law." 132
The ABA Committee of Fifteen's proposal for procedural reform was not new. The advantages of a system of procedure implemented by rules of court had been discussed in the 1896 and
1898 reports of the ABA Committee on Uniformity of Procedure
and Comparative Law. 133 Similar advantages were noted in New
York, where the appropriate division of responsibility for procedure between the legislature and the courts had been explored
34
in detail.
13134 A.B.A. REP. 578, 588 (1909).

The second principle stated:

WHENEVER IN THE FUTURE PRACTICE AcTs OR CODES OF PROCEDURE AiE
DRAwN Up OR REVISED, THE STATUTES SHOULD DEAL ONLY WITH THE
GENERAL FE.AuREs OF PROCEDURE, AND PRESCRIBE THE GENERAL LINES
TO BE FOLLOWED, LEAVING DETAILS TO BE FIXED BY RULsS OF COURT,
WHIcH rH CourTs MAY CHANGE FROM TME TO Tn,-E, AS ACruAL ExPERIENCE OF THEI= APPLICATION AND OPERATION DICTATES.

Id. 595.
132 Id. 596. The Report goes on to state: "The ideal would be a clear and
scientific outline, of say one hundred sections, laying out the limits and the lines of
procedure, to be developed by rules of court which may be enacted, revised,
amended or abrogated by experts as the exigencies of judicial administration demand." Id. 597.
133 See supra text accompanying notes 122-23; 21 A.B.A. REP. 454 (1898).
134 In its 1899 report, the Committee on Code Revision of the New York State

Bar Association specified as three of the objects to be accomplished by code reform:

Third. To distinguish between such matters of procedure as relate to
jurisdiction and the like, and those matters relating to practice which are

mere details, by placing the important and jurisdictional matters in a
statute, and leaving the more unimportant parts to be provided for by rules
of court; it is quite clear that matters relating to the organization of the
courts, the powers and duties of judicial officers, the more important regu-

lations relating to the commencement and the progress of an action and
the effect of judgment, are statutory, while matters relative to the inter-

locutory proceedings in an action, amendments, motions and the like, may

well be relegated to rules.
Fourth. To place the various provisions of substantive law which
have crept into the Code in their proper positions in the statutes relating
to cognate topics....
Fifth. ...
[T]o place the control of the details of practice with the
courts by which it was uniformly exercised, up to the time of the enactment of the Code of 1848.
22 N.Y. ST. B.A. REP. 170, 179-80 (1899).
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In 1909, the ABA's Committee of Fifteen eschewed any attempt to formulate either uniform legislation or legislation for the
federal courts. 135 In its 1910 Report, however, the Committee
136
noted that it was considering a practice act for the federal courts.
In the Report, the Committee also presented nine "Principles of
Practice Reform," 137 which were disseminated in three articles
published by Pound in the same year. 38 Pound characterized the
practice act/rules of court principle as "the first and most fundaThe ABA and New York Committees shared a chairman. See supra note 117.
To the extent that the New York Association advocated "a short practice act
covering jurisdictional matters mainly, leaving the details of practice to be controlled
by rules of court like the system in England," its plan was the subject of the objection that "it vested in judicial officers legislative functions, which was un-American
and not suited to our system." The objection, although not the identity of those
making it, was reported in the 1901 Report of the Special Joint Committee on
Statutory Revision Commission Bills of the Legislature of the State of New York.
It had been brought directly to the attention of the Association by the Chairman of
the Joint Committee. Rodenbeck, The Work of the Joint Committee on Statutory
Revision Commission Bills of the Legislature of the State of New York, 24 N.Y. ST.
B.A. REP. 265, 279 (1901).
Those voicing the criticism disagreed with the State Bar Association as to the
nature and number of matters to be covered in rules of court rather than the practice act. Rodenbeck acknowledged "some difference of opinion whether the practice
should be governed by legislative act or by rules adopted by the courts." Id. 282.
His own position was unclear, see id. 281-82, 286, but was reported to be "for a
legislative act of procedure, instead of rules of court." Id. 333. The Committee
on Law Reform took the position that the Joint Committee's plan "to reduce the
practice provisions to a single act, does not necessarily exclude power to the court
to make rules, and the extent to which rules shall be provided for in place of statutes,
is left an open matter, and one for future determination." 24 N.Y. ST. B.A. REP.
287, 312 (1901). But it had also expressed the view that the Joint Committee, "as
at present constituted, inclines strongly toward embodying the main features, at least
of the practice, in a statute." Id. The Association was, understandably, unsure of
the Joint Committee's position and thus agreed to endorse its 1900 plan only with a
reiteration of its "preference that the details of practice should be in the form of
rules of court." Id. 335.
The 1903 report of a New York Committee of Fifteen authorized by an act of
the legislature attempted to accommodate these conflicting views by recommending
a "middle ground" in which "minor matters" would be left to court rules, while the
"more important matters of practice" would be enacted in a statute. 26 N.Y. ST.
B.A. REP. 318, 347 (1903). The legislation pursuant to which the Committee was
appointed was secured largely through the efforts of the Association, and the Committee's members included, among other members of the Association, J. Newton
Fiero. See id. 324-26; supra note 117. The Committee's report was endorsed by
the Association. See 26 N.Y. ST. B.A. REP. at 363-64.
1a5 See 34 A.B.A. REP. 578, 588 (1909).
130 See 35 A.B.A. REP. 614, 616 (1910).
The Committee's resolution that it
be authorized to consider and report on a federal practice act was adopted. Id.
65-66.
137Id.
635-48. The principles were prepared by Roscoe Pound. The first of
them was essentially identical to the second principle in the 1909 Report. See supra
note 131.
138
See Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 ILL. L. REv. 388
(1910); Pound, A Practical Program of Procedural Reform, 22 GREEN BAG 438
(1910) [hereinafter cited as Pound, PracticalProgram];Pound, Principles of Practice
Reform, 71 CE.rT. L.J. 221 (1910) [hereinafter cited as Pound, Practice Reform].
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mental in a program of procedural reform." 139 But he stressed
the importance of defining clearly those matters subject to, and
those beyond the reach of, court rules, invoking as a model the
English Judicature Act of 1873.140 In that year, too, President
Taft, whose support of a system of procedure on the English model
had been cited by the ABA Committee of Fifteen in 1909,141 told
Congress of the need for reform of procedure in federal and
state courts, concluding "that the best method of improving judicial procedure at law is to empower the Supreme Court to do it
through the medium of the rules of the court, as in equity. This
is the way in which it has been done in England, and thoroughly

done."

142

2. The Origins of the ABA Committee on Uniform
Judicial Procedure
In 1911 the tempo quickened. After decades of neglect, the
Supreme Court undertook to revise its Equity Rules. 143 In a
speech on procedural reform, Elihu Root told the New York State
Bar Association that "the method [of code procedure] is wrong;
the theory is wrong; and that the true remedy is to sweep from
our statute books the whole mass of detailed provisions and substitute a simple Practice Act containing only the necessary, fundamental rules of procedure, leaving all the rest to the rules of
Court ...
,,144 Discussing the lawyer in politics, Woodrow Wilson told the Kentucky Bar Association: "The American Bar is behind every other bar in Christendom in respect to the simplification
of legal procedure." 145 Thomas W. Shelton, a lawyer from Norfolk,
1 9

3 Pound, Practice Reform, supra note 138, at 222.

"Probably the best device would be that adopted in the English Judicature
Act of 1873,--to put the permanent and unalterable provisions in the form of
sections and append a schedule of rules of practice to serve as rules of court until
set aside, amended or added to by the Supreme Court." Pound, PracticalProgram,
supra note 138, at 447.
141 See 34 A.B.A. REP. 578, 597 (1909).
140

14246 CoNG.

Eec. 17, 26 (1910).

143The ABA was asked to help.

See 36 A.B.A. REP. 44 (1911); Wheeler,
Procedural Reform in the Federal Courts, 66 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1917).
The
Court's action was later credited with giving "[gleneral stimulation" to the movement to secure similar authority for actions at law. Shelton, Uniform Judicial Procedure Will Follow Simplification of Federal Procedure, 76 CENT. L.J. 207, 208

(1913).

14 4

Root, Reform of Procedure, 34 N.Y. ST. B.A. REP,. 87, 89 (1911); see id.

92-93.

14 5

Wilson, The Lawyer in Politics, 1911 Ky. ST. B.A. PNoc. 99, 116. Wilson's
speech (as well as Taft's message) became a standard item of reference in a
chronology used by the ABA Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure. The ex-
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Virginia, began "well-organized propaganda" 146 for the regulation
of judicial procedure in the federal courts by the Supreme Court
of the United States. In two articles published in 1911 and another
in 1912,'14 Shelton argued that uniformity of procedure was essential, along with uniformity of interpretation, to the goal of
uniformity of law.148 He asserted the failure of the Conformity
Act' 49 and saw a federal model, prepared by the Supreme Court,
as the best hope for national uniformity. 15 0 At the 1911 ABA
annual meeting, Shelton introduced a resolution that marked the
formal commencement of an effort that was to last more than
twenty years. 15'
In the following year, the Report of the ABA Committee on
Judicial Administration and Remedial Procedure recommended
cerpt used by the ABA, however, is nowhere to be found in the printed version of
Wilson's speech. See, e.g., Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure,
6 A.B.A. J. 509, 520-21 (1920).
146 Shelton, Uniform Judicial Procedure-Let Congress Set the Supreme Court
Free, 73 CENT. L.J. 319, 319 (1911).
147 See Shelton, supra note 146; Shelton, The Relation of judicial Procedure to
Uniformity of Law, 72 CENT. LJ. 114 (1911) [hereinafter cited as Shelton, Judicial
Procedure]; Shelton, Let Congress Set the Supreme Court Free, 75 CENT. L.J. 126
(1912) [hereinafter cited as Shelton, Supreme Court]; see also Shelton, Simplification
of Legal Procedure-Expediency Must Not Sacrifice Principle, 71 CENT. L.J. 330
(1910). Shelton was Associate Editor of this periodical. Committee on Uniform
judicial Procedure, 75 CENT. L.J. 357, 357 (1912).
48
1 See Shelton, Judicial Procedure, supra note 147.
149 See Shelton, supra note 146, at 320-22; Shelton, Supreme Court, supra note
147, at 126-27.
150 See, e.g., Shelton, JudicialProcedure,supra note 147, at 117.

151 See 36 A.B.A. RPBi.50 (1911).

The resolution provided:
WEREAS, Section 914 of the Revised Statutes [the Conformity Act of
1872] has utterly failed to bring about a general uniformity in federal and
state proceedings in civil cases; and
WnmAs, It is believed that the advantages of state remedies can be
better obtained by a permanent uniform system, with the necessary rules
of practice prepared by the United States Supreme Court;
Now, therefore, be it, and, it is Hereby resolved:
First: That a complete uniform system of law pleading should prevail in
the federal and state courts;
Second: That a system for use in the federal courts, and as a model, with
all necessary rules of practice or provisions therefor, should be prepared
and put into effect by the Supreme Court of the United States;
Third: That to this end, See. 914 and all other conflicting provisions of the
Revised Statutes should be repealed and appropriate statutes enacted;
Fourth: That for the purpose of presenting these resolutions to Congress
and otherwise advocating the same in every legitimate manner, there shall
be appointed a committee of five members to be selected by the President
to be known as "The Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure."
37 A.B.A. REP. 434-35 (1912).
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adoption of Shelton's resolution.152 A motion to that effect carried,
and the ABA Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure came
into being under Shelton's leadership. 153
D. The ABA Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure and the
Uniform Federal Procedure Bill: 1912-1921
1. The Clayton Bill
Shelton's Committee wasted no time. Before the year ended,
the Committee collaborated with Judge Henry D. Clayton, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, in preparing a bill that
was introduced in both houses. 5 4 The bill was supported by
former President Taft and Attorney General McReynolds, among
others, prompting Shelton to predict at the 1913 ABA annual
meeting that it would be passed at the next session of Congress. 155
152 See 37 A.B.A. RFP. 434, 435 (1912).
The Committee found that the Conformity Act had failed to bring about uniformity, that uniformity was desirable, and
that a uniform system of law pleading and procedure prepared by the Supreme
Court for the federal courts would, in time, attract emulation by the states. See id.
The Committee also considered, but made no recommendation with respect to, a
resolution of the Wake County Bar Association, North Carolina, which endorsed a
bill designed to achieve conformity in law and equity. See id. 435-36; Sunderland,
supra note 36, at 1123.
153 See 37 A.B.A. REP. 35-36 (1912). The five individuals first appointed to
the Committee were Shelton, J.M. Dickinson, William B. Homblower, Louis D.
Brandeis, and Joseph N. Teal. Id. 142.
154 See H.R. 26,462, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1912); S.8454, 62d Cong., 3d Sess.
(1912) (reprinted in 38 A.B.A. REP. 542 (1913)). The bill provided:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That the Supreme Court shall
have the power to prescribe, from time to time and in any manner, the
forms and manner of service of writs and all other process; the mode and
manner of framing and filing proceedings and pleadings; of giving notice
and serving process of all kinds; of taking and obtaining evidence; drawing
up, entering, and enrolling orders; and generally to regulate and prescribe
by rule the forms for the entire pleading, practice, and procedure to be
used in all actions, motions, and proceedings at law of whatever nature by
the district courts of the United States.
The Committee's 1913 Report states that the statute was "prepared with the
advice and assistance of" Clayton. Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial
Procedure, 38 A.B.A. REP. 541, 542 (1913). During the annual meeting, Shelton
was asked whether the Committee drafted the act that it wanted adopted. He replied: "The specific act was drafted by Judge Clayton of the House Committee."
Id. 37; accord Hearings on ABA Bills Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1914) [hereinafter cited as 1914 House Hearings]; letter
from the Hon. Henry D. Clayton to the Hon. Thomas J. Walsh (May 26, 1926)
(Thomas J. Walsh Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Container 302
[hereinafter cited as Walsh Papers]). But see Sunderland, supra note 36, at 1118.
The bill was commonly referred to, and will be referred to hereafter, as amended
after the 1914 House Hearings, as the "Clayton bill."
155 See 38 A.B.A. REP. 35 (1913).
The ABA Committee's first report, establishing a format that would be followed in later years, dwelled upon the numerous
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At the request of the ABA, the House Judiciary Committee
held hearings on the Clayton bill in early 1914.156 In his testimony, former President Taft, by then President of the ABA,
again15, expressed his personal preference for a merged system of
law and equity procedure, but he bowed to political considerations
and supported the bill. 58 Shelton's testimony added little to his
individuals who, and organizations which, supported the bill, explained why it had
not been passed in the most recently concluded sessions of Congress, and urged
those dissatisfied to convert their complaints into "concrete and persistent demands
for immediate action by Congress." Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial
Procedure, 38 A.B.A. REP. 541, 543-44 (1913). Notwithstanding the Association's
action in 1912, however, the adoption of the Committee's report was not without
opposition. Moorfield Storey, a former President of the ABA, objected that the disuniformities within a state that would result from uniform federal procedure "would
be more dangerous than the existing system." 38 A.B.A. REP,. at 35. He also
argued that a representative commission was better suited to the task than the
Supreme Court, which was overburdened and had recently promulgated revised
Equity Rules, an effort that evidently did not impress Storey. See id. 35-36.
Another member moved that the report be referred back to the Committee so that it
might embody the principle that the distinction between actions at law and suits in
equity should be abolished. See id. 39-40. Finally, a third member contended that
the Conformity Act system best served "the convenience and accommodation of the
vast majority of the Bar," whose practice was confined to a single state, and, since
the Clayton Bill would not yield uniformity anong the States, should not be disturbed. Id. 44.
There was doubt whether, in light of the Association's previous actions on this
subject, opposition to the basic thrust of the campaign was in order. See id. 37-38.
But see id. 43. The failure to attempt the unification of procedure in law and
equity was explained on grounds of political reality, many lawyers in Congress believing that there were "constitutional difficulties." Transfer from equity to law,
already authorized under the 1912 Equity Rules, and from law to equity, authorized
(among other things) in a bill proposed by the Committee of Fifteen, were thought
to "go as far as it is possible to go at present." Id. 42.
156 1914 House Hearings, supra note 154. The Clayton bill had been reiniroduced as H.R. 133, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. (1913). The Hearings also considered
H.R. 4545, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1913), the ABA-sponsored bill providing, among
other things, for the amendment of pleadings from law to equity and for interposing
equitable defenses in actions at law. See supra note 155. The latter bill became
the Act of March 3, 1915, ch. 90, 38 Stat. 956.
157 In his inaugural address as President of the ABA, Taft had observed: "[M]y
own judgment about the Shelton Bill is that it is not quite radical enough. I think
it ought to provide that all suits in the federal court should be brought in one form
of civil action, thus uniting cases in law and equity . . . ." 39 A.B.A. REP. 381-82
(1914).
58
See 1914 House Hearings, supra note 154, at 16. Taft welcomed the
1
Clayton bill and H.R. 4545 as steps in the right direction, but he expressed the
hope that Congress ultimately would "go all the way and give to the Supreme Court
the opportunity to make rules uniting the two." Id.
Commentators have treated the ABA's original failure to seek a merged system
of law and equity procedure as inadvertent, misguided, or worse. See, e.g., Chandler,
supra note 41, at 480-81; Clark, ProceduralReform, supra note 41, at 146-47; ]lsen,
The Preliminary Draft of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 11 ST. JoHN's L. REv.
212, 213 (1937); Policies Involved in Federal Rule-Making, 18 J. Ams. JUDnCATmz
Soc'Y 134 (1935); Sunderland, supra note 36, at 1123-24. As the discussion at the
1913 ABA annual meeting, supra note 155, and the 1914 House Hearings indicate,
however, it was a considered response to the constitutional doubts of legislators,
reflecting the view that, as Taft put it, "what you want to do in getting legislation
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previous expressions on the subject, except a more realistic sense
of priorities among the goals of the proposed legislation.159 At
one point in his testimony, however, Shelton described the ABA's
program using words and concepts that came to assume prominence:
The Supreme Court would gather from the spirit and
letter of the statute the desire of Congress to make an
equable division of duty as to the courts, leaving to the
court the preparation of the detailed machinery but reserving to itself all fundamental and jurisdictionalmatters.
In other words, Congress would tell the Supreme Court
what the nisi prius courts may and shall do, but will
[sic] leave it to the experience of that great tribunal to
provide how they shall do it....
...[The bill] will set the Supreme Court free to do those
things it is prepared and properly situated to do, the
Congress confining itself to substantive, jurisdictional,and
fundamental matters.160
The issue that consumed most of the discussion at the 1914
House Hearings concerned the effect of the Clayton bill on existing
federal statutes. The ABA's witnesses resisted an amendment that
would have rendered the court rules promulgated pursuant to
the proposed legislation subordinate to other statutes.161 More
is to get as much as you can and not ask for too much and defeat the whole." 1914
House Hearings,supra note 154, at 16. In that regard, it should be noted that such
constitutional doubts were not restricted to members of Congress. See, e.g., 2
CAIw. L. Bsv. 150, 151 (1914). Indeed, as late as 1909, in his annual message to
Congress, Taft himself had presumed that a unitary form of action in the federal
courts was "impossible, without an amendment to the Constitution." 45 CONG. EeC.
25,31 (1909).
On the other hand, not everyone in the reform movement was convinced, with
Taft, that further legislation (in addition to H.R. 133 and H.R. 4545) was necessary
to truly effective reform. See 1914 House Hearings, supra note 154, at 25.
159 See 1914 House Hearings,supra note 154, at 23-24. Judge Parker, President
of the New York State Bar Association, was even more realistic, observing about
uniform procedure among the states on a federal model: "It is not to come in your
time or mine, but nevertheless it is an ideal which should be reached in the future."
id. 26.
180 Id. 22-23 (emphasis added).
161The grant of authority to promulgate Equity Rules under § 917 of the
Revised Statutes, on which the Clayton bill may have been modeled, specified
that the Supreme Court "shall have power to prescribe, from time to time, and in
any manner not inconsistent with any law of the United States .... ." Rev. Stat.
§ 917 (1878) (emphasis added). The provision is hardly unambiguous. The
language of the 1914 proposed amendment, "not inconsistent with any law of the
United States," had originally been left out after consultation between Representative Clayton and Shelton. See 1914 House Hearings, supra note 154, at 21-22.
At the hearings, Shelton and Judge Parker opposed it on the grounds that it would
require the repeal of numerous statutes, the specification of which was a difficult
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generally, they resisted proposals for naming the statutes to be
repealed by the rules.162 Members of the Committee were uneasy
about the constitutionality of delegating "to the Supreme Court
. . . the authority to repeal an existing statute." 113 They ultimately accepted the position of Senator Elihu Root of New York
that any superseding effect derived from the authorizing statute,
although they agreed that such effect should be made explicit in
the statute.6 4 None of the participants at the hearings, however,
was troubled by the constitutionality of the basic delegation (that
is, with the exception of its super-statutory aspect), at least after a
discourse by Root placing it in the context of the times. 165
enterprise, and would breed controversy regarding the status of the Conformity
Act See id. 21-22, 25.
62
1 See supra note 161; 1914 House Hearings,supra note 154, at 36.
163 1914 House Hearings,supra note 154, at 36.
164 Senator Root opined that Congress could not delegate to the Supreme
Court the power to supersede existing statutes. He was of the view, however, that
the Clayton bill itself had that effect with respect to the Conformity Act. When
his attention was drawn to the situation of federal statutes providing specific procedural directives, Root again relied on repeal by operation of the authorizing
statute. His responses suggest that he continued to have the Conformity Act in
mind, although in terms they covered the other situation. Taft may have recognized the possibility that they were dissimilar. In order to avoid any constitutional
question, he suggested naming the statutes to be repealed in futuro. That suggestion was opposed for the reasons invoked earlier. Finally, Representative Floyd
vigorously stated his doubts that Congress could constitutionally delegate to the
Court the power, by court rules, to repeal prior inconsistent statutes. He was
evidently persuaded by Root's argument that Congress could itself "do so in futuro
in the authorizing statute, and he did not distinguish between statutes present to
the mind of Congress at the time, such as the Conformity Act, and unidentified
and (until rules were promulgated) unidentifiable statutes. See id. 29-31, 33,
36-38.
' 65 We, by law, provide that the Supreme Court of the United States shall
make the rules in relation to the practice. The whole progress and development of our Government is necessarily toward a greater measure of
delegation of authority. As our Government becomes more vast and complicated and the problems more difficult to understand, and as more and
more duties are imposed upon Congress, it becomes more necessary to
delegate more and more. That is the inevitable result of a higher and
wider organization.
We can, ourselves, no longer consider and pass upon matters of detail.
We delegate to the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to do
things which, in the beginning, the legislators and Congress did themselves. And they are dealing with a vast transportation problem with the
exercise of exceedingly wide discretion.
And we have just delegated to the Central Reserve Board enormous
power in regard to the banking interests of the country. We are now
considering a measure for a trades commission, to which, if the bill passes,
will necessarily be delegated very broad powers.
It is the inevitable course of the development of government in a
growing country that the body which is at the head must deal more and
more with the general subjects, and must delegate the particulars more
and more to other agencies. It will, in accordance with that inevitable
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The 1914 House Report recommended that the Clayton bill
be- passed with two amendments. 16 Although uniformity of federal and state procedure was not slighted as a goal, inadequate
state procedure and the otherwise inadequate federal procedure
under the Conformity Act were deemed equally important reasons
for reform. 107 In describing the system envisioned by the Clayton bill, the 1914 Report elaborated Shelton's argument that it
represented an equable division of power between the Supreme
Court and CongTess. 16 8
course of development, leave this subject of making rules of practice to
the courts which have to administer them.
Id. 30; see also id. 29-30.
166 The first extended its application to the district courts of the District of
Columbia. H.R. REP. No. 462, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914) [hereinafter cited
as 1914 HousE REPORT]; see 1914 House Hearings, supra note 154, at 23. The
second, reflecting the extensive discussion at the hearings, added a new § 2, as
follows: "When and as the rules of the court herein authorized shall be promulgated, all laws in conflict therewith shall be and become of no further force and
effect." 1914 Hous. REPORT, supra, at 1. In explaining this amendment, the
Report reflects the somewhat confusing discussion at the 1914 House Hearings.
However, although agreeing with Shelton that the rules would not "have the effect
or dignity of statutes or decisions"-indeed, probably for that reason-the Report
concluded that an express statutory repeal of inconsistent existing statutes was not
only desirable, but "necessary." Compare id. 16 with 1914 House Hearings, supra
note 154, at 21-22.
This provision remained essentially unchanged in all subsequent versions of
the uniform federal procedure bill, including the version that was enacted in 1934,
which provided in § 1: "[Said rules] shall take effect six months after their promulgation, and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no firther force or
effect." Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064. It therefore
requires a narrow view of the legislative history of the Act to maintain that "ithe
reason for this grant of law revision power is entirely unclear-this provision was
simply never discussed in the legislative reports or debates on the Rules Enabling
Act." Clinton, supra note 13, at 64 (footnote omitted); see id. 54 & n.243. Moreover, there is little basis for historical speculation about this provision using 1934
as a point of reference, rather than 1914. See id. 74-75. Indeed, when a question
was raised about it by a member of Congress in 1938, the secretary of the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, noted its provenance and referred to the 1914 House
Report for an explanation of the reasons it was inserted in the uniform federal
procedure bill. See letter from Edgar B. Tolman to the Hon. Abe Murdock (March
3, 1938) (copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
After the passage of the Act, Professor Sunderland made the argument that
the provision for super-statutory effect evidenced "a purpose to confer broad rather
than narrow powers." Sunderland, Character and Extent of the Rule-Making
Power Granted United States Supreme Court and Methods of Effective Exercise,
21 A.B.A. J. 404, 406 (1935). In fact, since only Federal Rules that are otherwise
valid under the Act supersede inconsistent federal statutes, it is neutral in that
respect. Moreover, it is not irrelevant that the provision was first inserted in a
bill the grants of rulemaking authority in which were considerably narrower than
those in the Act. For other recent commentary on this provision, see W. BRoWN,
supra note 14, at 98-101.
167 See 1914 HousE REPORT, supra note 166, at 7-9.
188 Analyzed, it means that Congress will delegate to the Supreme Court

the power to regulate all detail questions of pleading and procedure and
practice; that Congress will retain control over all fundamental and juris-
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2. Borrowings from the New York Reform Movement
Representative Clayton thought that, in his bill, Congress
"pretty well defined what the court may do." 160 That is not a
surprising view in light of the bill's specific and restrictive grants
of authority to prescribe
the forms and manner of service of writs and all other
process; the mode and manner of framing and filing proceedings and pleadings; of giving notice and serving process of all kinds; of taking and obtaining evidence; drawing up, entering and enrolling orders; and generally to
regulate and prescribe by rule the forms for the entire
pleading, practice, and procedure . .. . 0
It is more difficult, however, to evaluate Shelton's and the House
Judiciary Committee's descriptions of the division of power and
responsibility effected by the bill. "Substantive," "jurisdictional,"
and "fundamental," some of the words used, are not self-defining,
and no examples are given.1 1 Because the language and concepts
of 1914 became standard in the propaganda for, and the legislative
characterization of, the uniform federal procedure bill, their origins
should be explored.
dictional matters, the production of evidence and, of permanent procedure.
In simple words, "Congress will tell the courts what they shall do, but
not how they shall do it." This superintendence and regulation will be
left exclusively to the Supreme Court.
. i . It is in order to say that the new system of rules will preserve all the merit of the common law and of the code procedure. It will
occupy a middle state between the two extremes. To that extent it will
follow somewhat the present English system that is so much praised, but
will possess the advantage of instant improvement by the Supreme Court
instead of by annual conference. Another advantage over the English
system is that it will contain no substantive law and no matters of jurisdiction or fundamental questions or legislative policy. All of that is reserved to Congress. So simple is the power delegated that the system of
rules can go into effect without the change of a single jurisdictional,
fundamental, or legislative policy or statute. They touch only the detail
operation of the inferior courts in the actual trial of a case and the
preparation therefor in the clerk's office.
Id. 14-15. For other borrowings from Shelton, compare, e.g., id. 2-3 with Report
of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 38 A.B.A. REPn. 541, 541-43
(1913).
169 1914 House Hearings, supra note 154, at 37.

170 ILR. 26,462, 62d Cong., 3d Sess.; S. 8454, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1912).
For the text of the bill, see supra note 154.
171 Nor are "permanent procedure" or "legislative policy," other concepts
invoked in describing the allocation, defined. See infra note 185.
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a. The 1912 New York Report
An early link between the ABA and New York reform movements has been noted. 7 2 There were some borrowings by both
sides at the end of the nineteenth century. 173 They were as
nothing, however, compared to the use Shelton and the House
Judiciary Committee made of New York materials in discussing
the limitations on court rulemaking imposed by the Clayton bill.
A Board of Statutory Consolidation had been appointed in New
York in 1904.17
In 1912 it was directed "to report to the next
legislature a plan for the classification, consolidation and simplification of the civil practice in the courts of this state." 175 The
New York Board's Report, dated December 1, 1912, called for a
short practice act, rules of court, and the segregation of substantive
law.' 76 The question of division of subject matter between practice act and rules of court, which had been a source of controversy and confusion in New York, 177 was answered by remitting
to the practice act "the fundamental and jurisdictional matters of
See supra notes 117 & 134.
For instance, the 1896 Report of the ABA's Committee on Uniformity of
Procedure and Comparative Law mentioned parallel efforts in New York. See
Committee Report, supra note 111, at 421-22 (1896).
The Committee's original
resolution, contained in the report, almost surely was modeled on a New York bill.
Compare id. with id. 423-24. The 1898 Report of the ABA Committee, which
described in some detail and praised the English system, observed that it did not
"necessitate the taking from the legislature of any of its functions relative to
questions of substantive law or jurisdiction, since it involves the enactment of a
statute which shall contain the skeleton of a system of procedure, leaving its
development to the courts." Report of the Committee on Uniformity of Procedure,
21 A.B.A. REP. 454, 459 (1898).
The author of that report was chairman of the
New York State Bar Association committees which, in 1898, urged the legislature
to pass the legislation that the ABA used as a model and, in 1899, elaborated the
division of legislative and judicial responsibility for procedure. See supra notes
157 & 174. Thereafter, the New York Association made use of the 1898 ABA
Committee's Report. See 22 N.Y. ST. B.A. Rm. 175-76 (1899); Report of the
Committee on Law Reform, 24 N.Y. ST. B.A. RiP. 287, 296-97 (1901).
174 The Board was appointed on the recommendation of the New York Committee of Fifteen. See supra note 134; Report of the Committee on Law Reform,
26 N.Y. ST. B.A. REP. 351 (1903).
175 1912 N.Y. Laws ch. 393, § 1. For the history, see 1 REPORT OF Tx BoAu
172
73

1

OF STATUTORY CONSOLIDATION ON TE SIvPLIFICATION OF THE CIVu. PRACTICE IN
TnE CouRTs OF NEW Youc 5 (1915) [hereinafter cited as 1915 NEw Yonx REPORT];
REPORT OF THE JoiNr LEGISLATIVE COMMrrTEE ON THE SIMVPLIFICATION OF CIVI
PRAcTIcE 16 (1919) [hereinafter cited as 1919 NEw Yosx REPORT].

The Board then included, among others, Adolph J. Rodenbeck, who had been
chairman of the Special Joint Committee on Statutory Revision Commission Bills,
and William B. Homblower, who was a member of the ABA's first Committee on
Uniform Judicial Procedure. See supra note 134; 37 A.B.A. Rm,. 142 (1912).
76

3 See REPORT OF Tm BOARD OF STATUTORY CONSOLIDATION OF THE STATE
OF NEW YoRic ON A PLAN FOR THE SIMAPLIFICATION OF TE CrvrL PRACTICE IN mm
CouRTs OF Tm STATE 7-9 (1912) [hereinafter cited as 1912 NEw Yonm REPORT].

177 See supra note 134.
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procedure in the Code of Civil Procedure," 178 and to rules of
court "the important details of practice now in the Code of Civil
Procedure and in the present court rules." 179 The plan adumbrated was thought to be midway between a legislative system
similar to that in existence in New York and a court rule system
similar to that in England, and superior to both. 80
The 1912 Report of the New York Board of Statutory Consolidation attracted attention immediately. Less than four months
after it was issued, Roscoe Pound referred to it in reviewing the
progress of the idea of reforming procedure by rules of court.' 8 '
178

1912 NEW Yonx BOEPOT, supra note 176, at 7-8.

179 Id. 8. The Report explained:

There are three systems of procedure in common use from which to select:
(1) the legislative system or the statutory idea of regulating the practice
by the legislature leaving to the courts the adoption of rules for the
orderly conduct and dispatch of business something like the system in
operation in this state although here some details of practice are regulated
by court rules, (2) the court rules system or the English idea under
which only the organization of the courts and jurisdictional matters are
prescribed by the legislature and all the rest of the procedure and practice
is regulated by stated court rules like the system in vogue in England, and
(3) the intermediate procedural system or the advanced American idea
combining the best features of both of the above mentioned systems and
under which jurisdictional and other important matters of procedure are
regulated by the legislature and the details of practice are left to court
rules similar to the system largely followed in Massachusetts and Connecticut and recently adopted in New Jersey.
Id. app. at 23-24.
The Report continued:
The present code system in this state of regulating details of practice
by statute has been tried and has so lamentably failed and has been condemned in such unmeasured terms that it may be passed by without
further comment
The English system under which important matters of procedure,
which we would regard as fundamental and jurisdictional, are regulated
by rules of court is not in harmony with the spirit of our democratic
institutions and the principle of checks and balances which is necessary to
the preservation of departmental equilibrium under our republican form of
government.
The intermediate procedural system which might be called the advanced American system of a legislative act dealing with the important
matters of procedure, jurisdictional and otherwise, leaving the details of
practice to court rules seems to be the one best suited to the existing
conditions in this state.
This plan will not disturb the existing procedure upon any fundamental and jurisdictional matter, most of the provisions relating to which
have received a settled construction, but will eradicate the evils attaching
to the regulation by statute of the details of practice concerning which
there is such a universal complaint
Id. app. at 29-30.
180 See id. app. at 29.
181 See Pound, Reforming Procedure by Rules of Court, 76 CENT. L.J. 211,
211 (1913).
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Shelton mentioned it in the 1913 Report of the ABA Committee
on Uniform Judicial Procedure.8 2 Moreover, the influence of the
1912 New York Report on the thinking of Shelton and the House
Committee is clear. The words used to describe the scheme of
allocation they supported-"substantive," "fundamental," and
"jurisdictional"-were taken from the 1912 New York Report. 183
Shelton and the House Committee also shared the Board's view
that such a scheme preserved "a due balance between the three
departments of government." 184
The borrowings made by Shelton and the House Committee
were problematical for a number of reasons. The 1912 Report of
the Board of Statutory Consolidation presented only a framework
for procedural reform; it did not elaborate the concepts designed
to effect the desired division of functions. Nor were the concepts
elaborated by Shelton or the House Committee. Thus, they were
espousing an allocation scheme knowing its purposes and abstractions, but not knowing how the creators of the scheme intended
to apply those abstractions. 8 5 Another problem presented by the
borrowing was the role, if any, that a practice act-central to the
New York scheme-would play in the proposed federal scheme.
The Clayton bill authorized rulemaking in designated areas; it
was silent as to the rest of the field of procedure.8 0 Finally, and
more generally, it does not appear that either Shelton or the House
82

See Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 38 A.B.A.
541, 543 (1913). The 1912 NEw Yo=x RE oRT, supra note 176, was cited
even after the 1915 NEw Yonn PEPor T, supra note 175, was issued. See, e.g.,
Procedure by Rules of Court, 1 J. Am. JunrcATuRE Soc'y 77, 77 (1917).
183 The House Committee referred to "permanent procedure," 1914 Housr.
REPoRT, supra note 166, at 14, and "legislative policy," id. 15, concepts not mentioned, in terms at least, in the 1912 NEw Yonn REPoRT, supra note 176. "Permanent procedure" may have been borrowed from Pound, see supra note 140, who
seems to have used it generically to describe matters beyond the reach of rules of
court. "Legislative policy," supra note 168, may have been no more than an
alternative formulation of "fundamental question."
184 1912 NEw YoRx REPORT, supra note 176, app. at 35; see 1914 HOUSE
REPoRT, supra note 166, at 13; T. SmToN, Spmrr OF THE CouRTs xxvii-xxix
(1918) [hereinafter cited as SPmrr OF THE CoURTs]; Shelton, The Reform of
Judicial Procedure,reprinted in Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary
on H.R. 2377 and H.R. 90, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 28, 33 (1922).
185 Cf. Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMBmRmGE L.J. 313,
315 (1978) ("Often when an idea is borrowed those responsible have no direct
experience of how well the rule works in practice."). The New York Board did,
however, classify a number of matters, including rights of action, limitation of
actions, and evidence, as substantive law. See 1912 NE W YoR REPO RT, supra
note 176, at 8; id. app. at 25.
186 It is unclear whether the House Committee's observation that the system
of rules could "go into effect without the change of a single jurisdictional, fundamental or legislative policy or statute," was intended to speak to this subject.
'

REP.

1914 HousEF_RFPORT, supra note 166, at 15; see supra note 168.
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Committee considered the possibility that differences between
procedural regulation in New York and in the federal system, both
inherent and historical, might render the borrowing inappropriate,
even at an abstract level.
Some light was cast on these matters in 1915, when the Board
of Statutory Consolidation presented to the New York Legislature
a report in three volumes, 187 and a subcommittee of the Senate
Judiciary Committee held hearings on a federal practice code. s8
b. The 1915 New York Report
The 1915 New York Report proposed to implement the threepart plan set forth in the 1912 New York Report by specifically
allocating some matters to court rules, some to a practice act, and
some to separate statutes. The New York Board often used the
term "fundamental" to describe matters allocated to the legislature. But the term as used by the Board had two different meanings that were linked to the choice between allocation to the
practice act and allocation to separate statutes. In its first meaning, "fundamental" matters signified the "ground work or fundamentals of procedure," 189 "the main propositions or principles
that should govern." 190 The Board placed matters deemed "fundamental" in this sense in the practice act.' 91 In its second meaning,
"fundamental" was a hedge. The Board used the term "fundamental" in this sense to designate matters that, for the purpose
of allocating between legislation and rules of court, were difficult
to classify as substantive law or substantive rights, on the one hand,
or procedure, on the other, and that, although possibly within
the broad rulemaking power of the courts under the New York
Constitution, were assigned to the legislature precisely because
they were matters thought to present serious questions of power. 192
87
'
See 1915 NEW YoRn PE 'onT, supra note 175. The report was made pursuant to 1913 N.Y. Laws, ch. 713, which was enacted as recommended in 1912

N-w YoRn REPoRT,supra note 176, at 17-19.
188 Simplification of Judicial Procedure: Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 552

Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 64th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1915) [hereinafter cited as 1915 Senate Hearings).
189 1 1915 NEw YoRK REPoRT, supra note 175, at 168.
190 Id. 173.
191 "This treatment.., leaves the field clear for the treatment of the changes
in the practice by the practice act, and the details of the practice by the rules of
court." 2 Id. 167.
19-See infra text accompanying notes 200-02. See also Rodenbeck, Principles
of a Modern Procedure, 2 J. Am.JumDcAT

RE

Soc'y 100, 102-03 (1918).

Roden-

beck was chairman of the Board of Statutory Consolidation, which wrote the 1915
New York Report.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

1060

[Vol. 130:1015

The New York Board recognized that it had "a large discretion" in assigning matters, 93 and it thought that "perhaps such
provisions as those relating to rights and limitations of actions" 194
might be placed in the practice act as "matters of a fundamental
and jurisdictional nature." 195 But it did not do so. Instead, the
New York Board treated matters deemed "fundamental" in the
second sense like the substantive law and assigned them to separate
statutes. Evidence, rights of action, and limitations of actions,
which had been classified as substantive law in the 1912 Report,
were so treated. 96 In addition, the Board placed in separate
statutes "cases . . . in which an execution may issue against the

person and property," 197 cases in which provisional remedies may
be applied, 198 and provisions defining the right to a jury trial.19
In either case the function of the concept was to assign responsibility to the legislature. Only in the case of matters deemed
"fundamental" in the second sense, however, was the choice
thought to implicate constitutional considerations.
The Board viewed the regulation of procedure as a suitable
subject, under the New York Constitution, either for legislation
or, in the absence of legislation to the contrary, for rules of
court.200

It reasoned that the courts possessed inherent power to

promulgate rules, subject to legislative override and to the limitation that the inherent power "would not extend to the declaration
in rules of court of substantive rights which come within the
province of the legislative function." 201 Such, in the Board's view,
were also the limits that the New York Constitution imposed on
the delegation by the legislature of its functions. The Board
concluded:
The regulation of procedure embraces matters that
are of a very substantial character as affecting rights of
person and of property and are suitable subjects of legis193 1 1915 NEW YoRm REPORT, supra note 175, at 167.
194 Id.
195 Id.
1

96

See 1 1915 NE.w Yorex

REPORT,

supra note 175, at 165-67; supra note 185;

see also 3 1915 NEw Yonx REPORT, supra note 175, at 477-79. Other provisions
so treated were costs, fees, disbursements and interest. See 1 id. 165-67.
1971 1915 NEw YoRK REPORT, supra note 175, at 423.
19 8 See id. 438-39; see also 3 id. 480-83.
199 See 3 id. 498; see also 1 id. 375.
The Board's discussion relied on Wayman v. Southard,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825); Beers v. Haughton, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 328 (1835);
and Bank of the United States v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51 (1825).
201 1 1915 NEw YonK REPORT, supra note 175, at 175.
200 See 1 id. 174-77.
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lation where the legislature deems it proper to define
them, but they may be regulated by the courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction in the absence of legislation
to the contrary.
The power of the courts, therefore, to enact rules in
the absence of restrictive legislation is very broad, covering rights that are of a very substantial character and
extends not merely to matters of form and practice, but
to matters of substance and procedure and generally whatever is necessary to exercise the jurisdiction conferred
upon the courts by the constitution or the legislature and
to enforce their orders, decrees and judgments.
Nevertheless, in working out the new practice every
serious question of power to enact a given provision has
been resolved against the courts and explains [sic] why
so many provisions formerly in the code have been inserted in substantive statutes.
The question of power to enact a specific rule rests
with the courts and where it is a mere matter of opinion
no fine theories or preconceived notions ought to stand
in the way of the advancement of a great public reform. 2

2

c. The 1915 Senate Hearings
Shelton testified before a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary
Committee in 1915 that the New York Board of Statutory Consolidation had been appointed "to work out an equable division of
power between the judicial and legislative departments of government." 203 He also claimed that the plan of the 1915 New York
Report was "identical with the American Bar Association's plan,"
raising again the question of the role of a practice act in the latter.2 0 4 The occasion of his testimony helps to explain that remark
and the statement in his 1915 Committee on Uniform Judicial
Procedure Report that the ABA's program included "a short practice code": 205 the subcommittee was holding hearings on a proposal
for what Shelton referred to as "The Practice Code," contained
6
in a bill passed by the House.2 0
Id. 176-77 (emphasis added).
1915 Senate Hearings, supra note 188, at 8.
204 Id.; see supra text accompanying note 186.
202

203
2 05

Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 40 A.B.A. REP.
502, 502 (1915).
206
The bill was H.R. 15,578, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914), passed by the
House on June 17, 1914. 51 CoNG. BEc. 10,615 (1914). Consideration of
the matters contemplated therein by a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary
Committee was authorized by S. Res. 552, 63d Cong., 3d Sess. (1915), reprinted
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Notwithstanding that a revision of federal statutory law governing procedure was under consideration in 1915,207 others did

not share Shelton's view that the "American Bar Association's
plan" and the model elaborated in the 1915 New York Report
were "identical." In remarks to the Ohio State Bar Association in
July 1915, Roscoe Pound asserted that there were two plans under
consideration in New York, one to "turn this matter over entirely
to rules of court," which Pound viewed as the ABA plan, and the
other "to have a short practice act . . . and then turn the rest

over [to rules of court]," which he associated with the 1915 New
York Report.20 8 Although Pound approved of the 1915 New York
Report's discussion of the constitutional issues, 20 9 he preferred to
the plan it recommended the plan he thought was recommended
210
by the ABA.
in 1915 Senate Hearings, supra note 188, at 53-54. For the references to "The
Practice Code," see Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure,
40 A.B.A. REP. 502, 504, 506 (1915). In his description of the plan proposed
in the 1915 New York Report and the ABA plan, said to be identical, Shelton
stated: "It means simply that the Congress shall in the future have absolute
control over all fundamental matters, questions of jurisdiction and of permanent
procedure and evidence and such other matters of a permanent nature as those
with which you have been dealing to-day; but that the detailed operation of the
courts and their conduct shall be by rules of court, and that those rules may be
made and changed from time to time by the Supreme Court .... ." 1915 Senate
Hearings, supra note 188, at 8 (emphasis added). H.R. 15,578 contained twelve
chapters and three hundred and eighty-one sections, as follows: Chapter One
(§ 1-56): District Attorneys,. Marshals, Clerks, Commissioners, and Stenographers; Chapter Two (§§ 57-105): Pay and allowances of Court Officers, Jurors,
and Witnesses; Chapter Three (§§ 106-165): Evidence; Chapter Four (§§ 166232): Civil Procedure; Chapter Five (§§ 233-269): Criminal Procedure; Chapter
Six ( §§ 270-296): Procedure on Error and Appeal; Chapter Seven (§§ 297-334):
Judgments, Costs and Execution; Chapter Eight (§§ 335-343): Limitations; Chapter Nine (§§ 344-361): Habeas Corpus; Chapter Ten (§ 362-376): Extradition;
Chapter Eleven (§§ 377-379): General Provisions; Chapter Twelve (§§ 380-381):
Repealing Provisions. See H.R. REP. No. 521, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
207In fact, H.R. 15,778 was nothing like the practice act contemplated in
the 1915 New York Report, as the outline supra note 206 and Shelton's use of
the word "code" suggest. See also Ninth Annual Report of the Special Committee
to Suggest Remedies and Formulate Proposed Laws to Prevent Delay and UnThat fact and a
necessary Cost in Litigation, 2 A.B.A. J. 603, 607 (1916).
review of matters covered by H.R. 15,778 (e.g., evidence, limitations) tends to
confirm that Shelton attached only one meaning to the concept of "fundamental"
matters, namely those matters that should be assigned to legislation rather than
court rules because they raised questions of institutional legitimacy, if not of
constitutional power. See infra text accompanying note 227.
Pound had referred to the 1915
20836 OMo ST. B.A. Paoc. 40 (1915).
New York Report, which had not yet been issued. Id. 36.
209 See Pound, Regulation of Judicial Procedure By Rules of Court, 10 ILL.
L. REv. 163, 170 n.27 (1915).
210 Of course jurisdictional lines are fixed by constitutions and statutes.
These matters will never be left and ought not to be left to rules of court.
Beyond that, however, I find it difficult to perceive any real advantage
in the plan adopted in New Jersey and recommended in New York. It
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3. Senator Walsh Opposes the Uniform Federal
Procedure Bill
The 1915 Senate Hearings were also the occasion of the first
public debate between Shelton and Senator Thomas J. Walsh of
Montana on the issue of uniform federal procedure. Walsh had
doubts about and objections to the Clayton bill that had led him
to prevent the report of the bill. 211

He was concerned both that

uniform federal procedure would cause inconvenience to the many
lawyers who would be unfamiliar with rules different from those
applied in their state courts and that a host of interpretive problems would be created by the new system.212 He feared that the
combination of practitioner unfamiliarity and interpretive problems would result in numerous mistakes. Walsh was curious about
the process that would be used to obtain amendments to rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court-which he regarded as legislation-and doubted that the Justices, overburdened, conservative,
and far removed from the trial of cases, would change them. 21s
Thus, Walsh sided with what he considered to be the interests of
most lawyers, who practiced only in their home state, by advocating
federal conformity to state procedure. He declared himself "for
is just as difficult to frame supposed essential principles a priori as it
is to lay down details a priori. Amendment will be as inevitable in the
one case as in the other. In each case the rle ultimately should be
shaped as a result of judicial experience of how it works in practice.
Id. 176. For Pound's earlier views, see supra text accompanying notes 139-40.
Pound was joined in this preference by Professor Hudson, who, however,
suggested that a statutory framework would be acceptable "for a beginning and
until the general acceptance of the principle of judicial control has been vindicated by success." Hudson, The Proposed Regulation of Missouri Procedure by
Rules of Court, 17 U. Mo. BuLL. 3, 28 (1916).
See also Morgan, Judicial
Regulation of Court Procedure, 2 MnqN. L. REv. 81, 96 (1918), where the
author endorsed the ABA's proposal, which he believed favored "the Colorado
plan of entrusting the entire subjects of pleading and practice to the courts, rather
than the New Jersey plan of having the legislature prescribe the general principles and outline, leaving only the details to the courts." Morgan did not classify
the plan contained in the 1915 New York Report, perhaps because he was then
describing the "movement for control of court procedure by rules of court" generally. Id.
After the passage of the 1934 Act, the Secretary of the Advisory Committee
noted that Congress had gone "beyond the scope of the canon of.procedural reform" that Pound bad prepared for the ABA Committee of Fifteen in 1910.
Tolman, Improvement of Court Procedure, 61 A.B.A. REP. 432, 436 (1936);
see supra text accompanying notes 131 & 137.
21140 A.B.A. REP. 32 (1915); see 1915 Senate Hearings, supra note 188, at
27-28.
2 12
See 1915 Senate Hearings, supra note 188, at 21, 27-28.
213

See id. 23-25, 28.
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the one hundred who stay at home as against the one who goes

abroad."

214

Shelton was not responsive to Walsh's questions at the 1915
Senate Hearings 215 and overreacted to the latter's suggestion that
uniform federal procedure would benefit only an elite minority of
the bar.216 Thereafter, Shelton became progressively critical of
Walsh's opposition to the reform, 217 addressing Walsh's arguments
in a patronizing manner. 2 18 In early 1917 the Senate Judiciary
Committee issued a report that appeared to recommend passage of
the uniform federal procedure bill.219 The putative "majority
report" 220 added little to the 1914 House Report which it specifically adopted. The "Views of the Minority," actually signed
by a majority of the Committee, elaborated Walsh's objections at
the 1915 Senate Hearings and suggested that Congress could not
constitutionally delegate the power to make supervisory rules of
procedure. 221 But because of the long history of Congress's
acquiescence in the Supreme Court's promulgation of Equity Rules,
Walsh pressed the argument only to the extent of suggesting that a
Id. 28.
id. 9-13.
216See id. 28-29; Shelton, A New Era of Judicial Relations, 23 CASE & COMmENr 388, 393 (1916); SPnuT OF =H COUNTS, supra note 184, at 195-96, 198-99.
217 See, e.g., Shelton, Progress of the Proposal to Substitute Rules of Court
for Common Law Practice, 5 VA. L. REv. 111, 120 (1917); SPRIT oF T=E
COURTS, supra note 184, at 96; 43 A.B.A. REP. 87 (1918); 48 A.B.A. REP. 114-15
(1923); 49 A.B.A. REP. 96-97 (1924); 51 A.B.A. REP. 119-22 (1926). In 1922
Walsh complained: "The discussion, so far as it has referred to opposition in
this committee, has had a personal tinge, and that is a thing that I feel at liberty
to speak of. I am supposed to be the evil genius who has stood in the way of
the enactment of this measure." Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on the judiciary, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1922).
Walsh's perception of a
"personal tinge" may have been sharpened by a resolution passed by the ABA's
Executive Committee at its 1922 mid-winter meeting. See Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 47 A.B.A. REP. 370, 371 (1922).
218 See, e.g., Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 46
A.B.A. REP. 461, 466 (1921). Following the passage of the Rules Enabling Act
of 1934, Attorney General Cummings was fond of contrasting his way with
the Congress with that of the ABA, and attributing the difference in results obtained to the difference in styles. See, e.g., Cummings, Remarks, in PocEEDNmcs
OF THE WASHINGTON, DC INsTrruTE ON FEDERAL RuLEs OF CiviL PROCEDURE 19,
20 (1938), reprinted in 24 A.B.A. J. 885 (1938). See also Clark, The Bar and
the Recent Reform of Federal Procedure, 25 A.B.A. J. 22, 22 (1939).
219 S.REp. No. 892, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1917) [hereinafter cited as 1917
214

215 See

SENATE

REPORT].

Subsequently, Senator Walsh explained that a majority of the members of
the Judiciary Committee ultimately signed the statement of the "Views of the
Minority," id. pt. 2, one member having "changed his attitude upon a more
careful study of the question, reversing the position of the Committee." S. REP.
No. 1174, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1926) (Minority Views); see Walsh, Senator
Walsh Replies, 12 A.B.A. J. 651 (1926).
221 See 1917 SENATE REPORT, supra note 219, pt. 2, at 6-8.
220

1982]

THE RULES ENABLING ACT

106,5

"new departure" should be scuttled and that reform should pro222
ceed, if at all, by direct action of Congress._
4. Clarification and Change in the ABA Plan and the
Uniform Federal Procedure Bill: The Sutherland Bill
It was mistakenly reported at the 1916 ABA annual meeting
that the uniform federal procedure bill had been passed by both
houses of Congress.223 In fact, a reading of the 1915 Senate Hearings and the 1917 Senate Report makes clear that early predictions
of a campaign quickly concluded had been naYve. Nonetheless,
the calls for passage of the ABA's bill, and for regulation of procedure by rules of court in the states, increased, particularly in
224
the literature.
One item published in this period is of special interest. In
1918, Shelton's book, Spirit of the Courts, was published. Consisting in the main of addresses made by the author between 1912
and 1917, the work described the ABA's program in, by then,
familiar but still largely undefined terms. 225 Shelton did, however,
clarify his view as to the role of a practice act in the ABA scheme.
He maintained that, because the ABA bill would not involve the
alteration of procedure "upon any jurisdictional or fundamental
matter," the preparation of a practice act to deal with those matters was "a subject entirely apart" from the adoption of the uniform federal procedure bill.226 He also suggested that the exclusion
222 Id. 9.
223

See Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 3 A.B.A. J.
521, 521 (1917).
224 See, e.g., Shelton, supra note 217; Clayton, Uniform Federal Procedure, 84
CErNT. LJ. 5 (1917)
(the author was the author of the Clayton bill, set forth
supra note 154); Morgan, supra note 210; Scott, The Progress of the Law, 19181919, Civil Procedure, 33 HAIv. L. lEv. 236, 236-38 (1919); Is Congress Obstructing Reform in Judicial Procedure?, 90 CENT. L.J. 40 (1920); Shelton,
Campaign for Modernizing Procedure, 7 A.B.A. J. 165 (1921). In 1917, the
American Judicature Society began publishing its Journal, from the start a constant and outspoken ally of both the federal and the national movements for
regulation of procedure by rules of court. See, e.g., Procedure Through Rules
of Court, J. Am. JuDicATuRE Soc'y, June 1917, at 17; Senate Committee Gone
Astray, J. Am. JuDicATuR= Soc'Y, Aug. 1917, at 17; Procedure by Rules of Court,
J. Am. JuDicATURE Soc'y, Oct. 1917, at 77; Thomas W. Shelton's Book, 2 J. Am.
JuDicATuRE Soc'y 91 (1918); Rodenbeek, supra note 192; Editorial, 4 J. Am.
JUDicATRE Soc'Y 163 (1920).
225 Spmrr oF THE Couwrs, supra note 184, at xxiv-xxv, xxviii-xxix, 105, 130.
226Id. xxv.
From the start, Shelton had been concerned that the uniform
federal procedure bill would be delayed by the proposed federal practice code.
See 1915 Senate Hearings, supra note 188, at 16. In 1916 he stated that he was
unwilling to "complicate" the uniform federal procedure bill with the proposed
federal practice code, because the latter was under the consideration of another ABA
committee and would require some time for passage. See Report of the Committee
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of "fundamental and jurisdictional matter[s]" from court rulemaking was required by "the spirit of our republican institutions,"
if not by "the basic constitutional principles in which they rest." 227
For Shelton, then, "fundamental" had only the second of the two
meanings evident in the 1915 New York Report: Shelton used
"fundamental" to refer only to those matters which raised questions of institutional legitimacy, if not of constitutional power,
and thus should be assigned to legislation rather than to court
rules.
The bill reported by Senator Sutherland for the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1917 and promoted by the ABA from 1919
until 1924 was somewhat different from the Clayton bill.228 Two
of the changes were patently a matter of reorganization. 229 Two
others may not so easily be dismissed. The first of these was in
the general authorizing clause. The Clayton bill had extended
on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 2 A.B.A. J. 657, 658 (1916). The proposed federal practice code did not become law. See 3 A.B.A. J. 509 (1917); 4 A.B.A. J.
502 (1918).
227
Spyrr oF T=E COURTS, supra note 184, at xxviii. The words first quoted
in the text were taken from the 1912 New York Report. See supra text accompanying note 183. See also Shelton, supra note 184, at 33.
228 Compare Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 39
A.B.A. REa. 571-72 (1914) with S. 4551, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916), reprinted
in 1917 SENATE REPoRT, .supra note 219, at 1. The new language was quoted in
Morgan, supra note 210, at 82 (January, 1918), but not in the Reports of the
Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure until 1919. Compare, e.g., 4 A.B.A. J.
519, 523 (1918) with Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure,
5 A.B.A. J. 468, 475 (1919). The uniform federal procedure bill, as reflected in
ABA and Congressional reports, and as modified in 1914 and 1916, is set forth
below. Phrases in brackets ([ ]) ware added in 1914. Phrases in carets (< >)
were added in 1916. Phrases in starred parentheses ( *(
) * ) were deleted in 1916.
Be it enacted, etc., That the Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe, from time to time and in any manner, the forms * (and manner
of service) * of writs and all other process; the mode and manner of
framing and filing proceedings and pleadings; of giving notice and
serving < writs and > process of all kinds; of taking and obtaining evidence; drawing up, entering, and enrolling orders; and generally to
regulate and prescribe by rule the forms for < and the kind and character of > the entire pleading, practice, and procedure to be used in all
actions, motions, and proceedings at law of whatever nature by the district courts of the United States [and the District of Columbia]. <That
in prescribing such rules the Supreme Court shall have regard to the
simplification of the system of pleading, practice, and procedure in said
courts, so as to promote the speedy determination of litigation on the
merits. >
[See. 2. <That > when and as the rules of court herein authorized
shall be promulgated, all laws in conflict therewith shall be and become
of no further force and effect.]
The bill in this form will hereafter be referred to as the Sutherland bill.
229 See the first deletion and addition in the composite set forth supra note
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the Court's general authority to make rules only to "the forms
for the entire pleading, practice and procedure to be used in all
actions, motions and proceedings at law .

... "

The Sutherland

bill extended general authority to "the forms for and the kind and
character of the entire pleading, practice, and procedure to be
used in all actions, motions, and proceedings at law .

. . ."

The

second change worth noting was the addition of a provision requiring the Supreme Court, when prescribing rules, to have "regard to the simplification of th system of pleading, practice, and
procedure in said courts, so as to promote the speedy determinadon of litigation on the merits." 230
Neither of these changes was discussed in the literature. As
was his wont, Shelton ignored them when describing the ABA's
231 But it is difficult to escape
campaign.A
the conclusion that the
general grant in the Sutherland bill conferred greater authority
on the Court than it would have had under the Clayton bill and
that this grant of enhanced power was tied to the stated objective
of simplification. Finally, the history indicates that the changes
were consistent with, albeit apparently not prompted by,232 refine-

ments in theory in the reform movement nationally. The purer
rules of court system favored by Pound and others must have
seemed more attractive for the federal system, if only for practical
reasons, once the magnitude of the task reserved for the legislature
under a system like that proposed in New York, and the difficulty
of securing congressional action on a practice act, became clear.
In 1919, when the ABA Committee on Uniform Judicial
Procedure incorporated changes in the uniform federal procedure
bill, it also began to issue more elaborate reports. 2 33
was essentially complete by the following year.2 34
2 30

See supra note 228.

The process
From 1920

Compare the second change with the 1842 act, supra

note 103.
23 1

For example, the 1921 Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Pro-

cedure stated that the bill set forth in Appendix A to that report was "the same
bill that has been introduced regularly for nine years." 46 A.B.A. BEP. 461, 464
(1921). In fact the bill, id. 470, was the 1916 version, with the changes noted
supra note 228. See also infra text accompanying note 277; Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 49 A.B.A. REP. 483, 490 (1924). But see
49 A.B.A. REP. at 95.
232
The 1917 SmATE BEPORT, supra note 219, at 5-6, made no distinction
among the systems in place in New Jersey, Colorado, and Virginia.
233
See Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 5 A.B.A. J.
468 (1919).
234
See Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 6 A.B.A. J.
509 (1920).
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through 1929, 2 35 the core of the ABA Committee's annual report
remained the same from year to year. Developments in the year
past were reported, but the structure and the arguments of most
of the report were identical. 23 6 Of particular interest is the section entitled "An Analysis of the Effect of the Statute":
The trouble with the procedure of the courts is due
to the fact that coordination between these two departments of government has been destroyed by exclusive
legislative control. The proposed bill would vest in the
Supreme Court the exclusive power to prepare for the
trial courts all necessary rules and regulations and gradually perfect them. It divides all judicial procedure into
two classes, viz.: (a) jurisdictional and fundamental matters and general procedure and (b) the rules of practice
directing the manner of bringing parties into court and
the course of the court thereafter. The first class goes
to the very foundation of the matter and may aptly be
denominated the legal machine through which justice is
to be administered, as distinguished from the actual operation thereof and lies exclusively with the legislative department. It prescribes what the courts may do, who
shall be the parties participating, and fixes the rules of
evidence and all important matters of procedure. The
second concerns only the practice, the manner in which
these things shall be done, that is the details of their
practical operation. Concisely stated, the first or legislative class provides what the courts may do, while the
second or judicial class regulates how they shall do it. It
is desired to be emphasized that the statute will necessitate
no alteration of the present procedure upon any jurisdictional or fundamental matter; that the Congress can
repeal it at its pleasure and that the proposed rules will
not have the effect of a statute.237
235 The 1927 Report departed from the standard format.
See Report of the
Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 52 A.B.A. REP. 396 (1927). The
reason for the departure is explained in id. 397.
236The post-1920 reports of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure
included identical sections, in the same order, entitled, with minor variations:
"The Purpose of the Bill"; "The Only Legislation Needed. The Bench and the
Bar Will Do the Rest."; "The Origin and End of Conformity (Sec. 914 R.S.)";
"A Reply to Certain Objections"; "There Will Be Little To Learn"; "The Small
Practitioner Will Profit"; "Uniformity Will Be Made Possible and Attractive";
"The Benefits To Be Derived"; "An Analysis of the Effect of the Statute"; "Post
Bellum Court Burdens"; and "The Judicial Section." All citations for material in
these sections are to the 1920 Report.
237 Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 6 A.B.A. J. 509,
517 (1920) (emphasis added).
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E. The Critical Years: 1922-1930

The uniform federal procedure bill was completely rewritten
and, in at least one respect, substantially revised, in the first two
years of the ABA campaign's second decade. The new version received detailed consideration in a legislative hearing and legislative reports, as well as in the literature, during the 1920's. For
some, the changes were of no consequence. For others, they provided fertile ground for objection. The debate about the bill,
reflecting these attitudes, was at times remarkably similar to, and
at times rather different from, that which attended prior incarnations. As in the past, the supporters of the bill looked to New
York for assistance in defining its limitations.
1. The 1922 House and Senate Hearings on the
Sutherland Bill
Before the changes were made, hearings were held on the
Sutherland bill in both the House 238 and the Senate.2 39 They
added very little new to the arguments in favor of or against the
proposed legislation. In his testimony before the House Judiciary
Committee, Shelton endorsed the suggestion made by Chief Justice
Taft in a 1922 speech to the Chicago Bar Association 240 that, in
formulating rules, the Supreme Court would consult a committee
of the bench and bar.2 41 In a statement made at the Senate Hearing, Senator Walsh argued that the asserted success of rulemaking
in England did not guarantee its success in this country, where
far-flung states "have very different ideas about the kind of procedure that they desire to follow." 242
2. Chief Justice Taft Proposes Merged
Law and Equity Procedure
Taft's Chicago speech contained another, far more dramatic
suggestion than the one cited by Shelton. Invoking the experi23S Procedure in the Federal Courts, Hearings on H.R. 2377 and H.R. 90
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 32 (1922)
[hereinafter cited as 1922 House Hearings].
239 Simplification of Judicial Procedure in Federal Courts, Hearings on S.1011,
1012, 1546, 2610, and 2870 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (1922) [hereinafter cited as 1922 Senate Hearings].
240See Taft, Three Needed Steps of Progress, 8 A.B.A. 1. 34 (1922).
241 Id. 35; see 1922 House Hearings, supra note 238, at 5, 12. In his testimony, Shelton also predicted that there would be no difference in the form 6f
procedure at law and in equity under the rules authorized by the bill. Id. 6.
242 1922 Senate Hearings,supra note 239, at 18.
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ence in England, Taft had recommended not only that the Court
be given the same power to make rules at law as it had in equity
but also that it be given the power "to blend them into a code,
which [would] make the procedure the same in all and as simple
as possible." 243 Taft developed his suggestion in a subsequent
speech delivered at the ABA's annual meeting in 1922.244 After
describing at length the system of procedural regulation in England and his personal observations of that system in action, 245 he
made a concrete proposal in which English influence was apparent:
What I would suggest is that Congress provide for a commission, to be appointed by the President, of two Supreme Court justices, two circuit judges, two district
judges, and three lawyers of prominence and capacity to
prepare and recommend to Congress amendments to the
present statutes of practice and the judicial code, authorizing a unit administration of law and equity in one form
of civil action. The act should provide for a permanent
commission similarly created, with power to prepare a
system of rules of procedure for adoption by the Supreme
Court. Power to amend from time to time should also
be given. The rules and their amendments, after approval by the court, should be submitted to Congress for
its action, but should become effective in six months, if
Congress takes no action .... 246
The ABA immediately adopted a resolution calling
gress to pass legislation implementing Taft's proposal.247
ton's suggestion, the matter was left to the Committee on
Judicial Procedure.2 48 In pursuing Taft's proposal, 249

on ConAt ShelUniform
however,

243 Taft, supra note 240, at 35. In this speech, Taft replied to the objection
that uniform federal procedure introducing a new system would create hardship
for lawyers, arguing that "the plan is to make the system so simple that it needs
no special knowledge to master it." Id. He described the allocation between
Congress and the Court as follows: "Congress can lay down the fundamental principles that should govern and then the court can fill out the details." Id.
244 See Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in the Administration of justice in
Federal Courts, 47 A.B.A. REP'. 250 (1922), reprinted in 8 A.B.A. J. 601 (1922).
245 See 47 A.B.A. REP. at 260-67.
246 Id. 268; see id. 260 ("Of course the present statutes governing a separate
administration of law and equity must be amended or revised by Congress, and
certain general requirements be declared, but the main task of reconciling the two
forms of procedure can be best effected by rules of court.").
247 See 47 A.B.A. REP. at 32-33.
243
See id. 82; Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 48
A.B.A. REP. 343, 343-44 (1923).
249Shelton reported that the bill prepared by the committee had been
introduced in the House and Senate but that no action had been taken by the
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Shelton's Committee construed its mandate more restrictively than
either the proposal itself or the ABA resolution suggests was ap-

propriate.

Taft's proposal called for the authorization of rule-

making in the same act that would establish a commission to
recommend legislation leading to "a unit administration of law
and equity." It also contemplated a permanent commission to
take first-line responsibility in the rulemaking enterprise. The
ABA Committee's bill was silent as to both matters, 250 and Shelton
continued to promote the Sutherland bill. 1 Uniformity of procedure at law and merger with equity procedure were thus, although only for a short time, parallel but separate efforts.325
3. Senator Cummins and Chief Justice Taft
Rewrite the Uniform Federal Procedure Bill
In July 1923, Shelton went to work on Senator Albert B.
Cummins of Iowa, seeking to persuade him to change his mind
about the uniform federal procedure bill. Cummins had been part
of the "minority" in the 1917 Senate Report 2 53 and was reported
to be "resolutely opposed to the measure, as he ever was," by Senator Walsh during the 1922 Senate Hearing.254 Using a mutual
friend's introduction, Shelton wrote to Cummins with "a suggestion that may help to bridge over the gap and give to the
people that to which they are entitled from their legislators and
lawyers." 25 The suggestion, reflected in a revised version of the
Judiciary Committee of either. See 48 A.B.A. REP. at 344; see also Potts,
Unification of the Judiciary; A Record of Progress, 2 TEx. L. REv. 445, 458 app.
(1924).
250 See 48 A.B.A. REP. at 344.
251 See id. 345.
252 Commentators have ignored this interlude. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 36,
at 449; Clark, Procedural Reform, supra note 41, at 146-47; Clark, The Role
of the Supreme Court in Federal Rule-Making, 46 J. Am.JuDicATURE Soc'y 250,
250-51 (1963); Clark & Moore, supra note 36, at 388-89; Ilsen, supra note
158, at 213; Sunderland, supra note 36, at 1120, 1124; Supreme Court Adopts
Rules for Civil Procedure in Federal District Courts, supra note 41, at 102; cf.
Chandler, supra note 41, at 481 (noting reference in 1922 to a bill to be introduced but suggesting that it was the Cummins bill).
Assuming these actions can properly be attributed to Shelton, his reasons for
departing from Taft's scheme, which bad been endorsed by the ABA, are unclear. It may be that, as in 1916, he was unwilling to "complicate" the uniform
federal procedure bill with other legislation, particularly legislation that prior
experience indicated could well be controversial. See supra note 226. Moreover,
he believed that something close to merger could be achieved without any authorization or legislation specifically directed to that end. See supra note 241.
253
See supra note 220.
254 1922 Senate Hearings, supra note 239, at 15.
2W Letter from Thomas W. Shelton to the Hon. Albert B. Cummins (July 25,
1923) (William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.,
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Sutherland bill that Shelton enclosed, was that the rules for actions
at law be prepared by a commission such as Taft had recommended for a merged system of law and equity. In addition,
Shelton adopted Taft's proposal that, following approval by the
Supreme Court, the rules be submitted to Congress and become
6
effective six months after submission absent congressional action.2
Shelton kept the Chief Justice informed about his suggested
"compromise between the Senate Judiciary Committee and the
Bar Association," noting that "[t]he most powerful personal influence ha[d] been brought to bear on Senator Cummins." 257
Cummins replied to Shelton that he was "in hearty sympathy"
with the goal and that he saw "no difficulty in reaching a satisfactory conclusion." 258 Thereafter, in December 1923, Cummins
held separate meetings with Justice (former Senator) Sutherland
and Chief Justice Taft. After returning from his conference with
Taft, Cummins redrafted the bill and sent almost identical letters
to the two Justices, enclosing his draft, explaning what he had
done and why, and seeking their comments. Cummins' draft
provided:
Section 1. The Supreme Court of the United States
shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, for the
District Courts of the United States and for the courts of
reel 255 [hereinafter cited as Taft Papers]); see also letter from Chas. A. Snyder
to the Hon. Albert B. Cummins (July 26, 1923) (Taft Papers, supra, reel 255);

letter from the Hon. Albert B. Cummins to Chas. A. Snyder (July 31, 1923)
(Taft Papers, supra, reel 255).
2

06 See letter from Thomas W. Shelton to the Hon. Albert B. Cummins, supra

note 255 (with enclosure). Section 3 of the bill Shelton proposed provided:
"Such system of rules and all amendments thereto shall be submitted to Congress
for its action, and shall become effective in six months after such submission, if
Congress shall take no action thereon." Note that Shelton's proposal did not in-

clude a provision for merger of law and equity procedure.

See supra note 252.

But see Clark, The Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A.B.A.

447, 448 (1936)

J.

("Abolition of conformity and union of law and equity were

perhaps the two important objectives most stressed by the American Bar Association to be achieved by the court under the rulemaking authority contained in the

bill which became the Act of 1934.").
27Letter

from Thomas W. Shelton to the Hon. William H. Taft (July 26,

1923) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 255). At a later time, in an open letter
to the ABA, Senator Walsh suggested that Cummins changed his position on the

uniform federal procedure bill because of repeated endorsements by the ABA and
because his state bar association had endorsed it. See Walsh, supra note 220;
see also S. REP. No. 1174, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27 (1926) (Minority Views).

258Letter from the Hon. Albert B. Cummins to Thomas W. Shelton (August
4, 1923) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 255).

In his July 31 letter to Chas.

A. Snyder, see supra note 255, Cummins expressed himself in "complete accord
with Mr. Shelton respecting the object he has in view," adding that "[t]he only
differences which have arisen are largely matters of form which I am sure can be
reconciled without difficulty."
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the District of Columbia, the forms of process, writs,
pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure
in actions at law. Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant.
They shall take effect six months after their promulgation and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be
of no further force or effect.259
Cummins explained that he had attempted to put the bill "in the
fewest possible words," and he requested that the Justices take
particular note of the second sentence:
Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the
substantive rights of any litigant.
This sentence, Cummins suggested, was" designed to emphasize
fact that "Congress could not if it wanted to, confer upon
Supreme Court, legislative power," and hence "to quiet the
prehensions of those who may be opposed to any measure of

the
the
apthis

sort." 260

25 Letter from the Hon. Albert B. Cummins to the Hon. William H. Taft
(December 17, 1923) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 259) (enclosure).
260 The full text of the letter to Taft follows:
December 17, 1923
My dear Chief Justice:
Since my conference with you this morning, I have attempted to put
in the fewest possible words, the bill intended to accomplish simplification and uniformity in the pleadings, practice, and procedure in actions
at law. I am sending a copy to you for your consideration and comment. I hope you will particularly note the sentence reading:
"Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive
rights of any litigant."
I hope you will not think that I overlooked the obvious principle
that Congress could not if it wanted to, confer upon the Supreme Court,
legislative power. I have suggested this sentence solely to quiet
the apprehensions of those who may be opposed to any measure of this
sort.
Yours cordially,
(signed) Albert B. Cummins
Honorable William H. Taft, Chief Justice,
Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D.C.
The letter to Sutherland was identical, with the exception of the first sentence, which read in pertinent part: "Since my conference with you the other
day and a later one had with the Chief Justice this morning, I have put in the
fewest possible words, a bill intended to accomplish uniformity and simplicity .... "
Letter from the Hon. Albert B. Cummins to the Hon. George Sutherland (December
17, 1923) (A.B. Cummins Papers, Iowa State Historical Department, Des Moines
[hereinafter cited as Cummins Papers]). I am grateful to the Iowa State Historical Department, Division of Historical Museum and Archives, for permission
to copy and make direct quotations from correspondence in the papers of Senator
Albert B. Cummins. The letter to Taft, together with Cummins' draft bill, are in
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Taft reported his conversation with Cummins to Shelton, indicating that Cummins had asked him to provide "one or two
suggestions as to the union of equity and law and the saving of
the jury rights under the Constitution in such an arrangement,"
and that Taft was "going to prepare a little something for [Cummins] for that." 261 Upon receipt of Cummins' letter and draft,
Taft replied that Cummins' "proposed bill [was] much better than
the one submitted to [Cummins by Shelton]" but expressed the
hope that Cummins would "add a section to [his] bill like the one
enclosed." 262 Taft proposed a second section of the bill, as
follows:
Section 2. The Court may at any time unite the general rules prescribed by it for cases in equity with those
in actions at law so as to secure one form of civil action
and procedure for both, provided, however, that in such
union of rules the right of trial by jury as at common
law and declared by the seventh amendment to the Constitution shall be preserved to the parties inviolate. Such
united rules shall not take effect until they shall have
been reported to Congress by the Attorney General at
the beginning of a regular session thereof and until after
263
the close of such session.
As to the proposed addition, Taft called Cummins' attention to
his opinion in Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon National Bank,264 and
to the distinction he drew between the provisions for effectiveness
of law rules under section 1 and of united rules for law and equity
under section 2. It was Taft's purpose in drafting section 2 to
give "Congress a chance to amend or reject [united rules] before

they go into effect."
the Taft

265

Papers, supra note 255, reel 259. The letter but not the draft bill are
in the Cummins Papers, supra.
261 Letter from the Hon. William H. Taft to Thomas W. Shelton (December
17, 1923) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 259).
262 Letter from the Hon. William H. Taft to the Hon. Albert B. Cummins
(December 18, 1923) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 259).
263 Letter from the Hon. William H. Taft to the Hon. Albert B. Cummins,
supra note 262 (enclosure).
264260 U.S. 235 (1922).
In his opinion for the Court in this case, Chief
Justice Taft stated that "Congress, we think, was looking toward . . . a union of
law and equity actions" in the enactment of provisions permitting the amendment
of pleadings from law to equity and from equity to law and the interposing of
equitable defenses in actions at law. 260 U.S. at 243. See supra note 156.
265 Letter from the Hon. William H. Taft to the 'on.
Albert B. Cummins,
supra note 262. Under § 1, rules for actions at law would go into effect six
months after their promulgation by the Court and were not required to be sub-
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Cummins thought Taft's proposed second section was "allright but [that] it could easily be omitted if it [was] an obstacle
in the way." 266 He resisted, however, the suggestion of a commission, as well as other suggestions, made by Shelton.267 Early
in 1924, Cummins introduced the bill, S. 2061, exactly as he and
Taft had drafted it.268
mitted to Congress. Under § 2 as drafted by Taft, however, united rules were
required to be reported to Congress "at the beginning of a regular session thereof"
and would not be effective "until after the close of such session." Of course, in
either case Congress could pass legislation preventing rules from taking effect.
See infra note 268.
Taft emphasized to Shelton that he deemed the addition of the second section
"very important." Letter from the Hon. William H. Taft to Thomas W. Shelton
(December, 1923) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 259). He evidently contemplated, however, that a merged system of rules would occur "at a later day,"
that is, after rules had been promulgated "for the common law side of the District
Courts." Letter from the Hon. William H. Taft to the Hon. George Sutherland
(January 29, 1924) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 260).
266 Letter from the Hon. Albert B. Cummins to Thomas W. Shelton (December
19, 1923) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 259). In addition, Cummins expressed the view that his bill would "accomplish the purpose and . . . [might]
obviate some of the objections [he had] heard." Id.
267
See letter from Thomas W. Shelton to the Hon. William H. Taft (December 26, 1923) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 259) ("He fought the Commission
idea from the jump."). In a letter to Taft written in early January 1924, Shelton
attributed Cummins' opposition to the latter's perception that a conflict would arise
if power were vested in both a commission and the Court. According to Shelton,
Cummins also argued that the Court should select the Commission. Shelton left
open, however, the possibility that Cummins would revive the idea if his bill
encountered "stiff opposition" without it. Letter from Thomas W. Shelton to the
Hon. William H. Taft (January, 1924) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 260).
Shelton also suggested that Cummins include "the bankruptcy, and Circuit
Court of Appeals." Letter from Thomas W. Shelton to the Hon. Albert B. Cummins (December 29, 1923) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 259). Moreover,
he stated: "While the Chief Justice would agree to the taking effect of the unit
plan after it had lain in Congress through a session, we would like for it to go
along with your bill [i.e., to become effective six months after promulgation]."
Id. Cummins evidently adopted the provision regarding effectiveness from Shelton's
proposed bill. See supra note 256 and accompanying text. Shelton, in turn, had
borrowed it from Taft's 1922 ABA speech. Id.
268See 65 CoNG. Rxc. 1074 (1924). The bill, S.2061, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1924), provided:
A Bill to give the Supreme Court of the United States authority to make
and publish rules in common-law actions.
Be it enacted ... That the Supreme Court of the United States shall
have the power to prescribe, by general rules, for the district courts of
the United States and for the courts of the District of Columbia, the
forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in actions at law. Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor
modify the substantive rights of any litigant. They shall take effect six
months after their promulgation, and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect.
See. 2. The court may at any time unite the general rules prescribed
by it for cases in equity with those in actions at law so as to secure one
form of civil action and procedure for both: Provided, however, That in
such union of rules the right of trial by jury as at common law and declared by the seventh amendment to the Constitution shall be preserved
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to the parties inviolate. Such united rules shall not take effect until they
shall have been reported to Congress by the Attorney General at the beginning of a regular session thereof and until after the close of such
session.
The bill in this form will hereinafter be referred to as the "Cummins bill," although
it might as well be referred to as the Cummins/Taft bill.
At the 1924 ABA annual meeting, Shelton stated: "Senator Cummings [sic],
of Iowa, told us at the beginning of the coming session he and Senator Shortridge
would vote for this bill, and in fact that Senator Cummings [sic] would introduce
it, as he did, with one or two little changes. We made one or two changes upon
the recommendation of the Chief Justice and one or two of our committee, Mr.
Lehmann and others." 49 A.B.A. REP. 95 (1924). This is inaccurate.
In 1927, Shelton asserted: "[Tihe second section which does merge the equity
and law was added to the bill by the Senate itself. It was put in there by
Senator Poindexter when he was in the Senate." 52 A.B.A. REP. 124 (1927).
Poindexter had been a supporter of the uniform federal procedure bill for a number
of years.
See, e.g., Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 46
A.B.A. REP. 461, 462 (1921). But this is an intentional misrepresentation.
Commentators have tended to assert or assume that the ABA was responsible
for drafting S.2061 and have taxed the organization for drafting or supporting a
bill replete with interpretive difficulties. See, e.g., Clark, Supreme Court Power,
supra note 41, at 1304; Clark, Procedural Reform, supra note 41, at 146-47; Sunderland, supra note 36, at 1120. Compare Clark, supra note 218, at 22-23 & n.1, where
the author recognizes that the 1924 version of the uniform federal procedure bill
"was spoken of as Senator Albert B. Cummins' bill," but asks: "Is there not a
touch of irony in the fact that the leaders of the American Bar should for years
have supported a bill so defective from the standpoint of technical workmanship.
I fear it means that, while their hearts were enlisted in the cause of reform, their
heads and hands were not." See also C. CLmrK, supra note 41, at 41 (footnote
omitted) ("Of course, the reason is largely to be found in the fact . . . that the
two sections were drafted about ten years apart and for different objectives.").
In fact, even more than in 1914, see supra note 158, the ABA found it necessary to tailor its campaign to political considerations, and Chief Justice Taft was
in part responsible for any defects in "technical workmanship." Note, moreover,
that both sections were drafted in 1923.
Section 2 of S.2061, supra, required that the rules lie before Congress for an
entire session. The latter requirement was part of the bill that was enacted in
1934, and commentators have attributed it to special congressional interest in the
"drastic" reform that merger represented. Mitchell, Reform in Judicial Procedure,
24 A.B.A. J. 197, 199 (1938); see C. Crkrc, supra note 41, at 43 ("important and
historically revolutionary"). As discussed infra text accompanying note 280, the
controversy surrounding § 2 of the bill evident in the reports and proceedings of
the ABA is not reflected in the legislative documents. Moreover, as we now know,
Taft himself was responsible for the provision, departing from the six-month period
recommended in his 1922 ABA speech, see supra text accompanying note 246,
for political reasons. See supra note 267. It did not make Shelton happy. See
supra note 266. Taft had borrowed the idea of submission from the English
practice, which he bad described but which permitted rules to be effective unless
and until annulled by Parliament. See Taft, supra note 244, at 261; see also
S. RosENBAuM, TnE Rurz-MA.ING AuTroarry IN Tm ENGLISH SUPREME CoURT
25-26 (1917); Sunderland, supra note 36, at 1116-17. Within a year Taft had
revised his proposal in this respect, see 7 J.Am. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 134, 135 (1923),
and President Coolidge's recommendation in his 1923 message to Congress also
accorded with the English model, see 65 CONG. REc. 96, 98 (1923). Taft probably wrote that part of the message. See W. MURPHY, ELEMiENTS or JUDICIAL
STRA-rEY 132, 141 (1964).
Moreover, after Taft drafted § 2, Shelton attempted
to recover some of the ground that the latter had ceded to Congress. See supra
note 267.
Taft's 1922 ABA proposal and Shelton's proposal to Cummins applied both to
the original rules and to amendments. See supra text accompanying note 246;
note 256. One of the reasons Dean Clark argued so strenuously against an inter-
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4. The Cummins Bill, 1924-1926
As chairman of a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Cummins presided over a hearing on S. 2061 on February
2, 1924.269 The subcommittee heard testimony in support of the
bill from Shelton, and from Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds,
and Sutherland. 270 When asked their view as to the "proper conpretation of the 1934 Act that would subject amendments to the process prescribed
in § 2 was his belief that submission prior to effectiveness would undermine
the historic goal of speedy amendment. See, e.g., C. CLARK, supra note 41, at
43-45; Clark, Supreme Court Power, supra note 41, at 1309-10. Clark's arguments,
which took no account of Taft's proposal, did not prevail. See 308 U.S. 642-43
(1939); infra note 601. In 1950, however, the Act as codified was amended to
permit reporting to Congress "at or after the beginning of a regular session thereof
but not later than the first day of May" and effectiveness upon "the expiration
of ninety days after they have been thus reported." Act of May 10, 1950, ch. 174,
§ 2, 64 Stat. 158. See infra note 404. The legislative history of these amendments, which were proposed by the Judicial Conference, indicates that they reflected that body's belief "both that the present procedure for adoption of the
rules is unnecessarily long and drawnout and that it comes at an unfortunate time."
S. REP. No. 1491, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1950).
269 See Procedure in Federal Courts, Hearing on S.2060 and S.2061 Before
a Subcomm. of the House Judiciary Comm., 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924) [hereinafter cited as the 1924 Senate Hearing]. Most of the hearing was devoted to
S.2060, the main purpose of which was to redefine the jurisdiction of the courts
of appeals and of the Supreme Court. See Act of February 13, 1925, ch. 229,
43 Stat. 936. For a description of Taft's role in securing this legislation, the
preparation of which by members of the Court was openly acknowledged, see
W. Murnpny, supra note 268, at 137-45.
270 Cummins "expressed deep concern as to the personnel to appear before the
Sub-Committee." Letter from Thomas W. Shelton to the Hon. William H. Taft
(January, 1924), supra note 267. However, although Cummins originally was of
the view that members of the Court should not appear, Shelton pressed on him
and on Taft the notion that the latter should testify. See letter from Thomas W.
Shelton to the Hon. William H. Taft (January 28, 1924) (Taft Papers, supra note
255, reel 260); letter from Thomas W. Shelton to the Hon. Albert B. Cummins
(January 29, 1924) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 260). Taft agreed with
Cummins' original view, stating that he was "not anxious to go before the Judiciary
Committee," and that "no one else is in our Court." Letter from the Hon. William
H. Taft to Thomas W. Shelton (January 17, 1924) (Taft Papers, supra note 255,
reel 260). After Shelton had disregarded his wishes, Taft wrote to Cummins:
I beg you to believe that Tom in writing you did not speak for me. I am
strongly of the view, knowing what I do about your committee and the
Senate, that it is a great deal wiser for you to depend on evidence of
Judges McReynolds, Van Devanter and Sutherland than it is to have me
appear in the attitude of urging bills. I think my view is generally known
at any rate, and that it might injure the bill with those--of whom there
are a number-who object to any activity on my part in matters of
legislation ....
Letter from the Hon. William H. Taft to the Hon. Albert B. Cummins (January
31, 1924) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 261). Taft had already written to
Cummins asking him to send a copy of S.2061 to the named Justices, as well as
to the Justices themselves. See letter from the Hon. William H. Taft to the Hon.
Albert B. Cummins (January 29, 1924) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 260);
letters from the Hon. William H. Taft to Justices McReynolds, Van Devanter and
Sutherland (January 29, 1924) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 260). His attitude on this matter may explain Shelton's subsequent dissembling. See supra note
268. But see supra note 269. See also W. MurPHY, supra note 268, at 142-43.
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struction of the words 'practice and procedure' "271 by Cummins,
Sutherland and McReynolds replied:
Mr. justice Sutherland. Well, I don't know that I can
give any precise definition. They apply, of course, wholly
to the adjective law. They could not involve the making
of any substantive law, because the Congress would be
powerless to delegate such power to the courts. I should
say it would be confined to making rules pointing out
the way in which cases should be presented, and the way
in which the court should discharge its duty in determining what the substantive law is. I don't know that I could
state it any more accurately than that.
Mr. justice McReynolds. A method of determining and
enforcing rights and liabilities which have been prescribed
by law.
Mr. justice Sutherland. Yes: it would enable the courts
to determine the "how" but not the "what" of the law.
Senator Cummins. I consider that a very comprehensive
answer. To determine the method by which he gets in
and the case is presented to the court that is to decide
2
27
the law of the case.

Pursuing further the limits of the grant of rulemaking authority,
Cummins noted an objection raised by others-although he made
clear that he did not share the view-that the bill might authorize
the Supreme Court to make rules for the execution of its writs,
including, in particular, to prescribe the property upon which a
writ could be levied, in contravention of state statutes. 273 Sutherland replied that he did not see how a provision relating to "forms
of writs and process . . . could be extended to include power to

say upon what property it might be levied, or regulate it in that
respect." 274 Sutherland was more tentative in response to a question about the extent of the Court's authority under the bill to
Cummins was particularly interested in Sutherland's views, because the latter
bad considered the subject of rulemaking as a member of the Senate and had
authored the 1917 Senate Report, which Cummins termed "very illuminating" and
"very complete" and had printed as part of the record. 1924 Senate Hearing,
supra note 269, at 56; see also id. 47. In addition, Cummins had consulted
Sutherland prior to introducing S.2061 and had sought his views about a draft
of the bill. See supra note 260.
271 1924 Senate Hearing, supra note 269, at 56.
272 Id.
273 See id. 61; see also id. 68.
274 Id. 62.
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provide notice to nonresident defendants. 275 Justice Van Devanter invoked the analogy of the Court's Equity Rules, which
did not treat the matter, leaving it to statutory regulation.276
It appears from Justice Sutherland's testimony at the 1924
Senate Hearing that he, like Shelton, may have treated the various
2 77
incarnations of the uniform federal procedure bill as fungible
The objections to the Cummins bill cited by Cummins, however,
are evidence that others remarked the potential breadth of the
grant of authority in section 1. Indeed, Cummins' 1923 letters
to members of the Court suggest that he anticipated such objections and attempted to meet them in the second sentence of his
bill.278

In any event, the function of the second sentence was im-

mediately grasped.
275

In an article advocating the enactment of the

See id. He did suggest, however, that the Court would not be authorized
to provide for notice in some other way than required by the state laws Cummins
used as examples. Id.
276 understand that the way in which in equity we bring in parties who
live in other jurisdictions is according to modes prescribed by statute
and not dealt with in the rules, and that the court has always dealt with
that as a question to be regulated by Congress or by statutes and not
as a matter to be regulated by rules.
Id.
Very little attention was devoted to § 2 of the Cummins Bill at the 1924
Senate Hearing. See id. 61-62; 69-70. Indeed, Shelton almost overlooked it in
his statement. See id. 69.
277Justice Sutherland's response to Cummins' question regarding executions,
see supra text accompanying notes 273-74, seems to have been based on the
language of the Sutherland bill, not the Cummins bill. The fomer's first grant
related to "the forms of writs and all other process." See supra note 228. The
latter's first sentence referred to "the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in actions at law." See supra note 268.
The failure to distinguish between the two was not uncommon. See, e.g., Paul,
The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 1 WAsH. L. REv. 163, 163 n.1 (1926)
(describing as "modeled after the proposed Federal rulemaking act" a Washington
statute that clearly followed the Sutherland bill); Note, The Federal Uniform
Procedure Bill, 23 Micm L. REv. 154 (1924) (discussing S. 2061 but quoting the
Sutherland bill).
Further evidence that Justice Sutherland failed to note changes in the bill is
found in his discussion of the advantage that a court rules system has over legislative regulation in terms of the speed of amendment. The Justice observed:
Under a system of this kind whenever a defect appears in the rule the
court can take it up, have a conference, and determine upon it, and a
new rule or amended rule put in operation in a week or two weeks instead of going through a long process in the legislature to have it done.
1924 Senate Hearing, supra note 269, at 55.
Justice Sutherland may have intended to imply the view that amendments under
the Cummins bill were not subject to either the waiting period of § 1 or the
reporting requirement of § 2. More probably he had not noticed or had forgotten such requirements. For further discussion of the goal of speedy amendment, see W. W.r..ouonmy, Pnmscnr.,Es or JUDIcIAL ADMNISTPRATION 422-23
(1929).
278
See supra note 260.
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Cummins bill and predicting that it would "mark the most important single step ever taken in the improvement of judicial
procedure in the United States," Professor Scott observed:
The legislature cannot, to be sure, constitutionally give
power to the courts to make laws covering substantive
rights. The making of such laws is a legislative and not a
judicial function. The courts may not make substantive
law except in so far as the decision of an actual controversy serves as a precedent for the determination of subsequent controversies, if, indeed, this process can be called
making and not merely pronouncing or discovering law.
In the Senate bill, it is expressly provided that the rules
of the Supreme Court shall not affect the substantive
2 79
rights of any litigant.
The reception accorded section 2 of the Cummins bill at the
1924 Senate Hearing, where it attracted little comment and
augured no controversy, was typical of its formal legislative treatment throughout the decade.2 s0 The impression gained from such
treatment, however, may be misleading, for, according to the 1924
report of Shelton's ABA committee, section 2 "was not pressed
when objection was raised to it in the subcommittee," 28 ' and only
282
section 1 was reported to the full Senate Judiciary Committee.
Thereafter, if one read only the ABA Reports, it might appear
that section 2 was the object of a vigorous debate whether merger
of law and equity procedure could constitutionally be effected,
as opposed to implemented, by court rule.283 But even the ABA's
279 Scott, Actions at Law in the Federal Courts, 38 H~Av. L. REv. 1, 3-4
(1924). The version of the Cummins bill quoted by Scott contained § 1 only.
See id. 2-3; infra text accompanying note 282.
Prior to the appearance of Scott's article, Shelton had written to Senator
Cummins: "You have no doubt observed the support given by your State papers.
The Press has been unusually helpful all over the country. Led by Harvard Law
Review, all the Law Magazines will be out in November in support .... ." Letter
from Thomas W. Shelton to the Hon. Albert B. Cummins (October 24, 1924)
(Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 268).
280
See supra note 276; infra notes 317 & 350.
281 Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 49 A.B.A. REP.
483, 485 (1924).
282 Id. Shelton wrote the report on May 1. Id. 483. On May 26, S.2061
was reported by the Judiciary Committee without amendment. See 65 CoNe. R c.
9485 (1924). This probably explains why one ABA member repeated the objections that had been made to § 2. See 49 A.B.A. REP. 98-100 (1924) (statement
of Mr. Gresham).
283 See, e.g., 50 A.B.A. REP. 121-22 (1925)
(remarks of Messrs. Gresham
and Shelton); 52 A.B.A. REP. 122-24 (1927) (remarks of Messrs. Gresham and
Shelton); Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 54 A.B.A.
REP. 514, 515 (1929); see also Clark, Procedural Reform and the Supreme Court,
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accounts are inconsistent,28 4 and the bare legislative record does
not support the notion that section 2 was controversial. 28 5
From its introduction in 1924, the Cummins bill was the
prize in a tug of war between its supporters, including in particular Shelton and Taft, and its most vocal opponent, Senator
Walsh. The bill's supporters wanted to bring it to a vote on the
floor of the Senate.2 6 Walsh's goal, or so he represented, was to
insure that his colleagues on the Judiciary Committee heard the
arguments against the bill before it was reported out.28 7 The
propaganda for the bill did not abate, and it became even more
personal, possibly stiffening Walsh's resistance. 28 Although the
8 Am. MERcuRY 445, 446 (1926) ("Nevertheless, the Bar Association committee
has relinquished its original plan to fight for the single procedure.").
284 See, e.g., Report of the Special Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 53 A.B.A. REP. 500, 502 (1928) ("this section has so far met with no objection and should be retained").
288 See supra text accompanying note 280. All of the Senate bills introduced
from 1924 through 1930 and sponsored by the ABA contained § 2. See S. 2061,
supra note 268; S. 477, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1925); S. 759, 70th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1927); S. 4573, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930). In the House, there was one
exception, H.R. 11,071, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. (1924), which contained only § 1.
The rest included § 2. See H.R. 419, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1925); H.R. 5621,
70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1927).
286 See, e.g., 49 A.B.A. REP. 483, 486 (1924); 50 A.B.A. REP. 539, 544
(1925); 53 A.B.A. REP. 500, 503-04 (1928). Taft continued to be active, albeit
behind the scenes, in promoting the legislation beyond the introduction of S.
2061. In late 1924 he reported to Cummins that he bad had correspondence
with Senator Swanson about "the Supreme Court procedure bill," a copy of which
he sent to Cummins since it might be of assistance to him. Letter from the
Hon. William H. Taft to the Hon. Albert B. Cummins (December 19, 1924)
(Cummins Papers, supra note 260); see also infra notes 290, 291 & 295-97; A.
MASON, WmLT m HowArw TAr: CimF JusTmcE 114-20 (1964).
For Taft's
lobbying activities more generally, see P. Fisn, supra note 41, at 79-90; A.
MASON, supra, 88-137; W. MuPHY, supra note 268, at 132-45, 163-68.
The Senate was the focus of the ABA's campaign during this period. Shelton
believed passage in the House would follow favorable action in the Senate. See,
e.g., Report of the Special Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 49 A.B.A.
REP. 483, 488 (1924); see also 53 A.B.A. REP. 500, 506 (1928). Nevertheless,
many of his Committee's annual reports from 1925 complained of inability to get
the bill out of the House Judiciary Committee as well. See, e.g., Report of the
Special Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 50 A.B.A. REP. 539, 544
(1925).
287
See Shelton, Present Situation as to Uniform Procedure Bill, 12 A.B.A. J.
498 (1926); Walsh, supra note 220; letter from the Hon. Albert B. Cummins to
Thomas W. Shelton (April 4, 1926) (Cummins Papers, supra note 260). Over
the years, Walsh was consistent in denying the ABA's charges that he was arbitrarily
obstructing Senate consideration of the uniform federal procedure bill and in
insisting that his arguments against the bill had either not been heard publicly
or by the Judiciary Committee or, if heard, answered. See, e.g., letter from
the Hon. Thomas J. Walsh to the Hon. J.W. Hamilton (December 6, 1920)
(Walsh Papers, supra note 154, Container 281); letter from the Hon. Thomas J.
Walsh to the Hon. Thomas Z. Lee (February 19, 1925) (Walsh Papers, supra
note 154, Container 281); letter from the Hon. Thomas J. Walsh to Mr. J.11
Tregoe (June 25, 1926) (Walsh Papers, supra note 154, Container 302).
2 88
See supra note 217; Walsh, supra note 220.
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Judiciary Committee reported the bill without amendment in
1924,289 Walsh succeeded in having it recommitted with Cummins'
consent.290 In 1925, Shelton told ABA members that Walsh had
agreed to report the bill, even if adversely, in December.2 91 Apparently he misunderstood; the bill was not reported. 292 In
March, 1926, Cummins wrote Shelton that, after listening to Walsh
argue "the greater part of the forenoon" against the bill, no Republican wanted to vote.29 3 He was at his "wits' end," not at all
sure how the Republicans would vote, and "much inclined to
just let the matter drop." 294 However, he did not do so. A vote
65 CoNG. BEc. 9485 (1924).
66 CONG. REc. 503 (1924). Walsh objected that the bill had been
considered when he was not present, a fixed date having been set for that purpose,
which meeting had been cancelled because of a majority caucus. See letter from
the Hon. Thomas J. Walsh to the Hon. Albert B. Cummins (December 3, 1924)
(Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 269). Shelton advised Cummins to assent to
recommittal, albeit on the erroneous premise, which Walsh corrected in his letter
to Cummins, that Walsh would facilitate the passage of the bill if the Judiciary
Committee again reported it favorably. See letter from Thomas W. Shelton to
the Hon. Albert B. Cummins (November 28, 1924) (Taft Papers, supra note 255,
reel 269). Cummins was doubtful about the wisdom of this course, although,
having counted votes, he thought "it . . . pretty safe to predict that the bill
would again be reported after any argument that Senator Walsh might make
against it." Letter from the Hon. Albert B. Cummins to Thomas W. Shelton
(December 2, 1924) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 269). Shelton sought
Taft's approval of recommittal. See letter from Thomas W. Shelton to the Hon.
William H. Taft (December 4, 1924) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 269);
see also letter from Thomas W. Shelton to the Hon. Albert B. Cummins (December 4, 1924) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 269); letter from Thomas W.
Shelton to the Hon. Thomas J. Walsh (December 4, 1924) (Taft Papers, supra
note 255, reel 269).
291 See 50 A.B.A. REP. 122 (1925)
(remarks of Mr. Shelton). It was
quickly clear that the gamble of recommittal was a mistake. On January 5, the
Senate Judiciary Committee voted 8-6 against the bill. See Vote on Procedural
Bill in Committee (undated) (Walsh Papers, supra note 154, Container 303);
see also letter from the Hon. Thomas J. Walsh to the Hon. Thomas Z. Lee,
supra note 287; S. REP. No. 1174, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1926) (Minority
Views). Shelton wrote Taft that "Senator Borah and Norris have deserted the
Senator or he misunderstood them," that he had recommended that Cummins
"bring out a minority report," and that he feared "Borah's desertion has made
a pessimist of him instead of a fighter." Letter from Thomas W. Shelton to
the Hon. William H. Taft (January 6, 1925) (Taft Papers, supra note 255,
reel 270); see also letter from Thomas W. Shelton to the Hon. Albert B. Cummins
(January 6, 1925) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 270). Borah voted against
the bill. Norris was absent and did not vote. Vote on Procedural Bill in Committee, supra.
29251 A.B.A. REP. 119-20 (1926) (remarks of Mr. Shelton). But see supra
note 291.
293 Letter from the Hon. Albert B. Cummins to Thomas W. Shelton (March
8, 1926) (Cummins Papers, supra note 260; Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 280).
294 Id. Upon receipt of Cummins' letter, Shelton replied urging that he get
in touch with Taft and suggesting that the latter would testify. See letter from
Thomas W. Shelton to the Hon. Albert B. Cummins (March, 1926) (Taft Papers,
supra note 255, reel 281). Thereafter, he wrote asking for the Senator's understanding of any "signs of keen disappointment" about what "ha[d] been and
289 See
290See

1982]

THE RULES ENABLING ACT

1083

was taken, and the bill was favorably reported by the Judiciary
Committee in May. 295 In July, Cummins submitted the Commit2 96
tee's report, and Walsh filed the views of the minority.
5. The 1926 Senate Report: The Cummins Bill's
Limitations on Rulemaking Are Defined
In the 1926 Report, the Senate Judiciary Committee undertook "to review with some care the entire subject" covered by the
[would] continue to be the life work of the writer," and expressing the hope "that
the Congress, if in its good judgment it rejects the American Bar Association's
plan, will offer a substitute." Letter from Thomas W. Shelton to the Hon. Albert
B. Cummins (March 19, 1926) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 281). Cummins
responded immediately, indicating his conviction that a vote would be taken within
two weeks. See letter from the Hon. Albert B. Cummins to Thomas W. Shelton
(March 20, 1926) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 281). Shelton reported the
"resurgence" to Taft. Letter from Thomas W. Shelton to the Hon. William H.
Taft (March 23, 1926) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 281).
295 See 67 CoNG. REc. 9586 (1926).
The vote was taken on May 13, 1926.
Eight senators voted in favor and six against. Two senators (Norris and Gillette)
were present but declined to vote. See Vote on Procedural Bill in Committee,
supra note 291.
296
See 67 CONG. REc. 12,472 (1926). On the day the bill was reported,
Walsh wrote to Taft and apparently to all the other members of the Supreme
Court, repeating some of his arguments against it, enclosing a copy of his April
23 speech to the Tri-State Bar Association at Texarkana (which subsequently
became the Minority Views to the 1926 Senate Report), and seeking to discover
whether the representation that all members of the Court supported the bill was
true. See letter from the Hon. Thomas J. Walsh to the Hon. William H. Taft
(May 14, 1926) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 282). Justice Stone sent Taft
a copy of an identical letter from Walsh and of his response, which supported the
bill, noting: "Our clever friend never misses an opportunity to drive a thin wedge
into the line of the enemy if he thinks he sees a possibility of doing so." Letter
from the Hon. Harlan F. Stone to the Hon. William H. Taft (May 17, 1926)
(Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 282). Stone's reply to Walsh is also in the
Walsh Papers, supra note 154, Container 302. For the probable reasons for Stone's
attitude toward Walsh, who opposed his nomination in 1925 because of the
indictment of Senator Wheeler, see A. MASON, supra note 58, at 188-200. Justice
Sutherland also supported the bill. See letter from the Hon. George Sutherland
to the Hon. Thomas J. Walsh (May 19, 1926) (Walsh Papers, supra note 154,
Container 301). justices Van Devanter and McReynolds were non-committal. See
letter from the Hon. Willis Van Devanter to the Hon. Thomas J. Walsh (June 22,
1926) (Walsh Papers, supra note 154, Container 301); letter from the Hon. James
C. McReynolds to the Hon. Thomas J. Walsh (June 9, 1926) (Walsh Papers,
supra note 154, Container 301). Justice Butler had no opinion. See letter from
the Hon. Pierce Butler to the Hon. Thomas J. Walsh (May 27, 1926) (Walsh
Papers, supra note 154, Container 301). Justice Brandeis declared himself "unreservedly against the measure," noting that he had "thought otherwise before his
experience on the Court." Letter from the Hon. Louis D. Brandeis to the Hon.
Thomas J. Walsh (May 14, 1926) (Walsh Papers, supra note 154, Container 301).
Brandeis was a member of the first ABA Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure.
See supra note 153. Justice Holmes could "see the objections much more clearly
than [he could] see the . . . advantages." Letter from the Hon. Oliver Wendell
Holmes to the Hon. Thomas J. Walsh (May 22, 1926) (Walsh Papers, supra note
154, Container 301). Chief Justice Taft had endeavored to prevent Brandeis and
Holmes from sending their letters. See letter from the Hon, William H. Taft to
Thomas W. Shelton (May 23, 1926) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 282).
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After stating the general purposes of section

Walsh also wrote to others, including many, if not all, federal judges. Summarizing the replies, Walsh said that the "very decided majority of those who
responded are against the plan." Letter from the Hon. Thomas J. Walsh to the
Hon. John C. Shea (October 1, 1929) (Walsh Papers, supra note 154, Container
302); see also letter from the Hon. Thomas J. Walsh to the Hon. H. M. Neely
(November 22, 1926) (Walsh Papers, supra note 154, Container 302).
Taft supported the suggestion that Cummins' report be sent to all ABA members, and added all judges to the list. See letter from the Hon. William H. Taft
to Thomas W. Shelton (June 6, 1926) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 282).
297 S. REP. No. 1174, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1926) [hereinafter cited as 1926
SENATE REPoRT]. It cemes as no surprise that Cummins had help in writing the
1926 Senate Report. The extent of the assistance and of his reliance on materials
provided is unclear. It is clear, however, that Chief Justice Taft provided material
on § 2 (which he had written). On May 31, 1926, he sent to Cummins a six-page
memorandum on § 2 for possible use by the latter. See letter from the Hon.
William H. Taft to the Hon. Albert B. Cummins (May 31, 1926) (Taft Papers,
supra note 255, reel 282) (with enclosure). It is also clear that the material was
not used. The 1926 Senate Report devoted only one short paragraph to § 2. See
1926 SENATE REPORT, supra, at 19; infra note 317. Shelton also provided material
on § 2 that was not used. See letter from Thomas W. Shelton to the Hon. Albert
B. Cummins (May 25, 1926) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 282).
It is considerably more difficult to determine the extent to which Cummins
relied on others in connection with § 1. The most likely sources of help were
Shelton and the Chief Justice's brother, Henry W. Taft. In May 1926, Henry Taft
wrote the Chief Justice, returning a copy of Walsh's Texarkana speech and commenting upon it. He suggested that the first sentence of the Cummins bill "was
intended to be confined to matters of mere procedure, and not to those matters
which affect substantial rights," and that matters raised by Walsh such as orders of
arrest, attachments, and statutes of limitations, were not within the grant of the
first sentence:
On the contrary they affect substantial rights and remedies, and are
matters for legislative cognizance. I should be inclined to agree with
Senator Walsh that if such matters as provisional remedies, evidence,
limitation of actions, the amount of court costs, and other matters which
relate to substantive rights, were to be committed to the Supreme Court,
the task would be too onerous, and, furthermore, would vest the Court
with power to make rules concerning matters which are properly for the
legislature.
Henry Taft concluded that, although he thought he "could make a pretty satisfactory answer to the most striking parts of Walsh's argument . . . it would take
more time than [he had] at [his] command at the moment," and that therefore it
was Shelton's job. Letter from Henry W. Taft to the Hon. William H. Taft (May
17, 1926) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 282). Shelton did prepare a report
which the Chief Justice sent to his brother with a request for such additions as
occurred to him. See letter from the Hon. William H. Taft to Henry W. Taft (May
21, 1926) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 282). Cummins thought that it required changes. See letter from the Hon. William H. Taft to Thomas W. Shelton
(May 23, 1926) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 282). Six days later Henry
Taft sent to Cummins, with a copy to his brother, a memorandum to assist the
Senator in drafting the Report. In his letters to both, Henry Taft expressed dissatisfaction with his answer to the matters raised by Walsh. In his letter to
Cummins he stated:
I found it difficult in the brief time at my disiosal to get anything which
was conclusive upon the subject. I am inclined to think that the reason is
that his assumption that a court in making rules of procedure would have
the power to deal with such matters is so wanting in fundamental principle that decisions are hard to find.
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the Committee described in detail the failure of the Conformity Act to achieve its purpose and the unsatisfactory condition
of federal practice that obtained as a result,29 9 rebutted the objections that the bill would cause greater, inconvenience to the bar
than did the Conformity Act and that the Supreme Court was too
busy to draft rules, 300 and noted some of the theoretical and practical advantages of regulating procedure by court rules.301 The
Senate Committee deemed the suggestion that the bill involved an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Supreme
Court one that could "hardly be urged seriously" 302 in light of
the history of such delegations and the opinions of the Supreme
Court discussing them.
The Committee, however, took very seriously the claim by
Senator Walsh that the delegation in the Cummins bill extended
to matters such as "limitations of actions, provisional remedies,
such as orders of arrest and attachment, and the selection or quali1,298

Letter from Henry W. Taft to the Hon. Albert B. Cummins (May 27, 1926) (Taft
Papers, supra note 255, reel 282); see also letter from Henry W. Taft to the Hon.
William H. Taft (May 27, 1926) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 282).
Unfortunately, neither Shelton's draft nor Henry Taft's memorandum could be
located in either the Cummins or Taft Papers, and inquiries to Taft's law firm and
a grandson suggest that Taft's memorandum has not survived elsewhere. Thus,
while there are grounds for inference that Cummins relied on his memorandum,
see, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 309 & 315; infra note 326, it is impossible
at this time to be precise about the extent of that reliance. It is tempting, for
instance, to attribute to Henry Taft the 1926 Senate Report's reliance on the 1915
New York Report. See infra text accompanying notes 313-16. But the New York
model had been resorted to as early as 1914 by both the Committee on Uniform
Judicial Procedure and the House Judiciary Committee. See supra text accompanying notes 183-84.
293 First, to make uniform throughout the United States the forms of
process, writs, pleadings, and motions and the practice and procedure in
the district courts in actions at law. It is believed that if this were its
only advantage that [sic] lawyers and litigants would find, in uniformity
alone, a tremendous advance over the present system.
Second, these general rules, if wisely made, would be a long step
toward simplicity, a most desirable step in view of the chaotic and complicated condition which now exists.
Third, it would tend toward the speedier and more intelligent disposition of the issues presented in law actions and toward a reduction in
the expense of litigation.
Fourth, it would make it more certain that if a plaintiff has a cause
of action he would not be turned out of court upon a technicality and
without a trial upon the very merits of the case; and, likewise, if the
defendant had a just defense he would not be denied by any artifice of
[sic] the opportunity to present it.
1926 SENATE REPORT, supra note 297, at 1-2.
299 Id. 2-5.
300 Id. 5-7.
3o Id. 7-8.
302 Id. 8.
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fication of jurors." 808 In the longest section of the 1926 Senate
Report, entitled "The Bill Does Not Attempt to Affect Substantive Rights or Remedies," 304 the Committee explained why the
bill authorized neither court rules relating to those matters nor,
as also argued by opponents, court rules relating to "substantial
rights and remedies in a manner contrary to the public policy of
the several States embodied in local statutory law." 305
Starting with the language of the Cummins bill,306 the Senate
Committee reasoned that the first part of the first sentence related
to "matters of form and [did] not affect substantial rights or
remedies."3 0 7 The Committee recognized that the grant to make
rules governing "the practice and procedure in actions at law" was
broader but asserted that it did "not extend the power so as to
affect substantive rights or remedies"; any other interpretation,
308
the Committee said, would ignore the bill's second sentence.
The matters raised by Senator Walsh involved "substantive legal
and remedial rights affected by the considerations of public
policy." 309 Accordingly, the Committee concluded that, although
those matters affected remedies, they were not "mere procedure,
such as a court has power to prescribe," but were rather "solely
within the legislative power." 310 In support of its conclusion,
the Committee marshalled the experience in England and in the
states:
[The matters raised by Senator Walsh] involve the policy
of the law which varies in the different States and are and
always have been regulated by legislative act. Neither
in England nor in any State of the United States where
the courts are vested with the rule-making power, has it
been assumed that the delegation of that power to them
authorizes them to deal with such substantial rights and
remedies as those just referred to. In Delaware, Virginia,
New Jersey, and Colorado, where the courts have for years
had power to make rules of practice and procedure, they
have never assumed to make rules relating to limitations
of actions, attachment or arrest, juries or jurors or evi303

Id. 9; see id.26-28 (Minority Views).

304 Id. 9-16.

305 Id. 9.
306
The language is set forth supra note 268.
307 1926 SFNATE REPORT, supra note 297, at 9.
308Id.
309 Id.

310 Id.
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dence; and in each of those States such matters are reserved for statutory regulation. 81 1
In his Minority Views, Walsh claimed that the Supreme
Court's rulemaking work would necessarily, and could under the
Cummins bill, include all matters typically found in a code of procedure.312 The majority of the Senate Committee responded by
referring to the reform movement in New York, in particular the
work of the Board of Statutory Consolidation. 1 3 It noted that
the New York Board had classified certain matters, including those
raised by Walsh, as substantive law and quoted passages from the
1915 New York Report explaining the classifications.31 4 After
stating the reasons for its reference to the work of the New York
Board, 31 5 the Committee continued to rely on it, albeit without
further acknowledgement:
Any power in the Supreme Court to deal with such
matters as those referred to must be rested solely upon
the provision authorizing it to make rules relating to
"practice and procedure in actions at law." In view of
the express provision inhibiting the court from affecting
"the substantive rights of any litigant," any court would
be astute to avoid an interpretation which would attribute
to the words "practice and procedure" an intention on
the part of Congress to delegate a power to deal with such
substantive rights or remedies. It would rather conclude
that in using the words "practice and procedure" Congress only intended to confer the power to make such
811 Id. 9-10.
312 Id. 26-27

(Minority Views).

It requires no elucidation before this assemblage that statutes of limitations

appertain to the remedy and neither confer nor abridge any substantive
right, that the period of the statute may be diminished or enlarged without
violation of the Constitution of the United States, though it can not be
reduced so as, in effect, to cut off all remedy.
Id. 27.
313 Id. 10-11. The Committee also noted that the classifications made by the
Committee on Code Revision of the New York State Bar Association included as
substantive rights or remedies matters of the sort raised by Walsh. Id. 10. For
the work of the New York Committee, see supra notes 157 & 174.
314 See 1926 SENATE REPonT,supra note 297, at 10-11.
315 We have made this somewhat extended reference . . . because of the
eminent professional character of the members of the board and because
it was probably the most scientific recent effort at simplification of a highly
technical and complicated system of procedure having in view the segregation in a practice act and rules of court those matters which might
properly be regarded as procedural.

Id. 11.
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rules of practice and procedure as the court itself could
make without enabling legislation, and they would not
include matters of the kind referred to.
Where a doubt exists as to the power of a court to
make a rule, the doubt will surely be resolved by construing a statutory provision in such a way that it will not
have the effect of an attempt to delegate to the courts
what is in reality a legislative function. And it is inconceivable that any court will hold that rules which deprive
a man of his liberty, as in the case of an order of arrest,
or put an end to a good cause of action, as in the case of a
limitation or abatement of an action, or determine what
jurors shall try a case and how they shall be selected, are
merely filling "up the details," even though they relate
to remedial rights.816
In the concluding part of the section, the Senate Committee incorporated in the Report substantial portions of the standard re3 17
port of the ABA's Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure.
Walsh's arguments in the Minority Views were designed to
demonstrate not only the magnitude, but also the difficulty, of
the task confronting the Supreme Court under the Cummins bill.
He pointed out that matters such as limitations, arrest, attachment,
and the composition of juries were controversial and were regulated in widely divergent ways among the states.31 8 He asked
which scheme of regulation the Supreme Court would choose to
implement in its rules and asserted:
The task to be set the Supreme Court is not only appalling in its magnitude, but I venture to assert, in view of
the radically different views of the bar, as exhibited in the
statutes of the various states, the predilections arising
316

Id.

31
7 See id. 12-16. Some of the borrowings are acknowledged; some are not.
Compare id. 12 with id. 14-16. Chief among the latter is a passage, id. 12,
adopting verbatim Shelton's two classes of procedure dichotomy, under which the

legislature "prescribes what the courts may do, who shall be the parties participating, and fixes the rules of evidence and all important matters of proce-

dure." See supra text accompanying note 237 (excerpt from standard report of
the ABA Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure).
The Report devoted only one paragraph to § 2, anticipating "no serious opposition to it." 1926 SENATE REPORT, supra note 297, at 19.

s18 See 1926

SENATE REPORT, supra note 297, at 26-28 (Minority Views).
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from training and experience, it is a well-nigh impossible
task.819
6. The Cummins Bill, 1926-1930: Changes in the
Character of the Debate
Notwithstanding the favorable 1926 Senate Report, the Cummins bill did not reach a vote in the Senate.8 20 Cummins died
in 1926,321 and the ABA's campaign began to show signs of
exasperation. 322 About this time, however, serious discussion of
the issues posed by court rulemaking increased in the literature.
In part, the discussion was an outgrowth of the ABA's campaign,
reflecting an attempt finally to put to rest the objections raised
by Senator Walsh. 823 In addition, the discussion reflected interest
in court rulemaking as a mode of procedural regulation in the
states. Statutory authorizations were already in place in some
states and had been acted on in a few.3 24

Of course, the propa-

ganda pieces were still published; indeed, the influence of events
on argument was closer to the surface than ever.325 At the same
In his May 14 letter to Taft, Walsh had asserted: "I insist that
319 Id. 28.
the task to be imposed upon the Supreme Court is well nigh impossible and
involves labor on its part prodigious beyond the dreams of those who propose the
legislation." Letter from the Hon. Thomas J. Walsh to the Hon. William H.
Taft, supra note 296.
3200n December 10, 1926, Walsh objected to S. 477s being called up on a
call of the calendar, and it was passed over. See 68 CONG. RMc. 223 (1926);
Hepburn, In the Hope of a New Birth of the One Form of Action, 13 VA. L.
REv. 69, 70 n.2 (1926).
321
Cummins' dath was 'keenly felt" by the Committee on Uniform Judicial
Procedure. 52 A.B.A. Rer'. 396, 397 (1927). For a discussion of Taft's views
of Cummins" successor as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Senator Norris,
see A. MAsON, supra note 286, at 96.
322 See, e.g., 52 A.B.A. Rep. 119-22 (1927) (remarks of Mr. Shelton); Tuttle,.
Reforms in Federal Procedure, 14 A.B.A. J. 37, 38 (1928).
23In March, 1927, the American Bar Association Journal published as a supplement articles written by members of the Committee on the Rule Making Power
of the Courts, formed in 1926. See 13 A.B.A. J.No. 3, pt. II (1927). In addition, see, e.g., H. TAsr, LAw REFoRm 40-44, 98-108 (1926); Pound, Senator
Walsh on Rule-Making Power on the Law Side of Federal Practice, 13 A.B.A. J.
84 (1927); Watkins, Non-Conformity to State Practice in Law Cases in Federal
Courts, 14 A.B.A. J.341 (1928).
324These developments were reported most prominently in the Journal of
the American judicature Society. See, e.g., Rulemaking Principle Enacted in
Delaware and Washington, 9 J. Am. JumlCATURE Soc'y 134 (1925); Whittier,
Regulating Procedure by Rules of Court, 11 J.Am. JurDIcATURE Soc'y 15 (1927);
Judicial Reform Has Complete Program, 12 J. Am. JUDIcATURE Soc'Y 5 (1928);
Wisconsin Takes Long Step Forward, 13 J.Am. JuDIcATRE Soc'Y 71 (1929).
See also Paul, supra note 277; Judicial Versus Legislative Determination of Rules:
of Practiceand Procedure--A Symposium, 6 OR. L. Rev. 36 (1926).
325 See, e.g., Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure are Void
Constitutionally, 23 Ir.r.. L. REv. 276 (1928); Campaign Strategy and the Rule-
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time, however, some of the subtleties and distinctions that once
had been obscured by the rhetoric of reform began to emerge.
One was the issue of making precise the matters allocated to the
rulemakers and to the legislature, respectively. Another was the
issue of treating the federal system and state systems as interchangeable for the purpose of evaluating rulemaking proposals.
a. Questioning the Proper Allocation Between Court Rules and
Legislation
Not long after the Senate Judiciary Committee praised and
relied on the work of the New York Board of Statutory Consolidation, Roscoe Pound took issue with one part of that work. Pound
had previously stated his preference for a purer rules-of-court system than the New York Board's 1912 and 1915 Reports envisioned,
on the ground that essential principles were no easier than details
to prescribe a priori.326 In 1927, he took the New York Board
to task, in its criticism of the English system, for assuming "a
theoretically exact, rigid, analytical separation of powers . . . not

possible in so practical matter as government." 327 Pound expressed confidence that if, as he believed, court rulemaking was
constitutional, "we need have no fear that it will disturb the
balance of our government, nor that it will be at variance with
democratic institutions." 28 Another scholar specifically questioned whether some of the matters classified as substantive law
Making Power, 15 A.B.A. J. 24 (1929).

For a collection of articles of a similar

tenor published between 1929 and 1937, see Williams, supra note 19, at 505 n.159.
32
GSee supra text accompanying notes 208-10. In a 1926 address to the
Delaware State Bar Association, Henry Taft described the work of the New York
Board, including its preference for a system combining practice act and rules of
court, and observed:
There is no particular a priori objection to the enactment by the legislature of a few fundamental rules. But it is a curious phase of legislative
psychology that where the entire responsibility for formulating rules has
been delegated to the courts, the tendency has been to allow such rules
to stand without legislative interference. When practice rules are made
by the legislature there is an invitation to the legislature to multiply
amendments.
Taft, Uniformity of Procedure in the Federal Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 20, 21 (1926)
(emphasis added). The 1926 Senate Report included language remarkably similar
to that in italics. See 1926 SENATE REPORT, supra note 297, at 7.
327 Pound, Regulating Procedural Details by Rules of Court, 13 A.B.A. J. No.
3, pt. II, at 12 (1927).
328

Id.

It is unclear whether Pound's criticisms were directed solely at the

New York Board's espousal of a practice act as a means of prescribing the "fundamentals" of procedure in the first sense, described supra text accompanying notes
190-91, or whether they extended to its attempts to carve out, and characterize
as substantive law, certain matters, including those characterized as "fundamental"

in the second sense, described supra text accompanying notes 192 & 196-202.
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by the New York Board ought not more properly to be regarded
as procedure and therefore subject to rules of court.32 9 On the
other hand, there were those who perceived a problem in reposing
exclusive control of procedural regulation in the courts, but they
83 0
did so in terms of ensuring that the rulemakers stayed at work.
b. Questioning the Interchangeability of State and Federal Models
The tendency to treat as interchangeable federal and state
rulemaking proposals was understandable in light of the hope of
the supporters of the uniform federal procedure bill that it would
lead to similar legislation in the states and ultimately to uniform
procedure throughout the country. 331 Moreover, both the ABA
and congressional committees had consistently referred to state
models, and in particular that proposed by the New York Board
of Statutory Consolidation, to describe the scheme of allocation
contemplated in the uniform federal procedure bill.332 Finally,
the uniform federal procedure bill in its various incarnations was
used as the model for state legislation authorizing court rulemak32
9 See Paul, supra note 277, at 239-41. However, the decisions upon which
the author based his question did not involve the allocation of lawmaking competence between the legislature and the courts. Cf. Montague, Restoring to the
Courts the Power to Make Rules of Procedure, 6 OR. L. REv. 17, 19-20 (1926):

In response to another objection . . . the Courts would not rashly

adventure upon ground which is debatable between adjective and substantive law. The Supreme Court of the United States has never shown
any disposition to tamper with the Statutes of Limitations in its equity
rules, nor with other fields which are technically procedural, but in which
matters of general public policy indicate that Legislatures should have a
voice. In my own view there would be no objection to reserving subjects
in which the general policy of the law might be involved from the operation of the rulemaking power, at least until that system has approved
itself in the exercise, and this would include attachment, and for the
present, evidence, although I, personally, believe the law of evidence is
responsible for a very large part of the preventable delay in trials without
any corresponding gain in the achievement of justice.
The author appears to have been referring to the 1926 Senate Report.
330 See, e.g., Clark, supra note 283, at 446, 449; Sunderland, The Regulation
of Legal Procedure, 35 W. VA. L.Q. 301, 314-22 (1929). There were others,
although apparently not many, who shared Senator Walsh's doubts about the
constitutionality of the entire enterprise. See, e.g., Skipworth, Change of Procedure, 6 OR. L. REv. 24 (1926). Chief Justice Taft considered that a view
"that nobody but an Irishman with a certain keenness of mind and without any
sense of humor could solemnly advance." Letter from the Hon. William H. Taft
to Henry W. Taft (May 21, 1926) (Taft Papers, supra note 255, reel 282). For
agreement with Walsh's non-constitutional arguments, see Hall, Uniform Law
Procedurein Federal Courts, 33 W. VA. L.Q. 131 (1927).
331 See supra text accompanying notes 147-51; supra note 159.
332

See supra text accompanying notes 183-84 & 313-16.
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ing, and the claim was often made that the state rulemakers had
33
not acted because they were waiting for federal court rules. 3
Nonetheless, a uniform national procedure was not embraced
by all who supported the idea of court rulemaking. 334 In addition,
the propriety of treating the federal and state proposals as if they
presented identical advantages and disadvantages was questioned.
Some saw as the major difference the inapplicability at the state
level of Senator Walsh's argument that uniform federal procedure
would inconvenience lawyers by forcing them to learn two systems
of procedure in order to practice in their home states. 38 5 Senator
Walsh himself saw more:
Now I want it distinctly understood that I am making no
argument whatever against the system of rules prescribed
by a court as against laws enacted by the legislature. If
the people of the state of Oregon believe that the Supreme Court of the state of Oregon can more wisely act
upon such a matter than can their legislature, I shall have
no fault to find. That is not what I inveigh against.
What I do protest against is endeavoring to enforce uniformity in the federal courts of forty-eight states, presenting such radical differences in social, financial, and political organization as is evidenced by the different
systems of law that exist in the various states with reference to matters of practice. It is confusing two entirely
different questions.33 6
7. The 1928 Senate Report: From Dissent
to Majority Report
The beginning of the end of the ABA's campaign was signalled
in 1928. The personnel of the Judiciary Committee had changed,
and once again a majority was opposed to the uniform federal
333 See supra note 277; supra text accompanying note 324; 9 J. Am. JuDicATuRE.
Soc'Y 4 (1925); 9 J. Am. JuDicATu E Soc'y 163 (1926). The earlier influence in
the states of the ABA Committee of Fifteens 1909 Report is noted in Campaign

Strategy and the Rule-Making Power, supra note 325, at 24.
384 See, e.g., Sunderland, The English Struggle for Procedural Reform, 39
Haav. L. REv. 725, 744 (1926) [hereinafter cited as Sunderland, English Struggle];

Sunderland, A Reply to Senator Walsh, 6 On. L. REv. 73, 74 (1926).
335 See, e.g., Hale, The Rule-Making Power-Clarifying the Issue, 6 OR. L.
REv. 70, 70-71 (1926); Johnson, Reform of Legal Procedure: Rule-Making Power
for Courts, 6 IND. L.J. 383, 395 (1931). Sunderland, English Struggle, supranote 334, at 744, opposed the idea of uniform procedure because it would, in his

view, put an end to experimentation.

336 Walsh, Rule-Making Power on the Law Side of Federal Practice, 6 OR.

L. REv. 1, 15 (1926), reprinted in 13 A.B.A. J. 87, 91-92 (1927). Walsh's objection, it should be noted, embraced a uniform federal procedure in toto.
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33
procedure bill.33 7 Pressure secured its release from committee,8
3
3
9
The Committee's report conbut it was reported unfavorably.
tained a brief statement of the history of the bill.3 40 It relied on
Walsh's 1926 Texarkana speech, which had also been used as the
Minority Views to the 1926 Senate Report, 341 for reasons "impelling the committee to the conclusion that the legislation is
unwise, and perhaps unconstitutional." 342 The Minority Views
to the 1928 Senate Report,343 signed by Senator Deneen, supported
passage. It was a considerably more elaborate document than the
majority Report, valuable more as a source of information on the
history of the campaign and of rulemaking in the states and England than as a source of further light on the proper interpretation of the Cummins bill. Again, however, care was taken to
address Senator Walsh's spectre of "the vast extent and variety of
rules that would be necessary, and of the complicated situations,
the local differences, etc., that would have to be adjusted."34 4 And
again, reference was made to the New York experience. The
minority noted that some of the matters dealt with in state codes
were beyond the jurisdiction of federal courts and that other subjects, although within that jurisdiction, "were entirely outside
the scope of rules of court." 84r

Matters of jurisdiction and of substantive right are
clearly within the power of the legislature. These are
not to be affected. It cannot be too strongly emphasized
that the general rules of court contemplated under this
bill will deal only with the details of the operation of
3 46
the judicial machine.
After quoting from Justice Sutherland's testimony at the 1924
Senate Hearing 47 and a Supreme Court decision,3 48 and to eluci33753 A.B.A. REP.
338 Id.; Report of

139 (1928).
the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 53 A.B.A.

REP'. 500, 501 (1928).
339
See 69 CONG. Ic. 3663 (1928). The bill number was S. 759. Id.
40
S
See S. REP. No. 440, 70th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1928) [hereinafter cited as
19283 SENATE
REonT], reprinted in 55 A.B.A. REP. 524-61 (1930).
41
See id. 2-15; supra note 296.
342 1928 SENATE REPoRT, supra note 340, at 2.
343 Id. pt. 2.
344

Id.15.

345

Id. 16.

84 Id.
847 See id.; supra text accompanying note 272.
348
See 1928 SmATE REPoRT, supra note 340, pt. 2, at 16.

The quotation was
from Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat
Co., 263 U.S. 629, 635 (1924).
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date further the intended scope of the authority conferred, the
minority addressed "some of the specific matters cited in the majority report as stumbling blocks in the way of the proposed
system."

349

Referring to prior federal classifications

and the

experience in states where rulemaking power had been conferred,
it concluded that none of those matters was within the Cummins
350
bill's rulemaking grant.

The Cummins bill did not come to a vote in 1928 or 1929.
The reports of the ABA Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure in those years were the standard fare, 351 urging passage of
the Cummins bill, but Shelton's remarks in presenting the 1929
report were not. His frustration was evident, but dominant was
the theme that "we are just beginning." 352
In fact, however, Shelton's career as chairman of the ABA
Committee was over, and with his passing from the post, the Committee recommended a change in strategy. Its 1930 report53
noted that the new chairman had spent some days interviewing
senators and representatives, as well as conferring with Shelton.
On the basis of those conferences and conversations, the Committee concluded that the prospects of the uniform federal procedure
bill were less favorable than in the past; it recommended that,
until such time as they appeared favorable to passage, efforts
should be limited to having the bill introduced and "keeping in
touch

with

the

situation."

3,4

The

Committee's

resolution

carried.35 5
F. Defeat and Victory: 1931-1934
1. The Lean Years: 1931-1933
The early thirties were lean years for the movement supporting court rulemaking, at both the federal and state levels. 35 6 Al349 1928 SENATE REPOnT, supra note 340, pt. 2, at 17.
350 See id. In concluding the section on "Scope of Rules,"

from the favorable 1926 Senate Report.
316.

the minority quoted
See id.; supra text accompanying note

Section 2 was, typically, treated by the 1928 minority as non-controversial.

The minority merely quoted from the 1926 Senate Report, which described it as
such. See 1928 SENATE REPoRT, supra note 340, pt. 2, at 24.
351 See Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 53 A.B.A.
REP. 500 (1928); Report of the Special Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure,
54 A.B.A. REP. 514 (1929).
35254 A.B.A. REP. 131 (1929) (remarks of Mr. Shelton).
353 Report of the Special Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 55 A.B.A.
REP. 521 (1930).
354 Id.; see id. 91.
35 See id. 92.

35
6 The experience at the federal level is chronicled in the ABA documents
cited infra notes 358-59. The situation in the states may be surmised from the
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though the 1931 report of the ABA Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure gave some grounds for optimism,357 another change
in personnel brought to the chair a federal district judge who was
personally opposed to the uniform federal procedure bill; he suggested that attempts to secure its passage would be unavailing and
indeed might improve the chances of pending legislation to abolish
diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction. 358 In 1933, the chairman
neglected to file a written report. He said, however, that notwithstanding the death of Senator Walsh, the uniform federal
procedure bill would not pass and that there was no longer any
need for the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure. 359 There
being no motion to continue the Committee, it lapsed.3 60
2. Homer Cummings and Passage of the Act
Just as the change in leadership of the ABA Committee on
Uniform Judicial Procedure very quickly brought a change in the
ABA's position on the uniform federal procedure bill, so was Senator Walsh's death in 1933 361 quickly followed by a change of
position in Congress. His death brought to the office of Attorney
General, for which Walsh himself had been chosen, Homer Cummings, a person who would fill the leadership vacuum in the
dearth of articles and editorials in volumes 14 through 16 (1930-1933) of the
Journal of the American Judicature Society. See supra notes 224 & 325.
85 7
See Report of the Special Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 56
A.B.A. REP. 487-89 (1931). One of the hopeful matters mentioned by the Committee was a project of the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges "to secure legislation authorizing them to recommend changes in the practice and procedure in
the federal courts." Id. 488. Fish reports that during this period Chief Justice
Hughes refused to join those who asserted inherent rulemaking power but that,
after the ABA's campaign 'languished," Hughes "took up the torch" and "[f]or
four years . . . unsuccessfully sought to lodge the rule-making power in the
Judicial Conference." P. FIsH, supra note 41, at 63 (footnote omitted). Fish
seems to have confused the rulemaldng power with the power to make recommendations for legislation. His cited sources do not support his assertions as to
the former. Moreover, Hughes' unwillingness "to take part in any promotion of
the [rulemaking] legislation or to be quoted with reference to it" had been reported in his presence at the 1930 ABA annual meeting. 55 A.B.A. REp. 91
(1930); of. 1936 Report of the Committee on Rule-Making Power and Judicial
Councils 2, reprinted in 21 MAss. L.Q. 66 (1936).
35 8
See 57 A.B.A. RFP. 117-19 (1932); Report of the Special Committee on
Uniform Judicial Procedure, 57 A.B.A. REP. 575-76 (1932). The new chairman,
Judge McClintic, had responded to Walsh's 1926 letter, see supra note 296,
vigorously opposing the uniform federal procedure bill. See letter from the Hon.
George W. McClintic to the Hon. Thomas J. Walsh (May 20, 1926) (Walsh
Papers, supra note 154, Container 302).
M9 See 58 A.B.A. REP. 108-10 (1933).
360
See id. 110.
361 See 19 A.B.A. J.197 (1933).
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reform movement created when the ABA Committee on Uniform
Judicial Procedure lapsed.
In an address to the New York County Lawyers' Association
on March 14, 1934, Attorney General Cummings declared that he
supported the uniform federal procedure bill and had suggested
its reintroduction to the "Chairmen of the appropriate Senate and
House committees." 362 Moreover, he announced that the proposed reform was endorsed by President Roosevelt. 63 The practical and theoretical reasons for his position given in that address
and elsewhere were those that had animated the ABA's campaign
for years. 3 " Indeed, Cummings saw himself as reviving the ABA's
campaign and, with the advantages of his position and political
approach, leading it to a successful conclusion. 365
Success was "startingly sudden." 366 The Senate Judiciary
Committee favorably reported the bill, referred to its attention
by Cummings, on May 18, 1934.367 The report, occupying less
than a page, did little more than reprint Cummings' covering
letter. 366 The House Judiciary Committee followed suit on May
362 SELECTED PAPERS

363 See

ov Hoz,= CummdnGs 182, 184 (C. Swisher ed. 1939).

id.

364 See id. 182-84; Cummings, The New Law Relating to Federal Procedure, 1
U.S.L.W. 926 (1934).
365 See sources cited supra note 364; Cummings, supra note 218, at 19-20, reprinted in 24 A.B.A. J. at 885-86. See also Address of Chief Justice Hughes to the
American Law Institute, reprinted in 21 A.B.A. J. 340 (1935):
This statute was the result of long effort. For many years the American
Bar Association had sought action by Congress to obtain uniformity of
federal procedure in actions at law by conferring upon the Supreme Court
the requisite rule-making power, similar to the power possessed by the
Court as to practice in equity cases. But the proposal was strongly and
persistently opposed and the final achievement in the passage of this
measure is no doubt attributable to the earnest and persuasive efforts
of the Attorney General.
Occasionally, however, Cummings allowed himself to be carried away, suggesting
a greater role in the drafting of the bill introduced than was warranted. See, e.g.,
Cummings, Modernizing Federal Procedure, 63 A.B.A. REP. 716, 719 (1938). As
indicated infra text accompanying note 375, the statute Cummings caused to be
introduced was the Cummins bill, with one minor change.
366 Congress Strengthens the Machinery of Justice, 20 A.B.A. J. 422, 422
(1934).
3 67

See 78 CONG. 1xc. 9070 (1934).

3
68 See S. REP. No. 1049, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)
1934 SENATE BRoaT]. The letter follows:

[hereinafter cited as
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30, 1934, in a report of two pages,3 6 9 one of which reprinted an
identical letter and the 1934 Senate Report.370 The debate in
both the Senate and the House was perfunctory.3 7 1 The bill
passed in the Senate on May 23, 1934,3-2 and in the House on
June 8.3 73 It was signed by the President eleven days later.3 74
In less than three months, Cummings had secured what the ABA
had sought for more than twenty years. The Act, identical to the
bill introduced by Senator Cummins in 1924 with the addition of
one word, provided:
Be it enacted, etc., That the Supreme Court of the United
States shall have the power to prescribe by general rules,
for the district courts of the United States and for the
courts of the District of Columbia, the forms of process,
Department of Justice
Washington, DC March 1, 1934
Honorable Henry F. Ashurst
Chairman Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, Washington, D.C.
MY DEAR SENATOR: I enclose herewith a draft of a bill to empower the Supreme Court of the United States to prescribe rules to
govern the practice and procedure in civil actions at law in the district
courts of the United States and the courts of the District of Columbia.
The enactment of this bill would bring about uniformity and simplicity
in the practice in actions at law in Federal courts and thus relieve the
courts and the bar of controversies and difficulties which are continually
arising wholly apart from the merits of the litigation in which they are
interested. It seems to me that there can be no substantial objection to
the enactment of a measure which would produce so desirable a result,
which, apart from its inherent merit, would also, it is believed, contribute to a reduction in the cost of litigation in the Federal courts.
I request that you introduce the enclosed bill and hope that you
may be able to give it your support.
Sincerely yours,
HOMER CUMMINGS, Attorney General.
369 See H.R. REP. No. 1829, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) [hereinafter cited as
1934 HouSE REPORT].

37 0
See id. 2. The remainder of the Report paraphrased the bill, predicted
that it would "promote simplicity and uniformity of practice in all Federal Courts,"
and described the prevailing practice at law and in equity. Id. 1. Although the
Report also stated that the Attorney General had appeared before the House
Judiciary Committee in support of the bill, id., there is no printed record of hearings in either the House or the Senate.
a71 In both, an objection that the bill could cause inconvenience to local lawyers
was made and withdrawn. See 78 CoNe. BEc. 9362 (1934) (remarks of Sen.
Adams); id. 10,866 (remarks of Rep. Eltse). Senator Ashurst assured his colleagues
that the bill "does not deprive any State or any citizen of any vital right," that it
"does not in any sense destroy or abridge any right or any statute of any State,"
and that "the Supreme Court of the United States could not make a rule that would
violate any law of any State or of the United States." 78 CONG. REc. 9362 (1934).
3 72
See 78 CoNG. REc. 9363 (1934).
3 73
See 78 CoNG. REc. 10,866 (1934).
37420 A.B.A. J.460 (1934).
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writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in civil actions at law. Said rules shall neither
abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any
litigant. They shall take effect six months after their
promulgation, and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect.
Sec. 2. The court may at any time unite the general
rules prescribed by it for cases in equity with those in
actions at law so as to secure one form of civil action and
procedure for both; Provided, however, That in such
union of rules the right of trial by jury as at common
law and declared by the seventh amendment to the Constitution shall be preserved to the parties inviolate. Such
united rules shall not take effect until they shall have
been reported to Congress by the Attorney General at the
beginning of a regular session thereof and until after the
37 5
close of such session.
IV.

THE Ruis

ENABLING

OF THE

AcT

PRE-1934

REINTERPRETED

IN LIGHT

HISTORY

A. The Interpretive Value of the Act's
Antecedent Period of Travail
1. Relevance
a. The Pre-1934 Materials
The legislative materials arising out of the consideration of
the bill introduced at the behest of Attorney General Cummings
in 1934 provide only the most general sense of the statute's meaning. 70G Those materials do not speak to the question posed in
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., and they do not speak to numerous
other problems that have since been identified in the interpretation of the Act. 3 7

Where the reports and debate preceding pas-

375 Cf. S.2061, set forth supra note 268. The addition of the word "civir' in
§ 1 made it consistent with §2. It may also have been designed to make clear that
the bill did not authorize rules in criminal actions. A 1925 Washington statute
modeled on the Sutherland bill had been interpreted to include rulemaking authority

See 12 J. AM. JumiCATOUE Soc'y 70 (1928);
see also Paul, supra note 277, at 234; Wickes, supra note 36, at 2.
376 See supra text accompanying notes 35 & 366-73.
in criminal as well as civil cases.
7

An argument from silence would decline to attribute to Congress an intention to impose restrictions on the delegation which were not elaborated in 1934
that might impede the effectuation of the Act's general purposes, which were.
See supra notes 368 & 370. In describing the bill, the House Report did note, but
did not elaborate, the restriction contained in the second sentence of the bill. The
argument should be rejected because it ignores the speed with which the Attorney
General's bill was considered and enacted. See supra text accompanying notes
37
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sage of legislation by Congress have been similarly uninformative,
the Court has considered more detailed materials from prior sessions of Congress. At least it has done so with respect to language
that "crystallized" at an earlier time and appeared in the bill when
enacted, 378 where "the essence of the legislation remained constant," 379 or where "the operative language of the original bill
was substantially carried forward into the Act." 380
In the case of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, the bill before
Congress remained essentially unchanged from 1924.381 There
are available as aids to its interpretation lengthy hearings, including one session presided over by its draftsman, and detailed reports,
including one written by its draftsman.38 2 Although there was a
gap of some years between these considered explications of the
bill's provisions and its enactment, and although they were not
specifically referred to in the scanty materials produced in 1934,
nothing happened in the meanwhile to suggest that in using the
identical language Congress sought to achieve different purposes,
or to rob some of that language of its meaning.3 83 On the contrary, for some of that period the campaign for passage of the
366-75; see also Shulman & Jaegerman, Some jurisdictional Limitations on Federal
Procedure, 45 YA.E L.J. 393, 396 (1936) (suggesting that the "easy passage" of
the Act was due to "paramount problems of economic maladjustment"); J. W=rsTEiN, supra note 3, at 67. Moreover, it ignores the fact that the Attorney General
himself was the prime source relied on by the House and Senate Judiciary Committees and that he did not purport to describe the legislation except in the most
general terms. See supra text accompanying notes 368 & 370.
378T.W.A., Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 336 U.S. 601, 605-06 n.6 (1949).
3 79

Dawson Chem. Co. v. Robin & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 204 (1980).
United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 404-05 n.14 (1973).
See supra text accompanying note 375.
382 See supra text accompanying notes 268 & 297.
38 3
As to references to prior material in the year of enactment, compare Dawson
Chem. Co. v. Robin & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 204 (1980) and United States v.
Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 405 n.14 (1973). But see id.: "Surely an interpretation
placed by the sponsor of a bill on the very language subsequently enacted by
Congress cannot be dismissed out of hand, as the dissent would have it, simply
because the interpretation was given two years earlier." In Enmons the legislative
history (of the Hobbs Act) in the year of passage was considerably more extensive
than the 1934 legislative history of the Rules Enabling Act, which may explain
why Justice Douglas, who wrote the opinion of the Court in T.W.A., Inc. v. Civil
Aeronautics Board, was of the view that "the most relevant legislative history . . .
concerns the 79th Congress, not the 78th." Enmons, 410 U.S. at 414. In any
event, Douglas cannot fairly be said to have "dismissed" the latter "out of hand."
Although the prior legislative hearing and reports on the Cummins bill were not
mentioned in the 1934 legislative material, the fact that the ABA and others had
recommended the provisions of the bill "for a good many years" was. 78 CoNO.
REc. 9362 (1934); see also id. 10,866. On the significance, if any, of intervening
events, see infra notes 385 & 426.
380
3 81
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uniform federal procedure bill was actively pressed in Congress,3 s4
and the bill's legislative sponsors in 1934 were both well acquainted
with that campaign. 8s5 Moreover, in 1934 and thereafter Attorney General Cummings made it clear that he was doing nothing
more than resuscitating the previous effort.3ss
The voluminous materials concerning the uniform federal
procedure bill produced by the ABA, in particular the ABA
Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, are also relevant to
the interpretation of the Act.38 7 Such extra-legislative materials
38 4

See supra text accompanying notes 320-52.

385 Senator Ashurst, who reported S. 3040 for the Judiciary Committee and

brought it to a vote on the floor in 1934, see supra notes 368 & 371, had voted
with the majority to report the Cummins bill adversely in 1928. See S. RE,. No.
440, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1928). Representative Sumners, who was the House
manager, see supra notes 368-71, had been on the House Judiciary Committee,
before which the uniform federal procedure bill was pressed, for years. See, e.g.,
Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 47 A.B.A. REP'. 370, 373
(1922). Moreover, he apparently was a supporter. See letter from Thomas W.
Shelton to the Hon. Hatton W. Sumners (June 29, 1926) (Cummins Papers, supra
note 260).
386 See supra text accompanying note 365. It might be suggested that the
1934 Congress intended a broad delegation in the area of judicial procedure, similar
to the delegations it was making at that time in other areas. See Clinton, supra
note 13, at 74-75. But see supra note 166. That view neglects the general recognition that the Act was merely the culmination of a long campaign. Moreover, the
history of the campaign hardly bespeaks a shared perception, at least in Congress,
of serious dislocations such as prompted those broad delegations. Indeed, it has
been suggested that Congress's preoccupation with the economic and social problems of the Depression led it to pass the Act in 1934 with little attention. See
supra note 377. Congress's change of heart is probably attributable to Senator
Walsh's death, Cummings' political skills, and the support of President Roosevelt.
See supra text accompanying note 363; supra note 218. "IBlut even this could
not have availed had there been no Shelton to fight on year after year and to at
least keep the need before the profession." Rule-Making Authority for Federal
Courts,
18 J. Am. JUDIcATURE Soc'v 37, 38 (1934).
387
See generally 2A J. SUTHManrN, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§48.11 (4th ed. 1973); Note, Nonlegislative Intent as an Aid to Statutory Interpretation, 49 CoLum. L. Rzv. 676 (1949).
Dean Clark, the Reporter of the original Advisory Committee, argued that "in
this case where the statute was enacted without any real discussion, such intent
[the 'intent of the legislature'] must be traced to the Association's draftsmen."
Clark, Supreme Court Power, supra note 41, at 1304. However, there are numerous problems with his reasoning. First, the Act was not drafted by the ABA.
See supra text accompanying notes 253-268. Second, Clark ignored the pre-1934
legislative history, which surely must be accorded more weight, and of which he
was aware. See, e.g., Clark & Moore, supra note 36, at 394 n.30. Third, even
with reference to the ABA materials, he paid attention only to general purposes
thought to be reflected there. See Clark, Supreme Court Power, supra note 41,
at 1304-05, 1307-08. Attention to specific purposes evident in the reports of the
ABA Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, let alone in the pre-1934 legislative
history, would not, for instance, have permitted Clark to support the view that the
Act authorizes rules of admissibility of evidence. Compare id. 1311 with infra text
accompanying notes 516-18.
Compare Dean Clark's use of the ABA materials with that suggested by
Ohlinger, supra note 36, at 478-80. Ohlinger also adduced the pre-1934 legislative
history. See id. 478 n.79.
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are independently important, however, only where congressional
materials on a question are "unavailable or indecisive."38 81
Finally, it is permissible to look, in cases of ambiguity, "to
the public history of the times in which [the legislation being interpreted] was passed." 89 Indeed, historical and jurisprudential
perspectives are essential to an understanding of the circumstances
from which the language of the Act drew much of its meaning.39 0
"It is a delicate business," Justice Holmes observed, "to base
speculations about the purposes or construction of a statute upon
the vicissitudes of its passage." 391 Holmes was responding to an
argument that relied on changes in the language of an amendment
to the legislation being construed.3 92 Where the language in successive versions of a bill has not changed, or has done so only in
immaterial respects, and where the only informative materials
attend the earlier versions, the business of considering those materials in interpreting the legislation is also delicate. But it is
essential if the process is even to attempt to remain faithful to the
legislative will.
b. The Post-1934 Developments
The argument can be made that, although the pre-1934 history once was relevant to the interpretation of the Act, developments since 1934 have rendered it solely of historical interest.
The argument is not without force, but it is ultimately unconvincing.
Certainly, one should not be deterred from reexamining the
meaning of the Act's limitations by the reality of more than forty
years of Supreme Court interpretations in promulgating Federal
Rules and amendments, and in adjudicating challenges to their
validity. The statutory limitations in question were intended to
confine the power of the Court itself, a fact that requires that
the Court ever be open to the reconsideration of past interpreta38SNote, supra note 387, at 685. The interpretive relevance of the ABA
materials is not of concern to the extent that they were incorporated in the pre-1934
legislative materials, see supra text accompanying note 317, or are relied on solely
for confirmation.
3
8sAldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 8, 23 (1845); see also Leo Sheep
Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 669 (1979).
390
See United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962); Civil Aeronautics
Bd. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316, 323-25 (1961); DuParquet Huot &
Moneuse Co. v. Evans, 297 U.S. 216, 218-21 (1936); see also H. FmENDLy,
supra note 38, at 212-15.
391pine Hill Coal Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 191, 196 (1922).
392
See id. 195-96.
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tions on sufficient demonstration that it has erred in ascertaining
the statute's meaning. 93 This general proposition takes on additional force in the context of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,
given that the Court has never considered the materials that are
relevant to the Act's interpretation. 394
Congress's failure to block Federal Rules and amendments
and its failure legislatively to overrule the Court's decisions construing the Act should not be regarded as ratification of the Court's
interpretations of the scope of its rulemaking power under the
Act, even when contrasted with those recent instances in which
Congress did not acquiesce in proposed Federal Rules. Justice
Frankfurter's dissent in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. pointed out the
dubiety of equating Congress's failure to act with its approval of
Federal Rules. 395 Professor Mishkin has since reasserted the weaknesses of the general proposition. 3 6 In overcoming institutional
inertia to block the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress
responded to considerations the very multitude and variousness
of which suggest the insignificance of its traditional posture. 397 It
is difficult to disagree with Judge Friendly: "Even as to decisions
of the highest court, the 'silence' principle should be limited to
the rather rare case where the history fairly supports the inference of legislative rejection of a proposal for change rather than
more likely inferences of ignorance, indifference or inertia ...

." 398

Finally, none of the post-1934 actions taken by Congress with
respect to the Rules Enabling Act signifies congressional approval
of the Court's interpretations, implicit or explicit, of the limitations on rulemaking which the Act imposes.
393 Where "the limits are being imposed on the courts themselves . . . the

judicial constraints to act in accordance with legislatively imposed limits should be
even stronger in order to counter the inherent tendency of any institution to extend

its own reach and power." Mishkin, supra note 82, at 1687.
394 See supra text accompanying note 56.
395312

U.S. 1, 18 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

396 See Mishkin, supra note 82, at 1687-88

(citing

H.

HART

& A.

SACKs,

Tr-m

LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAmING AND APPLICATON OF LAw 13941401 (tent. ed. 1958) and P. MIsHmN & C. Momris, ON LAw IN THIE CounTs

481-84 (1965)).

The experience of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

before Congress provides specific support for the rejection of an argument equating

congressional inaction with congressional approval. See infra text accompanying
notes 699-704.
39
7 See 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 5006, at 101-07 (1977).
398

H.

Fim

,nLY, supra note 38, at 233 (footnote omitted).
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In the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, the Act as codified
was consolidated with parts of other sections of title 28.399 There
were two changes of possible relevance for these purposes. First,
the reference to "the substantive rights of any litigant" in the
second sentence of the 1934 Act became "any substantive rights."
This change was not explained in the Reviser's Note; presumably,
therefore, it was considered one of the "[c]hanges . . . made in

phraseology." 400 A more interesting change was the addition of
the sentence, "Nothing in this title anything therein to the contrary notwithstanding, shall in any way limit, supersede, or repeal
any such rules heretofore prescribed by the Supreme Court."
Added by a Senate amendment, and thus not treated in the Reviser's Note, this provision was thought to be "necessary in order
to make clear that no provisions of the existing Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure . . . are amended or otherwise affected by this
bill." 401 The amendment was not specifically discussed in either
house.40 2 It bespeaks caution appropriate for a legislative undertaking of such scope and complexity, not a judgment that any
particular Federal Rule was, let alone that all of them were,
40 3
valid.
399 See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2072, 62 Stat. 961 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1976)).
400 Reviser's Note to § 2072, H.R. EP'. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A170
(1947). For a discussion of this change, see Wellborn, supra note 82, at 405-06.
For a discussion of the weight to be given the Reviser's Notes in statutory interpretation, see J. MooRE, MooRE's JuDicr. CODE ir 0.03(11), at 77-78 (1949).
401S. REP. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1948).
A similar provision was
added to § 2073, dealing with admiralty rules. See id.
4 2
O Approximately eighty amendments to H.R. 3214, the bill passed by the
House, were made by the Senate Judiciary Committee. They were agreed to en
bloc in the Senate. See 94 CONG. REc. 7927-30 (1948). Thereafter, the House
concurred in the amendments. See id. 8498-501. It appears that the amendment
in question was one of a number submitted by the Reviser which were collectively
described as "perfecting amendments of a wholly noncontroversial character which
further study of the bill has indicated would be desirable." Hearings on H. 3214
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 27
(1948).
403 The inference from reenactment to congressional approval is particularly
attenuated in connection with any "revision and codification of an entire branch of
statutory law," which, "[i]f it is to be carried through successfully ... must usually
be placed on a plane of high public interest above the levels of ordinary partisan
contest." H. HART & A. SAcKs, supra note 396, at 1402. The 1948 revision of the
Judicial Code was no exception, and the special precaution taken by Congress with
respect to the Federal Rules provides no additional ground for an inference of
approval. Representative Keogh, the Chairman of the House Committee on Revision of the Laws, explained: "The policy that we adopted, which in my mind
has been very carefully followed by the revisers ... was to avoid wherever possible
and whenever possible the adoption in our revision of what might be described as
controversial substantive changes of law." Hearing on H.R. 1600 and H.R. 2055
Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
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None of the amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 2072 since 1948 has
involved the Act's basic limitations on rulemaking.4 4 In such
circumstances, a principle of statutory interpretation equating reenactment or amendment with approval is equally without foundation in theory and in the assumptions of fact necessary to justify
it.405

At the least, the reenactment principle should be rejected in
the absence of legislative history indicating congressional approval
of the Court's interpretations. 4 6 No such legislative history has
been found in connection with the post-1934 amendments of the
Act.40 7 Again, Judge Friendly has the last word: "We ought not

to get in the position where Congress reenacts a statute in the
expectation that the courts will retain freedom to interpret it, but
the courts deny themselves that freedom because of a supposition
that Congress meant them not to have it."

408

2. Weight
Even though, as a legal matter, the pre-1934 history of the
Act is relevant to its interpretation, numerous considerations, aris6 (1947). Subsequently, Representative Robsion, Chairman of Subcommittee No.
1, told the House: "It can be said truthfully that this bill is not a partisan bill in
any respect." 93 Co.zcu. BREc. 8385 (1947).
The strongest case for an inference of approval in connection with the 1948
revision is presented by congressional repeal of a statute thought to have been
superseded under the terms of the 1934 Act by a Federal Rule. Even in such a
case, there is reason to question whether Congress's action should foreclose a subsequent determination of the Rule's invalidity. See infra note 608.
404 See Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 103, 63 Stat. 104 (requiring direct reporting by the Chief Justice to Congress and eliminating Attorney General as the
transmitting agent); Act of July 18, 1949, ch. 343, § 2, 63 Stat. 446 (making § 2072
applicable to the District Court for the Territory of Alaska); Act of May 10, 1950,
ch. 174, § 2, 64 Stat. 158 (allowing reporting of proposed Federal Rules to Congress not later than May 1 of each year, to become effective 90 days after they
have been reported); Act of July 7, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 12(m), 72 Stat.
348 (eliminating provisions relating to the District Court for the Territory of
Alaska); Act of Nov. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-773, § 1, 80 Stat. 1323 (extending
rulemaking power under § 2072 to admiralty and maritime cases, appeals in civil
actions (including admiralty and maritime cases), proceedings for review of Tax
Court decisions and for judicial review or enforcement of orders of administrative
agencies, boards, commissions, or officers).
405 See H. HAT & A. SAcKs, supra note 396, at 1403-04.
406
See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 38, at 232.
407 Note, however, the general observation that "[tihe Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have worked with great success to improve the administration of justice"
and the conclusion that "[t3here seems no doubt that their application by the courts
of Alaska will be to the advantage of lawyers, litigants, and the general public."
H.R. REP. No. 959, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1949).
408 H. FPrENDLY, supra note 38, at 232-33.
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ing from events before and after 1934, affect the weight it should
be accorded in that enterprise.
The pre-1934 history reveals a borrowing from state sources
that is replete with theoretical and practical difficulties. 40 9 It also
affords room for doubt as to the care and conviction with which
the supporters of the uniform federal procedure bill articulated
410
the bill's limitations on court rulemaking.
Experience under the Act since 1934 may not preclude reinterpretation, but it surely furnishes strong practical arguments
against, at the least, the invalidation of Federal Rules whose validity has been adjudicated or generally assumed.411 Moreover,
during that period our thinking about procedure-indeed about
law-has changed. 412 We may fairly question the sense of an attempt to define in advance the boundaries of court rulemaking,413
as well as the usefulness of any such attempt in 1926 or 1934 for
present needs and conditions. 414
409

See infra text accompanying notes 502-10 & 733-35.
See infra text accompanying notes 519-24. It is true that the debate about
the uniform federal procedure bill was, for the most part, conducted at a high
level of generality. But the motives of the supporters of the bill in maintaining
that level of discourse are as important to explore as Senator Walsh's motives in
insisting on particulars.
For some, generality was probably the counsel of convenience and political
success. The task of reducing to specifics the limitations on court rulemaking was
not easy, at least after the bill had been rewritten in 1923, and the enterprise entailed the risk of arousing opposition. Cf. H. FImNDLY, supra note 38, at 128
(prospect of opposition to legislation evokes "compromise or even.. . unintelligibility in the text").
For others, generality was probably also the best hope of significant power for
the Supreme Court and hence, in their view, of truly effective reform. Indeed, it
has recently been suggested that Shelton "painted a bright line between procedure
and substance" and that "[tihis was in part a transparent attempt to convince Congress that it was not giving up much power by enabling the Supreme Court to draft
procedural rules." Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 A.B.A. J.
1648, 1651 (1981). The suggestion appears to attribute legal realism to a person
whose writings, as Professor Subrin himself recognizes, see id. 1650-51, hardly bespeak it. Moreover, a bright line approach could work both ways: witness the
classification of evidence. See supra text accompanying note 237; infra text accompanying notes 516-18. In any event, the point may be valid if confined to the
generality of the debate.
411 Apart from the practical concerns that usually animate the doctrine of stare
decisis, see infra note 632, it is important to consider the disruption of national
uniformity that might attend the invalidation of numerous Federal Rules. Many
states have used the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a model. See, e.g., Rowe,
A Comment on the Federalism of the Federal Rules, 1979 D=xz L.J. 843, 843.
412 See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 410, at 1651.
413
But the logical and practical difficulties of classifying a matter as procedure
or substance are not sufficient reason to abandon the enterprise, at least when it is
required by statute. See Ely, supra note 3, at 724; infra text accompanying note
742.
414
See infra text accompanying notes 738-83.
410
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It is not my purpose here to resolve all of these problems.
Some of them are taken up in connection with particular matters
on which they bear. Others are left for further research. The
confidence with which one can draw conclusions from the pre1934 history varies considerably with the question that is asked.
Let us ask the questions. There will be time enough to debate
the accuracy and pertinence of the answers.
B. The Purpose of the Procedure/Substance Dichotomy
Nothing could be clearer from the pre-1934 history of the
Rules Enabling Act than that the procedure/substance dichotomy
in the first two sentences was intended to allocate lawmaking
power between the Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress.
The pre-1934 history also makes clear that the protection of state
law was deemed a probable effect, rather than the purpose of, a
limitation designed to allocate lawmaking power between federal
institutions.
1. Allocation of Lawmaking Power Between the
Supreme Court as Rulemaker and Congress
From the beginning, a stated goal of the ABA's campaign for
the uniform federal procedure bill was to achieve an "equable
division" of power and responsibility between the courts and Congress in the regulation of procedure. 415 The language used by
Shelton and the 1914 House Judiciary Committee to describe the
purposes and effects of the allocation scheme in the Clayton bill
was borrowed from the 1912 New York Report, which was imbued
with concern about the appropriate allocation of matters between
the courts exercising rulemaking power and the legislature. 416
When the uniform federal procedure bill was redrafted in 1923,
its draftsman, Senator Cummins, expressed particular concern that
Congress not be thought to have delegated to the Supreme Court
legislative power; he indicated that he had inserted the second
sentence specifically to emphasize that limitation and thus to quell
potential opposition. 417 The 1924 Senate Hearing 418 and con415 1914 House Hearings, supra note 154, at 22, quoted supra text accompanying note 160.
416 See supra text accompanying notes 182-86. "And if a word is obviously

transplanted from another legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it brings the old soil with it." Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading
of Statutes,
47 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 537 (1947).
417
See supra text accompanying note 260. Cummins' privately expressed views
as draftsman of the bill are relied on only to the extent that they are consistent with
the pre-1934
legislative history.
418
See supra text accompanying notes 269-76.
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temporary literature419 confirm that "procedure" and "substantive rights," as used in the Cummins bill, were understood to
demarcate the spheres of lawmaking appropriate for the Supreme
Court acting as rulemaker and for Congress.
In the most detailed and informative of all the legislative
materials concerning the bill that became the Act, 420 the Senate
Judiciary Committee devoted considerable attention to the articulation of the limitations on court rulemaking imposed by the Cummins bill. The purpose of those limitations, as marking the
boundary for the delegation of legislative power, was repeatedly
made clear by direct assertion, 42 1 by reference to state models
wherein no other purpose is conceivable, including in particular
the model proposed in the 1915 New York Report, 42 2 and by incorporation of standard ABA language that was originally borrowed from, and continued to be informed by, the work of the
423
New York Board of Statutory Consolidation.
2. The Act's Second Sentence is Surplusage
It also appears that the Supreme Court was correct in Sibbach and subsequent cases to the extent that it failed to attribute

independent meaning to the Act's second sentence, and thus to
impute to the second sentence limitations not imposed by the
42 4
first.
419

See supra text accompanying note 279.

420 In light of Senator Cummins' role in these matters, and of the origin of the
1928 Senate Report, which did little more than reprint the 1926 Senate Minority
Report, see supra text accompanying notes 340-42, one can fairly, and should, look
to the 1926 Senate Report (and not to the 1928 Senate Report) for guidance.

[We have often cautioned against the danger, when interpreting a statute,
of reliance upon the views of its legislative opponents. In their zeal to
defeat a bill, they understandably tend to overstate its reach. "The fears
and doubts of the opposition are no authoritative guide to the construction
of legislation. It is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the
statutory words is in doubt."
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers
Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-395 ....
NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964). The Minority Views
to the 1928 Senate Report were generally consistent with the 1926 Senate Report.
See supra text accompanying notes 343-50.
421
See 1926 SENATE REPORT, supra note 297, at 9, 11, 12; supra text accom-

panying notes 304-17.
422 See 1926 SENATE REPORT, supra note 297, at 10-11; supra text accompanying notes 313-16. Specifically, federalism was obviously not a concern for those
who fashioned the state models relied on in the 1926 Senate Report.
423
See 1926 SENATE REPoRT, supra note 297, at 12; supra text accompanying
note 317.
424 See 312 U.S. at 11, 13-14. But see Ely, supra note 3, at 698, 733.
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In the opinion of the draftsman, as indicated in his correspondence, the second sentence served only to emphasize a restriction inherent in the use of the word "procedure" in the first
sentence. 425 Neither at the 1924 Senate Hearing nor in the contemporary literature was the second sentence thought to perform
any additional function.426 The matter comes more clearly into
focus in the 1926 Senate Report, where the Committee reasoned
that an expansive interpretation of the first sentence would ignore
the second 42 7 and indicated that it had in mind "procedure" of a
particular kind-the kind elaborated by the ABA Committee on
Uniform Judicial Procedure as the second class 42 8--namely, procedure fit for regulation by rules of court.429

In other words, the

first sentence itself was thought to impose significant restrictions
on court rulemaking.
3. Federalism
Thus, the Court in Sibbach, although correct in refusing to
attribute independent significance to the second sentence of the
Act, was clearly wrong when it linked the procedure/substance
dichotomy with constitutional (or other statutory) limitations on
federal lawmaking and neglected restrictions sought to be imposed
by Congress on federal court rulemaking. 430 A number of recent
commentators, seeking to invigorate the Act's limitations, have
accepted the Court's erroneous view that the dichotomy has its
roots in federalism concerns. Their method, again contrary to the
lesson of the pre-1934 history, has been to parse the Act's first
425 See supra text accompanying note 260.
This was also the view of Henry
Taft, who provided assistance in the preparation of the 1926 Senate Report. See
supra note 297.
426
See supra text accompanying notes 269-79.
427
See 1926 SENATE REPORT, supra note 297, at 9, 11; supra text accompanying notes 308-10.
428 "The second concerns only the practice, the manner in which these things
shall be done, that is the details of their practical operation." Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 6 A.B.A. J. 509, 517 (1920), quoted supra
text accompanying note 237.
4 29
See 1926 SENATER BEPoRT, supra note 297, at 9, 11; supra text accompanying notes 308-10. The 1926 Senate Report incorporated verbatim the description
from the standard Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure report quoted supra
text accompanying note 237. See supra note 317.
43
o See supra text accompanying notes 57-66. In Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460 (1965), the Court clarified the constitutional restraints on federal lawmaking
and eliminated the Rules of Decision Act as a restraint on federal court rulemaking
under the Rules Enabling Act. It adhered, however, to the correct view that the
Rules Enabling Act's second sentence has no independent significance, as well as
to the erroneous view that the procedure/substance dichotomy was designed to protect federalism. See supra text accompanying notes 72-82.
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two sentences and to rely on the second sentence for the protection
431
of "substantive" state policies.
It is not surprising that the preservation of state law, as such,
was not a primary concern when the Act was formulated or when
it was passed.

Even in 1934, Erie was four years away.48 2

In the

1920's, Swift v. Tyson was in full bloom, and Erie was considered
by most to be an impossibility. 43 3 Moreover, the Federal Rules
43

'

See sources cited supra note 82; see also infra notes 495-96.

432 Some commentators have recognized the problem but have nevertheless felt

free, in light of the absence of useful legislative history in 1934, to interpret the
Act's procedure/substance dichotomy as designed to protect federalism values. See,
e.g., Ely, supra note 3, at 720-21; Note, supra note 69, at 1032-33; Note, Congressional Control of Procedure in Diversity Cases, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 565, 570
(1961).
433 See Frankfurter, Distribution of judicial Power Between United States and
State Courts, 13 CoRNmLL L.Q. 499, 524 (1928) (footnote omitted): "[Swift] is
now too strongly imbedded in our law for judicial self-correction. Legislation
should remove this doctrine, which, though derived from diverse-citizenship jurisdiction, denies its basis." In a footnote to the quoted passage, Frankfurter referred to a bill (S.4333, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928)) introduced by Senator
Walsh on May 3, 1928. See 69 CoNG. RPc. 7688 (1928). The bill provided
"[t]hat the decisions of the highest court of a State shall govern the courts of the
United States in the ascertainment of the common law or general jurisprudence of
such State." It apparently died in Committee, as did a bill (S.96, 71st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1929)) with the same title introduced by Walsh in the next session, and
Frankfurter was a poor prophet. The explanation for both phenomena may be
the same. The bill was drafted by Frankfurter himself and sent to Senator Walsh
at the suggestion of Justice Brandeis. Letter from the Hon. Louis D. Brandeis to
Felix Frankfurter (April 21, 1928), reprinted in 5 LETrnS OF Louis D. BnaNzxs
336-37 (M. Urofsky & D. Levy ed. 1978): "1. Answering your enquiry: I think it
would be an excellent idea to draft a bill to correct the alleged rule acted on as to
general law in the Black & White taxi case [Black & White Taxi Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxi Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928)]. The draft bill should go to Sen. Tom
Walsh. He sat through the reading of the opinions, seated in a front seat, &
seemed much interested." Brandeis had written to Frankfurter on April 10 that
"Holmes's dissent in the Black & White Taxi Cab Case will stand among his notable
opinions. It was delivered with fervor." LrrEns OF Louis D. BRANDEIs, supra, at
335. In his opinion for the Court in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, Brandeis cited
Frankfurter's 1928 article, see 304 U.S. 64, 73 n.6, 74 n.7, 77 n.21, as well as the
bills introduced by Walsh, see id. 77 n.21. For a discussion of this instance of collaboration between Brandeis and Frankfurter, see Levy & Murphy, Preserving the
Progressive Spirit in a Conservative Time: The Joint Reform Efforts of Justice
Brandeis and Professor Frankfurter, 1916-1933, 78 MxcH. L. REv. 1252, 1276-77,
1.290-91 (1980); see also B. MurPHY, ThE BY-n mms/FANKFu RTR CONNearON
ch. 3 (1982); H. FmENDLY, supra note 38, at 19-21. For criticism of Frankfurter's 1928 article, see Keeffe, Gilhooley, Bailey & Day, Weary Erie, 34 CoRNeroLL
L.Q. 494, 504-05, 527-31 (1949).
Of course, the Frankfurter/Walsh bill and the other legislative efforts to overrule Swift referred to in Erie, see 304 U.S. at 77 n.21, as well as efforts to abolish
diversity jurisdiction, see id. 77 & n. 2 0, indicate that, in some quarters at least, the
preservation of state law against encroachment was a matter of considerable interest
and concern by the early nineteen-thirties. Moreover, it is true that Senator
Ashurst was at pains to assure his colleagues in 1934 that the effect of S.3040
would not be to "deprive any State or any citizen of any vital right." 78 CONG.
RPc. 9362 (1934). But he made the same assurances regarding "any law of any
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contemplated by the Act were to apply in all civil actions tried in
federal court, including those in which federal law furnished the
rule of decision. If, as commentators have recently suggested,
Congress's concern in formulating the procedure/substance dichotomy was the preservation of an enclave of state law in diversity cases,43 4 the question arises whether Congress intended to
impose any limitation at all on rulemaking in federal question
cases. On that issue, recent commentators have been, understand435
ably, less than clear.
State or of the United States," id., and similar assurances had been provided in
1926 and in 1928, see supra text accompanying notes 306-16, 343-50 and note 385.
On the other hand, many accepted or embraced Swift and saw the Rules
Enabling Act as a logical step in the "tendency in the history of this country ...
towards a uniformity in the law applicable in the trial of cases in the federal
courts, rather than a conformity to state law, with respect to matters of substantive law, procedural law, and the law of evidence generally." Wickes, supra
note 36, at 19-20; see Jaffin, supra note 2, at 518-20.
Finally, contemporary commentators recognized that the purpose of the Act's
procedure/substance dichotomy was to allocate power between the Supreme Court
and Congress. See, e.g., Clark & Moore, supra note 36, at 411; Jaffin, supra note 2,
at 518 n.41; Ohlinger, supra note 36, at 449; Sunderland, supra note 166, at 405-06;
see also Mitchell, supra note 268, at 197. Mr. Mitchell, chairman of the Advisory
Committee, also was of the view that the Act's second sentence "was probably
surplusage. If it had said 'pleading, practice and procedure' and stopped there,
that would have excluded substantive rights, and furthermore constitutional limitations would have prevented Congress, even if it had tried, from delegating to the
courts power to make rules of substantive law." PaoczzINCS OF = C ZVELARD
INsTrrU
oN FEDmAL RuLEs 183 (1938) [hereinafter cited as C
.EvELAmINSTrruTE]. See supra text accompanying notes 424-29.
4
43 See supra text accompanying notes 82 & 431.
435 See, e.g., Ely, supra note 3, at 721 & n.153, 737 & nn.225 & 226; Chayes,
supra note 82, at 742 n.8; Mishkin, supra note 82, at 1685-86; see also supra notes
59 & 71. "Federalism does matter, and we can better understand why it matters
by seeking to grasp its historical dimension rather than resorting to ex cathedra
assertions or mere expressions of faith." Scheiber, Federalism and Legal Process:
Historical and Contemporary Analysis of the American System, 14 LAw & Soc.
REv. 663, 713 (1980).
Prior to the decision in Erie, commentators generally recognized that, since the
limitations imposed by the Act derive from notions about the delegation of legislative power, and whatever the precise contours of those limitations, they apply to
Federal Rules no matter what the source of the rule of decision or the basis of
federal jurisdiction. See sources cited supra note 433. The original Advisory
Committee also appears to have recognized this. See, e.g., infra text accompanying
note 613. The immediate impact of Erie in muddying the waters may be gleaned
not only from contemporary commentary, see, e.g., Tunks, supra note 25, but also
from the Senate Hearings held on the proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
At the first session, held prior to the decision in Erie (rendered on April 25, 1938),
the discussion of the Act's procedure/substance dichotomy was in terms of the
permissible scope of delegated legislative authority. See, e.g., Hearings on S.J.
Res. 281 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess., pt. 1, at 9-10, 20 (April 18, 1938) [hereinafter cited as 1938 Senate
Hearings]. The discussion at the House Hearings had been of the same tenor.
See, e.g., Hearings on Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure and on H.R. 8892 Before
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 14, 25, 74, 131 (March
1-4, 1938) [hereinafter cited as the 1938 House Hearings]. At the second session
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It is difficult to find even a trace of concern that the uniform
federal procedure bill might lead to an inappropriate displacement
of state law in any of the reports and other material produced
by its ABA sponsors during the long campaign. Indeed, Shelton
suggested that the Conformity Act was "a sop thrown to state
pride," the product of misguided social "politeness" any basis for
which no longer obtained. 436 Of course, the form of the original
uniform federal procedure bill,43 7 the heavy reliance placed by

Shelton on the New York model, 438 and the hope for a uniform
national procedure 439 may have obscured the possibility, of improper encroachment. Another explanation, however, applicable
as well to Congress, seems more plausible.
Senator Walsh's early published objections to, and arguments
against, the uniform federal procedure bill emphasized the convenience of lawyers. 440 Even the argument in his 1926 Texarkana
of the Senate Hearings, held after Erie was decided, the possibility that one or
more of the proposed Rules might be invalid was explored both from the perspective of delegation, see, e.g., 1938 Senate Hearings, supra, pt. 2, at 28-30 (May
19, 1938), and from the perspective thought to have been made relevant by Erie, see
id. 39-40, 45. Indeed, the record of the Senate Hearings includes a memorandum on
the implications of Erie for the proposed Rules co-authored by Gustavus Oblinger,
who had previously attacked the Advisory Committee's work on delegation
grounds. Compare Ohlinger & Wolf, Memorandum in Connection with Senate
Joint Resolution 281, Seventy-Fifth Congress, reprinted in 1938 Senate Hearings,
supra, pt. 2, at 53 with Ohlinger, supra note 36.
In the years following Erie, although some commentators could not resist the
Court's invitation in Sibbach to read the Rules of Decision Act, as interpreted by
Erie's progeny, into the Rules Enabling Act, even when they recognized that that
might be contrary to Congress's original intent, see, e.g., Note, supra note 69, at
1032-33, others realized that the Enabling Act had a separate function, including
presumably in cases where federal law furnishes the rule of decision. However,
they were rarely clear in articulating what that function was, or, alternatively, in
moving beyond Supreme Court decisions that had failed to recognize it. See, e.g.,
Clark & Wright, The Judicial Council and the Rule-Making Power: A Dissent and
a Protest, 1 SyxrtcusE L. REv. 346, 364-65 (1950); Degnan, supra note 19, at
345-51; Degnan, supra note 22, at 283-87; Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963 (1), 77 H~Av. L. REv. 601, 604-09, 629-35
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Kaplan, 1961-1963 Amendments (I)); Kaplan, Amendments of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 1961-63 (II), 77 HAM. L. REv. 801,
806-11, 834 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Kaplan, 1961-1963 Amendments (11)];
Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 Hnv. L. Rv. 356, 369-70 (1967). But see, e.g.,
Clinton, supra note 13, at 51-77; Landers, supra note 31, at 849-61; cf. Wright,
supra note 20, at 568-74 (limitations on procedural reform).
430 Shelton, supra note 146, at 127.
43 7
See supra note 154; see also supra note 228.
4 38
See supratext accompanying notes 174-86 &203-04.
439 See supratext accompanying notes 148-51 & 159.
440
See supra text accompanying notes 211-14 & 221. It should be recalled
that, according to the Court, the convenience of lawyers was the primary consideration behind the Conformity Act of 1872. See Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426,
441 (1875); supra text accompanying notes 99-101.
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speech, which was incorporated in the 1926 Senate Minority and
1928 Senate Reports, 441 was, in terms, designed to demonstrate
the immensity, if not the impossibility, of the rulemaking task
set for the Supreme Court. 442 The fact that, as a skillful opponent
of the Cummins bill,443 Walsh eventually fastened on controversial
matters that, for some purposes, might be deemed "procedure"
should not obscure what is also the fact, namely that when Walsh
finally did begin explicitly to articulate federalism objections to
the Cummins bill, they embraced the entire enterprise and not
some preserve established by the boundary between "procedure"
and "substantive rights." 444

Whatever the thrust of Walsh's objections to the Cummins
bill, properly conceived, it may be that those who disagreed with
him on the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1926 and 1928 interpreted them to include the objection that the bill authorized
rulemaking in discrete areas properly governed by state law. 445

The important point for present purposes, however, is that those
who rebutted Walsh's objections did not thereby intend to suggest
that the purpose of the bill's procedure/substance dichotomy was
to safeguard state law. Rather, they sought to demonstrate that
the effect of the limitations on court rulemaking-limitations that
were formulated for another purpose 44 6-was to do so, unless Congress chose to legislate specifically in the area. 447

See supra text accompanying note 341.
See supra text accompanying notes 318-19. But note Walsh's statement at
the 1922 Senate Hearings. See supra text accompanying note 242.
443 See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964), quoted
supra note 420; see also Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 288 (1956).
444 See supra text accompanying notes 318-19 & 336.
445 See supra text accompanying notes 311 & 350. The same may be true of
the objections reported by Cummins at the 1924 Senate Hearing. See supra text
accompanying notes 293-96. In that regard, it should be noted that some of the
matters that prompted objections had been sources of friction and had prompted
congressional action in the nineteenth century. See supra text accompanying notes
93-105.
446 See supra text accompanying notes 415-23.
447 In the Minority Views to the 1928 Senate Report, a reference was made to
441

442

the treatment of state statutes of limitations under the Rules of Decision Act, in
support of the argument that the matter was not subject to rules of court under
the Cummins bill. See 1928 SENATE REPORT, supra note 340, pt. 2, at 17. However, there is no reason to believe that the reference was other than an isolated
(and inappropriate) attempt to support a substantive characterization under the
Act by reference to prior characterizations. Immediately thereafter, by referring to

state models and by quoting from the 1926 Senate Report, the minority again
demonstrated its awareness of the purpose of the procedure/substance dichotomy
in the bill. See id.; see also supra note 433.
None of the pre-1934 legislative materials purported to speak to the question
of the power of federal courts to make law in the context of adjudication. The
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C. Standards of Allocation
Discerning the purpose served by the procedure/substance
dichotomy in the Act's first two sentences is obviously of critical
importance to the process of reinterpretation. Directing attention
to allocation of powers rather than federalism is, however, only
the beginning of an attempt to give meaning to the language in
light of the pre-1934 history. Except with respect to specific matters it illuminates, the history is useful only to the extent it provides a basis for reasoning about general standards of allocation.
If the Act could be read to reflect, and only to reflect, constitutionally imposed limitations on court rulemaking, there would
be a basis for the development of allocation standards outside the
Act's history. But the evidence does not support that reading;
the statutory limitations imposed by the Act stand on their own.
How, then, in light of the pre-1934 history, should the category of procedure subject to regulation by court rules be formulated? That category was thought to exclude substantive law, in
the sense those words were used in Sibbach,448 but it was thought to
exclude more. The relevant substantive rights under the Act, however, are not, as Professor Ely has argued, those that reflect existing
state substantive policy choices on the same subject covered by a
Federal Rule. The purpose of the procedure/substance dichotomy
is not to protect state or federal policy choices on such matters,
although it may have that effect. Its purpose is, rather, to allocate
policy choices-to determine which federal lawmaking body, the
Court or Congress, shall decide whether there will be federally
enforceable rights regarding the matter in question and the content
of those rights. To the extent existing legal rights are relevant
to an allocation decision under the Act, they are rights recognized
by federal or state substantive law (in the Sibbach sense) and interassurances given in the 1926 Senate Report and in the 1928 Senate Minority Report
related only to court rules promulgated under the Cummins bill. And indeed, it
might have been difficult to give such assurances even as to local statutory law in
1926 or 1934. See, e.g., Kirby v. Lake Shore & Mich. S.R.R. Co., 120 U.S. 130
(1887). But see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 100-11 (1945).
448 Is the phrase "substantive rights" confined to rights conferred by law
to be protected and enforced in accordance with the adjective law of
judicial procedure? It certainly embraces such rights. One of them is the
right not to be injured in one's person by another's negligence, to redress
infraction of which the present action was brought ....
:. . The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure,--the
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.
312 U.S. at 13-14.
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ests recognized by the Constitution. The pre-1934 history suggests
an intent to exclude rulemaking by the Supreme Court, and to
require that any prospective federal lawmaking be done by Congress, where the choice among legal prescriptions would have a
predictable and identifiable effect on such rights. In addition, the
history suggests a purpose to foreclose the creation in court rules
of rights that would approximate the substantive law in their effect
on person or property.
1. The Relationship Between the Act and Constitutional
Limitations on Court Rulemaking
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to identify the source
of the limitations on rulemaking that those in Congress who gave
informed consideration to the legislation that became the Rules
Enabling Act sought to impose. For although the Court's acceptance of plenary legislative control of its supervisory rulemaking
has rendered academic some interesting and difficult questions
regarding the place of court rulemaking in our constitutional
scheme, 449 there is at least one practical problem of interpretation
demanding the inquiry: if Congress's primary purpose in prescribing limitations on the Court's rulemaking power under the Act
was to ensure that the Court observed whatever might be the
constitutional limitations on the delegation of legislative power
or the constitutionally required separation of powers either as of
1934 (static linkage) or as of the time the Court promulgated
Federal Rules (dynamic linkage), 450 any specific standards emerging from the pre-1934 history would be of little interest today.
First, the legislators may have misperceived the relevant constitutional doctrine at the time. Second, the shape of that doctrine,
and with it the Court's rulemaking power, may have evolved since
1934. A review of the history, however, suggests that the individuals concerned about allocation standards were not primarily
animated by constitutional considerations and that they were in
any event unwilling to remit the standards to changing constitutional interpretation. To the extent those individuals referred to
449

See supra note 19; see also J. WrznsTmN, supra note 3, at 21-75.
For a discussion of the constitutional sources of the non-delegation doctrine,
distinguishing, for example, separation of powers, see S. BARBER, TIn CoNsTITauoN
ANTHE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSiONAL PowER ch. 2 (1975); see also Freedman,
Review: Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 307
(1976). These constitutional questions are to be distinguished from constitutional
limitations governing the exercise of federal power vis-i-vis the states. Compare
450

Ely, supra note 3, at 703-06 with Mishkin, supra note 82.
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constitutional limitations, it was to fortify support for statutory
limitations independently deemed appropriate, which Congress had
451
the power to impose in the Act.
a. The ConstitutionalContext
The Supreme Court has never satisfactorily explained-indeed it has hardly discussed-the place of court rulemaking in our
constitutional framework. The early cases, starting with Wayman
v. Southard,452 in which the sources and limits of the rulemaking
power were treated, set a pattern of ambiguity that has not been
departed from. 453 Not even the power of federal courts to regulate
procedure by court rules in the absence of legislative authorization, power assumed to exist in the 1926 Senate Report,45 4 is made
455
clear in those cases, and it has not been made clear since.
451 Cases dealing with interpretive problems of this sort identified by the author
have not proved very helpful. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 336-40 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring
and dissenting); Federal Power Comm'n v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464 (1950);
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944); Helvering
v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943); Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244
(1941). It is clear, of course, that Congress's intent controls, to the extent it can
be ascertained. Note, moreover, that these cases are relevant only if, contrary to
the argument in the text, Congress imposed limitations on court ralemaking primarily
because they were thought to be required by the Constitution. Finally, the cases
point in opposite directions on whether, once linkage is found, it should be deemed
static or dynamic. Compare, e.g., Grilfiths with South-Eastern Underwriters.
452 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
453 See id.; see also, e.g., Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. Baltimore &
Philadelphia Steamboat Co., 263 U.S. 629 (1924); Beers v. Haughton, 34 U.S. (9
Pet.) 328 (1835); Bank of the United States v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51
(1825). For a discussion of the problems posed for rulemaking by the Supreme
Court by constitutional and prudential limitations on the exercise of judicial power
enunciated in other contexts, see J. W=NsTEmr, supra note 3, at 44-55. "The rulemaking power has, nevertheless, evolved through pragmatic choices and by largely
ignoring the dilemmas posed by the theoretical underpinnings of our judicial system."
Id. 21; see also 1 K. DAvIs, AnMiNSTRATIVE LAW TEATnSr § 2.1 (2d ed. 1978).
4 54
See 1926 SmAz REPoRT, supra note 297, at 11. Elsewhere in the Report,
the Committee indicated that "[there may be doubt" on the question. Id. 8; see
also id. 2; of. id. 7 (no inherent power "beyond the power of Congress to amend or
repeal").
455
But see 1 1915 NEW YonE REPORT, supra note 175, at 174-77. The authorities relied on there, cases cited supra notes 452-53, simply do not establish
judicial power, absent legislative authorization, to regulate procedure by court rules,
let alone supervisory court rules. The most they establish-all that was necessaryis that rulemaking is a function that, under the Constitution, federal courts may
exercise under a delegation from the Congress that is itself constitutional. But see
Note, supra note 22, at 1064 (failing to note that the passage quoted from Wayman
was part of the argument of counsel, not of the opinion of the Court). Moreover,
whatever the case for power to fashion local or supervisory rules in the absence of
legislation, see In re Hien, 166 U.S. 432, 436-37 (1897) (dictum) (local rules);
Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500, 505 (1938) (dictum) (Equity Rules); cf.
Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312-14 (1920) (inherent power to appoint auditor),
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In the absence of considered discussion by the Court, the
theory seemingly espoused in Wayman and subsequent cases, that
of delegated legislative power, 456 has not easily won acceptance in
the literature. During the campaign for the uniform federal procedure bill and the national movement for court rulemaking,
arguments were increasingly made that courts possessed the inherent power to regulate procedure by court rules and to do so even
in the teeth of contrary legislative direction. 45 7 To be sure, such
arguments often reflected the passion of the reformer more than
the detachment of the scholar,458 ignoring distinctions between
local and supervisory rules of court and between rules of court
promulgated in a legislative vacuum and rules of court contravening statutes;

459

4 60
but they were, and are, persistent.

it is difficult indeed to understand how either can be said to be a power "necessary
to the exercise of all others," United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 32, 34 (1812), so as to trump a contrary determination by Congress. See
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980); Frankfurter & Landis,
supra note 2, at 1020-23; Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 19, at 29-33; Comment,
supra note 90, at 83. But see 34 Hiv. L. REv. 321 (1921); Note, supra note 19.
It is unclear whether Professor Martin's argument that the federal courts are
free to disregard some of the Federal Rules of Evidence is intended to insulate from
congressional action not only common law rules of evidence, but local or supervisory
court rules of evidence as well. See Martin, supra note 4, at 178. In any event,
even if one confines the argument to common law rules, the author's own examples,
see id. 195-200, suggest the inappropriateness of making categorical, a priori judgments of "indispensibility." Finally, as to congressional power over evidence, compare id. 177 with Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 31 (1976) and
Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1980).
456 "It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the courts, or to any
other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative. But Congress
may certainly delegate to others; powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise
itself." 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 42-43; see supra note 19; Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 473-74 (1965); Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941); Van Alstyne,
The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the
Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, 40
LAw & CONTEMP. NOBs., Spring 1976, at 102 (1976).
In Supreme Court v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719
(1980), the Court held that "in promulgating disciplinary rules the Virginia Supreme
Court acted in a legislative capacity," id. 731, and hence that the doctrine of absolute
legislative immunity foreclosed an award of attorney's fees in a § 1983 action that
was premised on acts or omissions in that capacity. See id. 738; see also W. BRowN,
supra note 14, at 40 n.89.
457

See supra note 325 and accompanying text.

458

See Williams, supra note 19, at 505-06.

459

See id.; see also Comment, supra note 90, at 81. Senator Walsh distinguished
between local and supervisory rules of court. See, e.g., 1926 SENATE Re'onr, supra
note 297, pt. 2, at 33 (Minority Views).
460
See supra note 19. For an interesting account of the experience in Connecticut and a review of state rulemaking allocations in general, see Kay, The RuleMaking Authority and Separation of Powers in Connecticut, 8 CoNm. L. Rmv. 1
(1975).
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b. Constitutional Doctrine and the Campaign for the Uniform
Federal ProcedureBill
The sponsors of the ABA campaign were cautious about tying
the argument for an "equable division" of power between the Supreme Court and Congress to a perceived constitutional imperative
of judicial power.461 Wayman and its progeny, and the long history of acquiescence by the Court in legislative control of rulemaking, no doubt exercised moderating influences. In addition,
it may have been thought the better part of wisdom to try to reach
a constitutional accommodation with Senator Walsh, whose expressed doubts about the validity of supervisory rules of court even
when authorized by Congress remained a threat to the entire enter46 2
prise throughout.
Against this background, it is understandable that the congressional supporters of the uniform federal procedure bill embraced a theory of court rulemaking that would enable Congress
to put an end to the experiment if it yielded untoward consequences. 463 The background also suggests, however, the difficulty
of finding support for the limitations imposed on court rulemaking
in the decisions of the Supreme Court.4 64 The Clayton bill pre461 See, e.g., 1914 House Hearings, supra note 154, at 22-24; id. 36-37; supra
text accompanying note 237 (excerpt from standard report of the ABA Committee
on Uniform Judicial Procedure); 1924 Senate Hearing, supra note 269, at 68; see
also Kay, supra note 460, at 28, 38-39; Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 19, at 3-4.

At a later time, during the congressional consideration of the proposed Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, at least one representative of the Advisory Committee was
less cautious. See, e.g., 1938 House Hearings, supra note 435, at 131 (statement of
E.B. Tolman). But see 1938 Senate Hearings, supra note 435, at 10 (statement of
W.D. Mitchell).
462
See supra text accompanying notes 221-22, 302-03 & 341-42; supra note 459.
463

But the bill proposed will not deprive Congress of the power, if an

occasion should arise, to regulate court practice, for it is not predicated
upon the theory that the courts have inherent power to make rules of
practice beyond the power of Congress to amend or repeal. On the contrary, Congress may revise the rules made by the Supreme Court, or by
legislation may modify or entirely withdraw the delegation of power to
that body. In that sense the bill is experimental. It gives to the court
the power to initiate a reformed Federal procedure without the surrender
of the legislative power to correct an unsatisfactory exercise of that power.

1926 S rA6

REPORT,

supra note 297, at 7.

Further evidence of the difficulty of deriving constitutional limitations on
court rulemaking from the decided cases may be found in the work of two scholars
who, almost alone, have questioned the basic premises of Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the Act. See Clinton, supra note 13, at 51-77; Landers, supra note 31,
at 855-61. Some of Professor Landers' conclusions are discussed supra note 60. His
version of the "constitutional limitations on the delegation of rulemadng power,"
Landers, supra note 31, at 855, although interesting, finds little support in any cases
of which the author is aware. Modem delegation cases do not, as Professor Clinton's
article suggests, take one very far. See Clinton, supra note 13, at 64-77; see aso
1 K. DAvis, supra note 453, oh. 3. But see id. § 3.3, at 155; Freedman, supra note
4 4
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sented no serious problem in that regard, 46 because the matters
as to which rulemaking power was conferred could easily be considered "details" to which the Court in Wayman had referred. 46
Moreover, Wayman had become, and remained for many years, a
locus classicus of delegation doctrine, 467 and by the time the bill
was introduced, that doctrine, itself imperfectly rationalized, was
experiencing strain in other areas. 468 No notice was taken of the
changes made in the Sutherland bill.4 9 It was the Cummins bill
that evoked objections to the extent of the rulemaking power
conferred and that provided the occasion for constitutional
470
linkage.
c. The Cummins Bill
Evidently, it was Senator Cummins' view, as the draftsman
of the first section of the bill that became the Act, that the limita450; Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress, and Executive Policy-Making: Notes on Three
Doctrines, La-w & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1976, at 46.
465 It did, however, present a serious problem for those who, with Senator
Walsh, believed that the regulation of judicial procedure was a legislative function
that could not, under the Constitution, be delegated to the courts acting in a supervisory capacity. See supra text accompanying note 462; supra note 330.
466 The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important
subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from
those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power
given to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the
details.
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 41; see supra text accompanying notes 169-70.
Marshall may have held the most permissive theory of delegation of any
American jurist-but Marshall's permissive theory, even if it does exist, is
well hidden by language which is clearly designed to communicate the
theory that Congress may delegate power over details only. Whatever
Marshall's hidden theory, the fact is that he has been received as having
enunciated a restrictive theory, and it is patent on the surface of his remarks that he intended to be received as he has been received.
S. BAnBms,
supra note 450, at 20-21; see also id. 63-72. But see 1 1915 NEw YoRK
BEPoaR, supra note 175, at 423 (noting that Wayman seems to authorize court rulemaking with respect to executions but resolving doubts by classifying as fundamental
and placing in separate statutes the "cases . . . in which an execution may issue
against the person and property").
467 See, e.g., In re Kollock, 165 U.S. 526, 536-37 (1897); Monongahela Bridge
Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177, 191-93 (1910); United States v. Grimaud, 220
U.S. 506, 516-21 (1911); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1939); see also
J. Wx~sams=, supra note 3, at 92-96; 1 K. DAvis, supra note 453, § 3.4, at 159.
468 See, e.g., Bondy, The Separation of Governmental Powers, in 5 Sarouns in
Has-toRy EcoNoIcsSAsm PuBLic LAw No. 2, at 162-71 (1896); Garvey, Judicial
Consideration of the Delegation of Legislative Power to Regulatory Agencies in
the Progressive Era, 54 IND. L.J. 45 (1978); Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of
Legislative Power: II, 47 CoLuM. L. REv. 561, 561-69 (1947); Wickersham, Delegation of Power to Legislate, 11 VA. L. REv. 183, 185 (1925); see also supra
note 165 and accompanying text.
4 69
See supra text accompanying note 231.
470
See supra text accompanying notes 278 & 303.
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tions contained in its first sentence, reinforced in the second,
would at least safeguard limitations imposed by the Constitution
on the Court's rulemaking power.47 ' Moreover, when the occasion
arose in the 1926 Senate Report to define those restrictions, the
Committee at one point indicated that the ambit of the rulemaking
power conferred was coextensive with the power the Court would
possess in the absence of enabling legislation. 472 Thereafter, having quoted from Wayman, it found "inconceivable" the notion
that any court would consider the matters raised by Senator Walsh
as "merely filling 'up the details,' even though they relate to remedial rights." 473

Nonetheless, it was not Cummins' or the Committee's primary
purpose in formulating the limitations imposed by the Cummins
bill to tie them to the Constitution, either as it was interpreted in
1926 or as it might be interpreted in the future. As to static
linkage, the implications of the relevant constitutional doctrine
were far from clear in 1926. Even at that time, it would have
been difficult, if not impossible, to justify some of the Committee's
classifications as constitutionally required.4 7 4 Moreover, the notion
that the rulemaking authority conferred by the uniform federal
procedure bill did not extend to a class of procedure including
"fundamental" matters had been advanced consistently throughout
the campaign by the ABA. It was accepted, without reference to
constitutional doctrine, at key points in the pre-1934 legislative
history of the Act, including in the 1926 Senate Report.475 As to
dynamic linkage, the 1926 Senate Report should not be read to
permit the revision of limitations by the very institution whose
power Congress sought to confine.
The 1912 and 1915 New York Reports classified as "fundamental" most of the matters with which the 1926 Senate Report
was concerned. 476 The 1926 Senate Report relied on the 1915
471

See supra text accompanying note 260.
See 1926 S.NATE REPoRT, supra note 297, at 11, quoted supra text accompanying note 316.
473 Id.
4 4
7 To the extent that the 1926 Senate Report is evidence of an intent to proscribe rulemaking not only with respect to the core of the matters characterized
there as substantive, but with respect to the matters as a whole, see infra text
accompanying notes 519-23, the notion that constitutional linkage was intended
becomes implausible. See infra text accompanying note 521. The Committee's
categorical classification of all rules of admissibility of evidence is also difficult to
support. See infra text accompanying notes 516-18.
475
See supra text accompanying notes 193, 237 & 317; 1926 SE-rATn REPoRT,
supra note 297, at 12.
4 76
See supra text accompanying notes 189-202 & 313-14.
472
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New York Report for the classifications. It did not borrow, however, that part of the New York Board's analysis that might
have been thought to give only statutory dignity to limitations
against court rulemaking.477 The scheme envisaged by the New
York Board involved prior legislative classification of certain matters as substantive and their treatment in statutes outside the proposed practice act. With the Cummins Bill, Congress, on the other
hand, was forced to rely on the Supreme Court:
Where a doubt exists as to the power of a court to make
a rule the doubt will surely be resolved by construing a
statutory provision in such a way that it will not have the
to the courts what is in
effect of an attempt to delegate
478
reality a legislative function.
The expansive view of court rulemaking power in the 1915
New York Report 479 presupposed a legislature that would itself
carve out areas preserved from the exercise of such power and
that would be actively engaged in the regulation of procedure
thereafter through a practice act.4
477

0

A legislature like Congress,

The 1926 Senate Report drew its allusions to constitutional theory in support of the limitations imposed by the Cummins bill from the same source as it
drew support for the existence of those limitations, the 1915 New York Report.
The paragraphs in the 1926 Senate Report making the constitutional links follow
immediately paragraphs in which the 1915 New York Report was cited and extolled as "probably the most scientific recent effort at simplification of a highly
technical and complicated system of procedure having in view the segregation in a
practice act and rules of court those matters [sic] which might properly be regarded
as procedural." 1926 SENATE B'oRT, supra note 297, at 11, quoted supra text
accompanying note 316. More telling, the 1915 New York Report had opined that
the inherent rulemaking power of the courts under the New York Constitution,
power thought to exist only in the absence of contrary legislation, was coextensive
with the rulemaking power that constitutionally might be delegated by the legislature to the courts. 1 1915 NEw YonK REPoRT, supra note 175, at 174-77, quoted
in part supra text accompanying note 202. The cited authority for that proposition,
Wayman and its progeny, provides only equivocal support. See supra note 455.
The 1926 Senate Report recited the same proposition, confining its discussion of
authority to Wayman. See 1926 SENATE REPonT, supra note 297, at 11. There is,
however, a difference between the analysis in the two reports, which may explain
why the 1926 Senate Report did not enlarge the scope of its explicit reliance on
the 1915 New York Report. The 1915 New York Report defined the constitutional
power of courts to make rules expansively and explained the placement of "so
many provisions formerly in the code . . . in substantive statutes" as flowing from
a decision to resolve against the courts "every serious question of power." 1
1915 NEw YoRK REPoRT, supra note 175, at 177, quoted supra text accompanying
note 202. The 1926 Senate Report admitted no question in allocating to Congress
specific matters which the New York Board had placed in separate statutes. See
1926 SENATE RE'owr, supra note 297, at 9, 11.
478 1926 SmATE REPoaRT, supra note 297, at 11.
479 See supra note 477.
480 See supra text accompanying notes 189-202.
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for which neither activity seems a realistic, or perhaps a wise, activity,48 ' may take comfort, at least in an uncertain constitutional
climate, in suggestions of constitutional limitations as support for
statutory limitations independently deemed appropriate. The
Senate Committee's allusions to constitutional doctrine provided
rhetorical support for those limitations. The allusions should not
obscure the Committee's view, with respect to the matters discussed in the 1926 Report, that "any court would be astute to
avoid an interpretation which would attribute to the words 'practice and procedure' an intention on the part of Congress to delegate a power to deal with such substantive rights and remedies." 482
If one accepts the relevance of the pre-1934 history, that view
should control the interpretation of the Act, whether or not it was
constitutionally required in 1926 or is so required today.
2. Procedure or Substantive Rights
a. General Guidance
The 1926 Senate Report identifies the matters raised by Senator Walsh as among those which, although involving only remedies, are not "mere procedure, such as a court has power to
prescribe." 483 In stating the reasons for such a characterization,
the Report is not always clear. At times it refers to the matters
excluded from the rulemaking power as "substantial," 484 an adjective that does not advance the inquiry. On the other hand, the
1926 Senate Report does at least adumbrate standards for a classification scheme under the Act that augur more than jurisprudence
by label. Among those standards is the notion that the rulemaking power does not extend to "matters involving substantive legal
and remedial rights affected by the considerations of public policy." 485 Limitation or abatement of actions is included in this
category because the decision when to bar or abate a claim limits
whatever rights have been conferred on the claimant by the substantive law.48 6 Limitations and abatement of actions, and provisional remedies, such as arrest and attachment, are included because, although remedial, in the words of the 1915 New York
See supra text accompanying note 232; supra note 326.
supra note 297, at 11.
483 1926 SENATE REPORT, supra note 297, at 9; see also supra note 297.
484 1926 SENArE REPoRT, supra note 297, at 9; see also 1 1915 NEW Yoia
REPORT, supra note 175, at 439.
485 1926 SENATE REPORT, supra note 297, at 9.
486 See id. 10-11.
481

482 1926 SENATE REPOnT,
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Report, quoted in the 1926 Senate Report, "the matter is all of a
substantive character and defines or limits certain civil rights . . .
using that term in its broad sense." 487 The selection and qualification of jurors is included " 'because the subject treated is a
fundamental right controlled by the Constitution.' "48s
b. The Substantive Rights That Are Relevant under the Act
Even recalling that the second sentence of the Act was inserted
for emphasis and was not thought to serve any independent function, 489 its language suggests a concern for substantive rights
already recognized by law.4 90

That line of reasoning was seized

upon by the Court in Sibbach and prompted the question,
"Recognized where and by whom?" 491 Recently, Professor Ely
has invigorated the second sentence so as more effectively to protect substantive state policy reflected in state law in an area covered by a Federal Rule. 492

Leaving aside that these interpretations

confuse purpose with effects 493 and thereby neglect a whole category of cases within the Act's grant of authority, attention to the
relationship of Federal Rules to legally recognized rights, as con487Id. 10 (quoting 3 1915 NEw YoRE REPORT, supra note 175, at 477). The
Committee also quoted passages noting that orders of arrest were governed by
separate statutes and stating with respect to the grounds for attachment: "They
embody substantive law of the same character as a provision prescribing under
what circumstances an action may be brought . . ..
[T]hey relate to important
matters of substantive right that should be regulated by the legislature and not by
the courts." Id. 11 (quoting 3 1915 NEw YoRn REPoRT, supra note 175, at 483).
The Committee failed to point out, however, that the New York Board's characterization was limited to regulations respecting grounds for attachment. The
Committee adopted it for "provisions governing attachments" generally.
1926
SENATE REPORT, supra note 297, at 11. The change may not have been inadvertent.
See infra text accompanying notes 519-23.
488 1926 SENATE REPORT, supra note 297, at 11 (quoting 3 1915 NEW Yoni
REPoRT, supra note 175, at 498).
Here again, the Committee took a narrow characterization and applied it more broadly. The language quoted by the Committee
was intended to apply to the right to jury trial. Although the 1915 New York
Report assigned regulations regarding the selection of jurors to the legislature, it
placed them in the Judiciary Law precisely because they were deemed "quite
different in character from the provisions defining the right to a jury trial." 3
1915 NEw Yore REPORT, supra note 175, at 498; see id. 317-22. The Board had
also proposed a few court rules regarding jury trial. See 1 id. 109.
4 89
See supra text accompanying notes 424-29.
490 But the impulse to impute to the Act's second sentence only a concern for
existing substantive rights should be resisted even on linguistic grounds. Substantive rights are "enlarged" when they are created for the first time in rules of court.
491312 U.S. at 13.
4 92
See Ely, supra note 3, at 71840; see also Chayes, supra note 82; Misbldn,
supra note 82; ef. Wellborn, supra note 82 (adapting Ely's analysis to the Federal
Rules of Evidence).
493 See supra text accompanying notes 415-16.
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tained in existing rules of law, may, unless circumscribed, distort
the basic purpose of the procedure/substance dichotomy as revealed
by the pre-1934 history.
The goal of the characterization exercise required by the
Act is to determine the locus of decision-making concerning the
need for and content of federally enforceable rights with respect
to a particular matter, the Supreme Court making law through
rules of court or Congress. All lawmaking with respect to the
conduct of litigation in federal courts presumably involves the
consideration of governmental policies and individual interests
that are procedural in the sense that they relate to "the speedier
and more intelligent disposition of the issues" in litigation.49 In
many situations any substantive policies and interests vying in
competition in the lawmaking calculus

49 5

can be tied to existing

rights only by reference to, and by begging the question posed in,
the most general sources of law, such as the Constitution. Moreover, in a federal system substantive policies often cannot be tied
to existing rights at all if attention is paid exclusively to choices
already made about the matter in question in federal law or in the
law of individual states. 49 6 Unless it was Congress's intention to
leave the protection of constitutionally recognized interests to the
Constitution itself, as interpreted by the courts in an adjudicatory
context, and to remit decisions regarding the validity of the Federal Rules to the vagaries of competing federal and state law
choices, the concept of substantive rights relevant for Enabling
Act purposes must be different from that suggested either in
Sibbach or in recent commentary.
With respect to some of the matters discussed and classified
in the 1926 Senate Report, the concern appears to have been the
potential effect on rights conferred by, including interests recognized in, an independent legal source, whether federal or state
494 1926 SENATE REPORT, supra note 297, at 2.
495 Professor Ely defines a "substantive rule-or

more particularly a substantive
right, which is what the Act refers to- . . . as a right granted for one or more
nonprocedural reasons, for some purpose or purposes not having to do with the
fairness or efficiency of the litigation process." Ely, supra note 3, at 725 (footnote
omitted). He would require that a Federal Rule yield to state law in the area
covered by the Rule when the conflicting state law prescription is found to reflect
any such purpose, and thus to confer a substantive right, even if it also reflects
"procedural" purposes. See id. 726-27.
496 According to Professor Ely's interpretation of the Act; a Federal Rule
would not yield to conflicting state law if, upon analysis, the latter were found to
reflect solely "procedural" policies or purposes. See id. 727-38. Thus, his interpretive construct protects only existing policy choices in the area covered by a
Federal Rule, only those choices in which "substantive" policies have survived and
are reflected, and only state policy choices.
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substantive law or the Constitution. 97 In discussing and classifying other matters, the Senate Committee appears to have been
concerned about the creation of rights with respect to person or
property that were deemed to be indistinguishable for rulemaking
purposes from the creation of substantive law. 498

The characteriza-

tion of a court rule as procedural or substantive was not to be
made by reference to a right conferred, reflecting a policy choice
already made, by existing federal or state law in the area covered
by the rule. The Committee recognized that the matters in question involved "the policy of the law which varies in the different
States." 499 Nor was it decisive that court rules regulating them
could be classified as procedural in the sense that some of the
policies vying for recognition in the lawmaking process concerned
the conduct of litigation. As might be expected in a statute designed to allocate lawmaking power, rather than to protect policy
choices already made in the area in question, the key was thought
to be whether the federal lawmaking decision would either affect
"rights" already recognized by the "substantive law," 00 or create
49 7

See supra text accompanying notes 486 & 488 (limitations and abatement;
selection and qualification of jurors). The Committee noted: "Some of our most
valued civil liberties have been obtained through the creation by legislative edict
of mere remedial measures. Notable examples are the writ of habeas corpus, which
enabled a citizen to enforce a substantive right which had existed for centuries."
1926 SENATE REPoRT, supra note 297, at 12.
As used hereafter, the word "rights" in quotation marks includes both rights
recognized by the substantive law and interests recognized by the Constitution, and
the words "substantive law" in quotation marks include both the substantive law
and the Constitution.
Note that, if one disregards Sibbach's preoccupation with state law, that case
has in it the seeds of a standard of this sort with respect to rights claimed under
the substantive law. See supra notes 59 & 71.
498
See supra text accompanying note 487 (arrest and attachment); see also 1
1915 NEW Yoim REPORT, supr"a note 175, at 424 ("These provisions [regarding
arrest] however have been preserved in the substantive statutes because it has not
been deemed the function of this board to revise the substantive law of the
state.").
The same analysis applies to the subject of execution, an objection regarding
which had been noted by Cummins at the 1924 Senate Hearing, see supra text
accompanying note 273, and which was thought by the New York Board to present
"sharply the limit of the power of the courts to make rules." 1 1915 Nmv YoRK
REPoRT, supra note 175, at 423. The Board classified as fundamental and placed
in the substantive statutes the "cases . . . in which an execution may issue against
the person and property." Id.; see supra text accompanying note 197; supra note
466. It noted, however, that "the rules will also be found to cover in general
language nearly the entire field." 1 1915 NEw YoRK REPoRT, supra note 175, at
423; see id. 152-60. Senator Cummins' remarks did not suggest similar precision
of classification. See 1924 Senate Hearing, supra note 269, at 61; infra note 643.
499 1926 SENAT REP RT, supra note 297, at 9, quoted supra text accompanying
note 311.
500 The nature of the effect proscribed remains to be explored. See infra text
accompanying notes 511-24.
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rights indistinguishable from those recognized by the substantive
law in their effect on person or property. If so, the choice between
or among the competing policies was for Congress, or in the absence of congressional action, for the states.5 0 1
c. Problems Arising from Use of the State Models: The Protection
of State Law
Reliance on state models was not without disadvantages for
the 1926 Senate Judiciary Committee, as for the ABA Committee
on Uniform Judicial Procedure and the 1914 House Judiciary
Committee. 0 2 In limiting its reliance on the 1915 New York
Report, the Senate Committee seemingly acknowledged differences
flowing from the extent of legislative involvement at the outset of,
and during, the rulemaking enterprise.5 0 3 Nevertheless, the
sources of restrictions on the rulemaking power aside, the 1926
Senate Report reflects, as much of the contemporary literature
reflects, a monolithic view of allocation standards that poses substantial theoretical and practical questions. 504
At the level of theory, it might be asked whether an allocation
scheme appropriate for a state will not inevitably submerge special problems of allocation unique to a federal system. In a
federal system, the scheme must accommodate not only situations
in which, as in a state system, the choice is exclusively among its
own lawmaking sources, but also situations in which the choice
is between federal and state lawmaking sources. The pre-1934
history reveals no special interest in problems of federalism among
the supporters of the uniform federal procedure bill.505 In response to objections, however, they provided assurances that, under
the Cummins bill, court rules would not be framed "which would
deal with substantial rights and remedies in a manner contrary to
the public policy of the States embodied in local statutory law." 506
The standards of allocation suggested by the pre-1934 history reserve to Congress, as opposed to the Supreme Court exercising its
rulemaking function, the responsibility for deciding whether to
501 There was, of course, a possibility that the matter might be governed by
federal decisional law, as to which the 1926 Senate Report is silent. See supra
note 447.

See supra text accompanying notes 185-86.
See supra text accompanying notes 477-82.
504 See supra text accompanying notes 331-36.
502

503
505

See supra text accompanying notes 430-47.
IlEPORT, supra note 297, at 9; see supra text accompanying

506 1926 SNTrs
note 305.

1126

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 130:1015

exercise federal power and what choices should be made when
"rights" recognized by the "substantive law" may be affected, or
rights akin to those recognized by the substantive law are at issue.
Thus, those standards have the potential to fulfill the promise in
the 1926 Senate Report507

Whether the potential can be realized

depends upon the manner in which the standards are implemented.
At the practical level, as well, reliance on a state model, particularly one which includes prior legislative classification, presents
difficulties. It is not surprising that, having recommended that
all matters raising a serious question of rulemaking power be
classified as substantive by the legislature, the New York Board of
Statutory Consolidation was content to dismiss questions "of power
to enact a specific rule," at least where they were "a mere matter
of opinion," lest "fine theories or preconceived notions . . . stand

in the way of the advancement of a great public reform." 508 Even
absent prior classification by the legislature, the task of identifying
matters that may affect "rights" under the "substantive law" or
that involve the creation of rights equivalent to those recognized
by the substantive law would be manageable in a unitary system
of government. Impact on the "substantive law" alone is of concern under the Act, interpreted in the light of the pre-1934 history. The policies reflected in existing rules of law are irrelevant
to the allocation decision, and it should be possible to identify
interests protected by the United States Constitution.509 In such
cases, it is the prediction of impact that may be difficult. The
areas in which the Act has reference to rights independent of
existing legal sources, and forbids their creation or definition, are
considerably more difficult to identify absent a shared conception
of the distinctive features of the substantive law.
But the federal system is not unitary. Those charged with
the duty of identifying and avoiding rulemaking with respect to
507

See Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLum. L. REv.
543 (1954); see also Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation,
and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89
H _v. L. REv. 682 (1976). Compare Degnan, supra note 22, at 288-89 with
Mishkin, supra note 82. But see Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment,
48 U. CoLo. L. REv. 139, 181-88 (1977). On the question of choosing state law
as a federal common law rule where Congress has not so directed, see Mishkin, The
Variousness of "FederalLaw": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National
and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797 (1957).
508 1 1915 NEw Yor REP RT, supra note 175, at 177, quoted supra text accompanying note 202.
509 "Where the delegated decision affects the constitutional rights of individuals,
there is at least a ready benchmark for assessing the 'importance' of the powers
delegated." Gewirtz, supra note 464, at 62; see id. 76-77.
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such matters at the federal level might seem to have a far more
difficult task because of the multiplicity of sources of law applicable
in the federal courts. The policies animating existing legal rules
governing a matter are irrelevant, however, and the alternatives
of becoming conversant with the jurisprudence of all of the states
or hazarding the validity of Federal Rules on the jurisprudence
of individual states-the alternatives presented by Professor Ely's
proposal to read the Act's second sentence to protect "substantive"
state policy 51 -are avoided. In addition, the rulemakers' task of
identifying interests protected by the Constitution is not affected
by the change of perspective. On this analysis, the main obstacle
to the fulfillment of the promise regarding the protection of state
law in the 1926 Senate Report is, again, the prediction of impact.
Finally, it does not require a catalogue of all existing rules of
substantive law to recognize when rules designed to regulate the
conduct of a lawsuit will share the distinctive features of the
former. Again, however, the missing element is a shared conception of what those features are.
d. Refining the Standards of Allocation
Without refinement, the broad standards of allocation derived
from the 1926 Senate Report would cripple the rulemaking enterprise contemplated by the Act. There is evidence, however, of
such refinement in the 1926 Report, although there is also evidence of confusion and lack of consistency.
510 According to Professor Ely's test for validity of a Federal Rule under the
Enabling Act, the Rule must yield even to nonobvious state substantive policy choices
but would not yield to a state law identical in terms if the latter were found not to
have been animated by a policy extrinsic to the litigation process. See supra notes
495-96. Apart from the problem of prior identification, one who is conversant with
modem American choice of law decisions might well pause before extending the
often rootless exercise in "[i]ntramural speculation" that masquerades as the determination of the policies reflected in rules of state law. Tooker v. Lopez, 24
N.Y.2d 569, 597, 249 N.E.2d 394, 411, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 543 (1969) (Breitel, J.,
dissenting). Indeed, the exchange between Professors Ely and Chayes, reaching
different conclusions while using the same technique, is reason enough to be dubious
about the usefulness of that technique in the real world. Compare Ely, supra note
3, and Ely, supra note 82 with Chayes, supra note 82. Professor Ely himself has
recently exposed some of the weaknesses of policy identification in the choice of law
context. See Ely, Choice of Law and the State's interest in Protecting Its Own, 23
WM. & MAny L. REv. 173, 192-99 (1981).
Legislative history aside, one should
certainly hesitate to attribute to Congress, in 1934 or today, a purpose to inflict such
an exercise on the bar or on the federal courts. See Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal
Co., 497 F. Supp. 1105, 1119-20 (E.D. Ky. 1980); cf. Brilmayer, Interest Analysia
and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 Mica. L. REv. 392 (1980) (arguing that
governmental interest analysis is not a method that discovers and then implements
actual legislative intent and that, from both normative and empirical perspectives,
it is not a reliable guide to constructive legislative intent).
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Most of the matters discussed and classified as substantive in
the 1926 Senate Report involve, at their core, either potential
effects on "rights" recognized by the "substantive law" that are
predictable and identifiable, or the creation of remedial rights that
predictably and identifiably affect personal liberty or the use and
enjoyment of property. Probably for that reason, the Committee
deemed it "inconceivable" that any court would consider rules
dealing with such matters as within its authority.511
One can predict with certainty that the choice of one rule
regarding the cases in which an order of attachment may issue
will, when compared to another rule defining such cases differently,
affect, in a manner that is identifiable, the use or enjoyment of
property in much the same way as rules of substantive law. A
similar analysis applies to the other provisional and final remedies
discussed in the 1926 Senate Report.512 The remedies are coercive.
They directly impinge upon the ability to use property or to enjoy
personal freedom. Thus, they share a characteristic with rules of
substantive law: both affect out-of-court conduct, or as it is sometimes called, albeit for a different purpose, "private primary
activity." 513

In connection with the Act's concern for "rights" already
recognized by the "substantive law," less certainty attends a prediction of impact as to a choice between one limitations or abatement period over another. The uncertainty arises from the differences in ability of those whose substantive law rights are at stake
to protect themselves, but experience with a variety of time periods
tells us that some impact is assured, and it is identifiable.
Clearly preclusive doctrines like a statute of limitations,
laches, or res judicata dramatically affect the ability of
litigants to enforce their substantive rights and, therefore,
determine in a practical sense whether those rights exist at
all, at least when viewed from the point in time at which
they are asserted.5 14
Still less clearly predictable and identifiable is the effect of
alternative standards of qualification and selection of jurors on
511 1926 SErAm REPORT, supra note 297, at 11, quoted supra text accompany-

ing note 316.
512 See supra note 498.
513
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 477 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); see
id. 475 & n.2 (citing H. HART & H. WECHSLEB, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND Tm
FEDERAL SYsTE 678 (1953)).
514 Clinton, supra note 13, at 59.
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constitutionally recognized interests. Experience may not be an
adequate guide here. The Senate Committee may have intended
to suggest that when the interest in question finds its source in the
Constitution, the confidence with which a prediction and identification of impact must be made before choice is allocated to
Congress under the Act should be reduced. Such a position would
be justified in light of the generality of most constitutional provisions and the possibility, therefore, that court rules will, in the
absence of authoritative judicial decisions, effectively define a constitutional right.5 15
Rules of evidence are perhaps the most difficult of the matters
classified as substantive in the 1926 Senate Report to rationalize in
terms of the concerns that, in general, seem to inform its characterizations. 1 6 It appears that only rules regarding admissibility,
515 Indeed, that seems to have been the concern of the New York Board with
respect to the right to jury trial. See supra note 488. It does not require much
faith in the reality of differences between court rulemaking and adjudication to believe that rulemaking involving constitutionally recognized interests poses significant
risks to those interests. See Clinton, supra note 13, at 45; Degnan, supra note 19,
at 348-49. But see Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) (local Rule).
In cases of this type, the allocation standard suggested by the pre-1934 history
would ensure that the Supreme Court, as the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution,
remained free of the predisposing effect of prior promulgation of a court rule. As
noted in W. BRowN, supra note 14, at 105: "The most serious concerns are those
relating to the allegedly cursory nature of the Court's review and its alleged inability
to consider promulgated rules impartially in litigated cases, with the result that constitutional questions are sometimes determined in the abstract by advisory committees, without either judicial or legislative safeguards." A somewhat different aspect
of this problem, raised by Colgrove v. Battin, is discussed in Flanders, Local Rules
in Federal District Courts: Usurpation, Legislation, or Information?, 14 Loy. L.A.L.
REv. 213, 237-39 & n.118 (1981).
Moreover, such a standard could serve federalism interests in two ways. First,
unless Congress acted in the area or the federal courts fashioned a rule in the context of adjudication that could displace state law, see supra note 447, the latter
would furnish the governing rule. This is no different in terms of federalism concerns than the effects of the allocation standards generally. See supra text accompanying notes 495-96 & 507. Second, by ensuring that the Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution free of the predisposing effect of court rules, the standard
might in some cases preserve the ability of the states to experiment. This is different, reflecting the fact that, in an age of constitutional incorporation, many
interpretations of the Constitution will foreclose state experimentation, whereas Federal Rules not embodying such interpretations are not binding on the states. In
other cases, however, state experimentation might better be served by the existence
of federal court rules affecting constitutionally recognized interests. See Colgrove v.
Battin.
Senator Cummins' questions regarding "notice" to nonresident defendants at the
1924 Senate Hearing seem to have derived from a concern that federal court rules
not displace state law that he apparently believed was constitutional. See 1924
Senate Hearing, supra note 269, at 61, quoted infra text accompanying note 641.
516 Although not one of the matters raised by Senator Walsh in his minority
views, rules of evidence were among the matters excluded from the rulemaking
power in the 1926 Senate Report, both by explicit reference to state models, see
1926 SENATE REPORT, supra note 297, at 10, and by an unattributed quotation from

1130

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 130:1015

as opposed to those governing the taking and obtaining of evidence, were excluded from the grant of rulemaking authority.5 17
Nevertheless, the prediction of an effect on rights recognized by
the substantive law hardly can be made with confidence categorically even concerning choices in that subset of the law of
evidence, and the effect need not be identifiableY' 5
On the other hand, it is not clear that the Senate Committee
intended to confine rulemaking limitations to what has been called
the core of matters classified as substantive. Most of those matters
involve broad legal categories. 519 It is possible to imagine Federal
Rules treating aspects of most if not all of the matters classified
as substantive by the Senate Committee that would have no more
predictable and identifiable effect on "rights" recognized by the
"substantive law" and would no more predictably and identifiably
affect private primary activity than the Federal Rules the Committee and Congress clearly did intend to authorize. 520 In fact,
the New York Board had proposed rules of court covering parthe standard report of the ABA Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, see id.
12. See also supra note 317.
517 Such was the New York model. Compare 1 1915 NEw Yonx REPoRT, supra
note 175, at 98-107 (court rules covering discovery and similar matters) with 3 id.
219-57 (evidence law). The Clayton bill authorized the Supreme Court to prescribe
"the mode . . . of taking and obtaining evidence." See supra note 154. The 1914
House Report, however, specifically noted that Congress would retain control over
the "production of evidence," 1914 HousE REPoRT, supra note 166, at 14, by which
it must have intended rules of admissibility. These matters are discussed further
infra text accompanying notes 547-66.
51
8 Cf. Degnan, supra note 22, at 289-91 (discussing the outcome-determination
test of Erie's progeny). It is possible that the failure of the Committee to be more
discriminating with respect to rules of evidence reflects mere slavish borrowing. On
the other hand, the Committee was selective in its use of the 1915 New York Report,
altering the analysis and characterizations it found there to suit its purposes. See
supra text accompanying notes 477-82; supra notes 487-88. Thus, the Committee
may have followed the New York Board because, in this area, the latter bad itself
taken a categorical approach. In addition, evidence having been one of the few
matters characterized in the 1912 New York Report, its treatment there had been
picked up early by the ABA Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, with the
result that "rules of evidence" was the only matter identified as within the "first
class" of procedure identified in the Committee's standard report as lying "exclusively with the legislative department." See supra text accompanying note 237 (excerpt from standard report of the ABA Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure).
519 It is important to keep in mind that the Committee's discussion was in response to the objections made by Senator Walsh and was essentially limited to the
matters he had raised. But see supra note 516. One must be careful, therefore, in
drawing general conclusions from the Committee's treatment of those matters.
520 For instance, the objection to court rules defining the cases in which provisional and final remedies may be applied would not seem to extend to rules specifying who shall issue or serve the process. See Preliminary Draft of Rules of Civil
Procedure for the District Courts of the United States and the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia 141 (1936) (draft rule 78) [hereinafter cited as Preliminary
Draft]; see also infra text accompanying note 571.
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ticular aspects of a number of the categories,5 21 and court rules
as to the "how" rather than the "what" had always been contemplated by the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure and
were contemplated in the 1926 Senate Report.5 22 In failing consistently to mark the distinction at the 1924 Senate Hearing and
in the 1926 Senate Report, Cummins and the Committee may have
sought to insure a margin of safety, at least in areas where objections had been made, even greater than that which had provided
5 23
comfort to the New York Board of Statutory Consolidation.
More probably, the difficulty and reactive nature of their enterprise
5 24
prevented a more consistent and comprehensive analysis.
V.

EXPERIENCE UNDER THE ACT

One of the complaints made about federal court rulemaking
is that the rulemakers have, in recent years, failed to pay adequate
attention to the Rules Enabling Act's limitations. 5 5 In the early
years, it has been asserted, 528 the Advisory Committee and the
Supreme Court scrupulously avoided questionable exercises of
power. In order to test the assertion and to understand the implications of the Act's pre-1934 history, it is instructive to examine
the interpretations of the Act's procedure/substance dichotomy
emerging from a lawmaking process that concluded before Erie was
decided and to compare them with the Supreme Court decisions
considering the validity or reach of Federal Rules, all of which
52 7
were rendered after Erie.
5 21

See supra notes 487-88 & 498.
See supra text accompanying notes 237 (excerpt from standard report of the
ABA Committee on Uniform judicial Procedures) & 317. This was, of course,
merely another way of stating the procedure/substance dichotomy.
52 3
See supra text accompanying notes 480-81; supra notes 487-88 & 498. It is
also possible that the Committee's references to the experience in England and in
those states which had authorized court rulemaking, see 1926 SENATE REPORT, supra
note 297, at 9-10, quoted supra text accompanying note 311, were intended not only
to support its characterizations but also to suggest the relevance of such experience
in the process of characterization itself. Both views are consistent with the assumption by the Committee of universally espoused standards of allocation. See supra
text accompanying note 504. Only the latter, however, has continuing interpretive
significance, and it is quite limited since the Committee relied on unanimity, which
was less likely to obtain as rulemaking caught on in the states.
5 24
See supra note 519.
525 For a summary of criticisms of this variety, see W. BnoWN, supra note 14,
at 86-93.
526 See, e.g., 1938 Senate Hearings, supra note 435, at 9 (statement of W.D.
Mitchell); 1 J. Moona & J. FnmDrnm , MooRE's FEDmA.L PRAC-ncE § 1.03 (1938)
[hereinafter cited as MooRE & FhIEDmAN]; Clark supra note 252, at 251-53.
527 The adoption of these criteria for discussion has seemed sensible in light of
the dual aims of this section and of considerations of space. It has the effect, how522
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This inquiry reveals that the Advisory Committee on Rules
for Civil Procedure appointed in 1935 had no coherent or con-

sistent view of the limitations imposed by the Act's procedure/
substance dichotomy. It also suggests, however, that unlike the
Supreme Court in Sibbach and subsequent cases, the original Advisory Committee recognized the basic purpose of the Act's procedure/substance dichotomy and occasionally adverted to the Act's
pre-1934 history. Finally, a review of the work of the original
Advisory Committee reveals that it followed a principle of court
rulemaking that, the pre-1934 history of the Act aside, casts
specifically in doubt-as knowledge of the Committee's approach
to the procedure/substance dichotomy casts generally in doubtthe presumption of validity of Federal Rules upon which the Court
has relied in interpreting the Act.
A. The Original Advisory Committee's Approach to the
Procedure/SubstanceDichotomy: In General
It is difficult if not impossible to determine how the original
Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure interpreted the
Act's basic limitations on rulemaking. Neither the published
drafts and notes of the Committee nor the published articles and
remarks of its members suggest that the Committee had agreed
upon standards or guidelines to inform the procedure/substance
dichotomy.5 28

The working papers and correspondence of the

Advisory Committee529 confirm that perceived problems of power
ever, of precluding analysis of some Federal Rules that have been challenged in the
lower federal courts or that otherwise have provoked controversy. Prime among
them is Rule 23, as amended in 1966, dealing with class actions. See, e.g., Landers,
supra note 31. Notwithstanding, the discussion in this section should clearly suggest
the implications of the pre-1934 history of the Act for such Rules.
528 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 547-48, 567-74, 587, 613-14, 628 &
723-24; Clark, Supreme Court Power, supra note 41; Clark & Moore, supra note 36;
Sunderland, supra note 36; Sunderland, supra note 166.
529 The official working papers and correspondence of the Advisory Committee
remain restricted, although there is reason to hope that they will be made generally
accessible to scholars and that permission will be granted to cite their contents.
In the meanwhile, substantial portions of the papers and correspondence of the
Committee are accessible in various libraries throughout the country. The author
has reviewed three collections of such papers. First, in the Harvard Law Library
is a nine-volume set containing most of the communications of the Advisory Committee, including unpublished drafts, comments and some correspondence among
members of the Committee, donated by Edmund M. Morgan, who was a member.
Communications of the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure for the
District Courts of the United States [hereinafter cited as Communications of the
Advisory Committee]. The Harvard collection also includes a six-volume transcript
of the proceedings of the Advisory Committee at meetings held on February 20-25,
1936. Proceedings of Meeting of Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure
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were approached without a shared conception of the Act's limitations and that the resolutions of those problems were, therefore,
essentially ad hoc. 80 To be sure, individual members of the
of the Supreme Court of the United States [hereinafter cited as February 1936
Transcript].
Another collection of the materials sent to members of the Advisory Committee, in fourteen volumes, is contained in the University of Chicago Law
Library, donated by Edgar B. Tolman, a member and the Secretary of the
Committee. U.S. Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, Materials, 1934-1939. Because the Chicago volumes have been classified
as rare books, citations will be to Communications of the Advisory Committee,
supra.
A much more extensive set of materials, including the communications of the
Committee, the transcripts of most of its proceedings, and substantial correspondence, can be found in the Sterling Library of Yale University, Manuscripts
and Archives. This set is contained in Series IV of the papers of Charles E. Clark,
the Reporter of the Committee [hereinafter cited as Clark Papers]. I am grateful
to the Yale University Library for permission to publish material in the Charles E.
Clark Papers. For a case in which the court made use of material in the Clark
Papers in resolving an issue of interpretation under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, see Whalen v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., 684 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1982)
(en bane).
Finally, papers relating to the work of the Advisory Committee can be found
in the Bentley Historical Library of the University of Michigan (donated by Edson
R. Sunderland), and a few unpublished drafts are in the University of Virginia
Law Library. They have not been reviewed by the author. It is probable that
other sets exist.
58
0 Almost a year after the Act had been passed-when the rulemaking project
was being run out of the Attorney General's office and before the Advisory Committee was appointed by the Court-there had been no study of the limitations
imposed by the Act's procedure/substance dichotomy. See letter from Edward H.
Hammond to E.J. Marshall (March 30, 1935) (copy on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review). After the appointment of the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee, Edgar B. Tolman sought the advice of Professor Ernest Lorenzen
of Yale as to "a satisfactory distinction between procedure and substantive law."
Letter from the Hon. Edgar B. Tolman to Professor Ernest G. Lorenzen (July 11,
1935) (copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). He was
advised by Lorenzen that any line must be arbitrary, "with the view of accomplishing a particular objective," that "any attempt to establish a formula or test by
which to distinguish substantive rights from procedure would be vain," and that he
should "study carefully the ends to be obtained and include the particular matter
if it would be helpful toward such end: otherwise exclude it." Letter from Ernest
G. Lorenzen to the Hon. Edgar B. Tolman (August 5, 1935) (copy on file with
the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). Tolman took the advice to heart,
expressing the view in a speech made after the appearance of the Advisory Committee's Preliminary Draft, supra note 520, that it would be "unwise to attempt in
advance to lay down a formula by which the line between procedural and substantive law shall be determined." Address by Edgar B. Tolman, Law Club
(Chicago, Illinois) (November 6, 1936) (5 Communications of the Advisory Committee, supra note 529).
Regarding the Advisory Committee more generally, the unpublished evidence
reviewed by the author is to the same effect. At its first meeting, the Committee
considered numerous questions of interpretation but did not consider, let alone
agree about, the general implications of the Act's procedure/substance dichotomy
for its work. See Summary of Proceedings of the First Meeting of Advisory Committee, Held in the Federal Building at Chicago, June 20, 1935 (1 Communications
of the Advisory Committee, supra note 529; Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 108,
Folder 42 & Box 104, Folder 35) [hereinafter cited as Summary of Proceedings].
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Moreover, although the Committee resolved to be "conservative as to the fields to
be covered by the rules," it also agreed that "within the fields which the rules do
cover the committee should go as far as may be necessary to liberalize the procedure
and reach a result that will do quick and accurate justice." Id.
As late as 1937, Mitchell was raising questions about the meaning of "practice
and procedure" in the Act's first sentence, and only then was an effort made to
collect relevant authorities. See letter from William D. Mitchell to the Hon.
Edgar B. Tolman (August 6, 1937) (copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review); letter from the Hon. Edgar B. Tolman to Leland L. Tolman
(August 10, 1937) (copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
After considering a troublesome question of power raised when the proposed Rules
were before the Court, Mitchell wrote to George Wharton Pepper, a member of
the Committee:
I frequently am dissatisfied with myself, because after more than two
years of struggling with practice and procedure, when a question arises as
to whether a matter is procedure or substance, my mind is murky on the
subject and I am unable to reach a conclusion in which I have confidence
whenever the question is at all debatable. The truth is that the twilight
zone around the dividing line between substance and procedure is a very
broad one. If it were not for the fact that the court which makes these
rules will decide whether they were within the authority, we would have
very serious difficulties in dealing with this problem. The general policy
I have acted on is that where a difficult question arose as to whether a
matter was substance or procedure and I thought the proposed provision
was a good one, I have voted to put it in, on the theory that if the Court
adopted it, the Court would be likely to hold, if the question ever arises
in litigation, that the matter is a procedural one.
Letter from William D. Mitchell to the Hon. George Wharton Pepper (December
19, 1937) (copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
Finally, about the same time, Warren Olney, a member of the Advisory
Committee, wrote to Mitchell expressing fears about the proposed Rules after reading an article by Mr. Ohlinger of the Toledo Bar (Ohlinger, supra note 36). Olney
had satisfied himself that "practice and procedure" as used in the Enabling Act
was not as narrow as suggested by Ohlinger, and that, of the provisions questioned
by the latter, only proposed Rule 4(f) (governing the territorial limits for service
of process) might exceed the authority conferred by Congress. He stated, however,
that "there are instances to which the article does not refer in which it is not at all
improbable that our rules do go beyond 'practice and procedure,' even under the
broad conception on which the Committee proceeded, although as I remember it,
all of these instances were of a minor character." Olney suggested that direct
approval of the Rules should be sought from Congress. Letter from Warren
Olney, Jr., to the Hon. William D. Mitchell (December 30, 1937) (Clark Papers,
supra note 529, Box 111, Folder 59). In his response, Mitchell evinced considerably more confidence than he had in his previously mentioned letter to Senator
Pepper, arguing that there were "few cases where it may be argued that we have
crossed the deadline," most prominently proposed Rule 4(f), and that they were
"not of any great importance." Letter from William D. Mitchell to the Hon.
Warren Oley, Jr. (January 4, 1938) (Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 111,
Folder 59). In this and a subsequent letter Mitchell argued against seeking legislation from Congress approving the Rules. See id.; letter from William D. Mitchell
to the Hon. Warren Oley, Jr. (January 15, 1938) (Clark Papers, supra note 529,
Box 111, Folder 59).
On the Committee, I was one of those, usually in the minority, who was
always raising the question of power, and taking a conservative view as
to what are matters of procedure rather than substantive right, always
having in mind what is troubling you, but now that the rules are in, 1
am all for standing by them as within the field of procedure. What if
there are a few minor provisions on which the Court may ultimately have
to hold are not within its rulemaking power? No great harm will be

1982]

THE RULES ENABLING ACT

Committee and its staff evinced awareness of the pre-1934 history,
and that history was brought to bear on the consideration of a few
issues of interpretation.53 1 But the use was occasional, and one
leaves the published and unpublished sources with the impression
that, although the Committee may have recognized the basic purpose of the procedure/substance dichotomy, in formulating and
applying the Act's limitations normative considerations took a
back seat to practical possibilities.
In part, this was a process of default. The literature on, and
other interpretations of, the Act available to the Committee often
raised false issues or suggested the wrong standards for deciding
real issues. For example, notwithstanding his familiarity with
the ABA's long campaign and the pre-1934 history, and notwithstanding Attorney General Cummings' posture in resuscitating the
campaign,532 Professor Sunderland fought a rearguard action
against uniform Federal Rules even after the Act was passed. His
early articles on the Enabling Act 5 8 argued that it should be
interpreted to authorize, if not to require, strict conformity to
state law (as opposed to the manipulable conformity permitted by
the Conformity Act of 1872, as it was interpreted 534). Those articles were striking pieces of revisionism insofar as they purported
to describe the intent of the draftsmen of the uniform federal
procedure bill, 535 even accepting the author's erroneous claim of
ABA authorship 63 Sunderland's purpose in distorting the record
probably was linked with his view that national uniformity in the
procedural field was undesirable because it would foreclose state
experimentation. 37z In any event, his prominence as a scholar
insured that his views were taken more seriously than they deserved, even by those who knew better,5 38 and they occupied a good
done, and my guess is that the bar will assume that the Court will stand
by its rules, and it is unlikely that assaults of that kind will be made.
Id.
See, e.g., infra notes 539 & 554; see also supra note 166.
532 See supra text accompanying notes 362-65.
53 Sunderland, supra note 36; Sunderland, supra note 166.
534 See supra text accompanying notes 99-113.
535
See Sunderland, supra note 36, at 1128; Sunderland, supra note 166, at 405.
53
6 See supra text accompanying notes 253-68.
5 37
See supra text accompanying note 334; Sunderland, supra note 36, at
1125-27.
538 See, e.g., Wickes, supra note 36, at 11-15, 30-32. Compare Supreme Court
Needs Rule-Making Commission, 18 J. Am. JUDiCATuBE SOC'r 131 (1935) with
Policies Involved in Federal Rule Making, 18 J. Am. JuDIcATuRE Soc'r 134 (1935).
In more recent years, Sunderlands articles have been regarded as a primary
source for those working with the Act. As a result, a good deal of misinformation
531
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deal of attention at the first meeting of the Advisory Committee.53 9
In addition, the Advisory Committee's approach may have
been affected by the attitude-emerging in scholarly circles at the
time and widely accepted today-that procedure and substance cannot usefully be distinguished by any a priori formula, and that
therefore the best one can do is to think deeply (and instru540
mentally) about particular problems.

Finally, the Committee's Reporter was more committed to the
integrity of the Rules than he was to the Act's limitations. Accordingly, he made or sponsored arguments that, although
has been perpetuated. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 23, at 739: "Its [the Act's]
failure to trumpet any grandiose legislative purpose merely reflects the indecision
of the act's draftsmen and sponsors as to whether uniformity of practice among
the state and federal courts in the same jurisdiction was more desirable than
uniformity among the federal courts throughout the country."
539
See Summary of Proceedings, supra note 530; letter from Charles E. Clark
to Edson R. Sunderland (June 22, 1935) (Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 108,
Folder 42). Indeed, since it was never more likely than in 1935 that Sunderland's
revisionism would be recognized as such, it is probable that his untenable interpretations of the Act with respect to conformity, rather than, as Dean Clark later
claimed, other, legitimate, questions of interpretation he raised, caused Mr. Mitchell
to be "profoundly disturbed" and "to question Sunderland's potential usefulness for
the work, even as a committee member." Clark, Edson Sunderland and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 58 MicHr. L. REv. 6, 9 (1959).
This supposition finds support in a letter written by Mitchell to Sunderland expressing disagreement with three of the latter's interpretations of the Act, which are
reflected in Sunderland, supra note 36, and Sunderland, supra note 166. Mitchell
took up the issue of conformity first, adducing the Act's reference to "general rules,"
the grounds of Senator Walsh's opposition to the uniform federal procedure bill and
the intent of the 1911 ABA resolution, in support of his conclusion, dearly correct,
that the Act contemplates "rules that prevail generally in all the district courts, that
is, a uniform set of rules applicable generally in each of the districts." Letter from
William D. Mitchell to Edson R. Sunderland (May 23, 1935) (Clark Papers, supra
note 529, Box 108, Folder 41).
The correspondence in the Clark Papers suggests that, far from saving Sunderland from total exclusion from the Advisory Committee, as he later claimed, Clark
ensured that he and not Sunderland would be selected as Reporter by bringing the
latter's views to Mitchell's attention. See letter from Charles E. Clark to William
D. Mitchell (May 17, 1935) (Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 108, Folder 41);
letter from William D. Mitchell to Charles E. Clark (May 24, 1935) (Clark Papers,
supra note 529, Box 108, Folder 41); letter from Charles E. Clark to William D.
Mitchell (May 25, 1935) (Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 108, Folder 41). In
that regard, Mitchell wrote to Clark that he was "a little disconcerted at [Sunderland's] conclusions," letter from William D. Mitchell to Charles E. Clark, supra,
hardly the level of disturbance Clark subsequently attributed to him. And it was
Clark who, at least in the correspondence, expressed doubt about Sunderland's fitness
for the position of Reporter. Letter from Charles E. Clark to William D. Mitchell
(May 25, 1935), supra.
Although Sunderland's misinterpretation of the Act on the issue of uniformity
or conformity was one of the most extreme in the literature, it was not his only error,
and he was hardly alone. See, e.g., supra notes 166, 256, 268 & 387 and infra text
accompanying notes 552-69.
540
See letter from Ernest C. Lorenzen to the Hon. Edgar B. Tolman, supra
note 530.
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surely instrumental, ignored other basic tenets of scholars whose
leader, as Dean of the Yale Law School, he was. 541
In various public pronouncements during the drafting of the
Rules and their consideration by Congress, members of the Advisory Committee assured their audiences that the task of observing
42
the procedure/substance dichotomy had proved not very difficult.
The truth, however, was that, having failed to address the problem
at all systematically, the Committee was forced, and in most cases
was quite content, to rely largely on judgments informed by a
sense of the professional and political climate and by the hope
543
that the Supreme Court would preserve it from error.
B. Specific Problems of Power Noted by the Original
Advisory Committee or Resulting from its Approach
1. Evidence
The original Advisory Committee brought to the attention of
the Supreme Court many questions of power it had identified in
the drafting process. One of the most interesting, because it has
been the subject of recent controversy, concerned the Court's power
under the Enabling Act to promulgate Federal Rules in the area
of evidence. This was one of the few areas in which the Commit541 See, e.g., infra note 620. On other occasions, Clark's attitude was closer to
home but still worthy of interest. In the debate about the power of the Court to
promulgate amendments to the Civil Rules without submitting them to Congress,
see supra note 268; infra note 601, Clark noted in a letter to Tolman that Professor Moore had "always laughed slyly at my Harvard Law Review article [Clark,
Supreme Court Power, supra note 41] on the basis that there I did much rewriting
of the Act." Letter from Charles E. Clark to Edgar B. Tolman (October 15, 1938)
(Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 113, Folder 65) (extract with letter from
Charles E. Clark to Monte M. Lemann (November 1, 1938)). He continued: "I
have answered that some one must do it and that I was affording a logical basis
therefor." Id. See also infra text accompanying note 546.
Other members of the Committee followed the lead of Dean Clark and his staff
in confounding analysis under the Act with the analysis of "procedure" and "substance" made for other purposes. For example, although Mr. Mitchell recognized
that the Act's procedure/substance dichotomy had a function in federal question
cases, see, e.g., infra note 620, he assumed that the same classification would govern
the matter of costs under the Act and under the Rules of Decision Act. See letter
from William D. Mitchell to the Hon. Charles E. Clark (October 13, 1937) (Clark
Papers, supra note 529, Box 111, Folder 58).
542 See, e.g., Cr vELAND INsTrrE, supra note 433, at 182-83 (statement of
W.D. Mitchell): "This problem at first approach seems difficult. The Advisory
Committee found very little difficulty with it. It is astonishing how many decisions
there are in the Supreme Court and the other courts which define the difference between procedure, on the one hand, and substantive rights, on the other." See also
1938 Senate Hearings, supra note 435, at 9 (statement of W.D. Mitchell).
543 See, e.g., letter from William D. Mitchell to the Hon. George Wharton
Pepper, supra note 530; letter from William D. Mitchell to the Hon. Warren Olney,
Jr. (January 15, 1938), supra note 530.
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tee brought the pre-1934 history to bear on its interpretation of
the Act. Although it successfully resisted pressure to deal comprehensively with evidence, the Committee's ultimate treatment
was a product of compromise. Nevertheless, a review of its deliberations confirms what is apparent from the pre-1934 history,
that Congress was faithful to the original understanding in refusing to acquiesce in the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence in
1973.r,"
In the Foreword to the May 1936 Preliminary Draft, evidence
was but one of a number of questions of power noted by the Advisory Committee. The extent to which the Committee's interpretations of the Act were dictated by perceived necessity is strikingly apparent. 45 Thus, the Committee noted with respect to
evidence: "There is some difference of opinion in the Committee
as to the extent to which the statute authorizes the Court to make
rules dealing with evidence. We have touched the subject as
lightly as possible. We felt it quite essential to go this far .... 541
In a Note to the Supreme Court accompanying the general rule on
evidence in the April 1937 Report, the Committee observed:
The first impression of the Committee was against touching the field of evidence. It later became clear that on
account of the union of law and equity there would be
doubt as to the rules of evidence to be applied. We think
it essential to deal with the subject at least to the extent
expressed in subdivision (a) of this rule. Having gone
that far, the Committee made the further provisions in
subdivision (b) of this rule and summarized in Rule 45,
the law on proof of official records now scattered through
many Federal Statutes.5 47
544

For Congress's actions, see supra text accompanying note 4; supra note 21.
545 Many of the questions noted by the Committee related to the Court's power
with respect to practice on appeals. See Foreword to Preliminary Draft, supra note
520, at viii-xviii.
The Committee felt it absolutely necessary to deal with these subjects. An
elaborate memorandum has been prepared dealing with the various statutes
enabling the Supreme Court to make rules of practice, and the Committee
concluded that if not the particular statute under which it is acting, then
under other general statutes the extent to which we have dealt with appeals
is within the power of the Court.
Id. x)-xii (emphasis added). The memorandum referred to, prepared by Dean Clark
and dated February 6, 1936, can be found in 2 Communications of the Advisory
Committee, supra note 529, and in the Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 105, Folder
37. See also Clark, Supreme Court Power, supra note 41, at 1308; Clark, supra
note 256, at 450.
546 Foreword to Preliminary Draft, supra note 520, at xvii.
547 Report of the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure 108 (1937)
(Draft Rule 44) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as April 1937 Report]; see also
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The draft rule was changed further in the Advisory Committee's
Final Report of November 1937. 54 8

Moreover, it was changed by

the Supreme Court, which deleted certain provisions in subdivision (b). 49
The attitude of the original Advisory Committee towards
evidence is, on the one hand, remarkable because it reminds one
of a person who is only "lightly" dead. 550 It is remarkable on the
other hand because the Advisory Committee resisted "tremendous
pressure" to deal more comprehensively with the subject, 51 inCr,vxr..
INsrn'to'r, supra note 433, at 186; Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 25 VA. L. Ray. 261, 283 (1939); Mitchell, Some of the Problems Confronting the Advisory Committee in Recent Months, 23 A.B.A. J. 966, 968 (1937).
548See Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure
30-31 (1937) (Draft Rule 44) [hereinafter cited as Final Report].
549Compare id. with Fed R. Civ. Pro. 43, 308 U.S. 645, 718-19 (1938). The
changes made by the Supreme Court after the filing of the Advisory Committee's
Final Report are collected in CL.LAND INsrtru-r, supra note 433, app. III, at
429-33. See also Clark, supra note 252, at 252. The changes regarding evidence
may have been made as a result of opposition expressed at the September 1937
meeting of the Judicial Conference. See Summary of Suggestions as to the Proposed Rules Made at the Annual Conference of the Chief Justice of the United
States with the Senior Circuit Judges, September 23-25, 1937 (9 Communications
of the Advisory Committee, supra note 529).
550
In addition to the quotation from the April 1937 Report, see supra text accompanying note 547, see the letter from William D. Mitchell to John H. Wigmore
(October 8, 1936) (Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 110, Folder 51): "Having
gone that far we have, of course, put ourselves in a position where we have to concede that the subject of evidence is one within the rulemaking power under this
statute, and we are left with the question as to how far we should go in this
direction."
551 CLuvELAND INsirrora,
supra note 433, at 186 (statement of W.D. Mitchell).
Some of the pressure came from Dean Clark, the Reporter, and from Edgar B.
Tolman, the Secretary of and a major force on the Advisory Committee. At its first
meeting on June 20, 1935, the Committee bad decided that the broad field of evidence, in particular rules of competency and admissibility, was not within the Act's
grant of authority and that the Rules should be limited to modes of taking and obtaining evidence, as by depositions and discovery. See Summary of Proceedings,
supra note 530. Clark expressed the hope to Professor Morgan that it would be
possible to draft "at least a few rules touching evidence in the federal courts."
Letter from Charles E. Clark to Edmund M. Morgan (October 12, 1935) (Clark
Papers, supra note 529, Box 108, Folder 43). Morgan doubted whether the Committee "could do anything worthwhile in the time now limited." Letter from
Edmund M. Morgan to Charles E. Clark (October 16, 1935) (Clark Papers, supra
note 529, Box 108, Folder 43). Clark then encouraged Tolman to "press further
the suggestion [he] made . . . as to a simple rule dealing with evidence." Letter
from Charles E. Clark to Edgar B. Tolman (November 21, 1935) (Clark Papers,
supra note 529, Box 109, Folder 44). Tolman, who had corresponded with various
academic commentators on the propriety of Federal Rules in the area of evidence
and who was consulting with Dean Wigmore, was also dissatisfied and did press for
more comprehensive treatment. See E. Tolman, Memorandum to the Advisory Committee In re-Rule A6 (January 14, 1936) (2 Communications of the Advisory
Committee, supra note 529; Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 105, Folder 37);
letters from Edgar B. Tolman to Charles E. Clark (January 17, 23, 1936) (Clark
Papers, supra note 529, Box 109, Folder 45); letter from Edgar B. Tolman to
Charles E. Clark (January 27, 1936) (Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 109, Folder
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cluding pressure from scholars who purported to demonstrate that
the Act authorized the Supreme Court to do S0.552 Notwithstanding the Committee's stated ambivalence and the action of the Supreme Court in deleting some of the proposed provisions regarding evidence, the fact that the subject was touched at all, however
"lightly," in the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
subsequently advanced as proof that authority existed for a far
more ambitious endeavor, the Federal Rules of Evidence.5 5 3 On
47). Clark supported Tolman's efforts. See, e.g., letters from Charles E. Clark to
Edgar B. Tolman (January 20, 25, 1936) (Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 105,
Folder 45); letters from Charles E. Clark to William D. Mitchell (January 28 &
February 1, 1936) (Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 109, Folder 47). Chairman
Mitchell opposed the proposal but left open the possibility that he might be persuaded to a different view if some additional provisions were necessary in light of
the merger of law and equity. See Comments of Mr. Win. D. Mitchell on Tentative
Draft II (February 11, 1936) (2 Communications of the Advisory Committee, supra
note 529; Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 105, Folder 37) [hereinafter cited as
Mr. Mitchell's Comments]. Tolman and Clark carried the argument at the February
1936 meeting of the Advisory Committee. See 4 February 1936 Transcript, supra
note 529, at 949-94. This transcript can also be found in the Clark Papers, supra
note 529, Box 95, Folder 11. See also letter from William D. Mitchell to John H.
Wigmore (October 8, 1936), supra note 550.
552 See, e.g., supra note 551; infra note 562 (Dean Wigmore); Callahan &
Ferguson, Evidence and the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 45 YALE L.J.
622 (1936); letter from Mason Ladd to Edgar B. Tolman (December 17, 1936) (6
Communications of the Advisory Committee, supra note 529); see also Sweeney,
Federal or State Rules of Evidence, 27 ILL. L. REv. 394 (1932); cf. Sunderland,
supra note 166, at 406-07 (asserting power but doubting whether it should be exercised). But see Wickes, supra note 36, at 18-28; Williams, supra note 19, at 462-64.
For Dean Clark's doubts about the timing of the publication of the article by
Callahan and Ferguson, Sterling Fellows at Yale (who, however, were not under
his direct supervision), see letter from Charles E. Clark to Edgar B. Tolman (January 25, 1936), supra note 551; letter from Charles E. Clark to William D. Mitchell
(February 1, 1936), supra note 551. He quickly overcame his doubts and relied
on the forthcoming article in comments for the Committee's February 1936 meeting.
See C. Clark, Suggestions and Agenda-Tentative Draft H (2 Communications of
the Advisory Committee, supra note 529; Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 105,
Folder 37); see also letter from Charles E. Clark to Edgar B. Tolman (February 29,
1936) (2 Communications of the Advisory Committee, supra note 529; Clark Papers,
supra note 529, Box 105, Folder 37 & Box 109, Folder 47) (enclosing Callahan &
Ferguson, supra, for distribution). Later, Clark stimulated Callahan and Ferguson
to publish their thesis in the hope that it might lead the Advisory Committee to go
"even further as you recommend." Letter from Charles E. Clark to Edwin K.
Ferguson (May 13, 1937) (Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 111, Folder 57).
It requires either an unusual notion of "consensus" or a careful definition of
"rules of evidence" to say that "[t]here has always been a consensus among the commentators that the Rules Enabling Act delegates sufficient authority to the Supreme
Court to permit the promulgation of rules of evidence for the federal courts." Miller,
supra note 23, at 739 (footnote omitted). As the citations in the author's footnote
reveal, there was a close division among the commentators in the years immediately
following the Act's passage, which, for this purpose, should presumably be regarded
as the most relevant period. See also supra note 329.
553 See, e.g., UNITED STATES
PRACTICE AND PRocEDURnE, A Prm

BILury

or

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, ColodI1TTEE ON RULES OF

NARY REPORT ON THE ADVISA rILIrTY AND FEAsr-

DEVELOPING UNIFOrM RULEs OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES
DIsrICT COURTS 34 (1962) [hereinafter cited as PREUinARy EVIDENCE REPORT];
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the contary, the public progress of the original Civil Rules suggests, and the papers of the Advisory Committee confirm, that the
Committee took seriously, even if it did not fully respect, the
54
Act's limitations as reflected in the pre-1934 history.e
The main difficulty with the efforts of most scholars who
attempted to determine the validity under the Act of Federal Rules
in the area of evidence has been ignorance or neglect of the pre1934 history, including in particular ABA and legislative reports. 55
A second and related source of difficulty has been the failure or
refusal to mark a distinction between Federal Rules regulating
the mode of taking and obtaining evidence and Federal Rules
regulating the admissibility of evidence. 56 The authorization in
Degnan, supra note 22, at 277-82; Moore & Bendix, Congress, Evidence and Rulemaking, 84 YAim L.J. 9, 12 n.17 (1974); see also Miller, supra note 23, at 740;
Clark, supra note 252, at 252.
54
See supra text accompanying notes 547-50; supra note 551. The Advisory
Committee's original position on evidence was based in part on the absence of any
suggestion in the pre-1934 ABA or congressional materials that the Act authorized
Federal Rules dealing with questions of competency or admissibility. See Summary
of Proceedings, supra note 530; see also letter from William D. Mitchell to John H.
Wigmore, supra note 550.
655 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 522 & 523. Professor Miller cited one
part of the 1926 Senate Report but ignored those parts of it that bore directly on
the question he was addressing. See Miller, supra note 23, at 743-44 & n.501; cf.
Stein, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power Prescribe Rules
of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A. J. 639, 644 & n.94 (1940) (recognizing that Shelton's legislative class of procedure included rules of evidence but asserting that "[s]uch a
differentiation has not been followed.").
556 See supra text accompanying notes 516-18. Callahan & Ferguson, supra
note 552, at 624-25 n.13, whose article may have been influential in moving the
Advisory Committee from its original position on evidence, see supra note 552, noted
that "[a] distinction has been drawn between 'Mode of Proof,' or the manner of
taking evidence, and a rule of evidence," citing Bryant v. Leyland, 6 F. 125, 127
(C.C.D. Mass. 1881) and Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Kendall, 167 F. 62,
65 (8th Cir. 1909). They argued, however, that such a distinction was vitiated by
Equity Rule 64, and thus that the Supreme Court's failure to deal more extensively
with evidence in its Equity Rules should be attributed to the lack of need rather
than to limitations imposed by the "Mode of Proof Act," Rev. Stat. § 862 (1872).
Callahan & Ferguson, supra note 552, at 624-25 & n.13; see also Stein, supra note
555, at 641, 643. Since Rule 64 merely authorized the use before a master of
documents previously "made, read, or used in the court," 226 U.S. 668 (1912), the
argument is not a strong one. Moreover, at the most it proves the assertion of
power, and a very limited one, rather than its existence. Finally, the argument
misdirects attention, disregarding the limited purpose of the Mode of Proof Act and
neglecting the statute authorizing the Equity Rules, which was discussed in Bryant
and which made precisely the distinction Callahan and Ferguson argued against.
See infra notes 560-61; see also 226 U.S. 661 (1912) (Equity Rule 46); Leach,
State Law of Evidence in Federal Courts, 43 HAnv. L. REv. 554, 579-81 (1930).
This was also the distinction originally made by the Advisory Committee, see supra
note 551, and emphasized by Mitchell in response to Tolman's memorandum, see
Mr. Mitchell's Comments, supra note 551 ("I draw a sharp distinction between the
mode of taking evidence, and the rules as to competency and admissibility. The
equity rules now deal with the mode of taking evidence, but contain not a word as
to competency or admissibility.").
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the Clayton and Sutherland bills to prescribe "the mode . . . of
taking and obtaining evidence" 6 by itself speaks neither one way
nor the other to the question of power to promulgate Federal
558
Rules in the broad field of evidence under the Enabling Act.
In the context of the history as a whole, however, it supports the
view that the Act carves up that field for rulemaking purposes,
drawing the line at questions of admissibility. 559
Against this background, the treatment of evidence in the
original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is comprehensible even
if not wholly consistent. The Committee felt free to recommend
Federal Rules regulating modes of "taking and obtaining evidence," as in the rules on discovery.56 0 The Committee was at
pains, however, to note that the use of depositions at trial was
"limited in substantially the same ways as at present." 511 The
other original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that dealt in
some way with evidence and that have been cited in support of
plenary authority under the Act by and large avoided questions
of admissibility.562 Rule 43(a), the original general Federal Rule
557

See supra note 228.

658 See supra note 517. But see Callahan & Ferguson, supra note 552, at 642
n.100 (asserting that the Sutherland bill "expressly included in the grant the matter
of 'taking and obtaining evidence,"' and thus neglecting the precise language of the
bill); Miller, supra note 23, at 741 (doing the same).
559
See supra text accompanying note 517; supra note 556.
560 See FED. R. Crv. P. 26-37; Summary of Proceedings, supra note 530. The
1842 statute that conferred broad rulemaking authority on the Supreme Court, see
supra note 103, separately enumerated the power "to prescribe, and regulate, and
alter .. . the forms and modes of taking and obtaining evidence, and of obtaining
discovery." The distinction was carried forward in Rev. Stat. § 917 (1872), which
preserved the Court's rulemaking power in equity and admiralty at the time that it
was taken away in civil actions at law by the Conformity Act. See supra text accompanying note 105. However, the grants were treated as fungible, see Bryant v.
Leyland, 6 F. 125, 126-27 (C.C.D. Mass. 1881), and the latter was probably omitted
in the Cummins bill, see supra text accompanying notes 259 & 268, as redundant.
501 Foreword to Preliminary Draft, supra note 520, at xvi. See also April 1937
Report, supra note 547, at 71-72 (Draft Rule 26); Notes to Rules of Civil Procedure
for the District Courts of the United States 29 (1938) (Rule 26) [hereinafter cited
as Advisory Committee Notes]; Memorandum on S.J. Res. 281 (April 21, 1938)
(Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 112, Folder 61). The Advisory Committee proposed Federal Rules, even if substantive under its interpretation of the Act, so long
as they incorporated existing federal law. That approach is discussed and criticized
infra text accompanying notes 577-609. Chairman Mitchell had argued vigorously
against a proposed Rule that would have abolished statutory restrictions on the use
of depositions. See Mr. Mitchell's Comments, supra note 551.
On the special problem of taking and using depositions in federal actions prior
to the Act, see A. DOBxE, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL JUBISDICTloN AND PnocEDURE
§ 187 (1928); see also Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary
Act of 1789, 37 Hanv. L. REv. 49, 100 (1923).
562 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 23, at 740; Moore & Bendix, supra note 553, at
12 n.17. The Rules adduced by these authors include Rules 26-37 (depositions and
discovery), 41(b) (involuntary dismissal), 43 (evidence), 44 (proof of official
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regulating evidence, is, however, difficult to justify. 5 3 Viewed as
a direction and broad grant of authority to the district courts to
admit evidence that would be excluded by an Act of Congress or
by state law, the Rule makes a choice that, if one accepts the
The
relevance of the pre-1934 history, runs afoul of the Act.
Rule, however, need not be, and was not consistently so viewed; 565
under the narrower interpretation, although the choice involved
was for Congress, the damage done to the Act's allocation scheme

is considerably reduced., 66
record), 45 (subpoena), 46 (exceptions unnecessary), 50 (motion for a directed
verdict), 59(a) (grounds for new trial), 60 (relief from judgment or order), 61
(harmless error), 68 (offer of judgment), and 80 (stenographer; stenographic report
or transcript as evidence). Of these, aside from Rule 43, see infra text accompanying note 563, the most troublesome on its face is Rule 44. The Advisory Committee
added the latter at the urging of Dean Wigmore. See Wigmore, A Critique of the
Federal Court Rules Draft-Three Larger Aspects of the Work Which Require
Further Consideration,22 A.B.A. J. 811, 813 (1936); Preliminary Draft, supra note
520, at 93; April 1937 Report, supra note 547, at 113; letter from Edgar B. Tolman
to Charles E. Clark (January 23, 1936), supra note 551. Again, however, it took
comfort in the fact that Wigmore's proposals could be seen as "consolidating and
simplifying the federal statutes on proof of official records and filling some of the
gaps in this field." PreliminaryDraft, supra note 520, at 93; see also Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 561, at 38 (Rule 44).
56a Rule 43(a) provided:
(a) Fom Am A-nssmmrnr. In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall
be taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by these rules.
All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the statutes
of the United States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied in the courts of the United States on the hearing of suits in
equity, or under the rules of evidence applied in the courts of general
jurisdiction of the state in which the United States Court is held. In
any case, the statute or rule which favors the reception of the evidence
governs and the evidence shall be presented according to the most
convenient method prescribed in any of the statutes or rules to which
reference is herein made. The competency of a witness to testify
shall be determined in like manner.
308 U.S. at 718.
564
See supra text accompanying notes 516-18. Such a view of the Rule as
proposed in the Final Report was taken in Callahan & Ferguson, Evidence and the
New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:2, 47 YAri L.J. 194, 198 (1937), where the
authors argued that the reference to evidence in equity "does give the courts a free
hand in applying reforms to individual rules, thus keeping them abreast of the times."
See id. 197; see also letter from Charles E. Clark to the Hon. Robert McWilliams
(June 25, 1938) (Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 112, Folder 62). For the
probable origins of the Callahan and Ferguson article, see supra note 552.
565 See, e.g., 1 J. WiGMoE, EvmEcCE § 6c, at 201-02 (3d ed. 1940). For
subsequent commentary on Rule 43 in operation, see, e.g., Green, The Admissibility
of Evidence Under the Federal Rules, 55 HAsiv. L. Rev. 197 (1941); Thompson,
Federal Rule 43(A)-A Decadent Decade, 34 Com.RLL L.Q. 238 (1948); Clark,
mN Y EvmmIcE
Foreword, 10 RwraEns L. REv. 479, 482 (1956); see also Pi
RePORT, supra note 553, at 19-26.
56
6 Under this narrower interpretation, the reference in Rule 43 to evidence in

equity had "little prospect of service," 1 J. WicioRE, supra note 565, at 201, and
the scope for the choice in favor of admissibility was markedly reduced. See Wellborn, supra note 82, at 407 (who also points out that the Rule was not narrowly
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2. Registration of Judgments
In addition to indicating doubt about the Court's power to
promulgate Federal Rules relating to evidence in the Foreword
to the Preliminary Draft, the Advisory Committee pointed out
that its proposed Rule respecting the registration of federal judgments raised a question of power. 567 The same question was noted
in the April 1937 Report, 5 s and in its Final Report, the Committee stated that a memorandum on the subject was "available
for the use of the Court." 569 Notwithstanding a last minute atconstrued by many federal courts). Moreover, it should be recalled that the exclusion from the rulemaking power of all Federal Rules governing the admissibility
of evidence is difficult to justify according to the standards reflected in the 1926
Senate Report. See supra text accompanying note 518.
During the discussion of evidence at the February 1936 meeting of the Advisory Committee, the following exchange occurred:
The Chairman. . . . When you come to enlarge the rules of evidence
in law cases beyond that established by existing law, then you are getting
into changing the rules of evidence, and I am still in doubt whether we
have the power.
Mr. Morgan. I think, if you put that up to the Court, they would say,
as the servant girl said, "It is such a little baby." (Laughter).
4 February 1936 Transcript, supra note 529, at 974.
567 See Foreword to Preliminary Draft, supra note 520, at xvii-xviii.
568See April 1937 Report, supra note 547, at 199 (Draft Rule 77).
5 69
Final Report, supra note 548, at 49. As finally recommended by the Advisory Committee, Draft Rule 77 provided, in pertinent part:
A judgment entered in any district court and which has become final
through expiration of the time for appeal or by mandate on appeal may be
registered in any other district court by filing therein an authenticated copy
of the judgment. When so registered the judgment has the same effect
and like proceedings for its enforcement may be taken thereon in the court
in which it is registered as if the judgment had been originally entered by
that court. If in the court in which the judgment was originally entered
the judgment has been satisfied in whole or in part or an order has been
made modifying or vacating it or affecting or suspending its operation, the
party procuring the registration shall and any other party may file authenticated copies of the satisfaction or order with the court in which the judgment is registered.
Id. 49; April 1937 Report, supra note 547, at 197-98. The memorandum referred
to in the Final Report had been prepared by Joseph Friedman, who was then at
Yale, and was sent to Tolman by Dean Clark for distribution to the Advisory Committee, in January 1937. Letter from Charles E. Clark to Edgar B. Tolman (January
14, 1937) (Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 106, Folder 38 & Box 110, Folder 53).
Such a memorandum had been requested by Mr. Mitchell, who observed: "We all
agree the system provided for in Rule 85 is good and ought to be adopted. The
question is whether the Court can establish that system as a mere matter of practice
and procedure or whether it goes into the field of substantive rights and requires
legislation." Letter from William D. Mitchell to Charles E. Clark (November 5,
1936) (Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 110, Folder 51) (emphasis added).
Friedman's memorandum concluded, among other things, that the Rule (Rule 85 in
the Preliminary Draft) would change subject-matter jurisdiction and venue requirements and would deprive a judgment-debtor of certain defenses. See Friedman,
Effect of Rule 85 (Registration of Judgments) Upon the Rights of a JudgmentDebtor Under Present Federal Practice (6 Communications of the Advisory Committee, supra note 529; Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 106, Folder 38).
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tempt by members of the Advisory Committee to preserve the
°
proposed Rule, the Court deleted it.57
3. Provisional and Final Remedies
Throughout the rulemaking process, as reflected in the published drafts, the Advisory Committee adopted a cautious approach to provisional and final remedies. The basic Federal Rules
as to both required dynamic conformity to state law except where
a federal statute otherwise provided.57 ' Although published comments and questions by individuals on the Committee suggest unAt the February 1937 meeting of the Advisory Committee, Chairman Mitchell
suggested that the Committee indicate to the Court its feeling that Rule 85 was
"beyond the scope of the power of this Committee under the statute." Another
member recommended retaining the proposed Rule but indicating doubt as to power.
Eight members voted that Rule 85 was within the Act's grant of authority; two were
contrary-minded, and one was doubtful. Proceedings of Meeting of Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure of the Supreme Court of the United States
(February 1-4, 1937) (Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 104, Folder 35) [hereinafter cited as February 1937 Transcript]. Nonetheless, when the proposed Rule was
before the Court, Professor Sunderland, who had drafted it, prepared a memorandum
supporting its validity. Sunderland, Memorandum in Support of Rule 77-E.R.S.
(9 Communications of the Advisory Committee, supra note 529; Clark Papers, supra
note 529, Box 107, Folder 39). Both the Friedman and the Sunderland memoranda
were transmitted to the Court. Memorandum to the Advisory Committee from
Edgar B. Tolman (December 8, 1937) (9 Communications of the Advisory Committee, supra note 529; Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 107, Folder 39).
During the period of congressional consideration of the Rules, and after hearing
opposition to Rule 4(f), Chairman Mitchell wrote to the Advisory Committee that
Rule 77 on registration of judgments would have aroused opposition in Congress
and that he was grateful the Court had deleted it. Mitchell, Memorandum to the
Members of the Advisory Committee (April 21, 1938) (Clark Papers, supra note
529, Box 112, Folder 61); see also letter from William D. Mitchell to the Hon.
Warren Olney, Jr. (January 15, 1938), supra note 530.
57 0

See supra note 569; CL vELN INsrr=, supra note 433, app. HI, at 429;
see also id. 180 (statement of W.D. Mitchell); 1938 Senate Hearings, supra note
435, at 20 (statement of E.B. Tolman); 1 MooRE & FnRu=NL&, supra note 526, at
44-48; Clark, supra note 252, at 251-52. The matter has since been dealt with in
a federal statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976).
571

See FED. R. Cry. P. 64, 69. Similar subdivisions in the Preliminary Draft
specifying the persons to issue and serve the process for such remedies were deleted.
Compare PreliminaryDraft, supra note 520, at 141 (Draft Rule 78), 148-49 (Draft
Rule 83) with April 1937 Report, supra note 547, at 176 (Draft Rule 69), 192-93
(Draft Rule 75). Apparently, this was done because the matters were thought to
be already covered in the Rules and also in order to shorten them. See letter from
Charles E. Clark to Edward J. Lonergan (October 17, 1938) (Clark Papers, supra
note 529, Box 112, Folder 63).
In the Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 561, at 60, the Committee observed: "No rule concerning lis pendens is stated, for this would appear to be a
matter of substantive law affecting state laws of property .... ." A memorandum
prepared by Joseph Friedman had reached that conclusion. See Friedman, The
Status of the Federal Lis Pendens (August 20, 1936) (4 Communications of the
Advisory Committee, supra note 529; Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 106, Folder
38).
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happiness with this approach and freedom to take some other, 572
there is also evidence in the published sources that the Committee
perceived questions of power.5 73 Unpublished sources confirm
both the unhappiness and the concern about power under the
Act. Read together, the published and unpublished sources evince
no shared conception of the Act's limitations with which to address
that concern. 57 4
In 1938 Chairman Mitchell observed:
I have only one regret about the work of the Advisory Committee. The
new federal system contains no rules prescribing the practice in seeking
such provisional remedies as attachment, garnishment, proceedings supplementary to execution, and so forth. The federal rules leave this practice
to be regulated by existing federal statutes, and where there are none, to
local state practice. The Advisory Committee could not cover that field
without considerable further delay in promulgating the new system. If the
Supreme Court appoints a standing advisory committee, I hope that one of
its first tasks will be to draft a simple and flexible set of rules in that field
which will thus complete the last step towards uniformity in the federal
courts and at the same time supply the states with a model system to which
they may conform.
Mitchell, Uniform State and Federal Practice: A New Demand For More Eflicient
judicial Procedure, 24 A.B.A. J. 981, 982 (1938); see also CvELarism INsTrruTr,
supra note 433, at 185 (statement of W.D. Mitchell). Note, however, that Mitchell
may well have been referring to aspects of provisional and final remedies that do
not raise problems of power under the Act interpreted in light of the pre-1934
history.
573
n 1935 Professor Sunderland had suggested that the Act might confer very
broad authority, including with respect to "mesne and final process and every type
of auxiliary remedy." Sunderland, supra note 166, at 406. He went on to observe,
however:
A question might perhaps be raised whether the right to arrest the person
or seize property on original process, or the right to employ attachment,
garnishment, execution or other similar remedies, all of which constitute
direct interference with personal liberty or control over property, ought,
on grounds of public policy, to be deemed procedural rather than substantive.
Id. Sunderland suggested that conformity to state law would avoid the problem.
See id.
In 1936, the Reporter solicited the help and advice of the bar on two questions
raised by the Preliminary Draft:
Thus, in the matter of provisional remedies, such as attachment and
garnishment, we have retained conformity to state procedure. Would the
bar prefer some attempt at substituting uniformity here? The rules of
evidence, while made more liberal by this draft, are stated only in broad
general terms. Would the bar prefer further regulation and specification
of detail in the field of evidence?
Clark, supra note 256, at 451 (footnotes omitted). The joinder of these questions
does not appear to have been fortuitous.
574 At its first meeting, the Advisory Committee tentatively determined to leave
"the subjects of attachments and garnishments of property and arrest of persons in
civil cases . . . untouched by the new rules, allowing them to be dealt with under
the present system, which in most districts follow the local state law." Summary
of Proceedings, supra note 530. Tolman objected, but yielded, to the proposal that
provisional remedies follow state law. Suggestions of Mr. Tolman re Rules T.D. I
(February 14, 1936) (2 Communications of the Advisory Committee, supra note
529; Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 105, Folder 37). Dean Clark was sympa572
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In one respect the rulemakers might be said to have exceeded
their power in the Rules regulating provisional and final remedies.
Under the scheme of allocation emerging from the pre-1934 history, the categorical choice between federal -and state law was, in
theory at least, as much for Congress as would have been the formulation of discrete Federal Rules regulating the seizure of person
or property. 575 At its first meeting, however, the Advisory Committee had determined that the Act permitted Federal Rules
providing that state practice be followed.5 7 In addition, the Advisory Committee seems to have taken the view that Federal Rules
were permissible, even if substantive under the Act, so long as
they perpetuated existing federal law.
4. The Incorporation Principle
It can be inferred from the published sources that the Advisory Committee passed questions of power under the Act when
proposed Federal Rules incorporated existing provisions of federal
law. In one sense that conclusion is misleading. For the incorporation principle remained essentially inarticulate until the very
end of the Committee's work, coming to the fore in the defense
of proposed Federal Rules challenged before Congress. 577 With
thetic but agreed that any attempt to deal comprehensively with the subject should
be postponed because of difficulties of preparation and questions of state policy.
Suggestions and Agenda-Tentative Draft II, supra note 551.
575 See supra text accompanying note 507.
576 Summary of Proceedings, supra note 530. In light of the interstitial nature
of federal law, it is unlikely that there could be serious objection to a Federal Rule
requiring conformity to state law. Moreover, the Advisory Committee at that time
evidently thought the same result might obtain in the absence of any Federal Rule.
See id. Only later would an attempt be made to fill in the gaps by local court rules
or federal common law. See FED. R. Civ. P. 83; Flanders, supra note 515, at 23335; infra note 763 and accompanying text.
577
See infra note 584. At the 1938 Senate Hearings, Mr. Mitchell was asked
by Senator Austin whether proposed Rule 64 did not supersede statutory provisions,
derived from the Conformity Act, regarding attachments. He replied: "I do not
think so. I do not think it had any such purpose. I think the practice in the Federal courts today in the matter of seizures of property by attachment, and so on,
conforms to the state practice, and that rule simply says that shall be continued."
1938 Senate Hearings, supra note 435, at 8. For other proposed Rules which were
explained to Congress inthese terms, see, e.g., 1938 House Hearings, supra note 435,
at 14 (Rule 17(b)), 21 (Rule 17(b)), 115 (Rule 25); cf. id.115 (Rule 23(b)).
In describing the Committee's approach generally, Mr. Mitchell stated: "What I
meant to say when I said the law had not been changed, is that when we came to a
point involving a certain public policy which we knew Congress and the country
are vitally interested in, we took the utmost pains not to make a rule that would
supersede or change the existing practice." Id. 25. In responding to the question
whether he did not think the matter of substantive rights was for Congress rather
than the Supreme Court, Dean Clark stated: "Yes I do, and if we had changed
them I would agree with you, but I do not follow why you think it is a change,
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the changes in thinking about the appropriate scope of federal
common law wrought by Erie, the incorporation of federal decisional law in Federal Rules has proved troublesome. Even the
incorporation of federal statutory law has posed problems. The
original Advisory Committee can perhaps be excused for not anticipating these difficulties. In light of them, however, if the Act
is to be interpreted with reference to the pre-1934 history, courts
considering challenges to existing Federal Rules must be alert to
the operation of the incorporation principle. Moreover, even
under the current interpretation of the Act, as set forth in Hanna,
awareness of the principle is important to the extent that it contradicts assumptions on which the Court has constructed a presumption of validity.
Reference to the incorporation principle may explain the
Advisory Committee's emphasis that its proposed Rule on the use
of depositions at trial substantially reflected the law as prescribed
in existing federal statutes. 578 Similarly, in connection with the
proposed Rule on provisional and final remedies, there were federal statutory provisions, the codified successors of the pertinent
sections of the Conformity Act, that required conformity to
state law.5 79

This principle does not find much support in the

Act or its legislative history, but simple convenience and a Supreme
Court opinion were in its favor. 8 0
when we make the rule depend on a substantive right developed from somewhere
outside of these rules themselves." Id. 14.
What is called here "the incorporation principle" should be distinguished from,
for example, the incorporation of state law in a federal common law rule. See
infra text accompanying notes 633-36.
G78 See supra text accompanying note 561.
79
5 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 726-27, 729 (1926); supra note 100. The Advisory Committee did alter these statutory arrangements by requiring dynamic conformity
rather than static conformity with discretion in the district courts to adopt subsequent changes in state law by court rule. See Advisory Commitee Notes, supra
note 561, at 60 (Rule 64), 63 (Rule 69).
580 The function of rules is to regulate the practice of the court and to
facilitate the transaction of its business. This function embraces, among
other things, the regulation of the forms, operation and effect of process;
and the prescribing of forms, modes and times for proceedings. Most
rules are merely a formulation of the previous practice of the courts. Occasionally, a rule is employed to express, in convenient form, as applicable
to certain classes of cases, a principle of substantive law which has been
established by statute or decisions. But no rule of court can enlarge or
-restrict jurisdiction. Nor can a rule abrogate or modify the substantive
law. This is true, whether the court to which the rules apply be one of
law, of equity or of admiralty. It is true of rules of practice prescribed
by this Court for inferior tribunals, as it is of those rules which lower
courts make for their own guidance under authority conferred.
Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co.,
263 U.S. 629, 635-36 (1924) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). This passage
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a. The IncorporationPrinciple and Derivative Suits: Cohen
Unfortunately, a technique that may have been convenient in
1935 has been the source of difficulties since. For example, the
Advisory Committee and the Court included in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b) special requirements with respect to complaints in shareholder derivative actions 581 borrowed from the
Equity Rules, 582 which in turn had been borrowed from a decision
of the Supreme Court.583 After the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had been promulgated and shortly after the Erie decision,
the Chairman and the Reporter of the Advisory Committee and
Professor Moore suggested that, because notions of what substantive law should govern in actions in federal court had changed,
one or more of the provisions in Rule 23 (b) might be required to
yield to contrary provisions in state law.5 4 When the issue came
was quoted by the minority in the 1928 SmEATE REPORT, supra note 340, pt. 2, at
16-17.
581 Rule 23(b) provided:
(b) SECONDARY ACTIONS By SsRmOLDERs. In an action brought to enforce a secondary right on the part of one or more shareholders in an
association, incorporated or unincorporated, because the association
refuses to enforce rights which may properly be asserted by it, the
complaint shall be verified by oath and shall aver (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his share thereafter devolved on him by operation of
law and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer on a
court of the United States jurisdiction of any action of which it would
not otherwise have jurisdiction. The complaint shall also set forth
with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff to secure from the managing directors or trustees and, if necessary, from the shareholders
such action as he desires, and the reasons for his failure to obtain
such action or the reasons for not making such effort.
308 U.S. at 690.
582 Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 561, at 24: "This is Equity Rule 27
(Stockholder's Bill) with verbal changes. See also Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450
(1882) and former Equity Rule 94, promulgated January 23, 1882, 104 U.S.
IX." See also 1938 House Hearings, supra note 435, at 115 (statement of E.B.
Tolman). The "verbal changes" included the extension of the action to shareholders in unincorporated associations. See infra note 596.
583 See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882).
Equity Rule 27 (following
Equity Rule 94) incorporated the requirements enunciated in that case. Ross v.
Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 n.4 (1970); Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor
& A.R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 703, 708 n.4 (1974).
584 See CLEvELANo INsrrnr,
supra note 433, at 184 (statement of W.D.
Mitchell); id. 265 (statement of C.E. Clark):
Subdivision (b) Mr. Mitchell spoke about yesterday. That is the old
Equity Rules, almost verbatim, coming from the Equity Rules of 1912, and
going back to the earlier equity rules in the case of Hawes v. Oakland....
As he suggested, there might be possibly a little question had that rule
been something newly adopted, whether it was not at least on the verge
of being a rule of substantive law, but since it is an ancient ruling of the
court's own, it seemed to us that clearly it should be included here as it
has been in the equity procedure for so many years.
See also 2 MoonE & FaDmAN, supra note 526, § 23.05, at 2252-53.
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before the Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Industrial
Corp.,5s5 it read the federal requirements as supplementary tothat is, neither displacing nor displaced by-requirements imposed
by the state law in that case.58 6
It is difficult to classify the matters treated by original Rule
23(b) under the Act, as interpreted in light of the pre-1934 history.
Mitchell's and Clark's public comments reflected a failure to distinguish between matters that are substantive for purposes of the
Act and matters that are substantive for Erie purposes. 58 7 Professor Moore shared this misconception,""" which was subsequently
blessed by Sibbach.5 89
Typically, Dean Clark's comments tended to depreciate the problem. In fact,
the question of the validity of the contemporaneous ownership requirement had been
raised by a number of correspondents late in 1937, before the Erie decision was
rendered. Chairman Mitchell, in particular, was troubled, taking solace at first in
the notion that, if the Advisory Committee had erred, it had merely followed the
example of the Court itself in Equity Rules 94 and 27. See letter from William D.
Mitchell to Arthur Berenson (December 9, 1937) (copy on file with the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review); letter from William D. Mitchell to Edgar B. Tolman
(December 8, 1937) (Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 111, Folder 59). Senator
Pepper pointed out to Mitchell that the requirement derived from Hawes v. Oakland,
104 U.S. 450 (1882). See letter from the Hon. George W. Pepper to William D.
Mitchell (December 9, 1937) (Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 111, Folder 59),
which prompted Mitchell to conclude that, even if the Court had exceeded its authority in promulgating Equity Rule 94, "no harm was done because the substantive
rule as stated was a mere reiteration of a substantive rule of law definitely established." Letter from William D. Mitchell to the Hon. George W. Pepper, supra
note 530. See also letter from Edgar B. Tolman to William D. Mitchell (December
10, 1937) (Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 111, Folder 59). The next day Tolman again wrote Mitchell, noting that Edward Hammond had brought to his attention the Court's decision in Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. Baltimore &
Florida Steamboat Co., 263 U.S. 629 (1924), discussed supra note 580, and suggesting that the author of that opinion, Mr. Justice Brandeis, might have bad Equity
Rule 27 in mind. Tolman also observed that he had passed other provisions in the
Rules raising questions of power so long as they did not change the substantive law.
See letter from Edgar B. Tolman to William D. Mitchell (December 11, 1937)
(copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
In 1946 the Advisory Committee considered the validity of the contemporaneous
ownership requirement in Rule 23(b)(1) after Erie, and although elaborately marshalling authorities, concluded that "the question is one which should not be decided
by the Supreme Court ex parte, but left to await a judicial decision in a litigated
case." 3B MoORE, supra note 41, at 23.1.01[4]. Rule 23 was amended in 1966.
The matters formerly treated in Rule 23(b) are now treated in FFD. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
See also id. 23.2.

ir

585 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
586 Id. 556 (dictum); see, e.g., Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116
U. PA. L. REv. 74, 93 (1967). But see infra text accompanying note 598.
587 See, e.g., CLvErAAm INsn'Trr,
supra note 433, at 184, 265. Mitchell had
recognized serious questions of validity even before Erie was decided. See supra
note 582. But even then he was not immune to taking a monolithic view of "procedure" and "substance." See supra note 541.
58
8 See 2 MooRE & FitmDMxAN, supra note 526, § 23.05, at 2252-53; see also
3B MooRE, supra note 41, at 1f23.1.1512].
589 See 312 U.S. at 9-10; supra text accompanying notes 57-66.
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At the outset, it is not apparent how the Rule can be .said
to have a predictable and identifiable effect on the substantive
59 0 Equating a shareholder with his corporation
rights of a litigant.
-refusing to distinguish the rights of the one from those of the
other-seems appropriate to the extent that some of the Rule's
requirements were responsive to perceived collusion in order to
secure the benefits of federal diversity jurisdiction.591 But those
requirements do not appear vulnerable to attack under the Act,
because it is unlikely that Congress intended to foreclose reasonable Federal Rules designed to protect jurisdiction.59 2 Equating
shareholder and corporate rights flies in the face of assumptions
that may have animated another requirement in the Rule, namely
that which requires the plaintiff to aver in his complaint that
he was a shareholder at the time of the transaction in question
3
or thereafter received his share by operation of law. 59
The problem with this analysis, as with an analysis that focuses
on policy choices already made under state (or federal) law, is
that such choices are, for the purposes of' the Act, seemingly irrelevant. 94 It should make no difference whether the rights asserted in a derivative action are thought to belong exclusively to
the corporation. 595 As an original proposition, the Act, interpreted in the light of the pre-1934 history, would require that,
as between the Supreme Court exercising rulemaking power and
Congress, a decision to authorize (or not authorize) derivative
59

o See supra text accompanying note 375.

In the 1948 revision, the second

sentence was changed to read: "Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge- or modify any
substantive rights."

See supra text accompanying note 400.

591 See 2 MooRE & FDw_mAN, supra note 526, at § 23.05; 7A Warcur

&

Mn.uiY,

supra note 41, at § 1821.
592
See 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1976).

593
Although the contemporaneous ownership requirement is at times rationalized as supplementary to the anti-collusion requirement it has also been thought to
serve oilier purposes, such as preventing "the speculation by shareholders in corporate causes of action." 2 MooRE & F=rmn"r r, supra note 526, at § 23.05; see
Harbecht, supra note 82, at 1041-42; Rowe, supra note 411, at 853-54. Indeed, in

considering the validity of the contemporaneous ownership requirement in late 1937,

Mitchell seemed to find persuasive the argument that it was valid in diversity cases,
where collusion is of concern, but not in federal question cases, where it is not.
See, e.g., letter from William D. Mitchell to Edgar B. Tolman (December 8, 1937),

supra note 582.
594

See supra text accompanying notes 494-506.
595 In fact, there was uncertainty about the nature of the rights asserted in derivative actions. Compare 2 MooaE & FknumiAN, supra note 526, § 23.05, at 225363 (drawing a bright line) with H. BAANrn-m & N. LATTI,
CASEs AN MATEnIAIs ON Tm LAw OF ConpoAAToNs 832-33 (1939) (arguing for a "double aspect")
[hereinafter cited as BALLANIruu & LATrnm].
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actions be made by the latter. 2 6 Similar reasoning leads to the
conclusion that choices with respect to regulations having a predictable and identifiable effect on such a derivative claim are for
Congress. The contemporaneous ownership requirement in Rule
5 7
23 (b) appears to be of that type.
In this light, the dictum in Cohen, suggesting the applicability and validity of the contemporaneous ownership requirement in
Rule 23(b), can be supported only on the ground that the requirement was not only not inconsistent with, but also not additional
to, the requirements of the relevant state law. 598 For whatever
59 Taking account of "more practical considerations" as recommended by
BALr..Arr

& LATjNJ, supra note 595, at 833, it is apparent that, even viewed from

the perspective of the corporation's rights under the substantive law, the derivative
action is responsive to a perception that in some circumstances those rights will not
be enforced by the officers and directors for reasons that have nothing to do with
sound management policy. See Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U.S. 161, 167 (1946). In
part, then, the remedy is calculated to, and will predictably, have an identifiable
effect on those rights. Moreover, to the extent a derivative action does have a
"double aspect," so that the shareholder can be seen as bringing "an action for
specific enforcement of the obligation owed by the corporation to the shareholder to
assert its rights of action," BA.Lr.Amnq & LATwI, supra note 595, at 833, its
creation and definition are indistinguishable from the creation and definition of rules
of substantive law. Finally, it should be noted that Rule 23(b) was not entirely
incorporative, since it broadened the action to include shareholders in unincorporated associations. See 2 MooRE & Fnm A, supra note 526, § 23.05, at 2247;
7A WmuHr & Mr.Lmi, supra note 41, § 1821.
697 See supra note 596. Viewed from the perspective of the corporation, a
choice with respect to such a requirement affects the likelihood that its rights will
be enforced by defining the universe of those who are permitted to assert them.
That this is not a fanciful problem is suggested by the laws of those states which
permit a court, in its discretion, to waive the contemporaneous ownership requirement. See Harbrecht, supra note 82, at 1043 n.10; see also id. 1063; 3B MooRE,
supra note 41, It 23.1.15[2], at 23.1-23. Viewed from the perspective of the shareholder, the choice defines his or her rights. Cf. Harbrecht, supra note 82, at 104950. Professor Harbrecht's analysis is, however, based on the interpretation of the
Act advanced by Professor Ely. See Ely, supra note 3, at 718-40; see also McCoid,
Hanna v. Plumer, The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA. L. BEv. 884, 908 n.114
(1965). Under either interpretation, it may be thought to make a difference whether
dismissal for failure to comply with the Federal Rule leaves the plaintiff free to sue
in state court, a matter as to which there is considerable doubt. See Harbrecht,
supra note 82, at 1049-50; 7A WmGHr & MuiER, supra note 41, § 1829, at 360-63.
598 The New Jersey statute imposed substantially the same requirement as to
contemporaneous ownership. 337 U.S. at 544-45 n.1. That, however, does not
preclude differences in interpretation. See Harbrecht, supra note 82, at 1046,
1050-51. The decision might also be supported if the fact that a matter was
treated in an Equity Rule were considered dispositive of validity under the Act.
See infra text accompanying notes 641-59. Note, however, that in this case, the
Equity Rule may have been adopted on the incorporation principle. See supra
notes 582 & 584.
Since Cohen, the Court has indicated that it "has never resolved the issue"
whether the contemporaneous ownership requirement in Rule 23(b), now FE.
R. Crv. P. 23.1, could "be validly applied in federal diversity cases where state
law permitted a noncontemporaneous shareholder to maintain a derivative action."
Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & A.R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 703, 708 n.4
(1974). As in Cohen, and notwithstanding Hanna, it seems not to have occurred
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scope may be given to the incorporation principle when a Federal
Rule incorporates preexisting federal law from an Act of Congress,5 99 the relevant considerations are quite different when the
law that is incorporated is found in a federal court decision. Or
at least they are when state law furnishes the rule of decision.
b. The IncorporationPrinciple in Federal Question Cases
When federal law furnishes the rule of decision, it may not
seem sensible to insist on a mixed regime of Federal Rules and
federal common law for the conduct of litigation or, viewed from
another perspective, there may be little harm in permitting incorporation in Federal Rules of preexisting rules of federal common law that, if initially proposed as Federal Rules, would have
been regarded as substantive within the meaning of the Act. 600
Since, by hypothesis, the Court already has had the benefit of
adjudicative lawmaking at least once, unless there is a substantially
greater likelihood that continuation in that mode would bring to
the Court's attention the need to change the governing legal
standard or would expedite that process, the costs of a dual system
of procedural regulation-some provisions in Federal Rules, others
in federal decisions-might not justify the distinction. 60 ' The
to the Court that a provision of the Rule should stand or fall no matter what the

ground of federal jurisdiction.

Compare

7A WIGrrr

&

MMLER,

supra note 41,

§ 1829. Ironically, if one accepts incorporation (but insists on analysis of the incorporated federal common law rule), in this case the argument for validity in
diversity cases may be stronger than it is in federal question cases. See supra note
593. But see infra text accompanying notes 602-05.
599 See infra text accompanying notes 606-10.
00
o The discussion assumes that there is constitutional power and authority to
fashion federal common law. In addition, the assumption is that the common law
rule incorporated in a Federal Rule has been announced by the Supreme Court.
Incorporation of rules emerging from the decisions of lower federal courts would
pose considerably greater difficulty. It is also assumed that, in fashioning federal
common law, the Court has given due attention to the possibility of using state
law as the federal rule. See Mishkin, supra note 507; see also Burks v. Lasker,
441 U.S. 471 (1979). Finally, when used in this discussion, "federal common
law" includes rules announced by federal courts sitting in equity, that is, prior to
1938.
601 Prior to the Cummins bill, which added the requirement in § 2 that proposed court rules for a unified system be reported to Congress, and the decision
that amendments to Federal Rules were subject to the same requirement, it could.
reasonably have been hoped that a Federal Rule found to be defective would be
changed more quickly than federal common law announced by the Supreme Court.
See supra notes 268 & 277. Notwithstanding contrary representations made to
Congress on the question of amendments, see, e.g., 1938 House Hearings, supra
note 435, at 67-68, and specific attention to it in the 1938 House Report, see H.R.
REP. No. 2743, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 3-4 (1938) [hereinafter cited as 1938 HousE
REPoRT], Dean Clark pressed his view that submission was not necessary (although
it might be made as a matter of courtesy). See, e.g., letter from Charles E. Clarlk
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question remains, however, whether multiple sources of procedural
law can be avoided in the federal courts.
c. The Incorporation Principle in Diversity Cases: Cohen Revisited
Where state law furnishes the rule of decision, a federal common law rule which as a Federal Rule would be substantive under
the Act might also be invalid under Erie and its progeny. 0 2 To
permit the incorporation principle to operate here diminishes the
Act's potential to safeguard federalism values in general. In addition, under current interpretations of the Act, it clothes invalid
exercises of federal power with a presumption of validity to which,
to Monte M. Lemann, supra note 571. Clark argued that, if deemed to be required
in all cases, submission would adversely affect federal procedure by retarding
needed amendments and inviting congressional supervision and tinkering. In December 1939, Chairman Mitchell submitted a report to the Court noting that the
Advisory Committee was of the view that amendments should be submitted to
Congress, Dean Clark alone dissenting, and enclosing memoranda in support of
both positions. See letter from William D. Mitchell to the Hon. Charles E. Hughes
(December 21, 1939) (Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 113, Folder 69). Thereafter, the Court transmitted an amendment to the Attorney General for reporting
to Congress. See 308 U.S. 642-43 (1939).
In light of the 1950 amendments to the Rules Enabling Act, see supra note
268, and given the nature of the Court's docket, change may still come more
quickly to a Federal Rule than to federal common law, at least in cases where
Congress does not intervene. That seems particularly likely to be true in areas that
have constitutional overtones. Such areas, however, are among the most questionable for a choice of rulemaking over adjudication. See supra note 515. Indeed,
the propriety of fashioning broad rules affecting constitutional rights even in the
context of adjudication is questionable. See, e.g., People v. Collie, 30 Cal. 3d 43,
634 P.2d 534, 177 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1981); H. FaImEDLY, supra note 38, at 235-84.
For a time chart of recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, see W. BRowN, supra note 14, app.; see also id. 60-63; infra note 632.
It was in part the difficulties caused by diverse sources of law that led to and
sustained the movement for a uniform federal procedure bill. See supra text
accompanying note 110.
002 "Diversity cases" and "cases in which state law furnishes the rule of decision" are used interchangeably, even though they are not congruent.
The impact on rights recognized by the substantive law that is of concern
under the Rules Enabling Act, interpreted in light of the pre-1934 history, would
usually lead to the conclusion that the application of a federal common law rule is
outcome-determinative under the test proposed in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,
466-69 (1965), and applied in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752-53
(1980). Moreover, a federal common law rule creating or defining rights affecting
persons or property in a manner similar to substantive law, which is also of concern under the Act, might not be outcome-determinative, but it might well lead to
forum-shopping and, if the concept has any independent utility, to a perception of
"inequitable administration of the laws." 380 U.S. at 468; 446 U.S. at 753; see
Ely, supra note 3, at 714; infra note 682.
Obviously, this analysis is chiefly directed to the original Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, since we may rely on the Supreme Court faithfully to apply its
decisions elaborating the implications of Erie in the context of federal common law.

THE RULES ENABLING ACT

as a factual matter, they are not entitled. Assume, for instance,
on the facts of Cohen, that New Jersey law had not required
ownership at the time of the transaction in question and that, as
suggested above, 603 the contemporaneous ownership requirement
in Rule 23(b) is substantive within the meaning of the Act. Although finding its original source in a decision of the Supreme
Court, the requirement could not in these circumstances be imposed by federal common law today. 6°" Whatever its other defects, the Court's interpretation of the Act in Hanna v. Plumer
surely must be questioned when we realize that in some cases the
incorporation principle, not a "prima facie judgment" by the Advisory Committee that a Federal Rule was procedural under the
Act, determined the Rule's content. 0 5
d. The IncorporationPrinciple and Federal Statutes
Finally, even where the federal law incorporated in a Federal
Rule is contained in an Act of Congress, the technique can cause
problems under the Act. For if the need arises to change the
See supra text accompanying notes 596-97.
604 The Court has not decided the question. See supra note 598. The conclusion seems inescapable, however, after Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S.
740 (1980). See supra note 602; infra note 682.
605 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471. The Court included itself and Congress in the
list of bodies said to have made such a judgment In light of the Court's past
approval of the incorporation principle, see supra text accompanying note 580, and
doubts about the thoroughness of its review of proposals made by the Advisory
Committee, see W. BROwN, supra note 14, at 71-73, one may question whether,
at least in situations involving this problem, its role provides a basis for the presumption. Even if the Court's reliance on the opportunity for congressional review
is reasonable as a general proposition, but see supra text accompanying notes 395-98,
it is not reasonable with respect to the original Civil Rules. See infra text accompanying notes 699-704.
Of course, it is not clear what sustenance the Court in Hanna derived from this
presumption of validity, and it was more restrained in that regard than the Court
in Sibbach. See supra text accompanying note 66; infra text accompanying notes
696-97. But see J. WENsTmEN, supra note 3, at 98 ("This is hardly the kind of
neutral approach that should be expected of the Supreme Court."). Perhaps
Sibbach will continue to be followed even when it is recognized that the incorporation principle is at work in a Federal Rule. It is also possible, however, that
the Court will be driven either to reexamine Sibbach or, at least, to hold that it
does not furnish a suitable test in the absence of a considered judgment that
federal power should be asserted. Cf. Wright, supra note 20, at 574: "[T]he implication of Hanna is not that the federal rules are valid because wise men made
them, but because wise men thought carefully before making them. Careful thought
to the presuppositions of federalism seems to me now essential in the formulation
of federal rules."
As pointed out supra note 598, a contemporaneous ownership requirement is
easiest to defend in diversity cases. However, it is doubtful that Hanna's dictum,
applied in Walker, permits the consideration of federal interests that would be
necessary to sustain a federal common law rule imposing such a requirement. See,
e.g., Ely, supra note 3, at 707-18; Redish & Phillips, supra note 75, at 367-72.
603
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Rule, there is doubt whether change can be effected by the rulemakers or must be made, if at all, by Congress. When confronted with this problem in connection with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 25, regulating the substitution of parties, the
Advisory Committee and the Court twice resolved the doubt in
favor of power to amend by court rule.06 0

In doing so, they

failed to recognize that rulemaking with respect to abatement of
actions seems to be excluded from the Act's grant of authority by
the pre-1934 history. 07 In addition, the Reporter placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the original provisions in Rule
25 were derived from statutes. 60 Justice Douglas specifically dis606 In 1961, the Court amended Rule 25(d), which deals with substitution of
successor public officers as parties to actions. See 368 U.S. 1009, 1015 (1961).
In 1963, the Court amended Rule 25(a), which deals with substitution of private
parties upon their death. See 374 U.S. 863, 882-83 (1963). The former is discussed in Kaplan, 1961-1963 Amendments (I), supra note 435, at 604-11. The
latter is discussed in Kaplan, 1961-1963 Amendments (II), supra note 435, at 806-11.
See also id. 834-38.
607 See supra text accompanying notes 486-87 & 514-15. The pre-1934 history
more clearly presents a problem for Rule 25(d), which itself determines survival
of the action. See infra note 608. Rule 25(a), on the other hand, looks to federal
or state law on that question, and prescribes time limits for a motion for substitution. It should be noted, however, that both matters were treated as substantive in the 1915 New York Report. See 3 1915 NEw Yom REPORT, supra note 175,
at 19, 479; cf. 1 id. 96 (general court rules as to substitution).
With reference to original Rule 25(a)(1), which required substitution within
two years, it is true in one sense that a Federal Rule with respect to substitution
deals with "an incident of an already existing action." Kaplan, 1961-1963 Amendments (II), supra note 435, at 810. That may not be determinative under the Act,
as the pre-1934 history with respect to provisional and final remedies indicates. See
supra text accompanying notes 487 & 512-13. Moreover, upon the death of a party,
it is admittedly a question of substantive law whether the action continues to
exist. At that moment, from the perspective both of the party to be substituted
and of the party seeking substitution, an inflexible time limit in such a Rule looks,
formally and functionally, like a statute of limitations. Because it was interpreted
as inflexible, see Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482 (1947), and because parties
often lacked the information necessary to protect themselves from its operation,
original Rule 25(a)(1) was not, as Professor Kaplan asserted, "comparable to.
other limitations of time appearing in the rules such as the usual thirty-day provision for giving notice of an appeal." Kaplan, 1961-1963 Amendments (II), supra
note 435, at 810; see 3B MooRE, supra note 41, f 25.06[1]-[2]; see also Clinton,
supra note 13, at 60. But see 70 HaRv. L. RIv. 1471, 1474 (1957). A choice
among time limits of that sort would have a predictable and identifiable effect on
rights recognized by the substantive law; accordingly, under the standards emerging
from the pre-19 34 history, it was a choice for Congress.
The 1963 amendment substantially obviated the problems of inflexibility and
notice. See Kaplan, 1961-1963 Amendments (11), supra note 435, at 810-11; see
also 3B MOORE, supra note 41, gT
25.06121. As an original proposition, the amended
Rule might be valid under the Act. However, the question of the significance to be
attributed to congressional action in the area remains to be explored. See infra
note 608.
608 See Kaplan, 1961-1963 Amendments (I), supra note 435, at 604, 607; Kaplan,
1961-1963 Amendments (II), supra note 435, at 810. Professor Kaplan was the Reporter for the Advisory Committee at the time. See also 3B MooRE, supra note 41,
1125.09[1].
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sented from one of the amendments on the ground that "any
change should be left to Congress." 609 The other has recently
posed a very difficult problem of conflict between federal and
state law.11 0
It is doubtful that Congress's action in repealing the statute upon which original
Rule 25(d) was based should be accorded dispositive significance, at least insofar
as the validity under the Act of departures from the statute in the original Rule or
the amendment of the Rule is concerned. Cf. Case Comment, 105 U. PA. L. BEy.
1098, 1101 (1957) (Rule 25(a)(1)); 3B MooPE, supra note 41, IT25.01[4J (same).
But see Case Comment, supra note 607, at 1473 (same). On the other hand, Congress's action surely must be accorded some significance, see supra note 403 and
accompanying text, and in that regard it seems formalistic to invalidate a Federal
Rule that tracks an Act of Congress in its substantive aspects on the ground that
the statute has been repealed, at least where repeal was itself premised on supersession of the statute by the Federal Rule. Cf. Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41,
46 (2d Cir. 1959) (Rule 25(a)(1)), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 949 (1960). But cf.
Perry v. Allen, 239 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1955) (same).
When, however, a Rule incorporates a substantive congressional policy choice,
the pre-1934 history of the Act suggests that any amendment, including an amendment that as an original proposition would be within the Court's power, should be
made by Congress. Thus, passing the validity of the departures in original Rule
25(d), see 3B MooRE, supra note 41, IT
25.09111, when Congress has imposed a
limitations period on revivor, it is not for the Court to eliminate it. But that may
not be a just ground for criticism of amended Rule 25(d), because dismissal under
the original Rule for. failure to comply with the six-months provision was without
prejudice to the commencement of a new action. See Snyder v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15
(1950); 3B MoonE, supra note 41, f 25.09[1]. On the other hand, the original
Rule, tracking the statute, required the party seeking substitution to make a satisfactory showing "to the court that there is a substantial need for so continuing and
maintaining [the action]." Id. It 25.01[7]. The 1961 amendment eliminated this
requirement. Id. IT25.09[1]. Justice Douglas dissented from the amendment, focusing-with good reason, it would appear-on this aspect. See 368 U.S. 1009, 101214 (1961) (dissenting statement of Douglas, J.). It is not apparent why the fact
that Congress acted in 1898 and 1922 on the Court's recommendations is relevant.
But see Kaplan, 1961-1963 Amendments (I), supra note 435, at 607; 3B MoonE,
supra note 41, IT25.09[3], at 25-105. And reliance on the fact that "the matter
had already been dealt with by a rule superseding a statute," Kaplan, 19611963 Amendments (I), supra note 435, at 607, is a bootstrap operation. Congressional interest in substitution may not be "intense," id., but where Congress has
spoken on a matter that is substantive under the Act, it hardly suffices to note that
"[t]o improve the rule by amending it in the usual way rather than by seeking direct
legislation does not seem an extravagant use of rulemaking power." Id.'(footnote
omitted). Many choices that will have a predictable and identifiable effect on rights
recognized by the substantive law (e.g., limitation periods) are essentially arbitrary.
A Federal Rule that eschews such choices in a legislative vacuum will be valid.
But original Rule 25(d) was not, and could not have been, promulgated in a legislative vacuum.
On this analysis, the 1963 amendment to Rule 25(a) (1) also seems of doubtful
validity if the Act is reinterpreted in light of the pre-1934 history. The two-year
provision in the original Rule tracked a statute. Equity Rule 45, which was also
cited by the Advisory Committee, contained no time limit. 3B MoorE, supra note
41, IT25.01[41. Since such a limitations period appears to be substantive under the
Act, the Court should have no greater power to vary it than it would to prescribe it
in the first place. The incorporation principle may be convenient, but it is not, and
was never intended to be, a license.
1009 368 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1961) (dissenting statement of Douglas, J.) (Rule
25(d));
see supra note 608.
010
See Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 497 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. Ky. 1980)

(Rule 25(a)).
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5. Tolling Statutes of Limitations and the
Problem of Reverse Incorporation "
Somewhat similar questions are raised in connection with
another problem of power that was identified by the Advisory
Committee in the drafting process-the use of Rule 3 to toll federal or state statutes of limitations. The Court has considered
this problem in the context of state statutes applicable in diversity
actions where, when the Act is reinterpreted in light of the pre1934 history, its proper solution is clear. It has yet to resolve the
problem where federal law furnishes the rule of decision, a context in which it is more challenging, if only because it raises questions that the Court's preoccupation with federalism has obscured.
Having opted, albeit with some reluctance, for a Federal
Rule providing that a "civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court" in the April 1937 Report, 12 the Advisory
Committee mentioned in the Note the question whether compliance with the Rule's terms should be interpreted as tolling the
relevant federal or state statute of limitations. 613 In its Note to
the Rule as promulgated, the Advisory Committee restated the
question and added the observation that the answer might depend
on the power of the Supreme Court "to vary statutes of limitations." 614 It also observed that the provisions of Rule 4(a), requiring the clerk, upon filing of the complaint, to issue and
deliver a summons for service "forthwith," would "reduce the
chances of such a question arising." 615
The Advisory Committee was a poor prophet. The question
it foresaw with respect to state statutes of limitations has twice
been ruled upon by the Supreme Court. In Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co., 61 6 the Court held that filing a complaint in accordance with Rule 3 did not toll the period of a
state statute of limitations requiring service of summons for that
purpose. In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,617 the Court adhered
611 "Reverse incorporation" refers to the use of a Federal Rule in its substantive
aspects as federal common law.
612 April 1937 Report, supra note 547, at 4; see id. 5-6.
613
See id. 4-5. This Note was apparently formulated after the May and August
correspondence discussed infra note 620. See letter from Edgar B. Tolman to
Charles E. Clark (February 8, 1938) (Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 111, Folder
60). As used in this discussion, the word "tolling" refers only to the suspension of a
limitations period in connection with the commencement of litigation.
614 Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 561, at 3-4.
615 Id. 4. Chairman Mitchell suggested the provision. See infra note 633.
616 337 U.S. 530 (1949).

617446 U.S. 740 (1980).
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to that view in the face of argument by the petitioner, some lower
court opinions, and academic commentary to the effect that Ragan
61
had been overruled by Hanna. 8
Hanna's gloss on Ragan, viewing the latter as an interpretation of Rule 3 rather than of Erie and its progeny, is difficult to
support, 619 and the interpretation of Rule 3 in the gloss is not as
persuasive as the reference in Walker to the Advisory Committee's
Note suggestsA 20 In any event, the opinion in Walker was not
61 8 See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, HamNDBoou or mE LAw or FEDERAL COURTS § 59, at
277 (3d ed. 1976).
1019 Compare Ragan, 337 U.S. at 533 with Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470. Such a
comparison makes it difficult to credit the Court's statement that the holding in
Ragan "was not that Erie commanded displacement of a Federal Rule by an inconsistent state rule, but rather that the scope of the Federal Rule was not as broad as
the losing party urged, and therefore, there being no Federal Rule which covered
the point in dispute, Erie commanded the enforcement of state law." Hanna, 380
U.S. at 470; see also J. WENsTmN, supra note 3, at 191 n.363.
620 This Note establishes that the Advisory Committee predicted the problem which arose in Ragan and arises again in the instant case. It does not
indicate, however, that Rule 3 was intended to serve as a tolling provision
for statute of limitation purposes; it only suggests that the Advisory Committee thought the Rule might have that effect.
440 U.S. at 750 n.10.
In fact, it is possible to infer from the published sources that the Advisory
Committee intended Rule 3 to have a tolling effect, if that were within the Court's
power under the Act. See 1938 House Hearings, supra note 435, at 74: "I suppose
that if there is neither a State noi a Federal statute which defines what constitutes
commencement of the action within the meaning of the particular statute of limitations in question, it is pretty clear that this rule governs." (statement of E.B. Tolman). See also Mitchell, supra note 547, at 967. In Mississippi Publishing Corp.
v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946), the Court indicated that the views of
"authorized spokesmen" for the Advisory Committee deserve weight in ascertaining
the meaning of Federal Rules.
The Advisory Committee's papers reveal a vigorous debate between Chairman
Mitchell and Dean Clark on the proper interpretation of Rule 3. Mitchell doubted
that the Act authorized a Rule having the effect of tolling a state or federal statute
of limitations, a matter he believed was to be settled by construction of the statute
involved, and he was concerned that, unless proper warning were given in the Notes,
the bar would be misled. See, e.g., letters from William D. Mitchell to Charles E.
Clark (May 14, 17, 18 & 19, 1937) (Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 111, Folder
57). Clark thought that such a Rule was valid and would control except as against
statutes that had been interpreted to require service of process, and he resisted
Mitchell's suggested Note. See, e.g., letters from Charles E. Clark to William D.
Mitchell (May 17, 18, 18 & 18, 1937) (Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 111,
Folder 57). In August 1937, Tolman sent to the members of the Advisory Committee two memoranda, one prepared by Joseph Friedman and forwarded by Dean
Clark and one by Tolman himself, on Rule 3 and statutes of limitations. Tolman,
Memorandum to the Members of the Advisory Committee (August 12, 1937) (8
Communications of the Advisory Committee, supra note 529; Clark Papers, supra
note 529, Box 107, Folder 39). Both memoranda are noteworthy for the confusion
evinced by their authors about the Act's procedure/substance dichotomy. In his
discussion, for instance, Friedman suggested the relevance not only of prior classifications as between the Rules of Decision Act and the Conformity Act but also of
conflict of laws decisions. See Friedman, Effect of Rule 3 upon Statutes of Limitations (August 12, 1937) (8 Communications of the Advisory Committee, supra
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confined to the conclusions that Rule 3 "does not affect state statutes of limitations" 621 and that state law was applicable under the
modified outcome-determination test of Hanna, invoked because
there was no pertinent Federal Rule.

22

The opinion went on to

elaborate the first of those conclusions with an analysis of the
policies underlying the state statute of limitations.6 23 Such an
analysis is irrelevant under the Act if it is interpreted in light of
the pre-1934 history. That history suggests, at the least, a prohibition against Federal Rules that have an effect on rights recognized
by the substantive law that is predictable and identifiable. 2 4 No
matter what policies animate it, a tolling rule is of that sort, because the choice of the event that will toll the statute necessarily
defines or limits the subsistence of a claim under the substantive
6 25

law.

The more interesting question raised by Ragan and Walker
is whether Rule 3 can be used to toll the applicable limitations
period in cases where federal law furnishes the rule of decision.
The Court so suggested in Ragan.62r The question was noted but
not addressed in Walker.621 The Advisory Committee acknowledged that there might be a problem in some such cases, but the
problem it recognized, potential conflict with a contrary provision
note 529; Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 107, Folder 39). Clark himself relied
on conflicts decisions in arguing to Mitchell that statutes of limitations were procedural, and it was for Mitchell to remind Clark of the lesson taught by the latter's
colleague, Walter Wheeler Cook. See letters from Charles E. Clark to William D.
Mitchell (May 18, 1937), supra; letter from William D. Mitchell to Charles E. Clark
(May 19, 1937), supra; see also Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict
of Laws, 42 YAT-E L.J. 333 (1933).
The debate continued into 1938, and the Note to Rule 3 was a compromise.
See letter from William D. Mitchell to Edgar B. Tolman (February 7, 1938) (Clark
Papers, supra note 529, Box 111, Folder 60); letter from Edgar B. Tolman to
William D. Mitchell (February 8, 1938) (Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 111,
Folder 60); letters from Edgar B. Tolman to Charles E. Clark (February 8 & 10,
1938) (Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 111, Folder 60).
621

622

446 U.S. at 751.
See id. 752-53.

028 See id. 751-52.
Even on its own terms, the Court's analysis seems to have
sown confusion. See Alonzo v. ACF Property Management, Inc., 643 F.2d 578,
580-81 (9th Cir. 1981).
624 See supra text accompanying notes 514-19.
625 It is in that sense, not because of the policies it may be thought to reflect,
that a tolling rule is an "integral" part of a statute of limitations for purposes of
the Act, interpreted in light of the pre-1934 history. Compare the treatment of
integrality in Walker, 446 U.S. at 751-52.
626See 337 U.S. at 533 (footnote omitted), citing and distinguishing Bomar v.
Keyes, 162 F.2d 136, 141 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947), as a case
"to enforce rights under a federal statute."
627 See 446 U.S. at 751 n.1.
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in a federal statute of limitations,628 seems not to be one that is
relevant under the Act. By the terms of the Act a valid Federal
Rule supersedes inconsistent federal statutory provisions. Conversely, a Federal Rule invalid under the Act is not rendered valid
because it tracks existing statutory law, except to the extent the
incorporation principle is given effect. Reading a tolling function
into Rule 3 violates the Act, interpreted in the light of the pre1934 history, no matter what the basis of federal jurisdiction or
what the source of the rule of decision. 629 The only situation in
which that might reasonably be done is where Congress had not
provided a governing rule, and it would involve what might be
called reverse incorporation.
In connection with the incorporation principle, the suggestion
was made that where a Federal Rule incorporates preexisting federal common law and the validity of the Federal Rule is considered
only with reference to cases in which federal law furnishes the
rule of decision, there is room for disagreement whether the
scheme of allocation revealed by the pre-1934 history of the Act,
even if generally accepted, should be strictly enforced.130 The
rulemakers had the benefit of at least one Supreme Court deci628
See supra text accompanying notes 613-14; supra note 620. Professor Ely
ignored this aspect. See Ely, supra note 3, at 730 n.202.
629
See supra text accompanying note 625. It should be recalled that the
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 3 was a product of compromise. See supra note
620. The problem noted by the Committee suggests heavy reliance on the incorporation principle or an analysis that treated limitations periods as substantive
law and inquired whether a Federal Rule read to provide ancillary provisions would.
have a proscribed effect on the right conferred thereby. Mr. Mitchell observed:
The Committee concluded that statutes of limitation are matters of subtantive law and not procedure, but there is a question, a legal question,
that arises, whether the Supreme Court, under the power to make rules
of procedure, may make a rule defining what constitutes the beginning
of a suit within the meaning of a state or federal statute of limitation.
CrvI.=AND INsTrr=u, supra note 433, at 183. However, he went on to discuss the
problem in terms of a conflicting provision in a state statute. See id.; of. Joint
Council Dining Car Employees, Local 370 v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 157 F.2d
417, 420 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J.) (Rule 6(a)). Note also the personal suggestion made by Dean Clark:
If there were a state statute of limitation which covered the question so
thoroughly, which said, for example, that an action shall be banned unless
summons is served within six years, I don't think that this would have any
effect at all, because it doesn't cover the same ground. But if, as so often
happens, the statute is phrased in terms only of commencement of action,
the action must be commenced within six years from the date of the
occurrence, then it seems to me that the state statutes in effect refer the
matter back to the procedural question of when the suit is commenced,
and that then you have to look to the procedure of the forum to see when
the action is commenced, and then this rule would apply.
CrLrvEAwN Irs'rrr=r, supra note 433, at 203.
63o See supra text accompanying notes 600-01.
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sion 631 on the matter that was informed by a factual record and
by the arguments of the parties. For that reason, and with the
other data available in the rulemaking process, the choices to be
made in the proposed Rule and the impact of alternative choices
in the universe of cases to which it would apply may have been
632
fully and fairly canvassed.
The use of Rule 3 to toll the relevant statute of limitations
in a case where federal law furnishes the rule of decision is
another matter. There is no evidence that the rulemakers relied
on a Supreme Court decision in which filing was determined to
be the appropriate tolling event. 633 In addition, it is doubtful
631

See supra note 600.

632 But see Landers, supra note 31, at 854-55 n.43. Moreover, in a system that
relies on precedent even in matters having a procedural aspect, it is not clear that
where a common law rule announced by the Supreme Court is found to be wanting,
it will be changed more quickly than a Federal Rule. Among the mainstays of the
ABA's campaign, and of the national campaign, for regulation of procedure by
rules of court were the arguments that the parties have no legitimate stake in rules
of procedure (so long as the court has discretion to protect them from actual
prejudice) and that legislative regulation deprives the courts of the ability to
recognize and right injustice where it occurs. Tied to these was the notion that
rules of court which prove to be unsatisfactory can be amended immediately. See,
e.g., Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 6 A.B.A. J. 509, 513,
516-17 (1920); s-upra notes 268, 277 & 601; Sunderland, supra note 330, at 302-04,
307-12; Paul, The Judicial Council and Reform of Judicial Procedure, 5 On. L.
REv. 1, 7-8 (1925).
Compare Peoria, D. & E. Ry. Co. v. Rice, 144 Ill. 227, 232,
33 N.E. 951, 953 (1893), in which the court, speaking of common law rules, said:
"Rules of practice must be laid down, not with reference to a single case, but to
be applied generally, and we entertain no doubt that our conclusion heretofore
announced on this subject is the better and safer practice."
Recently, Professor Ely has suggested, in defending the refusal of the Court
in Hanna to cast doubt on Ragan, that "much of the point of a set of procedural
rules is to let people get used to and rely on the routine of doing things in a
certain way." Ely, supra note 3, at 730. The same view was apparently taken
by the Court in Walker. See 446 U.S. at 749. Although both discussions involved
the interpretation of a Federal Rule, they may indicate a more general attitude that
includes federal common law rules.
The practice of reporting amendments of Federal Rules to Congress substantially vitiated the objective of speed that had animated the ABA sponsors of the
uniform federal procedure bill, but particularly in the absence of congressional
interference, and given the Court's docket, that process seems likely to secure
change as quickly as or more quickly than case-by-case adjudication by the
Supreme Court See supra note 601.
633 There were cases in which federal courts sitting in equity applied a federal
tolling rule for federal statutes of limitations. See, e.g., Linn & Lane Timber Co.
v. United States, 236 U.S. 574, 578 (1915).
Moreover, Professor Moore asserted
that the same was true where federal courts sitting in equity applied "state statutes
of limitation by way of analogy." 1 MooRE & FUEDMAN, supra note 526, § 3.06,
at 246. However, his citations provided very weak support for that view. See
cases cited id. 246 n.18, 243 n.8; see also Blume & George, Limitations and the
Federal Courts, 49 Mici-. L. REv. 937, 943-46 (1951).
In any event, the tolling
rule emerging from these cases---"filing of complaint and issuance of summons to an
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that there could be one decision that would persuasively lay down
a broad governing rule on the subject. Whenever federal law
furnishes the rule of decision and there is no controlling statutory
provision, and particularly when limitations are at issue, the possibility exists that state law will be borrowed to serve as the federal law. 6 m Sensitive exercise of the power to fashion federal
common law requires attention both to the federal legal context
in which the rule will fit and to the possibility that piecemeal
borrowing may distort the state scheme from which a selection is
made. 13 5 Of course, the Supreme Court may determine after an
appropriate analysis that filing is the appropriate event for tolling
an applicable statutory period, federal or state, and it may even do
so categorically.03 6 But in that case not even the argument from
convenience justifies reference to Rule 3 as the source of the common law rule.
officer with bona fide intent that it be served," 1 MooRE & FREmAN, supra note
526, § 3.06, at 246-is not incorporated in Rule 3, or even in Rules 3 and 4, and
there is no mention of it in the Advisory Committee's published drafts or Notes.
In fact, one of the grounds upon which Mitchell objected to Clark's interpretation
of Rule 3 was its inconsistency with the view of the Committee at the time when
it was purporting to deal with the question of tolling, that is, before it determined
that the matter was beyond the authority conferred by the Act. See letter from
William D. Mitchell to Charles E. Clark (May 17, 1937), supra note 620. Later,
Mitchell suggested an amendment to Rule 4 that he believed would come close to
solving the problem. See letter from William D. Mitchell to Charles E. Clark
(August 16, 1937) (Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 111, Folder 58); supra text
accompanying note 615.
634 See, e.g., UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966); Johnson
v. REA, 421 U.S. 454 (1975); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980);
see also Special Project, Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal
Rights of Action and State Statutes of Limitation, 65 CoRNErL L. REv. 1011
(1980). See generally Mishkin, supra note 507.

635 See, e.g., Johnson v. BEA, 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975); see also UAW v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701-08 (1966).
636 Cf. Union Nat'l Bank v. Lamb, 337 U.S. 38, 40-41 (1949) (concluding
that "the considerations of liberality and leniency which find expression in Rule
6(a) are equally applicable to 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c)"); 2 MooRE, supra note 41,
at ff[6.06[1]-[2] (Rule 6(a)). It is not clear whether there should be more than
one category. See Note, Commencement Rules and Tolling Statutes of Limitations
in Federal Court: Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 66 CORNELL L. Rzv. 842, 854-59
(1981). Certainly, the Court's perception in Walker that the state tolling rule there
involved was an "integral part" of the statute of limitations suggests caution in
fashioning a uniform federal common law rule for all cases, including those in
which a state limitations period is borrowed. Id. 858; see Johnson v. BREA, 421
U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975).
Compare an analysis of this type with that in the cases that have used Rule 3
to toll the limitations period where federal law furnished the rule of decision.
See, e.g., United States v. Wahl, 583 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1978); Bomar v. Keyes,
162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947).
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C. Specific Problems of Power That Were Not Noted by the
Original Advisory Committee: Hanna and Sibbach Revisited
The original Advisory Committee identified other questions
of rulemaking power during the drafting process. 637 In concluding
this analysis of the Committee's work and the implications of the
limitations suggested by the pre-1934 history of the Rules Enabling
Act, however, it may be more useful to examine two instances in
which the Committee did not specifically acknowledge such questions and in which the Supreme Court has sustained the validity
of Federal Rules. This discussion takes us back to Hanna and
Sibbach, the recent and original foundations of the Court's interpretation of the Act.
1. Service of Process: Hanna
There is no indication in any of the Advisory Committee's
published drafts or in the unpublished papers reviewed for this
article that the method proposed for service of the summons and
complaint on an individual in Rule 4 was thought to transgress
the Act's restriction to Rules of "procedure." 638 Moreover, when
presented with a challenge to the validity of the Rule under the
Act and an assertion that different requirements of a state statute
637 For instance, in connection with Rule 23 on class actions, the Committee
"consider[ed] it beyond their functions to deal with the question of the effect of
judgments on persons who are not parties. No attempt has been made to state the
effect of the judgments upon members of a class who have not been specifically
named as parties to the action." April 1937 Report, supra note 547, at 60. Professor Moore had proposed that the matter be covered. Moore, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEo. L.J.
551, 570-76 (1937). The Advisory Committee rejected the proposal "due to the

feeling that such a matter was one of substance and not of procedure." Moore &
Cohn, Federal Class Actions-urisdiction and Effect of Judgment, 32 IrL. L. REv.
555, 556 (1938); see February 1937 Transcript, supra note 569. For a further
discussion of this problem, see Ross, Rule 23(b) Class Actions-A Matter of "Prac-

tice and Procedure" or "Substantive Right"?, 27 EmoRy L.J. 247 (1978); Fyr, On
Classifying Class Suits: A Reply to Mr. Ross, 27 EMory L.J. 267 (1978).

638 Original Rule 4(d)(1) provided:
(d) Summons: Personal Service. The summons and complaint shall be
served together.

The plaintiff shall furnish the person making service

with such copies as are necessary. Service shall be made as follows:
(1) Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent
person, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to
him personally or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or

usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein or by delivering a copy of the summons and of

the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process.
The Rule has not been amended.
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applied, the Court in Hanna dismissed the former with dispatch. 63 9
The issue has been deemed considerably more difficult by commentators who read into the Act congressional intent to protect
substantive state policies.6 40 It is more difficult, but not for the
reasons those commentators have suggested.
a. A Special Problem of Incorporation: The Supreme Court's
Equity Rules
At the 1924 Senate Hearing, Senator Cummins asked the witnesses testifying in favor of his bill:
And what do you say in regard to another phase of it?
You bring a suit, and there are several defendants; there
may be more than one defendant; some of them may be
non-residents of the district or of the state in which the
suit is brought. Would this give the Supreme Court the
power to say how those defendants should be notified? 041
Although hesitating to answer, Justice Sutherland confined the
Court to "fix[ing] the form of [notice]." When asked specifically
whether the bill would authorize the Court to prescribe notice
in some manner other than publication in states where that was
permitted, Sutherland replied, "I would not think so." Both Justice McReynolds and Justice Van Devanter followed with references to the treatment of notice under the Equity Rules, the
former opining that the bill conferred no more authority than
had been exercised in the Equity Rules, and the latter stating his
understanding of the practice thereunder with respect to nonresi6 42
dent defendants.
639

See 380 U.S. at 464; supra text accompanying note 77.
640 See Ely, supra note 3, at 732-33; Chayes, supra note 82, at 751-52; Ely,
supra note 82, at 759-62.
641 1924 Senate Hearing, supra note 269, at 62; see supra text accompanying
note 275.
642 1924 Senate Hearing, supra note 269, at 62. Justice Van Devanter stated:
What we have just read from the statute is very broad in respect of the
making of equity and admiralty rules, and I do not believe-without
intending to now be exceedingly accurate, because I have not recently
looked it up, although I assisted in making the equity rules that are now
prevailing, and also the admiralty rules-but I do not believe that the
court has ever construed that section that now exists as going so far as
suggested that some think that maybe this might go, and I understand that
the way in which in equity we bring in parties who live in other jurisdictions is according to modes prescribed by statute and not dealt with
in the rules, and that the court has always dealt with that as a question
to be regulated by Congress or by statutes and not as a matter to be
regulated by rules.
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To the extent that Senator Cummins' concern about the
power to make court rules specifying the manner of giving notice
comprehended both resident and non-resident defendants,64 3 the
participants in this exchange were talking past each other. Equity
Rule 13, which was cited in the Advisory Committee Note to
Rule 4(d)0 44 provided for service of the subpoena "by delivering
a copy thereof to the defendant personally, or by leaving a copy
thereof at the dwelling house or usual place of abode of each
defendant, with some adult person who is a member of or resident
in the family." 645 Thus, a more plausible reading of Cummins'
questions and of the Justices' responses would confine his concern
to "notice" to non-residents. 40
The distinction between notice to resident and non-resident
defendants suggested by the 1924 Senate Hearing was involved in
0 47 a case cited by the Court in Hanna in
Insurance Co. v. Bangs.,
support of its conclusion that Rule 4(d)(1) "relate[d] to the 'practice and procedure of the district courts' " within the meaning of
the Act. 648 In that case, the question was whether a federal court
had jurisdiction over a non-resident infant in a suit on a contract
where service was made on the infant's general guardian after the
infant had left the State. In holding that it did not, the Court
noted that the law might be otherwise in the state courts. But
it continued:
the State law cannot determine for the Federal courts
what shall be deemed sufficient service of process or sufficient appearance of parties. Substituted service, by
publication, against non-resident or absent parties allowed in some States in purely personal actions is not permitted in the Federal courts. Such service can only be
resorted to where some claim or lien upon real or personal
property is sought to be enforced, and the decision of the
643 Support for this view comes from Cummins' description of the objection

"that this might give the Supreme Court the authority to make rules for the execution of its writs, say the execution of the writ of scire facias, and prescribe the notice
that should be given, and how it should be given, and the property upon which it
could be levied," a view Cummins did not share. Id. 61 (emphasis added).
644 See Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 561, at 5.
65 226 U.S. 627, 652 (1912).
046 "Notice" in this sense includes the assertion of territorial jurisdiction. Indeed, at the time the Supreme Court had still not fully sorted out the two problems
in the context of state court litigation. See generally Hazard, A General Theory of
State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241, 272-81. On the special problem
of the territorial jurisdiction of the federal courts, see infra note 673.
647 103 U.S. 435 (1880).
648 380 U.S. at 464. Bangs was introduced by the signal "Cf."
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court will then only affect property of the party within
the district. Rev. Stat., sect. 738.649
The authority for that proposition, a federal statute, was
also said to require personal service or voluntary appearance in an
action on a contract.650 The Court incidentally observed, however,
that the Equity Rules "qualifie[d] the statute" in two respects, including by allowing "a copy to be left at the dwelling-house, or
usual place of abode of the defendant, with some person who is a
member of or a resident in the family." 651
Of course, the fact that a matter was treated in one of the
Supreme Court's Equity Rules does not establish that it is within
the Act's grant of authority. Notwithstanding general representations by the ABA sponsors and congressional supporters of the
uniform federal procedure bill that its purpose and effect were to
give the Court the same authority to make rules of court in actions
in law as it already possessed in suits in equity, 5 2 and more spe53
cific interpretive links suggested at the 1924 Senate Hearing,
the Enabling Act contains limitations, put there for a specific
purpose, that may or may not reflect limitations in prior rulemaking authorizations. 654 In addition, as the discussion of Rule
23(b) suggests, something akin to the incorporation principle was
operating long before the original Advisory Committee went to
103 U.S. at 439.
6 See id. Such apparently was the result of a negative inference from § 738.
See also Rev. Stat. § 739 (1878):
Except in the cases provided in the next three sections, no person shall
be arrested in one district for trial in another, in any civil action before a
circuit or district court; and except in the said cases and the case provided
by the preceding section, no civil suit shall be brought before either of
said courts against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original
process, in any other district than that of which he is an inhabitant or in
which he is found at the time of serving the writ.
Compare Arrowsmith v. U.P.I., 320 F.2d 219, 238 (2d Cir. 1963) (Clark, J., dissenting) with id. 228 n.10.
Since the Court in Bangs relied on a federal statute, it is not clear what support
that case was thought to provide on the proposition for which it was cited in Hanna.
651 103 U.S. at 439-40. If the Equity Rules had prescribed notice in a manner
inconsistent with the statute, they might have been invalid under Rev. Stat. § 917
(1878). See also id. § 913; supra note 161. However, both § 738 and § 739 referred to a defendant who was an inhabitant of or found within the district (the
former referring also to a defendant who voluntarily appeared). Thus, neither required, at least by its terms, personal service as to an inhabitant.
652 See, e.g., 1926 SENATE REPonT, supra note 297, at 12.
653
See 1924 Senate Hearing, supra note 269, at 61, 62.
654 One obvious and important difference between the Act and the prior statutory authority for Equity Rules concerns the effect of inconsistent federal statutes.
See supra notes 161 & 166; General Electric Co. v. Marvel Rare Metals Co., 287
649
50

U.S. 430, 434-35 (1932).
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work,655 with the result that even if the rulemaking authorizations
were found to contain identical limitations, one could not safely
end an inquiry under the Act by reference to the precedent of
an Equity Rule. Finally, without reference to the congruence of
rulemaking limitations, the possibility exists that an Equity Rule
used as a model exceeded the limitations of the statute pursuant
to which it was promulgated.6 56
Notwithstanding these caveats, one should not lightly assume
that the Enabling Act forecloses rulemaking in a merged system
with respect to matters that had been treated by the Supreme
Court in its Equity Rules. For quite apart from the implications of an analysis that is required to probe all of the potential
discontinuities adumbrated above-implications that are horrifying when one considers the extensive borrowings from the Equity
Rules by the original Advisory Committee 65 7-it is clear that the
congressional committees and subcommittees considering the
Cummins bill simply did not pay much attention to section 2.658
Their attention was focused on section 1, and they therefore had
in mind a new system of court rules being constructed, for actions
at law, where none had existed before. Moreover, although it
would not be fair to read into the Act a purpose, as it were, to
grandfather all Equity Rules imported into a merged system, section 2's authorization to "unite the general rules prescribed by it
for cases in equity with those at actions at law" 659 perhaps should
be read to reflect a prima facie judgment that the Equity Rules
satisfied the Act's limitations.
b. Rule 4(d)(1) and the Substantive Rights That Are Relevant
Under the Act
All of this is a far cry from the analysis of Rule 4(d)(1) in
Hanna, which, following Sibbach, emphasizes the difference between procedure as a process and substantive law, 6 0 or from Pro655 See supra note 598.
656 Cf. Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co., 263 U.S. 629 (1924) (admiralty rule); Meek v. Centre County Banking
Co., 268 U.S. 426 (1925) (general order in bankruptcy).

057Our

rules have followed and have used a great deal of the equity rules.

In fact, if one dared generalize, one might, I think, say that our new procedure
really consists of the equity rules of 1912, applied to all actions and brought down

to date by such new developments as have occurred since 1912."
supra note 433, at 196 (statement of C.E. Clark).
See supra notes 276, 297, 317 & 350.
659 See supra note 375.

INSTiTUTE,
658

660 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965).

CrLv-r.a- -
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fessor Ely's analysis, which, although acknowledging that the goal
implicated in a particular rule respecting the manner of giving
notice is "terribly important," dismisses it as irrelevant because
it is a procedural goal. 661 The concern for substantive rights expressed in the Act, read in the light of the pre-1934 history, apparently extends to constitutional interests that are procedural in
the sense that they are implicated only in the context of litigadon.6 62 Were it otherwise, the 1926 Senate Report would not
have characterized matters having to do with the selection and
qualification of jurors as substantive, 663 and no attention would
have been paid in the consideration of the Criminal Rules Enabling Act to the constitutional rights of criminal defendants,
which, although procedural in this sense, were nevertheless thought
to be substantive for purposes of that legislation. 6 4
e61 Ely, supra note 3, at 732-33; see also id. 724-25 n.171; supra notes 495-96.
But see Clinton, supra note 13, at 60-61.
662
See supra text accompanying notes 497, 509 & 515. The discussion in the
text focuses on the concern about constitutionally recognized interests that emerges
from the pre-1934 history of the Act. The more demonstrable concern regarding
Federal Rules that, even if designed exclusively to advance procedural goals, have a
predictable and identifiable effect on rights claimed under the substantive law, should
be kept in mind. That concern is also implicated in this situation. See infra note
666.
663
See supra text accompanying notes 488 & 497.
064By the Act of February 24, 1933, Pub. L. No. 72-371, 47 Stat. 904
the Supreme Court was given the power to prescribe rules of practice and procedure
In criminal proceedings after verdict. In promoting legislation that would coner
on the Supreme Court rulemaking power in criminal cases prior to verdict, Attorney
General Cummings observed:
In making this suggestion I am not unaware of the difficulties which would
be confronted in drafting the rules. For example, it is not always a simple
task to distinguish between procedural details on the one hand and matters
which affect substantial rights on the other. While it is difficult, in close
cases, to make the necessary distinctions, and while the drafters of the rules
will be faced constantly with the perplexing problems, these facts do not
appear to me to be, in any sense, fatal to the project. The same problem
was faced by the Supreme Court and its advisers in connection with the
preparationof the Rules of Civil Procedure.
I have no reason to believe that the Supreme Court in framing Rules
of Criminal Procedure would fail to use the same discriminating care which
was exercised in the preparation of the Civil Rules. In any event, if the
Court should feel that a particularproblem might better be left to legislative determination, such matters could readily be excluded.
Cummings, A Rounded System of Judicial Rule-Making, 24 A.B.A. J. 513, 514
(1938) (emphasis added).
In a letter to the Chairman of the House judiciary Committee, which was holding hearings on the bill proposed by the Department of Justice, Cummings, by then
no longer Attorney General, wrote: "It must be remembered in this connection that
we are dealing, not with substantive criminal law in which crimes are defined and
punishments prescribed, nor with substantive rights which are embodied in constitutional guaranties, but rather with practice and procedure-the mechanics of a
criminal trial." Letter from Homer D. Cummings to the Hon. Hatton Sumners
(May 8, 1939), reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 4587 Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the
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The interests in notice and an opportunity to be heard are
recognized in the Constitution as it has been interpreted. 6 5 A
choice between, for instance, personal service and service by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the defendant's home
may affect those interests-and it would do so identifiably-but so
may other choices of the same sort that are made in the Federal
Rules.6 66 Moreover, those interests arise under constitutional proHouse Judiciary Comm., 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1939) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as 1939 House Hearings]. Cummings' dual focus on substantive criminal law and constitutional rights was reflected in the testimony at the 1939 House
Hearings. See id. 18. Indeed, for reasons that are understandable in the context
of criminal litigation, substantive law was occasionally discussed in terms of constitutional rights. See id. 21; see also Cummings, Extending the Rule-Making Power
to Federal Criminal Procedure, 22 J. Am. JTDicAAT=rE Soc'y 151, 152-53 (1938);
Hall, Objectives of Federal Criminal ProceduralRevision, 51 YALE L.J. 723, 735-39
(1942); Vanderbilt, Foreword, The New Federal Criminal Rules, 51 YALE L.J. 719,
721-22 (1942). But see 1939 House Hearings, supra, at 27-29.
The bill considered by the House Judiciary Committee was reported favorably,
with an amendment substituting for a provision as to effective date borrowed from
§ 1 of the 1934 Act, one borrowed from § 2. See H.R. REP. No. 2492, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. 1 (1940); see also S. BEP. No. 1934, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940). As
enacted, the legislation empowered the Court "to prescribe, from time to time, rules
of pleading, practice and procedure" and did not include a sentence like that in the
1934 Act proscribing the abridgement, enlargement, or modification of substantive
rights. See Act of June 29, 1940, ch. 445, 54 Stat. 688. It is of interest that Congress did not insert such a provision, particularly in light of the amendment it did
make. Its failure in that regard and the discussion of the procedure/substance
dichotomy at the 1939 House Hearings are further evidence that the second sentence
of the 1934 Act was regarded as surplusage. See supra text accompanying notes
424-29. Moreover, the assumption that the same limitation would apply to rulemaking under the Criminal Rules Enabling Act as under the Rules Enabling Act of
1934 again calls into question the propriety of formulating that limitation by reference to considerations of federalism. See supra text accompanying notes 430-47.
665 See, e.g., Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1900); Grannis v. Ordean, 234
U.S. 385 (1914); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (fourteenth amendment); see also,
e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (fifth amendment).
666 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 5(b) (service: how made). A similar analysis
applies when Federal Rules regarding notice are considered from the perspective,
made relevant by the Act's pre-1934 history, of rights claimed under the substantive
law. See supra note 662. As to both perspectives, however, it is more difficult to
distinguish problems of notice at the outset of and during litigation under the Federal Rules than problems of time limitations. See supra note 607. For relief from
a default judgment may be available under Rule 60(b) both to a party who had no
actual notice of the litigation and to a party whose default occurred during the
course of the suit. See, e.g., Rooks v. American Brass Co., 263 F.2d 166 (6th Cir.
1959); United States ex rel. Kantor Bros. v. Mutual Constr. Corp., 3 F.R.D. 227
(E.D. Pa. 1943). See generally 11 Wnsomr & Minix n, supra note 41, § 2858; Project,
Relief from Default Judgments under Rule 60(b)-A Study of Federal Case Law, 49
FonmDzvr L. REv. 956 (1981). In addition, in the case of a default judgment
entered in the absence of actual notice of litigation, the one-year limitation under
Rule 60(b)(1) does not seem to be an insuperable barrier. See, e.g., Tozer v.
Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1951); 11 WmiGHr & Mn.T.R_, supra
note 41, § 2864; Project, supra, at 983-87.
The recent amendments to Rule 4 promulgated by the Court, permitting in
some cases service of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail,
provide for entry of a default or of a judgment for default only if "the record con-
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visions of exquisite generality that, because they speak to legal
procedures, are implicated in connection with every Federal Rule,
as well as every statute, prescribing methods for the conduct of
litigation. One mode of accommodation would be to confine the
constitutional interests relevant under the Act to those specifically
enumerated in the Constitution. Such a standard provides some
hope that they will be recognized as "fundamental"

167

by the

rulemakers and, at the same time, that the entire enterprise will
668
not founder in the lap of the due process clause.
c. The Pre-1934 History Provides Specific Guidance
In any event, the validity of Rule 4(d)(1) is supported by more
than the existence of an Equity Rule covering the same territory.
Although none of the statutory grants pursuant to which the Supreme Court promulgated Equity Rules referred to notice, 669 the
Clayton bill specifically authorized the Court to prescribe "the
mode and manner . .. of giving notice and serving process of all
kinds." 670 The Sutherland bill preserved the grant with changes
in language not relevant for present purposes. 671 When Senator
Cummins redrafted the uniform federal procedure bill in 1923,
he did not intend to confine the authority already conferred; on
the contrary, his concern was that his bill be thought to have
expanded the Court's authority beyond acceptable, or even constitutionally prescribed, limits.

672

The aspect of "notice" discussed

tains a return receipt showing acceptance by the defendant or a returned envelope

showing refusal of the process by the defendant."

Amended Rule 4(d) (8) further

provides: "Any such default or judgment by default shall be set aside pursuant to

Rule 55(c) or Rule 60(b) if the defendant demonstrates to the court that the return
receipt was signed or delivery was refused by an unauthorized person." 50 U.S.L.W.
4454 (May 4, 1982). Congress has delayed the effective date of these amendments.
See supra note 8.
067
See supra note 509.
66
SWhere Federal Rules are formulated affecting specific constitutional interests,
and unless they do no more than incorporate prior decisional law, there is a danger
that the rulemaking process will in effect define constitutional rights. See supra
text accompanying note 515; cf. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) (local
rule). From the point of view of the interests protected by the due process clause,
however, every Federal Rule can be regarded as a statement of what is fair. That
is not to say that Federal Rules that are thought to operate at, or purport to define,
the margins of due process are a good idea. See, e.g., FED. R. Cry. P. 23(c) (2);
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
669 See supra notes 98, 103 & 161.
670 See

supra note 154.
See supra note 228.
672
See supra text accompanying notes 259-60.
671
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at the 1924 Senate Hearing involved the discrete problem of the
territorial jurisdiction of the federal courtsera
6 See supra note 644 and accompanying text. In Mississippi Publishing Corp.
v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946), the Court sustained the validity of Rule 4(f),
which authorized service of process "other than a subpoena . . . anywhere within
the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held." The Court's
reasoning in this aspect of the opinion involved little more than acceptance of the
Advisory Committee's interpretation of another Rule, Rule 82, providing that the
Rules "shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts
of the United States or the venue of actions therein." See id. 444-45. Having
agreed that Rule 82's prohibition referred only to subject-matter jurisdiction, the
court invoked Sibbach to support its conclusion that Rule 4(f) did not violate the
Act. See id. 445-46; supra note 71.
Prior to the Federal Rules, and except where otherwise provided by Act of
Congress, the territorial jurisdiction of the federal courts in in personam actions was
restricted to the district of which a defendant was an inhabitant or in which he could
be found. This restriction was not lightly dispensed with. See, e.g., Robertson v.
Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619 (1925); see also Ohlinger, supra note 36, at
464-65. The Advisory Committee pointed out to the Court various statutes that
authorized service of process outside of the district, but it also noted that some
people had questioned "the power of the Court to make" the more general extension
provided in Rule 4(f). April 1937 Report, supra note 547, at 14; see also CLEvELAND INsTrrTT, supra note 433, at 183-84 (statement of W.D. Mitchell), 205-06
(statement of C.E. Clark); 1 MooRE & FRIDMAN, supra note 526, § 4.38.
It is a close question whether Federal Rules expanding the territorial jurisdiction
of the federal courts are valid under the Act, interpreted in the light of the pre-1934
history. Certainly, the view that only subject-matter jurisdiction is beyond the reach
of the Rules is not the only possible interpretation of the Act or even of Rule 82.
See Insurance Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 50 U.S.L.W.
4553, 4559 (June 1, 1982) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). The view
carries no greater presumption of fidelity to legislative intent than any other interpretation of the Act by the Advisory Committee and the Court. Moreover, even if
Federal Rules do not have a proscribed effect on "rights" recognized under the
"substantive law," they are not necessarily "mere procedure, such as a court has
power to prescribe." 1926 SENATE REPoRT, supra note 297, at 9. The Chairman
of the Advisory Committee regarded Rule 82 as "really surplusage, because the
jurisdiction and venue are matters of substantive right and not proper pleading,
practice or procedure." C vELAND INsTuTE, supra note 433, at 188. And the
Advisory Committee's papers reveal considerable uneasiness about rulemaking with
respect to territorial jurisdiction. See, e.g., letter from Warren Olney, Jr., to the
Hon. William D. Mitchell, supra note 530. Rule 4(f) was questioned in the Senate,
prompting Mitchell to observe that if it had been omitted, there would have been
little in the proposed Rules to challenge as substantive. See Mitchell, Memorandum
to Members of the Advisory Committee, supra note 569. A memorandum prepared
in response to the Senate Judiciary Committee Report favoring postponement of the
proposed Rules, see infra text accompanying note 701, emphasized the slight effect
of Rule 4(f) on existing statutes. See Memorandum on SJ. Res. 281, supra note
561.
Before the decision in Murphree, a number of district courts held Rule 4(f)
invalid. See, e.g., Carby v. Greco, 31 F. Supp. 251 (W.D. Ky. 1940); Melekov v.
Collins, 30 F. Supp. 159 (S.D. Cal. 1939). In 1943, the Advisory Committee considered Dean Clark's suggestion that legislation be sought to validate the Rules.
Chairman Mitchell observed about Rule 4(f): "When that rule was passed, I had
the gravest doubt of its validity, and I was astounded when the Court passed it. I
thought they would wipe it out. I don't think they ever considered it." 1 Proceedings of the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure 37 (May 17, 1943)
(Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 114, Folder 71). Mitchell predicted that when
the Court considered the Rule, "they are going to say that the question of territorial
jurisdiction is just as important as the subject matter jurisdiction." Id. Moreover,

1982]

THE RULES ENABLING ACT

1173

d. The Real Problem in Hanna
What, then, of the promise in the 1926 Senate Report regarding the protection of state law choices involving "substantial
in response to Dean Clark's proposal that Rule 82 be amended to refer specifically
and exclusively to subject-matter jurisdiction, Mitchell stated:
I have always contended that that other rule [Rule 4(f)] is a real extension
of jurisdiction-maybe jurisdiction of the person and not of the subject
matter-but it is jurisdiction, and now the Reporter comes back and says
that is so and wants to have our last rule, Rule 82, recognize that fact by
merely saying that we don't extend jurisdiction over the subject matter;
but he does not say that we do not extend jurisdiction over the person. I
think we are giving away our case as to whether it is procedural jurisdiction.
4 Proceedings of the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, supra, at
1092 (May 20, 1943).
A number of cases, including Sibbach itself, have recognized "the inability of a
court, by rule, to extend or restrict the jurisdiction conferred by a statute." Sibbach,
312 U.S. at 10 (footnote omitted); see supra note 59. One of the cases cited in
support of that proposition in Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 10 n.9-Davidson Bros. Marble
Co. v. United States ex rel. Gibson, 213 U.S. 10 (1909)-involved territorial rather
than subject-matter jurisdiction. See also Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v.
Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co., 263 U.S. 629, 635-36 & n.7 (1924). The
court rule involved in Davidson, however, was invalid because it was inconsistent
with the statute granting an appeal to the Supreme Court. See 213 U.S. at 18.
Alternatively, it was invalid because inconsistent with the statute conferring jurisdiction on the circuit courts. See id. 19. In any event, cases discussing the rulemaking power must be read in context. But see Landers, supra note 31, at 856 &
n.49. An important part of the rulemaking context prior to the Act was the requirement that court rules not be inconsistent with statutes. See supra note 654; Durabilt
Steel Locker Co. v. Berger Mfg. Co., 21 F.2d 139 (N.D. Ohio 1927).
During the campaign for the uniform federal procedure bill, the ABA consistently maintained that "the statute will necessitate no alteration of the present
procedure upon any jurisdictional or fundamental matter." See supra text accompanying note 237 (excerpt from standard report of ABA Committee on Uniform
Judicial Procedure). The 1926 Senate Report incorporated that language verbatim.
See supra note 317. At the 1924 Senate Hearing, Justice Van Devanter assured
Senator Cummins that the Court had "always dealt with" service outside of the
"jurisdiction" (Cummins had referred to "nonresidents of the district or of the State
in which the suit is brought") "as a question to be regulated by Congress or bystatutes and not as a matter to be regulated by rules." 1924 Senate Hearing, supra
note 269, at 62; see supra text accompanying note 276.
It should be noted, on the other hand, that the New York Board of Statutory
Consolidation, from whose 1912 Report the ABA and the 1914 House Report adopted
the abstractions used to describe the uniform federal procedure bill, see supra text
accompanying notes 185-86, included in the court rules proposed in its 1915 Report
extensive provisions regarding service that seemingly would have had the effect of
defining the territorial jurisdiction of the courts. See 1 1915 NEw YoRu REPORT,
supra note 175, at 89-95, 310-24. That may have been one reason the report was
subsequently rejected. See 1919 NEW YoK REPoRT, supra note 175, at 21.
From the point of view of federalism values, the regulation of the territorial
jurisdiction of the federal courts can affect, as the regulation of subject-matter jurisdiction affects, the allocation of business between the federal and state courts. Indeed, original Rule 4(f) was designed specifically to address discontinuities between
state and federal jurisdiction arising from the limitation to service within the district.
See 1 MooRE & FnawmAN, supra note 526, § 4.38. That may have been a desirable
reform, but both its purpose and effect suggest that, if the Act is interpreted in light
of the pre-1 9 34 history, it is a reform that should have been implemented by
Congress.

1174

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 130:1015

rights and remedies"? It may be, as suggested above, that the
Act should not be read to include the interests recognized in the
due process clause in that category. Whether or not that is the
case, we should not grieve that Rule 4(d)(1), insofar as it regulates
generally the mode and manner of giving notice of the commencement of a lawsuit, may affect or displace federal or state policies
extrinsic to the litigation process. 674 The place for the implementation of such policies is not in general prescriptions about
notice or similar matters, where they will likely remain unknown
to, and unknowable by, federal rulemakers. 675 That perception
suggests what makes Hanna a hard case. Although the Court
would have been correct, for the reasons suggested above, in upholding Rule 4(d)(1) as a means of giving notice of the commencement of litigation and insuring a fair opportunity to appear and
be heard, the state statute in Hanna was not concerned with notice
in that sense.
According to the court of appeals whose decision was reviewed
in Hanna, the manner of service provided in Rule 4(d)(1) "was
in entire compliance with . . . the usual Massachusetts procedure,

so far as service was concerned. Further, the action was commenced in time, and served in time, in full compliance with the
requirements of the ordinary Massachusetts statutes of limitations." 676 "The difference," according to the court of appeals,
"was that in addition to service sufficient to satisfy due process
requirements for in personam jurisdiction, the executor . . . was

by law entitled to receive specific notification of the action within
the year." 677
The court of appeals' gloss confirms what a fair reading of
the statute as a whole suggests, namely that the statutory provisions in question were the functional equivalent of a tolling
rule.6 78 The Supreme Court's attempt to bifurcate the statute
674

But see Chayes, supra note 82, at 751-52; Ely, supra note 82, at 759-62.

This says nothing of litigants, who may well be wary of suing in federal
court if their ability to use federal as opposed to state procedures depends upon their
ability to identify correctly the policies animating the latter and the outcome hangs
in the balance. See supra notes 495-96 & 510.
76
5 Hanna v. Plumer, 331 F.2d 157, 159 (1st Cir. 1964), rev'd, 380 U.S. 460
(1965).
675

677 Id.

statute provided, in pertinent part:
Except as provided in this chapter, an executor or administrator shall not
be held to answer to an action by a creditor of the deceased which is not
commenced within one year from the time of his giving bond for the performance of his trust, or to such an action which is commenced within
said year unless before the expiration thereof the writ in such action has
678 The
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into limitations provisions and notice provisions was artificial,

79

which may explain why Justice Harlan deemed Ragan impossible
to distinguish and was moved to express his disagreement with the
result in that case. 680 Moreover, in its elaborate dictum considering whether a federal common law rule identical to Federal Rule
4(d)(1) would yield before the Massachusetts statute, the Court's
attempt to distinguish Ragan was notably unsuccessful. 81 Forumshopping was of no more concern on the facts of that case than it
was on the facts of Hanna or, for that matter, of Walker, where
the Court recognized the difficulty. 6 2
But Hanna was a case involving a Federal Rule, not federal
common law. Whether or not detailed inquiry into the facts or
the impact of a particular state law configuration on choice of
68 3 it
forum is appropriate in cases involving federal common law,
is not an inquiry called for by the Act interpreted in the light
of the pre-1934 history. What the Court observed about Rule 3
in Walker is true also of Rule 4. "There is no indication that the
been served by delivery in hand upon such executor or administrator or
service thereof accepted by him or a notice stating the name of the estate,
the name and address of the creditor, the amount of the claim and the
court in which the action has been brought has been filed in the proper
registry of probate.
MAss. GEN. LAws Awx. ch. 197, § 9 (West 1958).
679
See 380 U.S. at 462-63 n.1.
6so See id. 476-77 (Harlan, J., concurring).
681
See id. 469 & n.10. In Ragan, the plaintiff, in choosing a forum, was no
more "presented with a situation where application of the state rule would wholly
bar recovery," id., than was the plaintiff in Hanna. See Ragan, 337 U.S. at 531;
Blume & George, supra note 633, at 956. Both had sufficient time to comply with
either state or federal law.
682
See 446 U.S. at 752-53 & n.15. By considering the facts of the case before
it and failing to give meaningful content to the notion of "inequitable administration" of the law, the Court in Walker "unmodified" the outcome-determination
test. See McCoid, supra note 597, at 888-89, 896; Chisum, Book Review, 33 STAx.
L. REv. 1161, 1176-77 (1981).
If the inquiry does not focus on the facts of individual cases, one does find a
difference between Ragan and Walker on the one hand and Hanna on the other.
For whereas forum-shopping to avoid the state statutes (including their tolling
rules) would be predictable in a class of cases if there were a federal common
law tolling rule identical with Rule 3, see Horowitz, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins-A Test
to Determine Those Rules of State Law to which its Doctrine Applies, 23 S.CAL.
L. REv. 204, 215-16 (1950), the same cannot be said about a federal common law
rule identical with Rule 4(d)(1). The reason, however, is not that given by the
Court in Hanna, see 380 U.S. at 469 n.h: comparative assessments of the likelihood
of obtaining a default judgment. Rather, under the Massachusetts statute an
alternative to in-hand service seemingly provided as speedy a means of tolling the
statute as service at the defendant's abode. See supra note 678. Of course, this
analysis merely shifts the focus from the facts of the case to a particular competing
state law configuration, which is no less clearly problematical for the test formulated
in Hanna and applied in Walker.
683 See supra note 682.
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Rule was intended to toll a state statute of limitations, much less
that it purported to displace state tolling rules for purposes of
state statutes of limitations." 684 Moreover, insofar as the Act is
concerned, it appears that the Massachusetts provisions were as
much an "integral part" of the statute of limitations as the Oklahoma provisions in Walker.68 5 That they may not reflect singleminded attention to one policy, or even a wholly rational adjustment of a number of competing policies,680 is irrelevant. By
invoking a "threat" that did not exist,8 7 and by dissecting the
Massachusetts statute with a scalpel, the Court in Hanna provided
itself with an occasion to circumvent the Act's limitations in the
interest of clarifying the confusion wrought by its precedents. The
lower courts and commentators were right. In a sense, Hanna did
overrule Ragan.6ss
2. Physical and Mental Examinations: Sibbach
The Advisory Committee also failed explicitly to acknowledge any problem of rulemaking power in connection with Rule
35, authorizing physical and mental examinations of parties. The
Notes to its drafts suggest, however, some awareness that a question
might be raised in that regard. 6 9 More important, Rule 35 attracted attention and prompted questions and discussion in Congress.6 90 Both facts were noted by the Court in Sibbach,691 but
the conclusions it drew from them are insupportable.
684 446 U.S. at 750-51 (footnote omitted).
685 See supra note 625.

686 See McCoid, supra note 597, at 912-14.

Compare Chayes, supra note 82,
at 751-52 with Ely, supra note 82, at 759-62.
687 "Because of the threat to the goal of uniformity of federal procedure posed
by the decision below, we granted certiorari ......
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 463. In
a footnote, the Court adduced "a number of state service requirements which
would not necessarily be satisfied by compliance with Rule 4(d)(1)." Id. 463
n.2. None of them, however, involved service or notice in connection with a state
limitations provision. Ragan was proof, and Walker reconfirmed, that "for their
separate purposes" a Federal Rule and a state statute "may both apply in federal
court in a diversity action." Walker, 446 U.S. at 752 n.13.
6
88 See supra text accompanying note 618.
689 See Preliminary Draft, supra note 520, at 70 (note to Draft Rule 39); April
1937 Report, supra note 547, at 88 (note to Draft Rule 35); Advisory Committee
Notes, supra note 561, at 32 (note to Rule 35).
690 See, e.g., 1938 House Hearings, supra note 435, at 117, 141; 1938 Senate
Hearings, supra note 435, pt. 1, at 9-10; id., pt. 2, at 29-30, 36-37, 39. The
proposed Rule also attracted attention in the literature. See, e.g., Oblinger, supra
note 36, at 470, 474.
691 See 312 U.S. at 15-16.
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The Court in Sibbach observed that the Advisory Committee's Notes called "attention to the contrary practice indicated
by the Botsford case." 692 But in its Note accompanying the final
version of Rule 35, the Advisory Committee also erroneously described a subsequent decision of the Court, Camden & Suburban
Ry. Co. v. Stetson, 93 and assimilated to the authority to order a
physical examination in the state statute in Stetson, the authority
created by Rule 35 itself. 69
The Court adopted the Advisory Committee's reasoning695
and went on to extol the "value of the reservation by Congress
of the power to examine proposed rules . . . before they become
effective." 696 It concluded with respect to Rule 35 that the absence of adverse action by Congress "indicates, at least, that no
transgression of legislative policy was found." 697 The Court's reliance on the congressional review mechanism in section 2 of the
Act lacks theoretical or empirical support generally. 698 Moreover,
by referring to the Advisory Committee's Notes and the legislative
692 Id. 15; see Preliminary Draft, supra note 520, at 70 (note to Draft Rule 39).

177 U.S. 172 (1900). See Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 561, at
32 (note to Rule 35), where it was erroneously stated that the state statute was
"made operative by the conformity act." In fact, as the Court acknowledged in
Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 12-13, reliance had been placed on the Rules of Decision Act.
Mrs. Sibbach had brought this error to the Court's attention. See Brief in Support
of Petition for Certiorari at 38, 49-50. In correspondence, Professor Sunderland
admitted the error and the possible inference that could be drawn from reliance on
the Rules of Decision Act, asserting, however, that the result would have been the
same if the Court bad relied on the Conformity Act. See letter from Edson R.
Sunderland to Leland L. Tolman (April 25, 1940) (copy on file with the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review). In fact, in light of the Court's reasoning in
Botsford, it would have been impossible for the Court to rely on the Conformity
Act in Stetson, and the reliance on the Rules of Decision Act is not much easier to
reconcile with that reasoning. These cases are one of many examples of the
hazards of relying on prior classifications in deciding questions under the Act or
under Erie. In that regard, Judge Clark regarded Sibbach's objection to the Note
as "in line with modem attempts, unfortunately sound strategically, to rest everything on Erie R.R. v. Tompkins." Letter from the Hon. Charles E. Clark to
Leland Tolman (April 29, 1940) (Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 113, Folder
70A).
The explanation of Rule 35 at the House and Senate Hearings left a good deal
to be desired from the point of view of candor and accuracy. See 1938 House
Hearings, supra note 435, at 141 (statement of E.B. Tolman); 1938 Senate Hearings, supra note 435, at 9 (statement of W.D. Mitchell); infra note 723.
694 See Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 561, at 32; see also 1938 House
Hearings, supra note 435, at 117.
69
5 "In the instant case we have a rule which, if within the power delegated
to this court, has the force of a federal statute, and neither the Botsford nor the
Stetson case is authority for ignoring it." 312 U.S. at 13.
696 Id. 15.
697 Id. 16.
69
8 See supra text accompanying notes 395-98.
693
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history of the Rule, the Court sought to support the general proposition with particular illustration.
a. The Legislative History of the Rules
Since the Court acknowledged the attacks on Rule 35 in the
1938 House and Senate Hearings on the proposed Rules, its statement that "no effort was made to eliminate it" 699 must be taken
to characterize the results of the congressional review process. So
viewed, the statement is, at best, misleading. The House Judiciary Committee recommended that the proposed Civil Rules be
permitted to go into effect.700 In the Senate, on the other hand, a
determined effort was made, supported by the Senate Judiciary
Committee, not to eliminate one or more of the proposed Rules
deemed substantive, but to postpone the effective date of the entire package so that Congress might give it "thorough study and
examination." 101 The effort failed in the Senate, in part, it may
be assumed, because it came up in a "late hour of the session," 702
and in part because the attitude toward the proposed Rules in the
House made it unlikely that both bodies would agree. 70 3 This is
enough to cast doubt on the significance of the absence of congressional action. But there is more. Supporters of the proposed
Rules gave assurances to Congress that there was "an easy way to
challenge" the validity of a Rule as substantive and that the Supreme Court would be "zealous to correct its mistake, if any has
699 312 U.S. at 15; cf. Ely, supra note 3, at 721 ("there is no evidence of a
reaction of betrayal or even surprise at the time of promulgation [of the original

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]").
700 1938 HouSE REaowT, supra note 601. An account of the legislative consideration of the proposed Rules may be found in Chandler, supra note 41, at
505-12.
701 S.REP. No. 1603, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938).

Rule 35 was specifically

noted as presenting "conflicts and uncertainties." Id. 3. The Senate Report was
made before the Senate Hearings were held. Chandler, supra note 41, at 510.
The latter were said to have been held in response to a request by the Attorney
General. See 1938 Senate Hearings,supra note 435, pt. 1, at 1. See also Mitchell,
Memorandum to the Members of the Advisory Committee, supra note 569. Mitchell
was of the view that Senator King's real hope in sponsoring S.J. 281 was not

merely to postpone, but to defeat, the proposed Rules. See id. This view may
find support in the fact that "King pleaded forgetfulness" when reminded that he
had promised a hearing on the proposed Federal Rules before anything was done
in the Senate.

Letter from Edgar B. Tolnan to Charles E. Clark (undated but

written April 25, 1938) (Clark Papers, supra note 529, Box 112, Folder 61).
70283 CoNe. REc. 8474 (1938) (remarks of Senator King); see Mitchell,
Memorandum to the Members of the Advisory Committee, supra note 569.
703 Chandler, supra note 41, at 511; see Mitchell, Memorandum to the Members of the Advisory Committee, supra note 569.
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been made." 704 With the exception of cases in which it has read
Federal Rules not to apply, however, the main thing the Supreme
Court has been zealous about in considering challenges to their
validity has been taking cover behind the process employed prior
to their effective date, particularly that part of it permitting congressional review. Such has been the rulemaking renvoi.
b. Sib bach'sArguments
The invocation of congressional approval was not the only
makeweight suggesting that, notwithstanding the test the Court
formulated, Sibbach was a hard case for the majority as well as for
the Justices who dissented. The view is apparently not uncommon
that the Court might have been forced to confront the limitations
in the Act, rather than invited to define them away, if Mrs. Sibbach had had better representation705 Actually, the Court created
its own invitation, simplifying Sibbach's arguments, and stripping
them of functional rationale, to the point of distortion.7 0 6 Not
that Sibbach's briefs are paragons. There is confusion, although
no greater than that evinced by the Court, about the relationship
between the Rules Enabling Act and the Rules of Decision ActY.7
There is also confusion about the relevance of state law to the
question of validity under the Act-although, again, no more profound than that under which the Court was laboring.70 8 Finally,
there is imprecision in formulating the standards advanced in order
to implement the Act's limitations. 70 9
All of these are, however, quibbles, considering that Sibbach
identified accurately the purpose served by the procedure/substance dichotomy7 10 and proposed criteria for the allocation of
7 04
Letter from Edgar B. Tolman to the Hon. J.C. O'Mahoney, the Hon. W.H.
King, the Hon. E.R. Benke and the Hon. W.R. Austin (May 26, 1938), reprinted in

1938 Senate Hearings, supra note 435, app. at 72; see also 1938 Senate Hearings,
supra note 435, at 16.
70 5
See, e.g., Ely, supra note 3, at 733 n.213; Fyr, supra note 637, at 274-75.
70
See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. Compare Brief in Support
of Petition for Certiorari at 18-29, 39-46 with 312 U.S. at 11, 13-14.
707 See, e.g., Brief in Support of Petition for Certiorari at 15-16.
708 See, e.g., id. 16, 47. On the latter page, Sibbach noted that the incorporation principle discussed in Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. Baltimore &
Philadelphia Steamboat Co., 263 U.S. 629, 635-36 (1924), quoted supra note 580,
might, in combination with the Rules of Decision Act, see infra note 713, save Rule
35 in states which authorized physical examinations.
709 See Brief in Support of Petition for Certiorari at 18-29, 39-46.
710 See, e.g., id. 26:
This line of argument would seem to indicate that there are "procedural"
matters that involve such broad and important questions of policy that the

1180

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 130:1015

lawmaking competence -that, although imprecise, provided a starting point from which the Court could have addressed the admittedly difficult task of translating congressional shorthand into
a workable system of Federal Rules. 711 Equally important, Sibbach drew -the Court's attention to the support for her functional
argument, and some of its implementing abstractions, in the
12
views of Shelton and in the 1926 Senate Report.7
The court ignored Sibbach's functional argument and the evidence that it was consistent with Congress's intent, posited a dilemma that did not trouble Sibbach, and asked the wrong question,
thereby setting up a strawman. 13 However imprecise Sibbach's
statement of ,criteria, and however confusing her willingness to
concede the validity of Rule 35 in states where physical examinations were permitted,71 4 she recognized that allocation of powers
concerns rather than federalism concerns animated the Act's
power to make rules about them may not be delegated by Congress to
the Courts under the doctrine of separation of powers. However, in the
instant case it is not necessary to pursue this line further in view of the
language of the Rules Enabling Act. It may be that the doctrine of
separation of powers does not forbid Congress to delegate to this Court
the power to decide by rule whether or not a plaintiff may be compelled
in a federal court to submit to a physical examination. But it is contended
here that Congress has not in fact delegated the power by the Rules
Enabling Act.
Note, however, that Sibbach attributed independent significance to the Act's
second sentence, see id. 26-29, whereas its purpose was to emphasize restrictions
inherent in the first. See supra text accompanying notes 424-29.
711 See, e.g., id. 24 (distinguishing "a detail of practice with which a court
is more familiar than the legislature" from matters involving "a general principle or
a question of public policy that the legislature is able to pass on (and perhaps
which can be most effectively considered in a forum where there are opportunities
for full debate)"), 25 & 29 (privileges), 39-44 (arguing that the "considerations
of policy in the determination to grant or not to grant courts the power to compel
a physical examination are of such a nature that the granting of the power is a
'substantive' matter which Congress did not intend to delegate to this Court."
id. 39).
712
See Supplemental Brief of Petitioner at 2-7.
713
See supra note 62. Sibbach argued that, Rule 35 being invalid, the law
to be applied was that of Illinois. Initially, she contended that this result followed, even though Rule 35 affected "substantive rights," by analogy to the rule
contained in BISTATEMENT OF CoNurC OF LAws § 585 (1934), directing the
application of the law of the forum as to matters of procedure. See Brief in Support of Petition for Certiorari at 52. She also relied on the reference in Stetson,
177 U.S. at 175, to the law of the state in which the federal court sat under the
Rules of Decision Act. But see Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 13. In her Reply to Brief
of Respondent at 3-5, Sibbach found it necessary to correct alleged misunderstanding of this argument, making clear her view that Illinois law was "pertinent
in this case only 'in connection with' the Rules of Decision Act and only apart from
Rule 35." Id. 5. Thereafter, Sibbach cited Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940), for the proposition that Illinois law
controlled. See Supplemental Brief of Petitioner at 9-10.
714 See supra note 708.
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dichotomy, that the Act's limitations were intended to fence off
from rulemaking more than the substantive law, and that the
search for substantive rights that are relevant for that purpose
must be made elsewhere than among state law choices on the matter of physical and mental examinations.
c. Rule 37: A Two-Edged Sword
Notwithstanding the Court's announcement at the beginning
of the opinion that the case called "for decision as to the validity
of Rule 35 and 37," 715 Sibbach herself had challenged only the
former.7 1 6 It remained for William D. Mitchell, the Chairman of
the Advisory Committee, to point out in an amicus curiae brief
that the district court had exceeded its power under Rule 37 in
ordering Mrs. Sibbach confined for her refusal to submit to a
physical examination.7 17 Sibbach's (or rather her lawyer's) motive
in failing to raise the issue is not difficult to discern.71 8 Still, accepting the Court's holding that the contempt order was plain
error,7 1 9 in what respect can the case be thought to have involved

"decision as to the validity of Rules 35 and 37"?
The Court was careful to note: "The suggestion that the rule
offends the important right to freedom from invasion of the person ignores the fact that, as we hold, [under Rule 37] no invasion
of freedom from personal restraint attaches to refusal so to comply
with [Rule 35's] provisions." 720 This would seemingly have been
312 U.S. at 6; see also id. 9, 11, 14.
See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3-4; Brief in Support of Petition
for Certiorari at 15-16; Brief for the Respondent in Reply to the Several Briefs Filed
by Petitioner at 2 ("Neither the form of the order itself, nor the penalty of arrest
and imprisonment for contempt because of failure to obey it, has ever been questioned in this case .... "). But see, e.g., Miller, supra note 23, at 744.
717
See Brief of William D. Mitchell as Amicus Curiae at 1, 3.
71 8 Sibbach claimed to have intelpreted Rule 37 as allowing a contempt order,
as opposed to "arrest." Reply to Brief of Respondent and to Brief of William D.
Mitchell, Amicus Curiae at 5-6. She also admitted, however, that she was "particularly interested in having the court determine that she need not submit to a physical
examination." Id. 6. In fact, Sibbach was a test case from the beginning. The
trial judge entered a contempt order to assist Sibbach's counsel in challenging the
validity of Rule 35. Moreover, both parties deliberately chose not to raise the Rule
37 question so as to present the "real question." Letter from J.F. Dammann (counsel for the respondent) to William D. Mitchell (April 26, 1940) (copy on file with
the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
71
9 See 312 U.S. at 16.
720 Id. 14. This passage originally included, after "ignores the fact that," the
words, "a litigant need not resort to the federal courts unless willing to comply with
the rules, and that .... ." In her petition for rehearing, Sibbach pointed out that
the passage did not accurately describe the situation of a plaintiff in a case removed
from state court. See Petition for Rehearing at 1-3. It was also inappropriate as to
a defendant. In denying the petition for rehearing, the. Court amended its opinion
715

716
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irrelevant if, as the Court held, the Act authorized any rule that
"'really regulates procedure,-the judicial process for enforcing
rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of
them." 721 And as the dissent pointed out, "[o]f course the Rule
is compulsive in that the doors of the federal courts otherwise
open may be shut to litigants who do not submit to such a physical
examination." 722 The provision in Rule 37 and the Court's emphasis on that provision in Sibbach suggest that both the Advisory
Committee and the Court were aware that Federal Rules might
be invalid even though they "really regulate procedure" and even
though, as Justice Frankfurter recognized, such Rules would be
valid if enacted by Congress. 723 But the Court's explanation of
the way in which that problem is obviated raises more questions
than it answers. For it suggests the invalidity of Rule 37, to the
extent it authorizes an "invasion of freedom from personal re72
straint" (i.e., arrest) for disregard of any discovery order. 4
by striking these words and adding, after the word "comply," the words "with its
provisions." 312 U.S. 655 (1941). See Commentary, Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.:
Implications of the Supreme Court's Opinion, 4 Fed. R. Serv. 35a.5 (1941).
721 312 U.S. at 14.
722 Id. 18 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
723 See id. 17. At the 1938 Senate Hearings, Mr. Mitchell was asked by Senator
King whether he considered "it procedural to compel a person to submit to a physical
examination." 1938 Senate Hearings, supra note 435, at 9. Mitchell replied:
You cannot compel him, but you can limit his right to maintain his action
in a personal injury suit. That is done everywhere. There are decisions of
the Supreme Court on that question. The rules on that subject are substantially the law. There is nothing new about them. The courts generally
regard that as a procedural matter. Of course, if you are going to say that
every step in a lawsuit that a man has to take in order to gain his rights is
a matter of substantive right, you have nothing left in the way of procedure.
Id. This statement was hardly a fair representation of the law at the time it was
made. See Note, Physical and Mental Examinations of Parties under New Federal
Rule 35(a), 34 ILL. L. RFv. 103, 104-05 (1939).
72 4
Mr. Mitchell's amicus curiae brief included excerpts from the proceedings
of the Advisory Committee at which the predecessors of Rules 35 and 37 were discussed. Mitchell himself had doubts about the constitutionality of forcing a person
"to exhibit his person." Brief of William D. Mitchell as Amicus Curiae at 29. Mr.
Lemann noted that constitutional questions bad also been raised about sentencing a
person for contempt who refused "to produce the automobile or some other thing
which he considers his own business." Mitchell suggested that "[plerhaps you are
making a distinction between an automobile and a man." Mr. Wickersham observed:
"A good many automobiles are worth more than some men." Id.; see also id. 32-36.
Rule 35 was not the only discovery rule attacked before Congress. See, e.g.,
1938 Senate Hearings, supra note 435, pt. 2, at 28-29 (Rule 34), 30 (Rule 37), 47
(Rule 37). Mrs. Sibbach was at pains to distinguish the other discovery rules on
the ground that they reflected remedies at least some of which were available prior
to trial in equity, and related to matters provable at trial, whereas prior to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "a court could not compel a litigant to expose his
body at the trial for examination either by the jury or by medical experts." Brief
in Support of Petition for Certiorari at 45.
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d. Rules 35 and 37 Analyzed in the Light of the Pre-1934 History
Unlike the aspects of provisional and final remedies that were
of most concern to Cummins and the 1926 Senate Judiciary Committee, Rule 35 cannot easily be equated with rules of substantive
law in its effect on person or property. For the latter are distinctive precisely in their effects on out-of-court conduct.725 Viewed
in isolation, Rule 35 not only speaks to, but it regulates conduct
only in, the context of a lawsuit, in much the same way as the
other discovery rules. Similarly, viewed apart from the question
of sanctions, a Rule regarding physical or mental examination
will have no more predictable or identifiable effect on rights recognized under the substantive law than any Rule regarding discovery.726 Finally, interests in privacy are implicated in connection with other discovery Rules, and in 1941 there was little basis
727
in constitutional decisions to recognize or distinguish them.
One is forced back to the question of sanctions. It was apparently the coercive nature of provisional and final remedies, and
the predictable and identifiable effect that choices in those areas
would have on person or property, that prompted their characterization as substantive in the 1926 Senate Report. Cannot the
same be said of orders imposing sanctions, or at least of arrest
orders, whether for violation of an order to submit to a physical
examination or of any other discovery order, and should we not
therefore conclude that rulemaking in the area is forbidden? 728
725
72

See supra text accompanying notes 512-13.

6In a sense it is true that every procedural rule has consequences of a
substantive nature, for every such rule may affect the outcome in some
cases, and some of them are deliberately intended to alter the outcome in
many cases. When the discovery rules were adopted in 1938 they were
expected to "make a trial less a game of blindman's bluff and more a fair
contest." This presupposed that they would change the results in many
cases. Every lawyer can think of cases that he won only because of what
he learned from discovery--or that he lost only because his opponent had
access to discovery. Yet I have no doubt that the adoption of these rules
was a valid exercise of the rulemaking power. Although they affect the
outcome of cases, they do so in a quite unpredictable fashion, and do not
help or hurt any particular identifiable class of litigants.
Wright, supra note 20, at 570-71 (footnote omitted).
72 7
See C. GuNTHr,
CASES AND MATMUAXS ON CoNsnrovoNA.L LAW 570-73
(10th ed. 1980); see also Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 17 (Frankfurter, J.,dissenting).
But see supra note 724. On developing constitutional norms, see infra note 759.
28
7
Certainly, as in all areas covered by the Federal Rules, Congress has the
power to override a Federal Rule with respect to sanctions, and it has done so. See
Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, Title II, § 205(a), 94 Stat. 2330 (repealing FFD. R. Crv. P. 37(f)); 4A MooRE, supra note 41, 1137.07. Whatever the irreducible inherent judicial power in this area, see, e.g., Frankfurter & Landis, supra
note 2, it does not include supervisory court rules. See supra note 455.
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A Federal Rule requiring a federal court to find a litigant in contempt for violation of an order would raise serious questions of
power. But that is not what Rule 37 did at the time Sibbach was
decided nor what it does today. Instead, the Rule leaves it to the
discretion of the court to pick from among a variety of sanctions,
only partially enumerated, as the facts of the case may warrant.
At least to the extent the Rule does no more than enumerate
sanctions that might have been imposed by a federal court prior
to 1938, the Rule, since it makes no choices, is unexceptionable. 7 9
The Supreme Court may have recognized in Sibbach, as a
member of the Advisory Committee had suggested previously,
that the Act should not be read to authorize rulemaking with respect to matters "which constitute direct interference with personal liberty or control over property." 730 By adducing Rule 37
in support of its holding, however, the Court in fact cast a greater
shadow over the Rules than Sibbach intended. Her argument
was limited to Rule 35. It was rejected, as it should have been,
but for the wrong reasons. In the absence of an identifiable deprivation of personal liberty, Mrs. Sibbach could not equate Rule
35 with those matters deemed substantive, quite apart from existing legal sources, in the pre-1934 legislative history. Her rights
under the substantive law were not implicated in any identifiable
way. Her argument that the "right" she claimed was protected
because it was substantial, or important, or involved questions of
legislative policy, missed the mark because it failed to make a persuasive case that hers was an interest specifically protected by the
Constitution, which the pre-1934 history of the Act suggests as
the guide on such questions. 3 1
729 In that respect, Rule 37 should be compared with Rules 6(b) and 60(b),
which grant discretion to relieve the parties from effects of Rules regarding time
limitations after an action has been commenced and judgments entered without
notice, that might otherwise be proscribed under the Act. See supra notes 607 & 666.
All of these Rules preserve for the federal courts a distinctive feature of the common
law method, flexibility to adjust the law applied to the facts of an individual case.
Cf. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 125 (1968)
("Rule 19(b), which the court of appeals dismissed as an ineffective attempt to
change the substantive rights stated in Shields, is, on the contrary, a valid statement
of the criteria for determining whether to proceed or dismiss in the forced absence
of an interested person. It takes, for aught that now appears, adequate account of
the very real, very substantive claims to fairness on the part of outsiders that may
arise in some cases.").
730
Sunderland, supra note 166, at 406. But see supra notes 537-38.
7 31
The 1915 New York Report, the source for a good deal of the analysis in
the 1926 Senate Report, included in the proposed Civil Practice Rules a Rule (238)
with respect to physical examinations in personal injury actions. 1 1915 NEw Yoax

rPoRT, supra note 175, at 103.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Just as it is regrettable that the pre-1934 history of the Rules
Enabling Act has been neglected, so it would be foolish to accord that history decisive significance in the Act's interpretation.
Numerous considerations arising from events before and after 1934
affect the weight that properly can be attributed to the Act's
antecedent period of travail. They do not, however, deprive it
of relevance. Only the basic purposes of the legislation, and in
particular of the procedure/substance dichotomy, as well as the
answers to a few specific questions, are revealed with clarity. The
rest is adumbration. For one who seeks light, shadows are preferable to darkness. Since the information to be gleaned from the
period is rarely without ambiguity, it will remain possible for reasonable people to disagree about the solution under the Act, interpreted in the light of its history, of some of the problems of
validity discussed in this Article as well as some others not addressed here. Moreover, it will remain possible for reasonable
people to disagree about the appropriateness in 1982 of limitations
on court rulemaking formulated more than fifty years ago. It
should not remain possible, however, for anyone to approach the
Act as if it sprang in full flower from the head of Homer Cummings in 1934, or as if it had become law in 1938.
Many aspects of, and many questions emerging from, the pre1934 history of the Rules Enabling Act require further study.
It suffices to mention two.
Although I have set forth as full an account of the history
as appears relevant for interpretation, that account lacks important
dimensions without which our understanding of the movement
for uniform federal procedure is incomplete. The movement
should be studied from the perspective of the legal and political
philosophies of its supporters and opponents; it should be set in
72
the broader social context in which it occurred. 3
I have alluded to but not systematically addressed the question whether, in using as their guide to the allocation of power
between the Supreme Court and Congress standards proposed for
a state, New York, with a history of procedural regulation quite
different from that in the federal system,73 3 the supporters of the
7 32

See Fish, William Howard Taft and Charles Evans Hughes: Conservative
Politicians as Chief Judicial Reformers, 1975 Sup'. CT. REv. 123, 136-38; Subrin,
supra note 410, at 1651. Professor Subrin is presently at work on a book that may
well fill this need.
733 For the New York history, see supra notes 92, 117 & 134; supra text accompanying notes 144, 180 & 480. The 1915 New York Report was subsequently
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uniform federal procedure bill ensured that those standards would
be ignored. This question is of particular interest to the extent
that the standards of allocation derived here from the pre-1934
history of the Act are thought to confine the Court's rulemaking
either more than prior authorizations to fashion Equity Rules or
more than, as a normative proposition, is appropriate. An answer
to it should take account of the lack of attention paid to section 2
of the Cummins bill in congressional hearings and reports in the
1920's. 734 Moreover, the lessons of comparative law should make
us wary of a hasty conclusion that the supporters' choice of a
model doomed their effort to confusion. For "usually legal rules
are not peculiarly devised for the particular society in which they
now operate and ... this is not a matter of great concern." 735
Much also remains to be done with the work of the original
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. My research has focused on
the narrow issue of the Committee's interpretation of the Act's
procedure/substance dichotomy. The approach has been largely
doctrinal. Now that the accessibility of most of the papers and
correspondence of the Committee is public knowledge, we can
hope for research that will further elucidate the issue I have identified and that will more generally explore the assumptions and
predilections of the rulemakers.7 3 6 Ultimately, we may be able to
penetrate and discipline the dogmas that have marked debate about
court rulemaking. We may also be able to make informed conclusions-the literature reviewed for this article is suggestive and
disturbing-about legal scholarship in the aid of reform. 737 The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were a remarkable achievement,
but we know very little about their creation.
Some of the dogmas are, however, inescapable even in a preliminary effort like this. For they are likely to shape our responses
to the central question posed by this article-the practical use that
rejected, in part because some of the rules of court it proposed "pertain[ed] to jurisdiction, to due process of law, or conferr[ed] rights and privileges which should not
be entrusted to the judgment of any court." 1919 Nxw Yoan REPORT, supra note
175, at 21; see supra note 673. For the federal history, see supra text accompanying
notes 83-113. Other questions raised by the borrowing are discussed. See supra
text accompanying notes 502-13.
734 See supra notes 276, 297, 317 & 350; supra text accompanying notes 641-59.
735 A. WATSONq, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 96 (1974).
Moreover, there is evidence
in the 1926 Senate Report that the New York model was altered to suit the perceived
needs of the federal system. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 477; supra
note 518.
736
See supra note 732.
737 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 532-41; see also G. HAzARD, RESEARCH IN CIvM PRocEDURn

13-16, 93-98 (1963).
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can and should be made today of our knowledge of the Rules Enabling Act's history and of the work of the original Advisory
Committee.
That the primary limitation imposed by the Act was intended
to allocate lawmaking power between the Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress and did not have any independent federalism
purpose is at once the most demonstrable lesson of the pre-1934
history and the lesson that is most difficult to accept. Forty years
of Supreme Court decisions and academic commentary have reversed this plan, with the result that federalism has loomed large,
and allocation of powers between federal institutions hardly at all,
in the discussion of Federal Rules. The Court's answer in Hanna
v. Plumer to its previous hypersensitivity regarding the displacement of state law was to assimilate diversity to federal question
cases. Because the Court had never acknowledged meaningful
limitations on its rulemaking power in the latter, however, we were
left with few limitations at all. So strong has this interpretive
tradition been that even where concern about allocation of federal
powers indisputably animated the congressional response to the
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court observed only con38
cern about federalism.7
Simply because federalism was not perceived as a discrete
concern by those, including those in Congress, who supported the
uniform federal procedure bill does not mean, of course, that it
would not be properly a matter of attention if the Act were reinterpreted or if it were replaced. But although the Hanna Court
reversed the original legislative priorities, it was surely correct in
refusing to embrace two standards of validity for Federal Rules.
Even when viewed apart from the pre-1934 history, an interpretive
construct like the one suggested by Professor Ely appears Solomonesque: it is better to have Federal Rules valid in some cases,
including some diversity cases, than not valid at all. But the
premise is disputable, and the construct, if only for practical reasons, renders illusory the goal of prospective allocation. Every738Compare Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) with H.R. REP.
No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1973) (separate views of Rep. Holtzman)
[hereinafter cited as 1973 HousE REPORT] and 120 CONG. REc. 1420-21, 2391-92
(1974). The comparison suggests that the Court was in error when it stated that
the requirement of congressional approval of privilege amendments in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2076 "was enacted principally to insure that state rules of privilege would apply
in diversity jurisdiction cases unless Congress authorized otherwise." Trammel, 445
U.S. at 47 n.8. See also Westen & Lehman, supra note 30, at 363 n.154. Again,
however, such is the effect of the requirement, which was promoted on the view
that "[rlules creating, abolishing or limiting privileges are legislative." 1973 HousE
REPOnT, supra, at 29 (separate views of Rep. Holtzman).
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body knows that "procedure" and "substance" are elusive words
that must be approached in context, and that there can be no one,
indeed any, bright line to mark off their respective preserves. But
the context of Federal Rules includes all the civil litigation in the
federal courts, and neither uniformity nor simplicity is well served
by a rulemaking charter that sanctions Federal Rules valid in one
state and not in another, here today, gone tomorrow.7 39
Those who gave detailed consideration to the Cummins bill
evidently believed that federalism values would receive adequate
protection through interpretive standards designed to allocate
power between the Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress. 40
The theoretical support for that view has been noted, as has the
importance to its realization of the formulation and manner of
implementation of standards. 741 If the standards derived here
from the pre-1934 history fail to satisfy, the explanation is close at
hand. The supporters of the uniform federal procedure bill were
ultimately forced by Senator Walsh's strategy of opposition to confront the implications of the Cummins bill's limitations with more
than Thomas Shelton's platitudes. They failed, however, to articulate fully and consistently the standards envisioned. Few if any
of those individuals were imbued with the Realists' counsel to
think functionally. Moreover, the difficulty and essentially reactive nature of the enterprise shaped its content.
In recognizing the interdependence of procedure and substance, however, it is not necessary, although it may be convenient,
to reject the utility of any attempt to develop rules or standards
of classification for court rulemaking purposes. It is necessary to
accept the fact that allocation rules, like other legal rules, will not
appropriately adjust the competing policies and interests in all of
the cases to which they are applied. We should, of course, be
alert to the dangers of labels. We should question whether formalism exacts too heavy a price when the question is who should
decide. But we should not continue to hide behind the dangers
7 42
while pretending to perform a task mandated by Congress.
739 In one sense, Professor Ely's interpretive construct, see supra notes 495-96
& 510, is like the incorporation principle. See supra text accompanying notes 577-

611. His method, however, has the effect of retroactively validating a Federal Rule
that incorporates in its substantive aspects state, not federal, law.
740 The pre-1934 materials do not speak to the problem of federal common law.
See supra note 447.
741
See supra text accompanying notes 506-07.
742 Of course, nowhere in the Act or in its legislative history did Congress require the rulemakers to proceed by general definition. The question is whether the
costs of generalization exceed its benefits. See infra text accompanying notes 764-
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For one conversant with the meager literature on the Act
that is not preoccupied with federalism, the allocation standard
most clearly suggested by the 1926 Senate Report will be familiar.
A number of commentators have argued that impact on rights
claimed under the substantive law is or should be a central concern under the Act. 743 They have recognized that such impact is
pervasive in a procedural system and, in an effort to implement
the concern without sapping the Act's grant of authority, have
fastened on predictability or identifiability of impact as a standard
of allocation. 744 That those who do not harbor a "mistaken extreme analytical idea of the separation of powers" 745 share this
concern with the supporters of the uniform federal procedure
bill should not come as a surprise. In this post-Erie age, it should
be more insistent than ever. Moreover, to the extent one acknowledges inhibitions on the development of federal common law746
and does not equate court rulemaking under the Act with legislation, 747 the concern cannot be confined to cases in which state
law furnishes the rule of decision.
The pre-1934 history also suggests a concern about court rulemaking in areas where choices, even if not having a predictable
and identifiable effect on rights claimed under the substantive law,
83. In that regard, it is worthwhile to consider the alternatives. The ABA's Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration, having concluded that the "interconnections [between procedure and substance] make it impossible to define the
scope of the rule-making power in precise and enduring terms," suggests working
out the proper boundaries "by processes that go beyond strict legal definition."
In fact,
STANDADMS RELATInG TO CoUR ORG. § 1.31, commentary at 75 (1974).
however, there is no evidence of any attempt at definition, except as the "process"
of "reference to legal tradition and precedent" or "[d]ue recognition of historical
categorizations" may be so characterized. See id. In resorting to historical categorizations in connection with the Act, does one rely on the pre-1934 history or on
the post-1934 history? Note that a choice of the latter is a choice in derogation of
the process recommended by the ABA Commission. As for the only other alternative
to general definition proposed by the Commission, "one form or another of consultation and joint deliberation," id., see infra text accompanying note 779.
Professor Hazard has reminded us that "a rule, to have cognitive and normative
significance as such, must have an important degree of determinative content to the
group to whom it is addressed." G. HAZArd, supra note 737, at 9; see also id. 8-11.
743 See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 13, at 56-64, quoted in part supra text accompanying note 515; Wright, supra note 20, at 569-71, quoted in part supra note 726.
Cf. Landers, supra note 31, at 855-61 (remedial provisions that should be left to
legislative regulation). Professor Clinton notes that this concern has been shared by
individual Justices in dissenting from the promulgation of Federal Rules. See
Clinton, supra note 13, at 61.
744 See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 13, at 56-64; Wright, supra note 20, at 569-71.
745
Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HAv. L. REv.
28, 33 (1952).
746 See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
747
See Lesnick, supra note 12, at 582-83. Compare Degnan, supra note 22, at
288-89 with Mishkin, supra note 82, at 1687-88.
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will create rights having a similar effect on person or property. It
is not clear whether in this aspect the 1926 Senate Report was
intended to reflect a more general view about the distinctive features of substantive law. 748 In any event, the recent literature on
court rulemaking and the Federal Rules of Evidence experience
suggest that the limitation, at least if confined by the specific examples illustrating it in the Senate Report, is too narrow when
considered from either an allocation of powers or a federalism
perspective.7 49 Perhaps if the supporters of the uniform federal
procedure bill had not categorically excluded court rules regulating the admissibility of evidence from the grant of authority, an
exclusion that was patently overbroad, the problem would have
been addressed. Certainly it is insistently presented in the area
of privileges. Indeed, there is language in the 1926 Senate Report
that, if not limited by specific examples and explanations, suggests
a broader standard. Thus, if lawmaking in an area necessarily
involves the consideration of public policy-policies extrinsic to
the process of litigation-the choices in that area are for Congress. 75o The kinship of this formulation with that proposed by
Professor Ely should be obvious.75 1 So should the differences.
74 8

See supra text accompanying notes 487 & 501-02.
See, e.g., Ely, supra note 3, at 718-40; Landers, supra note 31, at 855-61;
Clinton, supra note 13, at 56-64; see also supra note 738.
750 It is also urged by opponents of the bill that... rules might be framed
which would deal with substantial rights and remedies in a manner contrary to the public policy of the several States embodied in local statutory
749

law.

[The matters raised by Senator Walsh] are matters involving
substantive legal and remedial rights affected by the considerations of
public policy.... They involve the policy of the law which varies in the
different States and are and always have been regulated by legislative act.
1926 SENATE REPORT, supra note 297, at 9. See also the reference to "legislative
policy" in 1914 HousE REPORT, supra note 166, at 15, quoted supra note 168; supra
note 329.
At the 1938 Senate Hearings, Edgar B. Tolman, the Secretary of the Advisory
Committee, observed:
I am convinced that when a procedural provision lays down a rule of
human conduct, when it constitutes a declaration of public policy, it may
be both procedural and substantive law. Take for example, the statutes
which limit the right of a wife to testify against her husband or the right
of a husband to testify against his wife-that is a question of such public
importance that I believe, although it is procedural, the legislature has a
right to legislate upon it.
1938 House Hearings,supra note 435, at 131.
Tolman was alone in suggesting to Congress a lack of legislative power in any
of the areas covered by Federal Rules. See supra note 461.
751 See Ely, supra note 3, at 722-27; supra notes 495-96 & 510. Note that,
passing Ely's federalism rationale, one need not follow him in suggesting a definition
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The standard suggested here is not restricted to diversity cases.
Nor does it depend upon a particularistic and after-the-fact inquiry
into policies animating competing legal prescriptions. Therefore,
it would not lead to the invalidation of Federal Rules in the face
of non-obvious state (or federal) policies. It is, in other words, a
standard for allocating federal decision-making, not a standard for
7 52
protecting some, and only some, policy choices already made.
A major objection to a standard of this sort-that it would
lead to an unfortunate and inefficient division of labor, substituting politics for procedural expertise 7 53-perhaps affected the scope
of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. That experience,
quite apart from Congress's response, raises the question whether
the objection should prevail. Legal rules always represent choices
among conflicting policies. It is well and good to uphold the constitutional power of Congress to "regulate matters which, though
falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either." 754 But
there is reason to fear that, if the rulemakers are left to make
choices in such areas, and whatever the purpose of the dichotomy,
they will choose to advance those policies that are their special
of "substance" more expansive than that formulated by Hart and Wechsler and
espoused by Justice Harlan, see Ely, supra note 3, at 725-26, if a limitation on rulemaking in areas where choices will have a predictable and identifiable effect on
rights claimed under the substantive law is accepted.
Professor Landers' admirable attempt to formulate a functional test for the
Act's dichotomy recognizes that "[a]lso within the legislative sphere are matters
bearing significantly on private primary conduct such as rules which have the effect
of telling people what to do or what not to do." Landers, supra note 31, at 856
(footnote omitted). He also suggests as appropriate for legislative regulation
"matters which are the subject of widespread public controversy, as differentiated
from controversy solely among lawyers," id. 857 (footnote omitted), and, unnecessarily it would seem, analyzes privileges under that rubric. See infra note 758.
752
See supra text accompanying notes 489-501 & 674-75. This standard would,
however, require the rulemakers fully and fairly to canvass the policies that reasonably could be thought to compete for recognition in a given area. Obviously, they
would usually be guided in that enterprise by lawmaking that had already occurred.
But see supra note 490. If rulemaking with respect to a given matter could not
fairly be said to implicate policies extrinsic to the litigation process, the fact that
the rulemakers had disregarded, or a state legislature or court had subsequently
passed or announced, an unusual competing rule reflecting such policies, should not
vitiate the enterprise.
The 1926 Senate Report suggests the interpretive relevance of experience under
state rulemaking arrangements. See supra note 523. The standard suggested here
would require a broader familiarity with state and federal law. But it would not
permit the invalidation of Federal Rules because of competing legal prescriptions
that unpredictably advanced substantive policies.
753
See, e.g., Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 19, at 14-24, 37-41.
754

Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).
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province and to subordinate those that are not. 55 To say Congress is likely to evince a similar bias in the other direction is not
an answer, whether the concern is allocation of powers or federalism7 56
Perhaps the most difficult matter touched upon in the pre-1934
history is rulemaking where constitutional interests are implicated.
There is reason to dismiss the 1926 Senate Report as simply reactive on this aspect 57 And yet none of the other allocation

standards derived from the Report or suggested here would reach
the situation, and constitutional interests that are procedural in
one sense were of concern in connection with the Criminal Rules
Enabling ActJ 58 Moreover, as an original proposition, one must
doubt the wisdom of a court making decisions affecting constitutionally recognized interests through a process other than adjudication. 59 The concern is greatest in criminal cases, which are beyond the scope of this article. But the problem deserves further
attention, and it is an area in which what I have called the in7 60
corporation principle may play a major role.
755 See, e.g., Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 501 advisory committee note (justifying
the proposed displacement of state privilege law by, among other things, depreciating
its "substantive aspect" and asserting a federal interest "in the quality of judicial
administration").
75 Moreover, notwithstanding Congress's recent penchant for exercising its preeffectiveness power of review under the Act, see supra text accompanying note 4,
one may doubt the efficacy of that mechanism in general to meet objections
grounded in democratic theory, see Mishkin, supra note 82, at 1687-88, to say
of its efficiency for the future. See also infra text accompanying note 764.
nothing
757
See supra note 488.
758
See supra text accompanying note 664. Professor Clinton, supra note 13,
at 60-61, recognized the problem in the context of federal post-conviction relief.
759 See supra text accompanying note 515; supra note 668. It is doubtful that
a standard allocating to Congress "matters which are the subject of widespread
public controversy, as distinguished from controversy solely among lawyers," advocated by Professor Landers, see supra note 750, can now, if it ever could, function
as a legal, let alone a constitutional, standard, rather than a counsel of caution.
But see 1938 House Hearings, supra note 435, at 25 (statement of W.D. Mitchell),
quoted supra note 577; 125 Coc. REc. 6375 (1979) (remarks of Rep. Drinan);
cf. Cewirtz, supra note 464, at 62-63, 77-78 (arguing that such a standard is not
unusual and can be applied by the courts for purposes of constitutional analysis and
Interests specifically recognized in the Constitution,
statutory interpretation).
interpreted to meet the developing needs and aspirations of society, might, however,
serve as an index of perceived public importance. Cf. supra text accompanying
727.
note 760
0n the incorporation principle generally, see supra text accompanying
notes 577-611; see also supra notes 515 & 668. To the extent the rulemakers are
faithful in incorporating in Federal Rules procedural law announced in the constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court, most of the problems associated with the
technique are avoided. Federal law is supreme, and the Court is the final arbiter.
But the problem of changing a Federal Rule originally incorporating a constitutional decision, where change may affect the constitutional right in question, cf.
supra text accompanying notes 606-10 (federal statutes incorporated), remains.
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Finally in this aspect, it bears repeating that all of the allocation standards derived here from the pre-1934 history have to do
with lawmaking choices. To the extent that a Federal Rule makes
no choices or makes a choice the consequences of which are defeasible by operation of another Federal Rule, the argument for
invalidity under those standards appears to be weakened considerably.70 1 This perception, if it is accurate, may advance an inquiry into the sense of a distinction as to power between court
rulemaking and adjudication in federal question cases.7 6 2 At some

point it may also call into question the sense of a distinction as to
power between court rulemaking and adjudication in diversity
cases3 63
What more, then, if anything, should be done to address the
widespread concern about rulemaking under the Act? As noted
at the outset, most suggestions for reform have concentrated on
process. In this, would-be reformers have followed, often without
acknowledging it,764 the path of administrative law.76 5

Both the

enduring constitutional framework of federal court rulemaking and
the history of the uniform federal procedure bill indicate the aptness of the analogy. 7 66 Indeed, explicit attention to the similarities
of, as well as the differences between, the two contexts may well
be useful if there is to be further reform.7 67 Undoubtedly this
761

See supra notes 607 & 666; supra note 729 and accompanying text.
supra text accompanying notes 600-01 & 630-32 (incorporation of
federal common law).
763 Consider FED. R. Civ. P. 83, the last sentence of which provides: "In all
cases not provided for by rule, the district courts may regulate their practice in
any manner not inconsistent with these rules." When the question is whether
competing state law is to be displaced, surely a common law rule of the sort Rule 83
purports to authorize cannot be tested, or tested only, under the standards for
validity under the Act set forth in Sibbach or Hanna. See supra text accompanying notes 57-82. Perhaps the answer is that this provision of Rule 83, indeed all
of Rule 83, is invalid, because the Act authorizes only "general rules." As to local
court rules, 28 U.S.C. § 2071 fills the gap (requiring, however, that the rules be
consistent with Acts of Congress as well as with the Federal Rules). In any event,
to the extent there is movement towards less general Federal Rules that avoid
choices, see Subrin, supra note 410, Hanna's dichotomy, whatever its other defects,
will demand reexamination. Cf. Ilro Prod. Ltd. v. MusicFair Enterprises, Inc., 94
F.R.D. 76, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (local rule).
764
But see, e.g., J. WkEIrN, supra note 3, at 92-96.
765 See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HAnv.
L. REv. 1669 (1975); see also 1 K. DAvis, supra note 453, § 3.15; Nathanson,
Separation of Powers and Administrative Law: Delegation, the Legislative Veto,
and the "Independent" Agencies, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1064, 1075-78 (1981).
766 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 452-82.
767 As an obvious example, the problem of the legislative veto, which is the
central concern of Professor Nathanson, supra note 765, is presented in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2076, which purports to permit either house of Congress by resolution to dis762 Cf.
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article will be greeted by many with the same skepticism as attempts to resuscitate the non-delegation doctrine in administrative
769
law have been received 65 But such attempts are persistent.
And in any event, they are not the only proposals to transcend
process. One proposal, advanced by Professor Davis, seems of particular interest in the context of federal court rulemaking. He
suggests "[s]hifting the non-delegation doctrine to a judiciallyenforced requirement that administrators must do what they reasonably can do to develop and to make known the needed
confinements of their discretionary power through standards, principles, and rules, as well as to structure their power through procedural safeguards." 770
To one who is not a cynic, it must be a wonder that the
original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure survived challenges intact. '7 1 For acknowledging the extraordinary abilities and dedicated service of the original Advisory Committee, it appears from
published and unpublished sources that the Committee proceeded
without attempting to formulate a coherent and consistent view
of the limitations imposed on their enterprise by the Act's procedure/substance dichotomy. 72 The research for this article has
not revealed any evidence that there was a change in this regard
in later years, although after the Court's decision in Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., a change might have been thought unnecessary.773
approve any amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence and thereby prevent it

from taking effect. See also McGowan, Congress, Court and Control of Delegated
Power, 77 CoLTrm. L. REv. 1119, 1133 (1977). On the other hand, a mainstay of
control of agency action, judicial review, has been impotent in connection with
rulemaking under the Act. See supra text accompanying note 704.
768 See, e.g., 1 K. DAvis, supra note 453, §§ 3.1-.8, 3.13; Stewart, supra note
765, at 1693-97.
769 See, e.g., S. BARBER, supra note 450; Freedman, supra note 450; Gewirtz,
supra note 464.
770 1 K. DAvis, supra note 453, § 3.15, at 214-15. An earlier version of Davis'
proposal is criticized in Cewirtz, supra note 464, at 53. See also S. BARBER, supra
note 450, at 135 n.70; Stewart, supra note 765, at 1698-1702. Note that one basis
for criticism, that Davis' approach does not "permit the courts to play their full
role in checking administrative abuses," Gewirtz, supra note 464, at 53, is, at least
historically, irrelevant in this context. See supra note 767. Moreover, the proposal is admittedly advanced as an alternative to the polar extremes of Sibbach and
Hanna on the one hand and an attempt by Congress to prescribe detailed standards
for federal court rulemaking on the other. It is the nature of compromises not to
partake of theoretical purity.
771 But see supra text accompanying note 543.
772 See supra text accompanying notes 529-43.
773 See, e.g., supra notes 435 & 607-08. It should be noted that the author's
examination of the working papers and correspondence of the Advisory Committee
was essentially confined to the papers concerning the original Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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Now that Sibbach and lanna have been called seriously into
question, and as an alternative to new legislation attempting to
define with greater precision limitations on Supreme Court rulemaking,7 74 the Judicial Conference should consider the formulation of standards or guidelines delineating the proper spheres of
activity of its Rules Committees.7 75 The Conference's Standing
Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure is already at
work on a formal statement of rulemaking procedures. 77 Procedural safeguards are, to be sure, a useful antidote to overreaching,
and they are perhaps the most important aspect of Professor Davis'
proposal. Unless there is consensus about the limits of the rulemaking function, however, it is doubtful that all the procedural
safeguards in the world will prevent controversy where it countsin Congress-because the rulemakers' reaction to controversy in
the lawmaking process will necessarily continue to be ad hoc. The
costs of congressional controversy to the Supreme Court as an institution are not the only concern, 77 7 and the Court may not
774 I do not foreclose the possibility that the Court may feel called to reexamine
the premises, see, e.g., supra note 605, or the potential, see supra notes 59 & 71,
of these cases.
77528 U.S.C. § 331 (1976) requires the Conference to "carry on a continuous
study of the operation and effect of the general rules of practice and procedure
now or hereafter in use as prescribed by the Supreme Court for the other courts
of the United States pursuant to law." In 1978, the Conference approved in
principle "the revision of Rule 23(b)(3) . . . by direct legislative enactment,
rather than by the rule-making authority, reserving for further consideration the
merits of any specific statutory proposals and the appropriateness of dealing with
specific aspects of such proposals through the rule-making authority." Report of
the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 33 (March 9 and
10, 1978).
The proposal in the text assumes no basic change in the existing rulemaking
structure. It would meet a need, however, no matter what changes in structure
are made, so long as Congress does not itself define limitations on rulemaking or
undertake routinely and affirmatively to approve all Federal Rules, as suggested by
Clinton, supra note 13, at 62.
The proposal would, however, permit the rulemakers to make recommendations
for legislation regarding matters that have been identified as falling beyond the
rulemaking power. Indeed, there is much to be said for a procedure that would
permit the submission to Congress of all provisions in the area of procedure, broadly
defined, that are thought to be needed, divided into two groups: those subject to
congressional review and those requiring congressional approval. See supra text
accompanying note 744; cf. Watson, Two-Tier Law-A New Approach to LawMaking, 27 I 'L & Coaw. L.Q. 552 (1978). Professor Watson's proposal, chiefly
of interest for civil law systems, nevertheless contains much that is of interest for
this country. In that regard, the considerations that prompt him to suggest a
differen% reduced, role for his "interpretative committee" in public law matters,
id. 566-68, are those which point to an enhanced role for the rulemakers in the
area of procedure narrowly defined.
776
See supra note 17.

777 See J. WswsrmN, supra note 3, at 101-02.
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remain a part of the process much longer. 778 In recent years, the
congressional review mechanism has proved inefficient. More
basically, that mechanism is an imperfect instrument for the protection of rights and interests far removed from the domain of
7 79
procedural expertise.
There are risks in such an endeavor, including primarily that
it will highlight questions of institutional legitimacy that the
rulemakers would prefer to submerge. To be effective, an attempt
to define limits must include an opportunity for public participation, and the question will arise whether the standards or guidelines should be reviewed by the Supreme Court and also by
Congress. To some extent, the answer to that question may depend on whether the existing structure continues or is replaced
by one of the alternatives that has been suggested or by some
other.7 8 0 Under the present scheme, since it is inconceivable that
limitations articulated by the Conference would violate existing
interpretations of the Act, there is no strong argument for, and
there may be arguments against, formal Supreme Court review
prior to implementation. 78 ' In light of some of the reasons for
dissatisfaction with current interpretations of the Act, congres77 8

779

See

supra note 16.

See supra note 747. "Even though section 2072 of title 28 provides that
rules must not affect substantive rights, as a practical matter little opportunity is
available for Congress to act upon a proposed rule that might infringe upon this
requirement." S. REP. No. 1406, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966).
Those who see in the Act's congressional review mechanism an adequate safeguard against overreaching by the rulemakers should ponder the striking inattention to § 2, and hence to that mechanism, in the pre-1934 legislative history.
See supra text accompanying note 658; c. Garvey, supra note 468, at 47 (judicial
tolerance of broad delegations in the progressive era cannot be explained by
notions of "agency expertise or interest group liberalism" which "belong to a later
period").
780 For proposals as to structural alternatives, see V. BnowN, supra note 14, at
77-86, 108-15. Compare with the commission suggested by Professor Lesnick,
supra note 12, at 582-83, Chief Justice Taft's 1922 proposal, quoted supra text
accompanying note 246.
781 The arguments against Supreme Court review of standards or guidelines are
variations of an argument against the Court's promulgation of Federal Rules. 'The
most frequent and serious argument against the role of the Supreme Court is that
promulgation interferes with objective consideration of the validity of the rules in
litigated cases." W. BRowN, supra note 14, at 75. Whether or not one agrees
with that argument, see id. 77; Hazard, supra note 13, at 1289-90, the Supreme
Court's decisions interpreting the Act may be thought reason enough not formally
to involve the Court in the stultifying exercise of repudiating them prospectively.
In addition, unless one fears that standards or guidelines approved by the Conference would go too far in the other direction, it is not clear that the speculative
benefit of Court review would outweigh the speculative cost of loss of objectivity
if the Court were ever to repudiate Sibbach and Hanna and a standard or guideline
it had approved turned out to be insufficient to prevent overreaching.
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sional review may seem desirable or even politically necessary. It
is to be hoped, however, that Congress, having always the power
to step in, would wait and see the results of this suggested exercise
in self-regulation rather than demand formal participation.
The question for the federal rulemakers in 1982 is whether
ignorance can continue to be "the best of law reformers." 78 2 This
article is not a brief for a return to the notions of institutional
power and competence of another age. Nor is it intended to let
"fine theories or preconceived notions . . . stand in the way of the

advancement of a great public reform." 783 Rather, it is an expression of faith that all forms of lawmaking are well served not only
by procedural safeguards, but also by candor about the admittedly
difficult business of defining institutional limits in a federal
democracy.
782 "Ignorance is the best of law reformers. People are glad to discuss a question on general principles, when they have forgotten the special knowledge necessary
aoN LAw 64 (M. Howe ed.
for technical reasoning." O.W. Horms, Tim Com

1963).
783

1 1915 Nuw YouR

accompanying note 202.

REPORT,

supra note 175, at 177, quoted supra text

